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and with what it shall be charged, it only re confusion has arisen from using the word mains for the courts to give effect to its in a loose manner, at one time in its techprovisions. Admittedly, the language of the nical sense, and at another in its popular section of the Code specifying in what in sense. It is often convenient and proper stances the homestead shall be subject to to speak of the lien of a mortgage or of execution and forced sale does not include the lien of a pledge. Of course, it will often the liens of material men. The language is happen, when the word is used in this sense, in satisfaction of judgments 'on debts se that the description of the lien shows that cured by mechanics', laborers', or vendors' the word is used merely to denote the charge liens upon the premises.' The chapter of the or incumbrance of a mortgage, pledge, atCode of Civil Procedure which provides for tachment, or judgment.” Section 2. "A liens of the nature claimed by the plaintiffs mortgage is sometimes inaccurately called a is headed 'Liens of Mechanics and Others lien. 'And so it is,' says Mr. Justice Story, upon Real Property,' and gives to 'mechanics, and something more; it is a transfer of the material men, contractors, subcontractors, property itself as security for the debt. artisans, architects, machinists, builders, This must be admitted to be true at law; miners, and all persons and laborers, of ev and it is equally true in equity, for in this ery class, performing labor upon or furnish respect equity follows the law. It does not ing materials to be used in the construction, consider the estate of the mortgagee as de
a lien,' etc. Code Civil Proc. $ feated and reduced to a mere lien, but it 1183." I do not observe any marked distinc treats it as a trust estate, and, according tion between the California statute and our to the intention of the parties, as a qualified own, nor can I agree that section 328 of our estate and security. When the debt is disCode of Civil Procedure helps the contention charged, there is a resulting trust for the that a pure material man may enforce a lien mortgagor. It is therefore only in a loose against a homestead. Section 323, Code Civil and general sense that it is sometimes called Proc., provides that this homestead exemp a lien, and then only by way of contrast tion shall not affect a laborer's or mechanic's to estate absolute and indefeasible.' lien. I think we all concede that the en Conard y. Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 441." forceability of the laborer's and mechanic's Section 11. I think that the intent of the Lien is intended to be saved by this section, proviso of section 328 was to treat of morteven granting that my construction of the gages, as the language says, and not of the words "laborer" and "mechanic" is correct, material men's liens, which are not menand that those terms are not generic, so as tioned in terms, and which it is not necesto include all material men.
sary to include in the word “mortgage." In Now, it is further suggested that the en this view, the proviso of section 328 looks to forceability of liens, including material the saving of a security created by the act men's, (such as plaintiff herein,) is saved of the party, namely, a mortgage. This by the proviso of section 328, which is as seems wholly just. It is right that the follows: "Provided, that this act shall not debtor should not be relieved from a ecuribe construed as to in any manner relate ty which he had voluntarily created. But to judgments or decrees rendered on the when the statute makes this sort of a decforeclosure of mortgages, either equitable or laration, I do not understand that we must legal.” The construction of this proviso, as also hold that, by the same language by held by part of this court, makes the words which it retains the security of the volun"mortgage, either equitable or legal," in sec tary mortgage, it also intended to re tion 328, to include material men’s liens. I tain the security of the involuntary me cannot satisfy myself that such inclusion chanic's lien, which
operates against was intended. A mortgage is an incum the debtor in invitum, which
the brance placed upon property by the acts of creature of the statute, and not of the debtthe parties, either expressly so intended by The appellant cites us to Windmill Co. the parties or so construed by a court of v. Shay, 32 Neb. 19, 48 N. W. Rep. 896, as equity. On the other hand, the mechanic's holding a view contrary to that which I or laborer's or material man's lien is given entertain. All that is said in that case is by virtue of an express statute. A mort as follows: "Section 3, c. 36, Comp. St., gage is given by the debtor, voluntarily, provides that the homestead is subject to either expressly or by construction of equi- execution of forced sale in satisfaction of ty. A mechanic's or laborer's or material judgments obtained–First, on debts secured man's lien