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jury shall be regarded as approved unless ex- Appeal from Smith County Court; J. F. cepted to as provided for in the foregoing ar-Odem, Judge. ticles."

Action by J. W. Beaird against the Texas This article is mandatory and precludes & Pacific Railway Company. From a judgthe consideration of any assignment of error ment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Re as to the action of the court in giving, refus- versed and remanded. ing, or qualifying requested charges, unless such action be excepted to and presented by

The appellee had purchased from the apbill of exceptions. Insurance Co. v. Rhoder- pellant's agent a ticket entitling him to pasick, 164 S. W. 1069.

sage from Grand Saline to Mineola, paying It is true that article 2062, R. S., is not therefor the sum of 40 cents. The ticket expressly repealed by the act above referred became misplaced in some way about the perto, but said act repeals all laws in conflict son of appellee, and he paid the conductor therewith, and if any conflict exists between of the passenger train the cash fare and took article 2062 and article 2061, as amended, a receipt therefor. Upon the arrival of the the former is repealed. The Legislature

train at Mineola, appellee found the ticket that passed the original articles evidently and at once presented it, together with the did not intend article 2062 to apply to the cash fare receipt of the conductor, to the apgiving or refusing special charges; if so, pellant's ticket agent at Mineola for redempthere would have been no necessity for ar- tion. In respect thereto appellee testifies: ticle 2061.

"He told me he could not do it, he had no [5] 7. We overrule appellant's assign

authority to redeem the ticket, but said that

any agent at any station could redeem it. He ments of error as to the action of the court would not redeem the ticket, and I purchased in refusing to allow appellant to introduce a ticket to Tyler and got on the train and testimony in reference to the suits against came to Tyler.” the accident insurance companies. The evi- Claiming that the railway company failed dence offered was irrelevant and immaterial and refused to redeem the ticket when preto any issue in this case, and would have sented, appellee brought the suit to recover been prejudicial to appellee. In so far as such $500 as a statutory penalty, the penalty beevidence was offered for the purpose of im- ing based upon articles 1527-1529 as containpeaching appellee by declarations in his peti- ed in the Penal Code of 1911. The agent of tion in his suit against the insurance company appellant testified as follows: it was clearly shown that such declarations fice on the arrival of the passenger train and

"I remember Mr. Beaird coming into the ofwere not made by him nor with his knowl-requesting me to redeem a ticket he had puredge, authority, acquiescence or ratification. chased from Grand Saline to Mineola, and I

Finding no error of record, the judgment told him that I had no authority to give him of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.

the cash on the ticket, but that I would redeem it by giving him a receipt for the ticket and sending it to the general auditor at Dallas, Tex., and he would send me a cash slip and

I could then give him the money. I told him TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BEAIRD. (No. 1317) that it not being a ticket sold by the Mineola (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana. June office, I could not redeem it.

I told 24, 1914. Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1914.)

him I had to go according to the instructions

given me by the superior officers of the rail1. CARRIERS (8_261*)—REDEMPTION OF TICK-road. He stated that he was going to Tyler ETS—"WHEN PRESENTED."

and that he did not want my receipt. I then Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1527, requiring told him that he could turn the ticket in at railroau companies to provide for the redemption either the I. & G. N. or Cotton Belt office in of tickets which the holder has not used, article Tyler, and that they would give him a receipt 1528, requiring presentation of the ticket for re- for it and have it redeemed as I had proposed. demption within 10 days after the right to use it He refused to let me redeem it in the manner has expired, and article 1529, providing that any that I told him.” railroad company, refusing to redeem any ticket when presented, shall' be subject to penalty, the

The court gave the following special charge railway company may provide its own processes at the request of the plaintiff, which is here of disbursement; and where a company required assigned as error: tickets for redemption to be forwarded to the "You are charged that if the agent of the auditor of the company, who would send a cash defendant railway at Mineola, at the time slip to the ticket agent whereupon the moneylaintiff presented the ticket in question, failwould be paid to the holder of the ticket, the re-ed to then and there redeem said ticket, plainfusal of an agent to immediately pay the re- tiff would be entitled to recover, notwithstanddeemable value of a ticket upon presentation did ing said agent offered plaintiff to forward said not subject the company to the prescribed penal- ticket to the auditor's office at Dallas, Tex.,

for ty, the words "when presented," being equivalent redemption." to "in case it is presented," or "on condition that it be presented."

