death of William G. Ardrey, which occurred the quitclaim deed, what construction should be 19th day of December, 1909, his said undivid-given to this deed? Appellants claim that it ed seven-thirteenths interest in said 136-acre tract passed to, and vested in, his said children created an estate by the entirety; respondas tenants in common, subject to the dower es-ents contra. Taking the deed alone, it untate therein of the said widow, Margaret V.doubtedly creates an estate by the entirety. Ardrey, which said dower estate became vested in her upon the death of her husband. Upon Respondents contend that the facts considthe delivery of said quitclaim deed from Mar- ered show a different character of instrugaret V. Ardrey to her said two children as ment. This is one of the vital questions in aforesaid, all of her interest in said lands, in- the case. cluding said dower interest, passed to and vested in, her said two children. If there was nothing in this record but the naked quitclaim deed to the husband and wife, we would be obliged to say that an estate by the entirety had been created, and that upon the death of the husband the whole estate vested in the wife, the survivor. Gibson v. Zimmerman, 12 Mo. loc. cit. 386, "Under the second count of the petition the court finds that fact as above found under count No. 1 of said petition, and the court further finds: That the plaintiff Elzena Moss is entitled to partition of the lands in controversy. That from the nature and amount of the property sought to be divided and the number of owners it is apparent to the court that the assignment of dower and partition of said 51 Am. Dec. 168; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. lands in kind cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. 68; Bins v. Bullock et al., 129 Mo. 117, 31 S. W. 342; Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65, 41 S. W. 784; Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. loc. cit. 523, 108 S. W. 9, 1134, 123 Am. St. Rep. 495. "It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the ownership of said 136-acre tract is as follows, to wit: That the defendant Pansy L. Ardrey and Clifton Ardrey are each the owners in fee simple of an undivided three-thirteenths interest in said 136 But in this case we have more than the acres. That the defendants Pansy L. Ardrey mere naked deed from which to determine and Clifton Ardrey are the owners of the said the character of the estate conveyed theredower estate in the undivided seven-thirteenths interest in said lands, held by her said husband, We have here a case where the husby. and acquired by him from the children of his band, without the written assent of the wife, first wife as aforesaid; said dower interest and invested her separate money in the lands in estate being an undivided one-third in said last-question, and took the title in the name of mentioned seven-thirteenths interest, for and during the life of the said Margaret V. Ardrey. the two. In such case when such a deed is That, subject to said dower interest, the plain- attacked in equity by the wife or her heirs, tiff Elzena Moss, and the defendants Pansy L. the husband is declared to hold that portion Ardrey, Clifton Ardrey, William S. Ardrey, James T. Ardrey, and Evelena Burch are each of the land paid for out of the wife's money the owner of an undivided one-sixth interest in in trust for her and her heirs, in case of her said last-mentioned undivided seven-thirteenths death, and holds the other portion for himinterest in said lands. self and his heirs, subject to all marital rights. Such seems to be the well-recognized doctrine in this state. In the early case of Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. loc. cit. 72, it is "It is therefore ordered by the court that at and during the regular February term, 1911, of the county court of Pike county, Mo., said above described 136-acre tract be by the then sheriff of said county sold at public sale to the highest bidder, for cash in hand, after giving notice of such sale as required by law, and that at the regular February term, 1911, of this court said sheriff make due report to said circuit court of his proceedings under this order." I. The court found against the plaintiff on her theory of there being fraud or undue influence in the making of the quitclaim deed by the plaintiff and the other three children described in the first count of the petition, and this question is not now urged here. It could not well be here under any circumstances, because the evidence in the record does not warrant such a contention. The finding of the trial court was right under the facts, and that leaves this deed and the character of the estate conveyed by it open for discussion, and that question we take next. said: "It may be conceded that, if a husband invests the separate funds of his wife in real estate and takes a deed to them jointly, a court of equity would protect her in the enjoyment of the property and declare a trust in her favor. But no such point arises in this case. This is a plain deed made to husband and wife as an advancement to her without any words securing to her sole and separate use. Under this husband as an entirety, and her heirs took view, at her death the estate remained in the nothing by descent." [3] The Garner Case was one where the character of the title was dependent solely upon the deed, and, as indicated in the opinion, there was no proof aliunde