is secured against the debtor by mechanics', laborers', or vendors' liens without his consent. A mortgage has the upon the premises; second, on debts secured characteristic of a lien, in that it is a se by mortgages upon the premises, executed curity upon property. A mechanic's lien is and acknowledged by both husband and also a security on property, but it is not wife or an unmarried claimant.' This sec. obtained by the voluntary act of the debtor. tion makes the homestead liable for a me A mortgage is a lien, and something more. chanic's lien." The matter is thus disposed 1 Jones, Liens, $82, 11. I quote from those of by the Nebraska court in one line of the sections as follows: "The word 'lien' is here opinion. Whatever good reasons that court used in its legal and technical sense. Much I had for its view are not disclosed by the
opinion, which, therefore, does not give me 11 Mont. 263, 28 Pac. Rep. 301. The former any light. The cause of action in the Ne appeal was taken from the entire judgment, braska case was for supplying a windmill. as well as the order denying a new trial. The counsel in the case for the lienor put This court reversed the judgment, set aside their claim upon the ground that it was for the order appealed from, and remanded the both labor and material, and that only pure cause for new trial. At the second trial of material men were excluded by the home the case in the court below the appellant stead exemption. That the claim was for sought, and requested the court, to confine both labor and material does not, however,
the issues to be tried to the first count in the appear in the statement of facts made by complaint; claiming that the judgment of the court, nor in the meager expression of this court on the for ner appeal was limited opinion as to the law. But if the Nebraska to the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain case was, as counsel therein argued, one the verdict of the jury on said first count for material and labor both, then the case and consequently left nothing to be tried but is not in conflict with the views which I the issues under this count. The appellant, suggest; and, if the case was one for ma at the close of the testimony, requested the terial only, all that I can say is that the
court to instruct the jury in this respect as case was not sufficiently reasoned out to
follows: “You are instructed that the only give me any satisfaction. This matter was
issue in controversy in this action is as to suggested in Merrigan v. English, supra, and
the employment of the plaintiff by the de the 70 and 74 Cal. (11 and 16 Pac. Rep.)
feridant subsequent to the 25th day of Occases were called to the attention of the
tober, 1888, and you will exclude from your court. But the court held that those cases
consideration all evidence of the execution of were not in point in Merrigan v. English,
the duebill, and the payment made thereon." and said: "In each of the cases cited, the
The court refused the request of the appelcourt treated the lien as a lien for material
lant, and this action is assigned as error on alone. In the first case cited, the lien, as
this appeal. a matter of fact, was for material only. We
The former appeal of this cause was from do not hold that a material man has such a
the entire judgment, and order of the trial lien as will be valid against a homestead.
court refusing a new trial. This court re
versed the entire judgment, and set aside the That is not the question before us." I am therefore of opinion that the district court
order denying a new trial, and remanded should be sustained in its finding that the
the cause for new trial. This placed the case
in the court below, at the time of the second premises were a homestead, and also in its
trial, in the same condition as if it had never conclusion that a pure material man
been tried at all. The former appeal was not lumberman cannot enforce a lien against a
taken from a part of the judgment rendered homestead.
at the first trial, az might have been done. Code Civil Proc. $ 444, p. 180; Bank v.
Fuqua, 11 Mont. 285, 28 Pac. Rep. 291. MATTOCK V. GOUGHNER.
Everything done in the first trial by the (Supreme Court of Montana. Sept. 5, 1893.) court below was reversed, set aside, and the APPEAL-EFFECT OF REVERSAL-CONFLICTING Ev
whole case remanded for a new trial by this IDENCE.
court on the former appeal. We think the 1. Where appeal is taken from the entire court committed no error in refusing the rejudgment, a general reversal and remand re quest of appellant, complained of here. We quire a new trial of all the issues, as if the
cannot see how the trial court could have case had never been tried. 2. Where the record on appeal from A
done otherwise than try the whole case anew. judgment based on conflicting evidence does The appellant insists that the evidence is not disclose any abuse of judicial discretion
insufficient to sustain the verdict, and claims in overruling the motion for a new trial, the judgment will not be disturbed.