Young & Stinchcomb, of Longview, and [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. R. S. Shapard, of Dallas, for appellant. E. Dig. $ 1034; Dec. Dig. $ 261.*]

P. Price, of Tyler, for appellee. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (8 501*) RESERVATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW.

LEVY, J. (after stating the facts as above). Assignments of error complaining of the [1] The legal effect of the instruction comcharge cannot be considered, where no bill of ex- plained of is to declare that it is a violation ception was preserved.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, of the statute requiring railway companies Cent, Dig. $8 2300-2305; Dec. Dig. $ 501.*]

to redeem unused tickets where a ticket Willson, C. J., dissenting.

agent of the selling company does not return *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

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the amount of the fare to the holder of such sented.” In this construction the right of unused ticket immediately on his presenta- the holder of an unused ticket presenting it tion of the ticket for redemption. As to to a local agent for the purpose of having whether there was error in giving the charge a refund of the fare made to him by the must be considered from the viewpoint of company would be to have return of the fare there being testimony going to show that the made with reasonable dispatch through the appellant had provided the channel or pro- usual processes of disbursement employed by cess of redemption of unused tickets to be by the particular company. The holder of the the local ticket agent forwarding the unused ticket would not be entitled to have return of ticket to the auditor of the company, who the fare made by the local agent "then and would send a cash slip to the ticket agent, there" on presentation of the ticket, regardand the money would then be paid by the less of the processes for disbursement employlocal agent to the holder. Article 1527 of the ed by the particular company for the especial Penal Code of 1911 imposes the duty upon all purposes of redemption. And the railway railroad companies in this state “to provide company having, by the terms of the act, the for the redemption" from the holder of the right to redeem an unused ticket through the whole or any part of an unused ticket that processes of disbursement employed by the may have been sold by the company or its particular company to accomplish the purposauthorized agent. Article 1528 makes it the es of the law, such company would not be actduty of the holder of such unused ticket, as ing in violation of the statute, subjecting it a condition precedent to any right to redeem, to the damages specified, in offering or unto present such ticket or parts unused for dertaking to redeem an unused ticket actuthe purpose of redemption to the company ally presented to it for redemption by the selling, or to any of its authorized agents, holder within the ten days required, through within a time not exceeding ten days after the usual processes of disbursement employed the right to use said ticket has expired. And by the particular company Hence we conarticle 1529 provides :

clude that giving the special charge consti"Any railroad company or receiver or trus- tutes, in view of the agent's testimony, retee of such ilroad company over or on which versible error. said ticket may be used, which shall refuse or fail to redeem the whole or any part or coupon

[2] Under the third assignment several of any ticket or tickets, when presented, shall propositions are made and argued. As there forfeit to the holder thereof a sum not less than was no bill of exception preserved to the one hundred dollars nor more than five hun-charge, as required by the latest law, we are dred dollars, recoverable in any court of competent jurisdiction."

without authority to consider the assignment It is not doubted that by the terms of ar

and the propositions thereunder. Railway ticles 1527 and 1528 there is created the ob- Co. v. Wadsack, 166 S. W. 42; Railway Co. ligation on the part of the railway company

v. Galloway, 165 S. W. 546. We are not unto make a refund of the purchase money of mindful of the decision in Railway Co. v. such of its unused tickets as are actually pre Mahaffey, 98 Tex. 392, 84 S. W. 616; but we sented to it by the holders for redemption assume, without any express ruling, that the before a period of ten days after the right Legislature properly re-enacted the statute to use such tickets has expired. But neither

in 1911. of the two articles mentioned provides the

We suggest that the ruling here necessi. particular channel or processes of disburse- tates the ruling that the first and second asment that the company shall employ. By signments present error and in view of anarticle 1527 the railway company is only re

