The Court, after argument, in an opinion by ALLISON, P. J. (reported 13 WEEKLY NOTES, 295), entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for three undivided sixth parts of the real estate in question. The defendants then took this writ, assigning as error the action of the Court in entering judgment for the plaintiffs in the case stated. John G. Johnson (with him Samuel T. Jaquette), for plaintiffs in error. There are two interpretations of the meaning of the words "male issue," both of which sustain the claim of the plaintiffs in error. October 6, 1884. THE COURT. The single question presented by this record has been so fully and satisfactorily discussed by the learned President of the Common Pleas, that little, if anything, can be profitably added to what he has said in the clear and exhaustive opinion upon which the judgment of that Court is based. After devising the "Prospect Hill"' lot to his daughters Catharine and Sarah, "for and during all the term of their natural lives and the life of the survivor of them," the testator disposed of the estate in remainder in the following words: They mean either male children, or male issue" and from and immediately after the decease of tracing descent through males only. The popular meaning of "issue" is "chil dren." Wells v. Ritter, 3 Wharton, 208. Thellusson v. Rendlesham, 7 H. L. 428. Jos. B. Townsend (with him J. Sergeant Price), for defendants in error. In all the cases cited on the other side and re- Lees v. Mosley, 1 Yon. & Coll. 589–610. Taylor v. Taylor, 13 P. F. Smith, 483. Hill v. Hill, 24 Id. 173. And wherever to the word issue or children the words of limitation to the heirs of such issue or children are added, it is always held that they take a remainder as the root of a new succession, and not as deriving it through or under the parent, even though the parent may have a pre cedent life estate. Guthrie's Appeal (ubi sup.). the survivor of them, I give the same unto the male issue then living of my said son Richard, their or his heirs and assigns in fee; but if no such issue shall then be living, in such case I give the same unto all the children of my said daughters, Catharine and Sarah, and my son Richard, their heirs and assigns, in equal parts, according to the number of them." The remainder thus devised was clearly contingent, because it was to a class not in existence, either at the date of the will or when it became operative in 1821, by the death of the testator. Moreover, testator's son Richard, to whose male issue the estate in remainder was given, was not married until June, 1824, and the survivor of the life tenants lived until September 21, 1866. The word "issue," in a will, prima facie, means the same as heirs of the body, lineal descendants indefinitely, and it is to be construed as a word of limitation; but the prima facie construction gives way if there is anything on the face of the will to show that the word was intended to have a less extended meaning, and to be applied to children only, or, as in this case, to lineal descendants of a particular class in being at a specified time. (Slater v. Dungerfield, 15 M. & W. 263.) The phrase "male issue of my son Richard then living," is a descriptio personarum, designating the class of persons to whom the remainder in fee was given upon the termination of the particular life estate; and the question is, who composed that class when the survivor of testator's two daughters died, September 21, 1866; in other words, who, according to the true interpretation of the will, were the male issue of testator's son Richard, living at that time? The case stated informs us there were, in all, only six male lineal descendants of Richard then in being, viz.: his two sons, Richard and William L., plaintiffs in error, and his four grandsons, John M., Lewis A., and Alexander H. Scott, the defendants in error, and sons of his daughter Fanny, and Richard W. Hopkinson, a son of his daughter Sarah. The contention of defendants in error is that the words, "male issue," as employed by the testator, include all the male lineal desce..dants above named, grandsons as well as sons, not-ing on the peculiar features of each case. One of withstanding the fact that four of them were born them is where a precedent estate or interest was not of sons, but of daughters of testator's son given to the parent of the children who were Richard. If this position is correct, it follows held to be intended by the word issue. In such that the judgment in their favor, for the three cases the devise to his issue has been likened to undivided sixth parts of the land in controversy, a legal succession in right of the parent. Bradis right. