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mentioned to you in the above-named instructions, nor was it convenient to involve us generally with those same States, without their having special relations with us."


On the 28th of January, 1825, Rebello proposed in writing the desired alliance to Adams, the latter having said to him on the 22d :

“What you have just told me will be brought to the knowledge of the President, but, in order that it may be done conveniently you must send me all this in a note, on the receipt of which the President will decide what the Government will consider best.” (Dispatch of January 26, 1825, No. 14, from the legation of Brazil at Washington.)

Here are the essential paragraphs of the note which on the 28th of January, 1825, Rebello directed to the Secretary of State Adams, and which began by a reference to the Monroe message of 1823 :

“ The Government of Brazil being convinced that the declaration made by the President of the United States in the message of His Excellency the President on the first session of the Eighteenth Congress was true, in which message it was said that relative to those countries in America which had declared their independence and maintained it and which independence this Government had recognized, founded on profound reasoning and principles of justice, this Government could not impartially see any interference with the purpose of oppressing or diminishing, in whatever way it be, the destinies of the same by whatever European power, but as a declaration of hostile sentiments to the United States; and therefore, it is to be hoped that the above European powers, enlightened by the true ideas which all Governments should entertain about the justice and principles on which Brazil based its independence, will not interfere in the questions which it has with Portugal; nevertheless as men are accustomed to do wrong and those governments are made up of men, and, as it is possible that some of the same powers might wish to help exhausted Portugal to recolonize Brazil, for which it so greatly strives; and as in such circumstances the Government of the United States must put into practice the principles of the policy set forth in the above-mentioned message, giving proofs of the generosity and feeling with which it is animated, which can not be done without the sacrifice of men and capital; and it not being in conformity with reason, justice, and law that the Government of Brazil should gratuitously receive such sacrifices, it (Brazil) is ready to enter with the Government of the United States into a convention which has for an object the uplifting of the Brazilian independence in the event of any power helping Portugal in its vain and useless projects for the recolonization of Brazil.

“The same reason which moved the Government of Brazil to hope that the Government of the United States may propose the terms of the convention above offered influences directly for it to hear from the Government of the United States the conditions under which it may wish to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Government of Brazil

The answer to this note was given after James Monroe had passed the Presi. dency over to his successor, John Quincy Adams.

The new Secretary of State, Henry Clay, in the note of April 16, 1825, expressed himself as follows:

" The President of the United States adheres to the principles of his predecessor exactly as they are formulated in his message of December 2 to the American Congress. But, not being in conformity with your first question, as the does not seem to be any probability at present of Portugal trying to obtain the help of other powers to recolonize Brazil, there does not appear to be any need for a convention founded on that improbable contingency. On the contrary, the President sees with pleasure the clear signs of an early peace between Portugal and Brazil, based on Brazilian independence, which the Government of the United States was the first to recognize. Declining, therefore, to enter into arrangements for the proposed convention, I have, nevertheless, the pleasure to say that you may assure your Government that the desires of the President are not the result of any weakness in the interest which the United States have constantly shown for the establishment of the independence of Brazil, but are only the result of the absence of circumstances which would be necessary to justify the signing of such a convention. If, in the course of

events, it be noticed that the European allies might renew demonstrations of attacks on the independence of the American States, the President will give to this new situation of things all the consideration which its importance may demand.

Relative to your second proposition for an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance to repel any invasion of Brazilian territory by forces of Portugal, I shall say that this also is unnecessary, since there are reasons for hoping for an approaching peace. Also, such a treaty would be contrary to the policy which the United States has up to now followed. According to this policy, the United States remains neutral, extending its friendship and showing justice to both parties as long as the war limits itself to a struggle between the mother country and its former colonies. From this line of conduct this Goevrnment did not deviate during the whole long period in which Spain fought with the different states which arose on the former Spanish territories of America. If an exception were made now for the first time, the sentiments of justice of your sovereign would cause him easily to admit that the other new governments would have some cause for complaint against the United States.

