immediately precedes and directly produces an effect as distinguished from a remote, mediate, or predisposing cause." "Immediate; nearest; next in order." The maxim of the law is," Causa proxima, non remota spectatur."

It is said and well settled that a party is not responsible "in respect of mischief which could by no possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would have anticipated." Broom's Leg. Max., 386; Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 248; Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 243.

"An act is the proximate cause of an event when, in the natural order of things, and under the particular circumstances surrounding it, such an act would necessarily produce that event." Shear. & Red. on Neg., 11.

In negligence, all courts, both in England and America, construe "proximate cause as a cause from which a man of ordinary experience and sagacity could foresee that the result might probably ensue. Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Snyder, 25 Conn. 265; Bennett v. Lockwood, 20 Wend. 223; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436.

In this case the connection between cause and result is so attenuated as not to be easily seen. The result appears very remote; one that could not have been anticipated or foreseen, and apparently no more the result of the alleged cause than any other unforeseen accident.

The court erred in admitting any evidence of the roadmaster's altercation with Shinwall, and its effect upon the employees. It could in no way afford a basis upon which negligence could be predicated. The court also erred in admitting the unsworn certificate of the attending physician, Hall, in regard to the character and extent of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. In a case where proof of damage is proper, the evidence of the physician is competent, but I know of no rule of evidence making a certificate, unverified and unsworn, as this was, competent.

The court erred in refusing the motion for a nonsuit. There was no question of negligence to be submitted to the jury, as far as the defendant was concerned. If the evidence

had any tendency to establish negligence, it was either that of his fellows in dropping the rail prematurely, for which the employer could not be held responsible, or his own, in holding on after he should have let go. The case as made by the evidence is clearly one of accident, pure and simple, and in no way resulting from negligence.

This court will, and all other courts should, hold corporations and employers strictly accountable for injuries to employees resulting from carelessness, but the law has been carried to its extreme limit in this direction, and employers cannot be held to be insurers against injuries purely accidental in character.

The fourteen instructions given by the court to the jury were, many of them, good law, and would have been apt and proper in a case where a question of negligence was involved. In this case the only instruction that could have been properly given would have been to find for the defendant. The judgment will be reversed.

Reversed.

NELSON ET AL. V. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF GARFIELD ET AL.

1. COUNTY-BRIDGES.

The board of county commissioners of a county is without authority to construct or maintain a bridge within the limits of an incorporated town.

2. COUNTY FUNDS-IMPROper Use of.

The appropriation of county funds to the purpose of constructing a bridge within the limits of a town is such an illegitimate use of such funds as to give a right of action to taxpayers who might be injured by the expenditure.

Error to the District Court of Garfield County.

Mr. EDWARD T. TAYLOR and Mr. JOHN T. SHUMATE for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. C. W. DARROW, Mr. J. L. HODGES and Mr. A. M. STEVENSON, for defendants in error.

BISSELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Sundry taxpayers of Garfield county filed a bill to restrain the board of county commissioners from executing and carrying out a contract to erect a bridge across Grand river. Respecting the bill, it is enough to state it contained all the requisite averments to entitle the complainants to maintain their suit, if the essentials were sustained by proof. A mass of testimony respecting the locality of the bridge and the existence of a highway on the southerly side of the river was produced, but the bulk of it may be dismissed from consideration. The whole case turns on the question of the power of the board of county commissioners of Garfield county to build a bridge on the site selected. There are but a few facts essential to the discussion or to the easy apprehension of the case. The proposed bridge was to be erected across the river and its northerly terminus would be at the foot of 3d street in the town of New Castle. On the south side of the river the town had not been platted, but the land was owned by The Glenwood Hot Springs Company. To reach the river a right of way would of necessity have to be purchased, and the approaches to the bridge constructed. The entire bridge would be located in the town of New Castle. Both the approaches would be in the same municipal corporation, and the only access to it in any direction would be over streets or highways controlled by the municipal authorities. The building of the bridge and its approaches, together with the estimated cost to acquire the right of way, would bring the total expenditure very close to thirteen or fourteen thousand dollars, at the very lowest estimate placed on it. A preliminary injunction was granted, but on final hearing it was dissolved and the bill dismissed. The taxpayers prosecute the appeal.

The evident convenience to the public which would result

from the building of the bridge and the possible necessity for its construction has led the court to examine the case with considerable care and to reach its conclusion after much hesitation. The lack of jurisdiction and authority in the board of county commissioners to construct a bridge at the point selected is so thoroughly settled by the current of decisions as to compel us to reverse the judgment. The nature of the corporate authority possessed by a county is not involved in the litigation. The wide difference which exists between powers possessed by a municipal corporation and those which. may be exercised by the governing body of a county is recognized in every case where the subject has been considered. The county is organized for governmental purposes, and is in reality part of the state's organization, possessing such jurisdiction and such power as the legislature has seen fit to confer. On the other hand, the municipality, while created under the general law and by virtue of the powers granted by the legislature, is the voluntary act of the inhabitants of the corporation, and when completed it may only exercise the delegated powers subject to well recognized rules of law which affix a vastly different liability on their exercise. Several state courts have decided where power was delegated to both the county and the municipal authorities, and there was no limitation in the statute on the power of the county board to act within the limits of the incorporated town, their powers would for many purposes be coextensive with the territorial limits of the county, even though they might be exercised within municipal limits. These cases are not very satisfactory. The reasons given are neither persuasive nor convincing, and are not in harmony with the general current of authority. We likewise conclude the decisions of the supreme court of this state are not in line with these cases. Our statutes respecting counties, towns, and cities, so far as we have been able to discover, and so far as they have been referred to by counsel, contain no specific provision restricting the powers of boards of county commissioners to such parts of the county as may not be included within the

limits of incorporated towns and cities. Yet, if we follow those cases which hold the jurisdiction of towns to be exclusive within the limits of their organization, we can sustain our conclusion. In re Public Road, 54 N. J. 539; City of Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196; McGrew v. Stewart, 51 Kan. 185; Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel., 144 Ill. 458; Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush, 166; Gallaher v. Head et al., 72 Iowa, 173; Tucker et al. v. Conrad, 103 Ind. 349; The State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; Cowan's Case, 1 Overt. 311; Roads & Streets, Elliott, chap. 19.

The

Much of the argument in these cases is of the ab inconvenienti sort, but of exceeding force and evident utility. It is impossible to concede to boards of county commissioners authority to build bridges and construct roads within the limits of towns without producing an endless confusion and an ultimate conflict. It is a little difficult to apprehend the status of the right to control a bridge built by the county government within a city, or to determine exactly the status of the title to the property. To carry this speculation to any logical conclusion would be idle, but it is suggestive of the difficulties which would arise from the enforcement of any other rule. Many illustrations of the absurdity of the contention could be given, but it is enough to rest our conclusion upon this very substantial current of decisions. precise question was not before the supreme court in the cases which will be cited, but, in many matters which were essential to their conclusions, the court has declared the law in exact accord with this line. The whole subject is covered by the three chapters of the General Statutes, 23, 95, and 119. Each organization is clothed with ample power to carry out the declared purposes for which they are organized, and within their respective limits are given full power and control in the one case over highways and in the other case over streets and bridges. This delegation of authority has been held to be entirely within the power of the legislature, and when granted and exercised under the grant to be entirely exclusive. City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328; City of Boul