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in shaw v. Milling, supra, and Robinson v. Sykes error contend that the words mean children, (23 Beav. 40), are illustrations of this class. In male children, and not male descendants gene- the latter case, the Master of Rolls said: "I rally of Richard, or that they mean male issue of am of opinion that though the word 'issue' is Richard, tracing their descent through males only. nomen generalissimum, and includes all the reAs has been clearly shown, in the opinion re- motest descendants, that nevertheless, where ferred to, the word issue, in legal parlance, issue are pointed out as persons to take with means lineal descendants, irrespective of their reference to the share of the parent, a gift, which being of the same generation. In our several so far as regards the parent fails, they take on Acts of Assembly, regulating the descent and the principle which may be called a quasi repdistribution of real and personal estate of intes- resentative principle; that is, the children of tates, the words, "issue," and "lawful issue," each parent whose share fails take that parent's have always been employed as synonymous with share, but not admitting the grandchildren to lineal descendants, including not only the first but take in competition with children." Whenever more remote generations as well. So, also, in it is apparent from a consideration of the whole a class of cases, to which Eichelberger v. Barnitz will that the testator intended to restrict the gift (9 Watts, 447) belongs, where devises, in terms to children it will be so construed. In the case broad enough to pass a fee simple, are reduced before us, there is not the slightest indication of to a fee tail by a subsequent provision limiting such intention. Testator's son Richard, whose the estate to another in the event of the first name is used merely as descriptive of those to taker dying "without issue," or "without leav- whom the estate in remainder was given, had no ing issue," etc., the word issue, as a general rule, interest under his father's will, or otherwise, in is never held to mean children, but lineal de- the land in controversy. The devisees did not scendants generally; and being thus a limitation take through or under him; but, as a defined over upon an indefinite failure of issue or lineal class, they took as purchasers by direct gift from descendants, such devises have always been con- the testator. There is nothing in the phrasestrued to create an estate tail. When, as in the ology of the will to indicate an intention to represent case, the word is manifestly used as de- strict the words "male issue" to the sons of scriptive of the devisees, and is also restricted to Richard, or to his male issue tracing their desuch issue as shall be living at a specified time, scent through males only. If the word "male" it is always construed as a word of purchase, had been omitted, it would scarcely be claimed embracing all lineal descendants of the person that all the lineal descendants of Richard, both named, in being at the time so specified, unless male and female, in being at the time designated, it clearly appears from the context that the tes- would not have been included in the description. tator intended otherwise. This principle of con- The only effect of that word is to exclude female struction appears to be fully sustained by the lineal descendants. authorities, among which are the following: Haydon v. Wilshere (3 T. R. 372); Hockley v. Mawbey (1 Ves. Jr. 150); Freeman v. Parsley (3 Ves. 421); Leigh v. Norbury (13 Ves. 340); Wythe v. Thurlston (Ambler, 555); Davenport v. Hanbury, (3 Ves. 257); Hawkins on Wills, 187-188; Cook v. Cook (2 Vern. 545); Bradshaw v. Melling (19 Beav. 417); Ross v. Ross (20 Id. 645); Miller's Appeal (2 P. F. Smith, Oct. & Nov. '84, 108. 113); Coyle's Appeal (2 Norris, 242). In Leigh v. Norbury, supra, the Court said: "It is clearly settled that the word 'issue,' unconfined by any indication of contrary intention includes all descendants. Intention is required for the purpose of limiting the sense of that word and restraining it to children." For these and other reasons, more fully elaborated in the opinion of the Court below, we think the judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by STERRETT, J. October 22, 1884. County of Butler v. Leibold. Horse-stealing-Act of March 15, 1821Reward. The owner of a horse, stolen by a bailee or otherwise, who pursues and captures the thief, is entitled to the reward given by the Act of March 15, 1821. (P. L. 90.) Several classes of cases, in which it has been The fact that he is the owner of the horse does not predecided that such intention was sufficiently indi- clude the person who pursues and makes the arrest from cated, are exceptions