“Regretting that these considerations of a political order-which the United States feel themselves obliged to respect-do not permit this Government to now enter upon the negotiation of the two treaties now suggested, I have, nevertheless, great satisfaction in agreeing with you in the convenience of permanently uniting our two nations in the bonds of friendship, peace, and commerce. With this intent, I am authorized to tell you that the United States are willing to conclude with Brazil a treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce and wish to adopt, as a basis for the mutual regulations of commerce and navigation between the two countries, principles of equity and perfect reciprocity. If you have the necessary powers to negotiate such a treaty, I shall have great pleasure in entering with you upon the examination and discussion of its clauses on whatever date may be convenient to both of us

The treaty of amity, navigation, and commerce between the two powers was signed in the city of Rio de Janeiro on December 12, 1828, by the two pleni. potentiaries of Brazil, Counselor Marquis of Aracaty, minister for foreign affairs, and Miguel de Souza Mello e Alvm, minister of marine, and by the plenipotentiary of the United States, William Tudor.


We shall add to the already transcribed documents the following extract, very significant, from a dispatch of the Marquis of Aracaty, minister for foreign affairs, sent on April 6, 1827, to our representative in Washington,

"And in this respect, while your honor is in conference with the respective minister, you will endeavor to make him believe that His Majesty, the Emperor of Brazil, in his high-minded and well-calculated policy, knows very well what that nation is and what it is worth, and how much it is to the interest of both countries for their respective Governments to especially tighten their political relations and to mutually shake their hands."


After treating of the recognition of our independence by the Government of Washington, Pereira Pinto says:

“Since the relations of good friendship between Brazil and the United States have been thus cemented, they have always continued on a basis of perfect cordiality, as several slight incidents or conflicts occurring at different times have not altered it in any form.

The author refers to discreditable incidents caused by the diplomatic representatives of the United States in Brazil-Condy Raguet in 1827, Wise in 1846, and Webb after 1863--as well as the offense made our sovereignty by Commander Collins, of the cruiser Wachusetts by the capture of the corsair Florida in 1864, in the waters of Bahia. The American Government in the three first cases disapproved the conduct of their agents and substituted them by others who by their contrast with them, knew how to cause to be forgotten the faults and the insolence of their immediate predecessors; in the case of the Wachusetts it gave us promptly an honorable satisfaction.

We cite further Pereira Pinto to show what always was among us the dominant thought at the time of the Empire: “Making an ardent prayer for the consolidation of our alliance with the United States by means of a sincere and

enlightened policy, may the reader consent that we transcribe in these papers some impressions which in this regard we wrote in the Correio Mercantil of April 7 of this year.

“No reason can be suggested to make us quarrel with the United States. Our interests in America are similar; they consume to a great extent our great product; they therefore ought to be our natural ally; and in fact they have those relations with us.

“ The facts prove it.

When European mediation was spoken of to put a stop to the struggle in that country, its rulers said that the traditional policy of Monroe excluded that intervention, and that if they should come to a position to desire intervention, they would prefer that of Brazil.

“All these precedents reveal on the part of the United States the best and pronounced desire to form a more intimate alliance with Brazil, and such an alliance would have prevented (who knows?) the unjustified interference of Spain and France in the affairs of Mexico and Peru and the affronts which the powerful nations of Europe have inflicted on the weak people of the New World. Perhaps our form of government is opposed to that intimacy? We believe not. The institutions of the Empire are also democratic and the monarchial element which was added to them give brilliancy and fortify the system in force in Brazil. It is certain that in spite of that difference the liberal precepts among us are more frank and tolerant. We have no exclusions and all are able to intervene in public affairs if they possess talent and good qualities.


Tovares Bastos wrote in March, 1862 (Cartas do Solitario): “I am a mad enthusiast of England, but I only well understand the greatness of that people when I look upon that of the republic which it founded in North America. It is not enough to study England; it is necessary to know the United States. And it is from this latter country that we can obtain more practical experience as regards our agriculture and our economic situation, which have the greatest similarity with those of the Americans.