other trial can be remedied. quired “to provide for the redemption" to the

The judgment is reversed and the cause holder of such unused ticket that may be

remanded. presented. The language would seem to ex

WILLSON, C. J. (dissenting). I think the press the intention to leave to the railway trial court correctly construed the meaning of the company the right to provide a channel or statute, and therefore dissent from the concluemploy processes of disbursement most or- sion reached by the other members of this court. derly to it. And the language of article 1529 The statute plainly makes it the duty of a rail

road company in this state to provide for the is consistent with the intention expressed in redemption of a ticket sold by it and unused by article 1527, and not a limitation upon the the purchaser, if such ticket is presented for reauthority conferred upon the company to demption to one of its ticket agents "within a

time not exceeding ten days after the right to adopt a particular channel or employ a par- use” same "has expired by limitation of time as ticular reasonable process for the purposes stipulated therein." Article 1528, Revised Crimof redemption to the holders of such unused inal Statutes (Pen. Code). It as plainly detickets most orderly to it. The clause “when shall refuse or fail” to redeemn such ticket

nounces a penalty against such company if it presented,” as used in article 1529, reasona- "when presented” to it for the pur) Article bly introduces into the meaning of the sen- 1529, Revised Criminal Statutes. To my mind tence the idea of the fact of presentation the words “when presented,” used in article 1529, rather than the time of presentation of the mean that the ticket must be redeemed at the

time it is presented to the company for the purunused ticket. llence the clause "when pre-pose, and the requirement of article 1528 that sented," being a conditional adverbial clause the company shall provide for the redemption of modifying the verbal phrase "refuses or fails the ticket, means that the company shall provide

for its redemption at that time, and not at some to redeem,” is equivalent to "in case it is other time chosen by it. Rohrig v. Railway

negligence as were set out in their original peFT. WORTH & R. G. RY. CO. v. MATHEWS tition. They further allege that the various et al. (No. 5381.)

acts of negligence charged against appellant

occurred on March 18, 1909, and that they suf(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

fered damages by reason thereof in the ag. June 10, 1914. Rehearing Denied gregate sum of $977. They conclude said pleadOct. 21, 1914.)

ing with the prayer that they have judgment 1. COURTS (8 169*)—COUNTY COURT-JURIS- for 'the said sum of $977 as damages, without DICTION-AMOUNT INVOLVED-INTEREST. interest, judgment for costs and for general and

Where a shipment of cattle was, through special relief.' A trial of said cause resulted defendants' negligence, damaged to the amount in a verdict and judgment in favor of defendof $970, the shipper immediately upon the ant Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Compainjury became entitled to 6 per cent. interest ny and against appellant for $950, with interon that amount, as compensation for withhold-est from September 16, 1913. at 6 per cent. ing the money to which he was entitled. Hence, per annum and costs of suit. À motion for new after the lapse of more than a year, the ship- trial was duly presented by appellant Ft. Worth per's cause of action was for a sum in excess & Rio Grande Railway Company, in the court of $1,000, and the county court was without below, and same was by the court overruled. jurisdiction.

Thereupon appellant perfected its appeal to [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. this court." Dig. 88 413-425, 428–436, 443, 456, 458, 465; [1, 2] The first three assignments of error Dec. Dig. $ 169.*]

deal with the question of the jurisdiction of 2. COURTS (§ 169*)-TEXAS-COUNTY COURT- the trial court over the subject-matter, the JURISDICTION.

contention being that as the jurisdiction of Where plaintiffs' cause of action was in excess of $1,000, the county court is without the county court is limited to $1,000, exjurisdiction, even though plaintiffs prayed judg-clusive of interest, the plaintiffs' petition ment for a sum slightly less than $1,000.

showed on its face that the court was with[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. out jurisdiction. In other words, counsel Dig. $$ 413-425, 428-436, 443, 456, 458, 465; for appellant contend, and we sustain the Dec. Dig. $ 169.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR_(8_1166*)-DISMISSAL face that the subject matter was of the value

contention, that the petition shows on its -GROUNDS—WANT OF JURISDICTION.