to the general rule, depend-claiming the reward upon the conviction of the thief. May 29, 1884. Error to the Quarter Sessions of Butler County. July, '84, 65. The facts set forth in the petition of Henry Leibold, and not disputed, were as follows: In Juniata County v. Overseers of the Poor of October, 1883, Henry Leibold, a livery stable Delaware Township. keeper, of the borough of Butler, hired a horse, Settlement of paupers-How lost-Liability for owned by him, to James C. Hughes. Hughes drove the horse to Kittanning, there traded him maintenance of insane paupers-Act of April for another, sold the one for which he had 8, 1861. traded, and squandered the proceeds. He was pursued and apprehended by Leibold, was indicted for larceny as bailee, and convicted at December Sessions, 1883. 66 The petitioner prayed the Court to inquire and determine whether he is entitled to said reward, and, if so, to direct the Clerk of said Court to certify the same to the Commissioners of said county, as provided in said Act of Assembly." No answer was filed. A decree was made adjudging that the petitioner was entitled to said reward, and mileage, and directing the County Commissioners to draw a warrant on the Treasurer in favor of the claimant for the amount thereof. The Commissioners thereupon took this writ, assigning for error the said decree. R. P. Scott (Thomas Robinson with him), for plaintiff in error. for his maintenance. A. abandoned his domicile in Pennsylvania in 1869, and settled in Kansas, where he lived several years, afterwards, in 1878, he returned to his native township, and and was committed by the Court to the State Lunatic resided there until 1883, when he was declared insane, Hospital: Held, that he had no settlement in said township, and that under the provisions of the Act April 8, 1861 (P. L. 248), the county and not the township in which he re sided was liable for his maintenance. Error to the Quarter Sessions of Juniata County. Petition by the county of Juniata, for a rule on the Overseers of the Poor of Delaware Township, to show cause why the Court should not The purpose of the Act of March 15, 1821 certify to the State Lunatic Hospital that Dela(Purd. Dig. 762), is to induce persons not in-ware Township was the place of settlement of terested in the stolen property to arrest the thief. The owner needs no greater inducement than the hope of recovering his horse. (Counsel for defendant in error were not heard. They did not submit a paper-book.) November 3, 1884. THE COURT. The Act of March 15, 1821, gives the reward to "whosoever shall pursue and apprehend any person who shall have stolen any mare, horse, or gelding, within any county of this Commonwealth," to be paid after conviction of the person so having stolen. The statute makes no distinction between the owner of the horse stolen and any other person. The reward is to any one who shall pursue and apprehend the thief. We see no reason for excluding the owner from the benefit of a statute which seeks to encourage the most active pursuit of a thief, who takes property susceptible of such rapid removal to a distant place. It does not matter by what mode the larceny be committed, whether by a bailee or otherwise, the requirement of the statute is fulfilled provided the person pursued and apprehended shall have stolen. one of the animals named, and shall have been duly convicted thereof. Judgment affirmed. PER CURIAM. PAXSON and STERRETT, JJ., absent. J. D. MC K. said hospital, and also why said township should one Theorus Thompson, a lunatic, committed to not pay to Juniata County the costs of commission and removal of said Thompson and of maintaining him there. A rule was granted as prayed for, and, after answer filed, a commissioner was appointed to take testimony, from which the following facts appeared : The original settlement of Thompson, the resided with his parents from the time of his lunatic, was in Delaware Township where he birth until 1869, when he went to Kansas, where he became the owner of an estate, and acquired settlement. In the autumn of 1878, Thompson returned to Delaware Township, Juniata County, and resided there until he was committed to the Lunatic Hospital. a rule, holding that Thompson had lost his settleThe Court, BARNETT, P. J., discharged the ment in Delaware Township by acquiring a settlement in Kansas, that he afterwards had residence merely, and no settlement, in Delaware Township, and that the county would have to this writ, assigning for error the discharge of said maintain him. Whereupon the plaintiff took rule. Jeremiah Lyons, for the plaintiff in error. Inhabitants of Townsend v. Inhabitants of Billerica, Inhabitants of Canton v. Bentley, 11 Mass. 441. Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 3 Harris, 182. The provision in our statute for sending a pauper out of the State to the place of his last legal settlement is nugatory, therefore the last settle ment in the State is liable. Limestone Twp. v. Chillisquaque, 6 Norris, 294. The Act of February 17, 1854, imposing the burden of costs upon the county was repealed by the Act of April 8, 1861. E. S. Doty, Jr., for defendant in error. Thompson lost his settlement by acquiring a new one in Kansas, the county is chargeable for him as for an entire stranger. Act February 14, 1854, Purd. Dig. 952. Pa. St. 294), though the facts in the latter case were similar to those in the former. The settlement of a person continues until he gains a new one. When he removes from this State and ac quires a domicile and settlement in another, he has no settlement in Pennsylvania. It might be provided that he should have, by statute, or by long-established usage, but it is not. Section 4 of the Act of 1861 (P. L. 249) provides that whenever an indigent insane person shall be sent to the State Lunatic Hospital, the city or county from which he is sent shall be liable to the trustees of the hospital for his maintenance, and shall have remedy over against the proper township, liable by existing laws for supOctober 6, 1884. THE COURT. How a per- port of such pauper. A chief object of this secson coming into a district may gain a settlement, tion was to give the trustees an efficient and where an illegitimate child shall be deemed to ready remedy for recovery of the expenses of be settled, where shall be the settlement of a maintaining such pauper, and it relieved no dismarried woman during coverture and after her trict or person, chargeable by their existing laws husband's death, and when the overseer of a for the pauper's support, from ultimate liability. district shall furnish relief to a poor person not The Act of 1854 (P. L. 85), imposing the burhaving a settlement therein, are matters defined den of supporting an insane person who has by statute. Little, if anything, respecting settle-been committed to the State Lunatic Hospital, ments, is left to be determined from ancient and who has no legal settlement in this Comusage, or by analogy. The statute contemplates monwealth, upon the county where he was found that a person may lose his settlement by acquir- lunatic, has not been repealed. ing a new one without the State as well as within, Order and decree affirmed. and provides for the removal of a pauper Opinion by TRUNKEY, J. the city, district, or place where he was last le- GREEN, J., absent. gally settled, whether in or out of Pennsylvania." It may be difficult, and often impossible, to remove a pauper from this State to his place of Jan. '85, 87. settlement in another; this provision may be nugatory as regards its enforcement, and yet material in ascertaining the intendment of the statute respecting persons coming into a district from another State. 66 'to Whenever a pauper has a settlement in this State, the district wherein he is settled is liable for his maintenance; but if he has no known legal settlement he shall be maintained by the district where he becomes a public charge. If the settlement of the pauper is in another State or country to which he cannot be removed, the district where he resides when he becomes chargeable is liable for his support. This is the general | rule, subject to some statutory exceptions, as for instance, when the Court commits a pauper to the State Lunatic Hospital, who has no legal settlement within the Commonwealth, but only a residence therein, the county wherein he is found a lunatic shall pay the expenses of his maintenance and removal. A person who has acquired a legal settlement in another State, after he had a settlement here, seems to stand on like footing as a person who never was in this State. Hence, the ruling in Inhabitants of Townsend v. Inhabitants of Billerica (10 Mass. 411), was not followed in Limestone Twp. v. Chillisquaque (87| a W. M. S., Jr. January 21, 1885. Gilbert's Appeal. Where the service of a libel in divorce is not personal, the libellant is not a competent witness against her husband, and in absence of other evidence a divorce cannot be decreed. Appeal of Fannie C. Gilbert, by her next friend, Rudolph Newkumet, from an order of Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia County, dismissing her application for divorce. Libel in divorce a. v. m., filed by Fannie C. Gilbert, a resident of Philadelphia, by her next friend, etc., against Harvey A. Gilbert. A subpoena and an alias subpoena were issued, and both returned by the sheriff non est inventus, and advertisement was made according to law. Before the examiner appointed to take