the evidence is substantially the same as on
the former trial, and claims that, as this Appeal from district court, Park county;
court held the evidence insufficient to support Frank Henry, Judge.
the verdict in the former trial, it must do so Action by Getchell L. Mattock against
in this appeal. The respondent claims that Emanuel Gougliner. Plaintiff had judgment,
the evidence is not the same in this as in the from which, and an order denying a new tri
former trial; that other evidence and circumal, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
stances are disclosed in this record, not in For forruer report, see 28 Pac. Rep. 301.
the former, sufficient to authorize and supSavage & Day, for appellant. Allen R. port the verdict; and the record sustains this Joy, for respondent.
position. There is, it must be confessed, a
palpablo conflict in the evidence in this case. PEMBERÄTON, C. J. This is a sult for The jury, we think, would have been justidebt. There are two counts in the com fied in finding for either party. We cannot plaint, the first alleging an indebtedness for say that the evidence is so satisfactory as to labor done and performed. The second is make it clear to our minds that the verdict based on a duebill. This is the second ap should not have been the other way. But it poal of this case. See Mattock v. Goughnour, is the province of the jury, under the law.
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, F. C. Park, for appellant. Arthur J.
bound to do under its contract with appel
lant, surgeons to treat his broken limb; HARWOOD, J., concurs
that these surgeons so carelessly and un
skillfully treated his leg, and were so negDE WITT, J. I concur in the affirmance. ligent in nursing and caring for appellant My views were fully expressed on the former during his sickness, that it became and was appeal. 11 Mont. 265, 28 Pac. Rep. 301. necessary to amputate the leg of appellant
in order to save his life; that the want of skill and ability of said surgeons was known
to the respondent at the time, and unknown JORGENSON V. BUTTE & MONTANA
to appellant; that defendant was guilty of COMMERCIAL CO.
negligence in the employment of said un(Supreme Court of Montana. Sept. 5, 1893.)
skillful laborer to assist appellant in his PRACTICE-Nonsuit-Cross-EXAMINATION.
work on said building, and in the employ1. Plaintiff was injured by a fall while
ment of unskillful and negligent surgeons to employed as a carpenter by defendant, and in an action therefor he alleged that the fall re
treat and nurse him. The appellant testisulted from the incompetency of H., a coserv
fied to the fact of his falling, how it ocant, and that because of the careless and nn
curred, and the result. He attributes his skillful treatment of the wound by a surgeon employed by defendant it was necessary to
fall to the incompetency of Harlander. As amputate plaintiff's leg. The evidence failed to the manner of his treatment by the surto show any lack of skill by H., or the neces geons and nurses, his evidence is unreliable, sity for his exercise of any particular skill, as he admits that a great part of the time or that defendant had knowledge of any incompeteney of H. of which plaintiff was igno
he was unconscious. Besides, his testimony rant. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that does not show any knowledge of these matII. was not working with plaintiff at the time ters. He was manifestly not supported by of his injury, and that plaintiff had stated
the testimony of his other witnesses as to that he alone was to blame; that the surgeon
the material facts in his evidence. Haremployed was duly qualitied, under the laws of the state, to practice his profession; and it lander, the man appellant says was assistfailed to show any injury to the leg, as a re ing him at the time he fell, and to whose sult of a lack of skill. Held, that a nonsuit
incompetency appellant attributes his fall was properly directed. 2. In an action by a servant for personal
and injury, swears he was not helping apinjuries resulting from the incompetency of H., pellant at the time he fell and was injured; a coservant, plaintiff called H. as a witness, that the appellant was working alone at that stating that "the witness would refer to the time and place plaintiff fell, for the purpose of
time. H. L. Smith, another witness for ap. fixing the time and place of other events in pellant, testified as follows: "I talked with connection with the case, and does not wish to him (appellant] about this fall. He said he make the witness his witness as to the acts
slipped and fell, and said nobody was to he was doing at the immediate time of the fall." H. then testified to facts connected
blame for it but himself." The appellant with plaintiff's fall. Held proper to allow H. to
testified that at the time he fell he was be cross-examined as to the entire case.