tending to [1, 2] II. The trial court found that in the purchase of this land the husband used $600 of the wife's money. This finding is borne out by the record, and we shall not disturb it. In fact, the evidence tends to show that one-half of the money used in the transaction was the wife's money. The difference would be that between $600 and $650, and wes. W. 262, Brace, P. J., said: shall not disturb the finding. Proceeding, then, upon the theory that the husband used $600 of the wife's money in procuring this show a trust estate. And such is the rule now, as we have above said. If we have in wife, we should declare an estate by the enevidence only a naked deed to husband and tirety to have been created. But, on the other hand, the rule is just as clear that by proper proof such a conveyance may be to the amounts invested by the two parties. shown to create a trust estate in proportion In Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. loc. cit. 651, 45 "It would seem to follow as a necessary sequence that if the husband invests his wife's statutory separate money in land, without her written assent, and takes the legal title jointly to himself and his wife, the title which he takes to himself will be held by him upon the same trust (Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68; Modrell v. Riddle, 82 Mo. 31); and where he purchases land and pays for it with the separate money of his wife in part, without her written assent authorizing him so to do, and in part with his own money, and takes the legal title jointly to himself and wife, the title which he takes to himself will be held by him upon the same trust pro tanto as the amount the separate money of the wife that was used by him in procuring the title bears to the whole of the pur chase money. Bowen v. McKean, 82 Mo. 594." Later, in McLeod v. Venable, 163 Mo. loc. cit. 545, 63 S. W. 849, Marshall, J., said: ship exist as to real estate where the land is purchased by the husband without the wife's express written consent, partly with the money of the husband, but the wife will be decreed a resulting trust in the land by a court of equity in the proportion that her money bears to the total purchase price of the land." To the same effect is Donovan et al. v. Griffith, 215 Mo. loc. cit. 166, 114 S. W. 625, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, 128 Am. St. Rep. 458, 15 Ann. Cas. 724, whereat Fox, J., said: complaints of the defendant appellant, James R. Griffith. Learned counsel for defendant insist that the conveyance of the Pritchett 40acre tract to James R. Griffith and Leona Griffith, his wife, created an estate by entirety, and became the absolute owner in fee of said 40 that upon the death of the wife the defendant acres by right of survivorship. It must be conrecord in this cause other than the conveyance ceded that, if nothing else was disclosed by the itself, the contention of counsel for the defendant would be unanswerable. The authorithe suit involves a contest as to the nature and ties are all one way on that proposition; but character of the estate created by this conveythe execution and delivery of the deed. ance, and all the facts were developed concernThat the purchase money for this land was partly furnished by the defendant, James R Griffith, and partly by money constituting the beyond dispute. We have read in detail the separate estate of the wife, the testimony shows testimony developed upon the trial, and it fully supports the finding of the court concerning the wife which was applied to the payment for the amount of money belonging to the husband and purchase of the Pritchett 40, as well as the interests of the parties in said lands. "This leads us to the consideration of the "In fact, it is more reasonable to so construe her actions. She is charged with knowledge of the law, and hence is as conclusively presumed to have known the rule announced in Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 647 [45 S. W. 261], as she is to have known that laid down in Garner v: Jones, 52 Mo. 68. Indeed it must be held that she knew that, under the facts of this case, the $1,200 was her separate property, and accrued to her after the passage of the act of 1875, and that it was invested in this land, in their joint names, by her husband, without her writing ten consent, and hence, under the rule announced in Jones v. Elkins, as well as under the exception to the common-law rule announced distinctly in Garner v. Jones, she had a trust estate in the land in the proportion of $1,200 to $3,712 which a court of equity would protect, and therefore there was no necessity for a severance of her interests from her husband's. The trial court took this view, and decreed her interest in that way, and then gave her husband one half of her interest, the whole of his own, and divided the other half of her interest among her collateral heirs." In Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. loc. cit. 118, 73 S. W. 210, 61 L. R. A. 166, 96 Am. St. Rep. 486, the same judge said: "In Missouri, since the passage of the Married Women's Acts, it has been uniformly held that if a husband invests any of his wife's separate money, acquired by her after said acts took effect and in the manner therein specified, together with money of his own in real estate in their joint names, without her express written consent so to do, it will not create an estate by the entirety, but the wife will, by a court of