Upon appeal from a judgment of the coun- of more than $1,000. The plaintiffs sued for ty court which was without jurisdiction, the damages to a certain shipment of live stock appeal will not be dismissed, but the cause and for $7 worth of hay. According to the will be reversed and remanded to enable that tribunal to dismiss the action.

petition the live stock was damaged in their [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and market value in the sum of $970, which Error, Cent. Dig. $8 4527-4530, Dec. Dig. & damage, it was alleged, occurred on the 18th 1166.*]

day of March, 1909. The plaintiffs' original Appeal from Coleman County Court; F. | petition was filed February 9, 1910. It is M. Bowen, Judge

well settled by the decisions of our Supreme Action by Will Mathews and others against Court that if the plaintiffs had any cause the Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Railroad Com- of action they were not only entitled to repany and another. · From a judgment for cover for the injury done to their property, plaintiffs, defendant named appeals. Revers- but were also entitled to recover 6 per cent. ed and remanded.

on the amount of such damages from the

time that the injury was inflicted, not as Andrews, Streetman, Burns & Logue, of interest eo nomini, but as compensation for Houston, and Snodgrass & Dibrell, of Cole- withholding the sum of money they were man, and Lockett & Rowe, of Ft. Worth, entitled to recover as soon as the injury was for appellant. Woodward & Baker, of Cole- inflicted; and at the time the suit was man, for appellees.

brought the 6 per cent. referred to brought

the total amount of the plaintiffs' cause of KEY, C. J. We copy from appellant's action up to a sum considerably in excess of brief the following substantially correct state- $1,000; and, this being true, the county ment of the nature and result of this suit: court was without jurisdiction to try the

“This is an action instituted by appellees case. That identical point was decided by against appellant, Ft. Worth & Rio Grande our Supreme Court in Schulz v. Tessman & Railway Company, and Gulf, Colorado & Santa Bro., 92 Tex. 488, 49 S. W. 1031, and we feel Fé Railway Company, for alleged damages by bad handling en route, to a shipment of cattle compelled to follow that decision. The plainmoving from Coleman, Tex., on the line of the tiffs' cause of action being in excess of $1,000, Gulf Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company, it is immaterial that they prayed for judgto Brady, Tex., on the line of appellant railway ment for only $997. Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. company Appellees filed their original petition in this cause on February 9, 1910, and v. Canyon Coal Co., 102 Tex. 478, 119 S. W. alleged therein various acts of negligence 294. against this appellant and its codefendant, al- [3] With perhaps a few exceptions, it has leged by them to have occurred on March 18, 1909, and they further aver that, by reason of been the general practice of this court, when the acts of negligence set out by them, they it ascertained that the trial court had no were damaged in the aggregate sum of $980, jurisdiction of the subject-matter, to dismiss for which amount they pray for judgment, as well as for costs of suit. On April 2, 1913, tion of this court is limited to cases of which

the appeal, for the reason that the jurisdicappellees filed their first amended original petition, alleging substantially the same acts of trial courts have jurisdiction. However, in *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Tig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

VIEW.

Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Canyon Coal Co., could not expect justice before a justice of the supra, the Supreme Court seems to disap- peace. prove that practice, and, in deference to the cent. Dig. ; 69; Dec. Dig. § 32.*]

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, views of that court, the judgment of the trial court in this case will be reversed and

Appeal from District Court, Travis Counthe case remanded with instructions to that ty; Chas. A. Wilcox, Judge. court to dismiss the case.

Suit by Wells Fargo & Co. against Chas. Reversed and remanded.

S. Guilheim and others. From an order dissolving a temporary injunction, complainants

appeal. Affirmed. WELLS FARGO & CO. v. GUILHEIM et al. Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, of Hous(No. 5400.)

ton, and W. B. Garrett, of Austin, for appel

lants. (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

J. H. Hart, of Austin, for appellee.

Austin.
June 10, 1914. Rehearing Denied
Oct. 21, 1914.)

