weakened Spaniards could no more have conquered them than they previously could conquer Cuba. Hence Spain had no lawful sovereignty in the Philippines. We may grant her the same supremacy there that she had in Cuba when we took up Cuba's cause, and we then denied that she had any rightful supremacy there. We began war to compel her to take her unrighteous hands away from that property to which she had lost all right. For the same reasons Spain had no sovereignty over the Philippines to sell or give away, wherefore we could buy none of her.

We, then, have entered into the same relation to the Philippines that Spain stood in to Cuba-the relation that caused us to declare a war of liberation. Who will declare war against us to liberate the Philippines? What great philanthropic Power, in response to the claims of humanity, will rise to this great moral crisis and command us to evacuate the territory that we are subduing to our new greed? Either our war for Cuba was unjust, or, on the principles which we invoked to justify it, we ought to be driven out of the Philippines. If we continue our present Spanish policy there we condemn our war against Spain as groundless and iniquitous.

We have the answer to our first question. Spain had no sovereignty in the Asiatic group to cede. She could grant a parchment claim-she could also have given away as much of Cuba as that any time these years back.

As to whether we could acquire a moral right to this territory by Spanish cession, our historical actions settled that question beyond a peradventure long ago. When we declared our independence of England we announced the principle that a people who were dissatisfied with the rule of a nation claiming them as a colony might declare that rule null and void and ended, and that if they so declared, it was at an end. This principle declares that a nation cannot extend its authority over a people that declines its authority. We may now find it convenient to repudiate these doctrines—we are repudiating them—but

we cannot do it without in the same act overthrowing the foundations of our own national life, of our history, and of our freedom.

We may be perfectly confident that whatever we now do to these helpless Islands is making new precedent for ourselves, and that if we pull down the bulwarks of justice and freedom by which we have thus far protected our own liberties, those liberties at home will next fall, and domestic tyranny will take the place of the independence established by the blood and courage and magnanimity of our forefathers. The time has come to choose, and we must do so with clear knowledge that the fate of all we have loved most in America is in our choice. As we choose for the Filipinos we choose for ourselves. If we disregard their rights and liberties such is the stern retribution of nature's laws that it is upon our own necks we shall be placing the servile yoke.

5. Our Great Debt to the Filipinos.

There is no doubt of the direction we have taken thus far. Our course toward the Filipinos has been one of the utmost perfidy. We had faithfully announced to the whole world that we harbored no designs of conquest or aggrandizement in going to war with Spain. The Filipinos took us at our word and welcomed us as deliverers. By our own declaration—addressed nominally to Cuba but universal in its terms and promises-we were pledged to the Filipinos not to violently subjugate them to ourselves. It was on this pledge that they received us. If they had believed our promise to be a lie, as it turned out to be, what would their course have been! It is most certain that they would not have co-operated with us. They had no knowledge whatever of us-most of them had never heard that we exist and they could have had no reason to think that our tyranny would be preferable to Spain's. They were seeking freedom, freedom from all alien rule. When they learned anything about us they must have learned that we were a stronger

nation than Spain and they might have very rationally decided to help the Spaniards against us, on the ground that it would be easier for them to drive the Spaniards out later than to drive a more powerful people out if it gained a footing. If they had done this our 'brilliant' career in the Far East would have been sadly tarnished. Could we have crushed Spain there if the Islanders had opposed us? It would have taken much of our time and blood and money, and the end is doubtful. For if the prospects had been brighter in the Philippines, Spain would have held out a little longer in Cuba, and in a few more days our Cuban army would have been helpless from disease and must have suffered a terrible punishment. Spain would have annihilated our land forces. To say that the Filipinos saved us from this humiliation is not a wild statement. Since they are fighting against us now for freedom there is no reason to suppose that if they had known our real designs they would have fought for us then to help us make them our subjects.

If they had not joined the Spaniards to keep us out, there were two other courses open: either to fight both the Spaniards and us, or to help us defeat the Spanish and then turn upon us. The result in either case would have been disastrous to our arms and prestige. The whole world would have looked upon our Spanish war differently if we had been driven to fight the natives before the war closed. The one justification of the war having been knocked from under, the restraints upon continental sympathy and interference would have fallen off and Spain would undoubtedly have found active supporters. There was Germany aching for a plausible excuse to order us out of that region. This would have been a stunningly plausible excuse-that on the pretence of liberating the Filipinos from Spain we were killing them (which we have since done). It would have been universally believed that since we were lying with regard to the Philippines, we were also lying with regard to

Cuba. What support could we have then found anywhere? England was able to give us moral support on the ground that we were waging an unselfish fight for humanity, but if this ground had been withdrawn, that support must not only have been much weaker but Continental Powers would have combined to disregard it and save Spain from humiliation. What then? We must have backed down or been the cause of a world war. England might or might not have helped then. If she had done so the war must have been infinitely more terrible and to no purpose but to gratify our desire to steal, and to establish the right of the Anglo-Saxon race to steal everywhere. If she had declined to back our hypocrisy with warships we should have received an exceeding great thrashing and would have exceedingly more than deserved it.

As

To return to our destinies in the Philippines. With the Filipinos hostile, or ready to attack us after the routing of the Spanish, our conquest of the islands would not have been the easy task that it was. The Filipino leaders have not shown themselves lacking in intelligence. Had they taken an attitude of enmity to both combatants, the land battle at Manila would probably have been a draw, and both sides been considerably weakened. suming, as we have seen that we justly may, that the hostility of the natives to us would have deferred (perhaps indefinitely) the surrender of Santiago, the war would have continued in the Philippines. We should have been forced to send thousands more troops to carry on a recognized and admitted war of conquest, in defiance of the moral judgment of mankind, and under difficulties rendered distressing by the native opposition. Would the war have been ended yet had this transpired? It is unlikely.

Moreover, if the real intentions of our political masters had been known earlier the support of the great majority of the American people would have been withdrawn from

the war. Americans would not at that time have endured the thought of subduing the native Filipinos to our benevolent sway by force. This would have so embarrassed the Administration and Congress as to oblige them to abandon the conquest of the Philippines or to declare as a finality that they should be free and independent after the eviction of Spain.

6. Superlative Treachery.

What is the whole truth? That we owe the greatest gratitude to these heroic Islanders, that we have shamelessly denied that debt. Their faith in us and aid contributed much to the success and speedy close of the war -we gained that faith and aid by deception. No sooner was the war done and their usefulness to us over than we came out in our true colors and announced our sovereignty, an act that, committed earlier, would have prevented alliance and made them our deadly foes. have shown by this deed that honor does not exist in us. It is one of those pieces of inconceivable infamy which have sullied the records of monarchies and which we abominated for a hundred proud years. We can only wipe this stain out by restoring the usurped sovereignty of these territories to the people who dwell in them.

We

Follow in further detail the course of American hypocrisy toward this unhappy people. Our Imperial and monarchical press may find that it serves their cause of prejudice to defame Aguinaldo, but their tirades lose force when we recall the opinions of the British press of our own "Mr." Washington a century and a quarter ago. Moreover, considering the lie that we have perpetrated upon the Filipinos, and sustained with our Imperialist press, there is better ground to believe him than his traducers. And here are declarations by him after General Otis had transmitted McKinley's proclamation of sovereignty to the Archipelago:

"General Otis calls himself in the proclamation referred to 'military governor of the Philippine Islands,' and I protest once and a thousand