equity, be decreed a resulting trust in the land to the extent represented by her money. "In Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 61 [52 S. W. 27, 74 Am. St. Rep. 517], it was held that if the husband takes his wife's money, arising as aforesaid, and uses it in his business, his wife could treat him as her debtor or as her trustee as she chooses. "In all these later cases, except Winn v. Riley, the investment of the wife's separate money, with other money of the husband, was in real estate, while here it was in personal property. But this is an immaterial difference. For at common law there was no difference between the right of survivorship as to real property or as to personal chattels. And, as hereinbefore shown, section 4600, Revised Statutes 1899, excepts grants to husband and wife, and leaves the rule as to them as it was at common law, so far as real estate is concerned, and the Married Women's Acts have abolished the common-law unity of the husband and wife and placed married women, as to their separate personal, as well as their real, property, on the same footing towards their husbands as any other persons occupy towards each other. The result is that only in the other jurisdictions referred to, and according to the text-writers quoted from, but also by the more recent decisions of this court, an estate by the entirety does not arise, nor does the right of survivor "Upon the facts disclosed by the record applicable to this case, it comes directly within the rules of law announced in McLeod v. Ventrine as announced in those cases is a full and able and Jones v. Elkins, supra, and the doccomplete answer to the contention of the defendant that the deed to Griffith and wife constituted an estate by entirety. "It was expressly ruled in Jones v. Elkins, supra, that where the husband purchases land and pays for it with the separate money of his wife in part, without her written assent authorizing him so to do, and in part with his own money, and takes the legal title jointly to himself and wife, a court of equity will protect the wife in the enjoyment of her interest in the property, and declare a trust in her favor. "In McLeod v. Venable, supra, the case of Jones v. Elkins was unqualifiedly approved, and it was held that, under the rule announced in the Elkins Case, as well as under the exceptions to the common-law rule announced distinctly in Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68, and under the facts in that case, the wife had a trust estate in the land in proportion to the amount contributed by her to the full amount of the purchase money, which a court of equity would protect. An examination of those cases will demonstrate that the facts upon which the rules of law are predicated are nearly identical with the facts in the case at bar. "Counsel for defendant manifestly rely upon the case of Garner v. Jones, supra. That case, it is true, very clearly and correctly announced the rules of law applicable to estates by the entirety, and in a clear, painstaking manner sets forth the reasons upon which the doctrines of estates by the entirety are predicated. With the doctrine announced upon that subject in Garner v. Jones we have no fault to find or criticism to suggest. It is entirely in harmony with the uniform unbroken line of decisions by this court, as well as most of the courts of our sister states where the subject has been in judgment before them. However, it is apparent that defendant overlooks what was said in that case, which is strikingly applicable to the case at bar. The learned judge, after discussing the law applicable to estate by the entirety, in conclusion announced this rule in the following language: 'It may be conceded that if a husband invests the separate funds of his wife in real estate and takes a deed to them jointly, a court of equity would protect her in the enjoyment of the property and declare a trust in her favor. But no such point arises in this case.' "The cases to which I have directed attention treating of this proposition cite numerous authorities in support of the conclusions therein reached, and it is sufficient to say that, if the doctrine as announced in the cases ap plicable to this proposition are longer to be followed, then there can be but one conclusion reached upon this question, and that is that Leona Griffith, the wife of the defendant appellant, had an interest in the lands involved in this proceeding, which a court of equity would protect, and, she being dead, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the interests as designated in the written finding of the court, and the court was warranted, as was done in the case of McLeod v. Venable, supra, to decree partition and order the land to be sold and the proceeds distributed in accordance with the interests of the parties." Upon the facts found in this case and the law as declared in the cases quoted from above, it is clear that, if the wife was attacking this deed in equity, or if in the event of her death her heirs were so attacking it, there would be no question that the chancellor should say that the husband held in trust for the wife such portion of the estate as her money paid for in the first instance. In this case it would be six-thirteenths of the whole tract. But does this rule apply here? That question we take next. III. We have changed our views from those expressed in the division. We were then impressed with the view that the