“In my opinion Brazil is more nearly approaching its moral and economic regeneration when it copies that of England, Germany, and the United States. In my cosmopolitism therefore there centers a great part of real interest for the country, the only real patriotism which I recognize.

“Do we wish to copy Europe? Let us copy the United States. The curved line is the nearest road.

" I also am a monarchist and consider that form of government as necessary to Brazil, as the republic is perfectly adapted to the social constitution, the ideas, and the tradition of North America."

In the session of the 8th of July of the same year, 1862, in the Chamber of Deputies, Tovares Bastos expressed himself as follows:

“The ex-minister for foreign affairs has said that the relations of Brazil with the United States continue to be good and that they prosper. I am convinced that, even from the political point of view, the relations with the United States of North America are those which are most convenient to Brazil. We must cultivate them and develop them, especially because after the present struggle-a glorious struggle-because it is that of liberty against servitude, of progress against barbarity—there is reserved for the glorious Republic of Washington an incalculable part in the destinies of the world. It is not necessary to point out the reasons which unite the commerce of the two countries and the affinities between the processes of their agriculture, between their means of communication, and between the moral and material constitution of their population."


Looking over the “Annals of the Brazilian Parliament” and in books, magazines, and newspapers published during the two reigns of the imperial epoch, we could multiply extracts as we have already done as a proof of the perfect understanding which, at that time, statesmen, writers, and, in general, all the men of the dominating classes in Brazil had of the advantages for us of a cordial intelligence with the United States of America.

Those who in intimacy talked with the Emperor D. Pedro II know in what respect he held the same sentiments as those inspired in his father by José Bonifacio, Carvalho e Mello, and others, who in the same way as later the Viscounts de Sepetiba and of Uruguay arranged or consolidated the basis of our foreign policy. These sentiments of the second Emperor were proved by the voyage he undertook to the United States in 1876, during which, even on board ship, he took pleasure in translating the popular hymn, “ Stars and Stripes," and the haste and satisfaction with which he appointed Brazilian delegates to the first pan-American conference of 1889, at Washington.

On the other hand, to review the proofs of friendship to Brazil, of interest for its progress and prestige, and of appreciation for its Government given by the United States from 1824 till to-day, it would be necessary to lengthen far too much the extension of this article, which is principally a compilation of texts. It is enough to remember that if the French military occupation of 1836 in Amapá ceased in 1840, to this concurred the representation of the Government of the United States, backing up in Paris those of Brazil and England; that if in 1895 a second military occupation, planned by M. Lebon, minister for the colonies, did not take place, it was because M. Hanotaux, minister for foreign affairs, better advised than his colleague, knew that this was opposed to the Monroe doctrine and the interests of England; that, on the wish of the United States, Brazil appointed an arbiter, Viscount of Itajubá, to the Geneva tribunal, which settled in 1872 the American claim against England in the affair of the Alabama; that by suggestion of the Government of the United States a Brazilian, Viscount de Arinos, presided over the Franco-American arbitration tribunal which was held in Washington from 1880 to 1884; and that to the offer of good offices insinuated by some of the great European powers in a critical moment of the civil war of the United States President Lincoln answered that as it was an American question the respect for the Monroe doctrine did not permit him to accept any European intervention, adding that if-which was not probable--it should become necessary for the mediation of a friendly nation the interventor or arbiter naturally indicated to both sides would be the Government of Brazil.

We shall not deprive ourselves of the pleasure to reproduce here, taken from the newspapers of the time, the following translation of the essential paragraphs of the speech which an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United Staes, Richard Kidder Meade, read at the audience of December 5, 1857, in the palace of Sao Cristovao on presenting his credentials to the Emperor Dom Pedro II.