using a pevee in handling and moving the Appeal from district court, Cascade coun planks. Beecher, a witness for appellant, ty; Charles H. Benton, Judge.
testified that he was a carpenter, at work Action for personal injuries by H. C. Jor on the same building with appellant at the genson against the Butte & Montana Com time he fell; that appellant was using a mercial Company. From a judgment of non pevee; that he considered it safer worksuit directed by the court, plaintiff appeals. ing where appellant was without a pevee; Affirmed
and that the superintendent had given all
the men instructions not to use a pevee | appellant were duly licensed, qualified, and in work like that in which appellant was authorized, under the laws of this state, to engaged. The evidence offered by the appel- practice their profession, and fails to show lant as to the negligence and want of skill that appellant hurt his leg or sustained damof the surgeons who treated him is vague, age as a result of a want of skill or care on and far from being satisfactory. It is true their part in the treatment of his wound. the appellant testified to some apparent neg From this review of the evidence, we are lect and want of care during his sickness. unable to see how the court below conld Smith, a witness for appellant, testified that have done otherwise than to instruct the jury he assisted in taking care of the appellant to find for the defendant, or direct a nonsuit part of the time; talked to him about his on the close of the appellant's testimony. condition; that he did not complain at any On the evidence, we are of opinion that aptime of how he was treated; that there was pellant had shown no right to recover, or no lack of attendance at any time. The that there was any substantial merit in his surgeon who treated him testified to proper treatment and care of appellant. Although Appellant also complains of the action of there is some evidence of unprofessional the court in permitting the cross-examinawitnesses which might be construed into tion of the witness Harlander. Appellant meaning that there was some want of care, placed the witness on the stand, and stated yet on the whole the evidence seems to that "the witness would refer to the time and show that as good care as the circumstances place Mr. Jorgenson fell for the purpose of would admit of was bestowed upon appel- fixing the time and place of other events lant. There is no evidence showing that the in connection with the case, and does not surgeons employed to treat appellant were wish to make the witness his witness as to not skilled and learned in their profession. the acts he was doing at the immediate time All these witnesses were the appellant's wit of the fall.” The witness swore to facts
The defendant offered no evidence, contemporaneous with the fall of the appelbut on the conclusion of the testimony of lant, so closely connected with the main fact fered by appellant moved the trial court that we think there was no error in permitfor an instruction to the jury to render a ting his being cross-examined as to the entire verdict for the defendant. The court gave case, especially as he was the person to whose this instruction, and upon the verdict so want of skill and care the appellant attributes rendered a judgment was entered for the his fall and injury. defendant for costs. From this judgment The appellant also claims that the trial this appeal is brought.