Statement of the Case. 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (8 954*)–MATTERS_OF JENKINS, J. This is an appeal from an DISCRETION RIGHT TO INJUNCTION-RE- order dissolving a temporary injunction.

that appellee Whether an injunction will be granted in Appellants' petition alleged a given case rests, to a certain extent, in the Guilheim had 43 pretended claims against it discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of for damages, by reason of the alleged fact which, while reviewable on appeal, will be up- that turkeys shipped by appellant for appelheld unless some abuse of discretion is shown.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and lee were dead when delivered, and that he Error, Cent. Dig. $8 3818-3821; Dec. Dig. 8 had filed 43 separate suits in the court of 954.*]

appellee Johnson, a justice of the peace, for 2. INJUNCTION ($ 118*)—COMPLAINT.

the recovery of such damages, and had causDefendant, having 43 claims against an ed citation to be issued thereon in each suit; express company for damages by reason of an that said claims were from 95 cents to $18.alleged fact that turkeys shipped by complainant company for him were dead when deliver- 48, and aggregated $208.37; that each of ed, filed 43 separate suits before a justice of said claims involved issues of fact and questhe peace to recover damages, ranging from tions of law identical with each other; that 95 cents to $18.48. Complainant, in a suit to restrain the prosecution of such suits, al- | said suits were separately filed for the purleged as a defense thereto that it was not lia- pose of vexing and harrassing appellant, and ble to defendant in any damages or sum what that the costs therein would amount to the soever, in that it held a receipt from him for sum of $300; that the county court had jueach and every shipment sued on, without exception, "and none dead within complainant's risdiction of the aggregate amount of said knowledge." Held, that such allegation did claims, and that a suit for same could be not charge that none of the turkeys were, in tried in the county court at comparatively fact, dead when delivered, but was only, an small trouble and expense; that appellant allegation of complainant's evidence of that fact, and hence the petition was demurrable. has a legal defense to said claims, in that

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Injunction, it holds receipts from appellee showing that Cent. Dig. $8 223–242; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] none of the turkeys were dead when the 3. INJUNCTION (8 119*)—VERIFIED ANSWER, same were delivered to appellee; that apCONSIDERATION. In determining whether a party is entitled that neither of said suits is appealable from

pellant has no adequate remedy at law, in to injunction, the answer, when verified, as well as the petition, must be considered under justice's court, by reason of the fact that Rev. St. 1911, art. 4645.

neither of them involves an amount exceed[Ed. Note.-For other cases, . see Injunction, ing $20, and that he cannot have said suits Cent. Dig. 88 243–250; Dec. Dig. $ 119.*]

consolidated in the justice's court for the 4. INJUNCTION ($ 32*)—GROUNDS OF RELIEF reason that the aggregate amount in con-SUITS BEFORE JUSTICE-MULTIPLICITY.

Defendant, having 43 claims for damages troversy exceeds the sum of $200; that "apagainst complainant express company arising pellant has no reason to expect, anticipate, out of shipments of turkeys brought 43 suits or hope for the proper determination of its before a justice of the peace against complain- just and legal rights in the trial of said suits ant for amounts ranging from 95 cents $18.48, aggregating $208.37 in all. Complain- in the said justice court, for the reason that ant sought an injunction, alleging that each of the said defendant M. M. Johnson, justice the claims involved issues of fact and ques- of the peace aforesaid, is not a lawyer learntions of law identical with each other, and that ed in the law, and that a jury in the justice the suits were separately filed for vexation and to prevent an appeal. Held, that since if court, although with no knowledge whatever the suits did involve the same issues, though of the law or the application of legal printhey could not be consolidated into one suit be- ciples to facts, are the exclusive judges of cause the amount would exceed the jurisdiction of the justice, yet they could be consolidated the facts and the law, with no appeal whatinto two suits, which would afford complain- ever from their decision, and, such jury beant an adequate protection and a right to ap- ing wholly ignorant of the law, and wholly peal, complainant was not entitled to an injunction restraining the prosecution of the incapable of applying any legal principle to suits on the ground that they were so institut- any state of facts, your petitioner could ed to prevent an appeal, and that complainant not hope for any consideration or determination of its legal rights in the trial of said not been denied, and would not be denied, by suits in said justice court than such as the the plaintiff, Wells Fargo & Co." prejudice and whims of said jury might dic- [1] As to whether or not the equitable re tate.” Appellee demurred generally to ap- lief of injunction will be granted in a given pellant's petition, and specially in that it case rests, to a certain extent, in the discreappeared that appellant's alleged legal de tion of the judge, which discretion is reviewfense involves a question of fact, and that able on appeal, and should be upheld, unthe justice court had obtained exclusive ju- less some abuse of such discretion is shown. risdiction to try the same. He alleges that If appellant was entitled to enjoin the sephis claims for damages involved are valid, arate prosecution of appellee's claims, and and have arisen from the fact that appellant knew that it was appellee's purpose to so shipped for appellee a large number of prosecute said suits, it might not be inequitaturkeys from various points at different ble to hold that it should have done so betimes, and that one or more of the turkeys fore appellee had incurred the expense of in each of said shipments were dead when filing such suits, which presumably included delivered to appellee; that appellee had fur- an attorney's fee in each of them. Such nished appellant a full statement as to his course would have prevented incurring the several claims for such damages, and that costs, which is one of the grounds of appelappellant failed and refused to pay the same lant's complaint here, and for which, even or any part thereof; that appellee notified should injunction be granted, it has already appellant long before said suits were filed, rendered itself liable by reason of its delay to wit, on March 26, 1913, that if said claims herein, unless it should clearly appear that were not paid he would ile separate suits such suits were brought for the purpose of thereon, and that said suits were not filed vexing and harrassing the appellant. Howuntil May 1, 1913; that by refusing to pay ever, we do not rest our opinion on this reasaid claims and by failing to take any action son of the court for dissolving the injuncto prevent or restrain appellee from so filing tion. If the judgment is correct for any othsaid suits, appellant invited appeflee to file er reason apparent of record, it ought to be the same, by reason of which it is estopped upheld. from receiving the relief claimed herein. Ap

