hypothesis of their believing a particular witness, when perhaps the conclusions they might draw from the testimony of that witness might be different from those which would be drawn by counsel or court.

So far as the testimony of Oat is concerned, it is clear to our minds that it was not susceptible of two interpretations. We have already expressed the same view in regard to the testimony of Brady. If it were fairly open to two conclusions, the objection would have force. But the facts he had testified to were few and simple, and there was no danger of misleading the jury by instructing them as prayed. Nothing could possibly be gained by repeating the facts to which he had testified in the request. The case was peculiarly one where precisely such a charge was most likely of all others to convey to the jury most clearly the meaning of the judge, and to enable them to apply it without error to the case before them. There was neither ambiguity nor confusion in the testimony of either Brady or Oat, and neither was qualified by any other testimony on a point material to the case. And as no other charge could have presented to the minds of the jury their duty in the case in more unexceptionable manner, we think the court erred in not complying with the request.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

The other justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE V. KOPPLEKOM.

People ex. rel Foley v. Augustus Kopplekom.

Where votes were cast at an election, by legal voters, but who had not been registered, for the reason that there was no acting board of registration: Held, that the statute requiring registration, being grounded upon the same article of the constitution which gives the right to vote, is imperative, and must be complied with before the elector can vote; and that the omission by the board of registration to meet, is of no avail to the elector. Const. Art. VII, § 6.

Quo Warranto.

Heard January 9. Decided January 13.

The information in this cause was filed to test the right to the office of Sheriff, for Houghton county.

An issue of fact having been joined, the cause was referred to the Houghton Circuit for trial.

The cause was tried without a jury.

The court below found that the defendant was not guilty of intruding into the said office. No exceptions were taken in the court below.

The report of the circuit judge being now before the court, the defendant moved for judgment.

A. W. Buel, for respondent.

1. The Registration Law is constitutional.

The general purpose of the law, as expressed by its title, and clearly indicated by its provisions, is "to preserve the purity of elections, and guard against the abuses of the elective franchise by a registration of electors," and the provisions are clearly promotive of those purposes.

The constitution simply gives the right of the elective franchise and prescribes the qualifications of voters; but leaves the mode and manner of exercising the right open to regulation by the Legislature, and for this purpose it is, and ever has been, a fruitful subject for changing legislation. 12 Pick. 485.

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Where the constitution has established a political right or privilege, but has not particularly designated the manner

THE PEOPLE V. KOPPLEKOM.

of its exercise, it is within the constitutional limits of the legislative power to provide such reasonable and uniform rules in regard to its exercise, as may be necessary to secure and protect the right or privilege thus established, and regulate the manner of its exercise. -12 Mass. 485; 44 N. H. 398.

It may be objected that a qualified voter, or all the qualified voters of a town, might lose their votes for the want of a register, from accident, ignorance, mistake, neglect, or fraud.

To this we answer:

a. No law ever does or can perfectly provide against possible failure of execution, from one or more of the causes suggested by the objection.

b. The constitutionality of a law can never depend upon its execution or non-execution, in fact.

C. To lose the right of voting from such causes, is not to be disfranchised by the law; but is a result produced in opposition to, or in defiance of, the intent and provisions of the law.

2. The law being constitutional, its vital provisions now in question are mandatory, viz:

a. There shall be "a register for every town, city and village."

b. The register shall be "in the hands of the inspectors of election, to be used by them during the election."

c. The Inspectors "shall not receive the vote of any person whose name is not written in the register."

Chief Justice Shaw speaks of similar provisions in the Massachusetts statute, as being "only a reasonable regulation of the mode of exercising the right of voting, which it may be competent to the legislature to make valid and binding, and to which both voter and presiding officers at elections are authorized and bound to conform."

It follows that if there be no register in existence, or if the election be conducted without a register in the hands of

THE PEOPLE v. KOPPLEKOM.

the inspectors, to be used by them at the polls during the election, then in either case the votes received are received illegally, and in the face of an express prohibition of the statute, and to be rejected in a judicial canvass.

Such being the case here, the entire vote of Franklin township should be rejected as illegal and invalid, and judgment be rendered for the respondent.

Wm. L. Stoughton, Attorney General, and Moore & Griffin, for People.

The constitution declares and defines the qualifications of voters, leaving to the legislature the right to pass laws to preserve the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise. Const. Art. VII, §§ 1-6.

2. In the exercise of this power, the Legislature cannot add new qualifications. They cannot restrict nor enlarge the conditions of suffrage, nor the qualifications of the electors. 5 Wis. 316; 9 Id. 283; 13 Mich. 127.

3. The registry acts of this state can be sustained as constitutionally valid, only on the ground that they are intended and adopted only to guard against abuses of the elective franchise.

They do not create nor enlarge the right to vote, and they cannot limit or destroy it, unless they provide the means for the voter to act in compliance with them, and so to secure the enjoyment and exercise of his constitutional rights.

The legislature may prescribe the mode of trying the right to vote, and regulate the evidence of such right; but this is as far as they can go.

4. This, in fact, is the scope of the registry law. The right to vote results from the constitution. The registry is but a means of preventing fraud, by requiring all voters, who are such under the constitution, to enrol their names before designated officers.-3 Allen, 1.

5. It appears in this case that there was no registration of voters, and no opportunity to the electors to register their names.

THE PEOPLE V. KOPPLEKOM.

There was no meeting of the board at all after 1864, and no opportunity to register on the day of the election. The court below properly decided that there was no legal register in existence.

In connection with these are the facts, that an election was held; that the electors of Franklin did vote; that they were legal voters but for registration; and that they had no opportunity to register.

We claim that this was a good election under the constitution, and that the rights of the voters, as secured by the constitution, cannot be abrogated by the neglect of the officers to comply with the directions of the Registry act.

a. To validly disfranchise a voter, he must himself have been in fault, in not complying with the reasonable requirements of the statutes.

The regulation must be reasonable in itself, and he must have an opportunity of compliance.

The principal authority on the validity of this class of acts, is that of Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485.

Now, this case requires the adoption of reasonable and uniform regulations, and not such as "should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself.”

The law, then, would be invalid, if it did not give the voter the opportunity to register.

b. We contend that the same consequences would follow if the officers designated by the law did not afford the opportunity to the voter to register.

If, in such cases, the legal voters actually came forward and deposited their ballots, the default of the officers to comply with the directions of the statute, does not invalidate the result any more than their default in other cases in complying with positive directions.

Ministerial officers cannot, by their wilful omissions, destroy rights of this character, vested under the constitution, when there is no default on the part of the voter.

16 MICH.-X.