court erred in permitting defendant to amend The principal error complained of is the its answer while the jury was being impanaction of the trial court in directing the jury eled. It does not appear that appellant was to render a verdict for the respondent. This surprised, or in any way injured or inconaction of the court was tantamount to di- venienced, by the amendment. No postponerecting a nonsuit against the appellant for ment or continuance of the cause was renfailure of the proof to sustain the allegations dered necessary thereby, or demanded on of the complaint. McKay v. Railway Co., account thereof, by appellant. We are una(Mont.) 31 Pac. Rep. 999; Creek v. Mc- ble to see how appellant was aggrieved by Manus, (Mont.) 32 Pac. Rep. 675. If there this action of the trial court. was such failure of proof the action of the court was not error. The evidence does not counsel in evidence at the trial, he not being disclose wherein any particular skill was re present. Counsel for appellant did not, for quired on the part of appellant's colaborer some reason, desire to read the whole thereto do the work he was employed in doing, of to the jury. At the request of the deor, if skill was necessary, wherein it was fendant the court required the appellant's not exercised, or, if there was a lack of counsel to read the whole thereof. This is necessary skill, that the defendant had knowl. | urged as error. Without inquiring whether edge thereof, and that appellant was ignorant this was error or not, it is apparent the appelthereof. The evidence offered by plaintiff lant was not injured, as the part of the depotends to show that he contributed to his sition the appellant sought to omit referred to own injury, by disobeying orders not to use the contract for nursing and medical treatthe pevee in the work he was doing. The evi- ment set up in the complaint, and the readdence also tends to show that Harlander, ing thereof to the Jury could not possibly on account of whose incompetency and want damage the appellant. We have been una. of skill appellant claims he was injured, ble to discover any substantial errors in the was not working with appellant at the time rulings and action of the trial court in the he fell. Harlander
swears. Witness trial of this cause. The case seems to us to Smith also testified that after appellant was be void of merit, on the appellant's own hurt he stated that he alone was to be blamed; showing. The judgment of the court below that he slipped and fell from the building. is affirmed. The evidence shows that the surgeons and physicians employed by respondent to treat HARWOOD and DE WITT, JI., concor.
the The appellant's deposition was read by his
and cut the hay. Other than these acts, he STATE ex rel. SIMARD v. FOURTH JUDI made no claim of any rights to the hay or CIAL DISTRICT COURT.
the land. In June Simard made a contract
with Hanratty and Tillman that he would (Supreme Court of Montana, Sept. 6, 1893.)
cut the grass for them for five dollars a ton
Afterwards, and on July 10, 1893, he sold
the grass as his own, as he says, to Asselin
and La Casse. After that, on July 24th,
he told Hanratty that he had concluded to
which he was doing on July 28, 1893, at
wbich time the injunction was served upon
once since the 10th of July, until he began to
cut the hay, as hereinafter described. A few
served upon Simard, he told Hanratty that Application by Eugene Simard for a writ the grass belonged to him, Simard, and of certiorari to the fourth judicial district that he was going to have it, and that he, court to review the action of the court in Hanratty, could not hurt him for taking it fining relator for contempt of court Writ
He then went at once to Frenchtown, and denied.
told Asselin of the service of the injuncStatement of the case by the justice de
tion, and he and Asselin went to Missoula livering the opinion:
to consult lawyers regarding the moving of This is an application for a writ of certio
the hay. On their way to Missoula nothing rari to review the action of the fourth was said by either of them regarding the hay judicial district court in tining relator for or the moving of it. Returning from Mis an alleged contempt of court. Relator was
soula, Simard told Asselin that he thought, attached for contempt, and a hearing was
from what their lawyers said, he, Asselin, had, at which evidence was introduced. In had better go ahead and cut said hay. the return to the writ of certiorari from this Simard himself took no part in the moving court, the papers, proceedings, and evidence of the hay, but the same was all taken which were before the district court, and from the ground by Asselin on the 30th of upon which relator was adjudged to be July. Hanratty had a talk with Simard reguilty of contempt are certitied to this garding his purchase of the land from the court, and from them the following state railroad company, and Simard never in any ment of facts may be made: J. 0. Hanratty way made any objection to Hanratty's own. and A. R. Tillman commenced an action in ership of the land prior to about the 24th of the fourth judicial district court against July, when he claimed the grass growing Eugene Simard, to obtain a judgment against thereon as his own. Upon the facts aphim, restraining him from cutting hayon pearing as above recited, the district court certain land, alleged in the complaint to be
discharged Asselin from the charge of con-
action of the district court was without
Bickford, Stiff & Hershey, for relator.
Marshall, Francis & Corbett, for respondent
dant to be 3 being impact appellants ired or
a use 28 demandet i
We are o aggrieved
18 read birds , he not being
did not fi
whole the st of the line
appellat cof. This ring whether Pnt the age : of the dark it referat jedical tren nd the rest not possa 'e been "rrors to the
court in die ms to N 1 Lant's om court bely