[2] We are of the opinion that appellant's pellee denies that said suits were brought for petition for injunction was bad upon general the purpose of vexing or harrassing the ap

demurrer. It appears from said petition pellant, or that the defense to same involves that each of the suits in the justice's court the same issues, but alleges, on the contrary, grew out of shipments of turkeys by appelthat each shipment was at a different time, lant for appellee, and that appellee's claim of turkeys purchased from different parties, for damages is that some of the turkeys so and that the facts that may be shown upon shipped were dead when delivered to appeltrial in one case will not be in any wise ma- lee. The only alleged defense to such claim terial in determining the facts at issue in is as follows: any other of said cases; that the costs in

"Your petitioner alleges and charges the fact said cases will be only what the law allows, fense in each and all of said 43 suits, and is

to be that it has a full and complete legal deand that if appellant establishes a legal de- in no way liable to the said defendant Chas. fense it will not have to pay the same. On S. Guilheim in any damages or sum whatsoMarch 25, 1914, the court heard the motion ever, in that it holds a receipt from the defend

ant Chas. S. Guilheim for each and every shipto dissolve the temporary injunction, “the ment sued on without exception, and none dead same having been submitted on the plaintiff's within knowledge of plaintiff.' petition and the defendant's demurrers and

If this means that appellant holds appelmotion,” and entered a decree that "said in- lee's receipt showing that none of the turjunction heretofore granted in this cause is keys were dead when delivered to appellee, hereby in all respects dissolved." The ap- it is not an allegation that none of them pellant, having duly excepted to the order were dead when so delivered, but only an dissolving said injunction, prosecutes this allegation of appellant's evidence of that appeal under article 4644, R. S.

fact, which evidence is not conclusive of the

fact. If it be an allegation that appellant Opinion.

does not know that any of the turkeys were The court found that appellant was estop- dead when delivered to appellee, it is clearly ped from prosecuting its suit herein for in- not an allegation of the fact that none were junction, for the reason that it was “made dead at that time. In order to obtain an known to the court that the facts set forth injunction, the petitioner must allege the in the answer of the defendant Chas. S. facts that entitle him to the same, and not Guilheim, to the effect that the said defend- his evidence as to such facts, or his want of ant presented all of said claims to the plain knowledge as to the same. tiff, Wells Fargo & Co. long before suits were [3] In determining whether or not a party filed in justice's court, and that payment of is entitled to an injunction the answer, when said claims was declined, and that said de- verified, as well as the petition, must be fendant Guilheim notified the plaintiff that taken into consideration. Article 4645, R. he would bring separate suits on same, had | S.; Dawson v. Baldridge, 55 Tex. Civ. App.

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