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“ In accrediting a minister near this Government, the United States have not only the purpose to fulfill a duty of courtesy to the greatest power of the South American Continent, but also to express its sincere desire to concur with the Imperial Government of Brazil in the maintenance of a policy which should unite forever the two countries by ties of peace and friendship, which shall give greater strength and vigor to an already growing and prosperous commerce, and which shall produce the permanent welfare, the prosperity, and the development of the power of the two countries on whose destinies depend the two great continents in which they are respectively situated.

“My Government is perfectly impressed by the points of similarity and the identity of interests which should render indissoluble the bonds between the two countries and the aspirations of each of them. An equal expanse of territory of gigantic dimensions promises for the two nations a future preponderance above whatever apprehensions and should give to their position an importance due principally to their own strength.

“The similarity which in several respects exists between the constitutional organization of both is sufficient to foster political sympathies and associations promoting mutual benefits and future commercial progress; to the help which à policy common to both countries, stable and deeply rooted in their own soil (a policy which will have to combat many hostile movements abroad), will establish an alliance between both, and will insure, for mutual defense, a unity of action and feeling that will prove invincible in the future,

These feelings, manifested then and on many other occasions, are those which up to now have animated the two Governments of Washington and Rio de Janeiro, as are demonstrated by recent events, which are of public notoriety and which it would be useless to relate.

Washington has always been the principal center of intrigues and for demands for intervention against Brazil on the part of our neighbors, perma


nent rivals, or temporary adversaries. When the first diplomatic agent of Brazil arrived there in 1824 he met a South American mission which asked for the backing of the United States against us. In 1903 and 1904, during the bitterest period of our quarrels with Bolivia and Peru, they also tried to seek intervention there and made tempting offers. The ex-President Capriles, of Bolivia, confessed in a well-known paper what had been done on his order in that regard.

All the maneuvers organized against this country at Washington since 1823 till to-day have always met an invincible barrier in the old friendship which happily united Brazil and the United States and which it is the duty of the present generation to cultivate with the same strength and ardor as that with which our ancestors cultivated it.



Ambassador Griscom to the Secretary of State. No. 23.]


Petropolis, August 31, 1906. SIR: I have the honor to give, for the records of the department, the following short account of Mr. Root's stay in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo from July 27 to August 7, 1905.

The United States cruiser Charleston, with Mr. Root and his family on board, arrived at Rio de Janeiro at 7 o'clock on the morning of July 27. Mr. Root's party consisted of Mrs. Root; his daughter, Miss Edith Root ; his son, Mr. Edward Root; Mr. Doyle, his private secretary; and Lieutenant Palmer, his aid-de-camp. On entering the harbor the Charleston exchanged salutes with the fortress at Santa Cruz and anchored between the Argentine cruiser Buenos Aires and the German cruiser Bremen.

At 10 o'clock I went on board, accompanied by the staff of the embassy, and was shortly afterwards followed by his excellency Dr. Joaquim Nabuco, the Brazilian ambassador at Washington, and by the representatives of the ministry for foreign affairs, Mr. Gomes Ferreira, minister plenipotentiary, and Mr. Domicio da Gama, minister resident. Mr. Root also received on board a committee of Brazilian students, one of whose members welcomed him by a short speech in English. At 11 o'clock Mr. Root, accompanied by his family, his naval aid, by myself and Mrs. Griscom, and by Dr. Joaquim Nabuco, were rowed ashore in the old Portuguese galley Dom João VI, propelled by 64 oars. The picturesque galley was surrounded and followed ashore by many craft crowded with students and other enthusiastic spectators.

On landing Mr. Root was met and cordially welcomed by Baron Rio Branco, the Brazilian minister for foreign affairs, and by other distinguished representatives of the Government. After another short speech by one of the students and a reply by Mr. Root, the whole party entered carriages and proceeded on a long drive through the city to the house which had been placed at Mr. Root's disposal during his stay in the city. This procession, which lasted for two hours, was received in all quarters with great cordiality and enthusiasm. On arrival at the Palace Abrantés, Mr. Root's temporary home, the enthusiasm was so great that Mr. Root was obliged to make a short speech.

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