testimony, the libellant herself swore to the facts of the alleged desertion. Other witnesses were produced, one of whom testified to the effect that he had been informed as to the facts, and the other that he knew the libellant, and that she was industrious, etc. The Court marked the Examiner's report "not approved," and a rule was taken to show cause why divorce should not be granted, which the Court discharged "for want of jurisdiction over respondent." Thereupon libellant took this appeal, assigning for error the said action of the Court. W. H. Redheffer, for appellant. Proceedings in divorce are statutory, and ser- February 2, 1885. THE COURT. There was no personal service of the writ on the appellee. The wife was not a competent witness against her husband. Without her evidence, the case is barren of proof necessary to justify a decree of divorce. Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. PER CURIAM. Common Pleas—Law. C. P. No I. which was a limited partnership, duly and properly formed under the Act of March 21, 1836, and its supplements, to continue for one year from January 1, 1882, and extended for the further term of two years from December 31, 1882; and that therefore he was not liable as a general partner in this suit. The recorded articles of the renewal of the partnership were dated January 6, 1883, and accompanied by affidavits of Daniel Haddock, Jr., special partner, and Stanley B. Haddock, one of the general partners, both dated January 6, 1883, the former to the effect that the sum of $50,000,. contributed by the affiant as special partner, was not then withdrawn or impaired, but was to remain in the firm according to the articles of renewal; and the latter certifying that the said sum had been contributed and then remained "in the common stock of the said firm." D. C. Harrington, for the rule. The affidavit of defence is defective, because it does not aver publication of the notice required by law. Purd. Dig. p. 936, pl. 10 and 12. The interval of six days having occurred between the expiration of the old and the making of the new agreement rendered the parties afterward general partners. Andrews v. Schott, 10 Barr, 53. The special partner's affidavit, annexed to the articles of renewal, was an interference with the business of the firm, and renders him liable as a general partner. [BIDDLE, J. What was that more than swearing to what he had already stated in the articles? Was it not mere surplusage?] February 7, 1885. Hirsch et al. v. Vanuxem et al. Limited partnership-Renewal - What constitutes-General and special partners - Act of March 21, 1836-An interval of six days between the expiration of the original articles of a limited co-partnership and the execution and It was as much an interference in the business recording of articles of renewal does not in- of the firm as if he had gone out among the validate the renewal of the limited partnership creditors and circulated the statement that his when the name, members, and capital of the capital was invested in the firm. But, besides firm remain unchanged, and no business has this, the affidavit of the general partner to the been done meanwhile-Powers of special part-renewal articles was insufficient. It is not a compliance with the law to certify that a special partner's capital has been contributed and "re ner. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. This was an action of assumpsit against Henry Vanuxem, William Moore Wharton, Stanley B. Haddock, and Daniel Haddock, Jr., lately trading as Vanuxem, Wharton & Co., on a promissory note for $750, dated May 26, 1884, payable three months after date to the order of the plaintiffs, and signed Vanuxem, Wharton & Co. The defendant, Daniel Haddock, Jr., filed an affidavit of defence, setting forth that he did not make or sign the said note, or authorize the same to be made or signed in any such manner as that he should be liable therein as a general partner; that he was not, when the note was made or dated, or when his affidavit of defence was made, a general, but a special, partner in the said firm, mains in the common stock." John G. Johnson, contra. In Andrews v. Schott there was an interval of fifteen days, during which business was transacted, and, besides, the partnership afterwards formed was a different one; it contained a new partner. Here it is otherwise; the new firm was merely a continuation of the old one, and there is nothing in the affidavit to indicate that any business was transacted in the interval. THE COURT. This was a limited partnership, which had expired by its own limitation. For a short space of time there was no renewal. It does not appear that any business was meanwhile transacted. The affidavit of defence and the |