trial court was right when it said: "The fact of such payment was testified to by the defendant Margaret V. Ardrey as a witness in the case, testifying therein in behalf of plaintiffs, and was conceded by counsel for defendants in their briefs furnished the court. The fact of such payment prevented said quitclaim deed from creating an estate by the entirety in said William G. Ardrey and his wife. If after such conveyance Margaret V. Ardrey had died before her husband, it clearly appears that neither he nor his heirs after him could be heard to claim that he took the entire estate as surviving tenant by the entirety. If it were such estate as to one, it was to the other. It would be an estate by the entirety as to both, or as to neither. The court finds and declares, as a proposition of law that, under and by virtue of said quitclaim deed, the grantees therein took title in and to said lands as tenants in common; the said William G. Ardrey thereby becoming the owner in fee of an undivided seventhirteenths interest in said 136-acre tract, and his wife Margaret V. Ardrey thereby becoming the owner of an undivided six-thirteenths interest in said 136-acre tract, subject to the said curtesy estate therein of the said William G. Ardrey." We were impressed with the idea that if the facts of the transaction prevented it from being an estate by the entirety in the interest of the wife or her heirs, that it could not be an estate by the entirety so far as to bind the husband and his heirs. We believe now that we were wrong in the view then ex pressed, and that the judgment nisi is wrong. It will be noted that the cases cited and quoted from are cases where the deed creating the estate by the entirety is being attacked in equity by the wife or her heirs. We find no case where the husband, who has done the legal wrong, has been allowed in equity to have the character of the estate as created by the deed changed by making proof of his wrong. Nor have we found a case where his heirs were permitted to change the character of the estate fixed by the terms of the deed by making similar proof. If the husband takes the funds of the wife and invests it in lands and takes the title in his own name, a court of equity will declare a resulting trust, because not to so declare it would be to work a fraud upon the wife, and the husband has been the author of such fraud. So, too, it is upon this principle that, if the husband takes his wife's money, and, along with some of his own, buys land, taking the title in the name of the two, thus creating an estate by the entirety, that a court of equity will, at the instance of the wife, seize upon the situation, and as to her, declare that as to such proportionate part of the land as was paid for by the wife's money, a trust arises in her favor, and she is the absolute owner of such interest. But these are cases where the wife or her heirs attack the deed. And it must be remembered further that the principle invoked is that it would be a legal fraud upon the wife to permit the transaction to stand. But does it follow from this that the husband, who is the wrongdoer, can appeal to equity, or, in the event of his death, can his heirs, who stand in his shoes, invoke the aid of such court? This is the vital question in this case. We do not believe that the husband could, in equity, change the character of a deed which had been made at his instance and in wrong of the wife any more than he could attack the validity of a deed which he might have made in fraud of his creditors. His wrongdoing in either case prevents him from getting relief in equity. What would prevent him would prevent his heirs; for they stand in his shoes. That it is upon the ground of fraud that the wife and her heirs can attack a deed creating an estate by the entirety is made plain by Valliant, J., in Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. loc. cit. 483, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St: Rep. 689. For these reasons we do not believe the heirs of the husband can attack this deed, and, if not, then the wife took the whole estate upon the death of the husband. The judgment nisi did not take this view of the case. The plaintiffs were not entitled to question the character of the estate created by this deed. They could not reap a benefit from the wrongful act of the husband. The deed should have been held to have created an estate by the entirety. With this question out of the case there is nothing left in the other contentions. It follows that the judgment should be re versed, and cause remanded to be proceeded [ed in the different counts. The motion to with in accordance with the views herein ex-quash was sustained, and the state has appressed. pealed. It is so ordered. All concur. STATE v. LONG. (No. 18073.) John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., Ernest A. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jerry M. Jeffries, Pros. Atty., of Moberly, for the State. Walter Bachrach, of Chicago, Ill., E. M. Har (Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2. ber, of Trenton, and Whitecotton & Wight, June 23, 1914. Motion to Transfer to 1914.) 1. GAMING (8 63*)-STATUTORY PROVISIONS REPEAL. Rev. St. 1909, § 4776, punishing the carry ing on of a bucket shop, is not repealed by section 4781, punishing option dealing, as the sections have distinct objects, and the enactment of one has no effect on the other. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 120; Dec. Dig. § 63.*] 2. GAMING (8 63*)-STATUTORY PROVISIONSREPEAL. Rev. St. 1909, § 4782, forbidding the keeping of an office, store, or other place for dealing in options, is not repealed by Bucket Shop Law 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 236), repealing Bucket Shop Law 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 171) § 3, though the sections were the same. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 120; Dec. Dig. § 63.*] 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 275*)-GAMING (8 63*)-DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITH OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Rev. St. 1909, §§ 4780, 4781, prohibiting dealing in options, and section 4782, forbidding the keeping of an office, store, or other place for the purpose of dealing in options, do not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14 or Const. art. 2, § 30, as depriving one of his liberty and property without due process of law. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 830, 835, 839, 843-846; Dec. Dig. § 275; Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 120; Dec. Dig. 63.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; James D. Barnett, Judge. W. A. Long was indicted for crime, and the State appeals from a judgment quashing the indictment. Reversed and remanded for trial. Defendant was indicted in 25 counts, of which 18 are based on section 4782 of the Revised Statutes, forbidding the keeping of an office, store, or other place for the purpose of dealing in options. The other 7 counts are based on sections 4780 and 4781, prohibiting dealing in options. of Moberly, for respondent. ROY, C. (after stating the facts as above). [1] The bucket shop law was enacted in 1887, and was amended in 1907. As thus amended, it appears as sections 4772 to 4779, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes. The statute against option dealing was enacted in 1889, and, with amendments not important to be discussed at this time, appears as sections 4780 to 4788 of the Revised Statutes. Respondent seriously contends that section 4776 of the bucket shop law, enacted in 1907, is almost verbatim the same as 4781 of the option dealing law, enacted in 1889, and that the former section, being later in date of enactment, operates as a repeal of the latter. It should suffice to say that on its face section 4776 is a supplement to the four sections immediately preceding it. Those preceding sections are incorporated into it, and it has no force or effect except as modified by the four sections referred to. On the other hand, section 4781 is supplementary to the next preceding section. Thus sections 4776 and 4781 have distinct offices to perform, and the enactment of one has no effect on the other. of 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 171) is practically [2] II. Section 3 of the bucket shop law the same as section 4782 of the Revised Statutes 1909, prohibiting the keeping of a place for option dealing. That section was expressly repealed by the bucket shop law of 1907. Laws 1907, p. 236. Respondent contends that, as those two sections are the same, the repeal of one was a repeal of the other. We think not, and shall state our reasons. As between section 3 of the bucket shop law of 1887 and section 4782 of the Revised Statutes, of the option dealing law, enacted in 1889 (Laws 1889, p. 98), the latter, being enacted last, would supersede the former, and operate as a repeal thereof. No doubt, the only reason for expressly repealing section 3 by the act of 1907 was the fact that it had been superseded by section 4782 of our present statute. The defendant promptly moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that it did not charge any offense; that the statute on which it is based has been repealed; that the indictment and each count thereof are contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the All rules for the interpretation of statutes Constitution of the United States, and to sec- are merely for the purpose of discovering the tion 30 of article 2 of our state Constitution, legislative intent. We cannot believe that it in that it seeks to deprive defendant of his was the legislative purpose to withdraw the liberty and property without due process of ban against the keeping of an office, store, law; that the indictment is contrary to sec- or other place for dealing in options. If it tion 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the was the purpose to repeal section 4782 of the United States; and that different, seperate, Revised Statutes of 1909, there should have distinct, and inconsistent offenses are alleg-been an amendment of sections 4785 to 4788, •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes inclusive, in which that section is expressly defense that the funds were derived from a void referred to by number. tax levy. [3] III. Counsel for respondent have made [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, no attempt to cite authority on the proposi- Cent. Dig. § 387; Dec. Dig. § 130.*] 3. HIGHWAYS (§ 130*) It tion that the law is unconstitutional. ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX-DISPOSITION OF FUND. Under Const. art. 10, § 22, authorizing a township special levy of road and bridge taxes, and forbidding diversion to any other purpose, the road and bridge taxes levied and collected The judgment is reversed, and the cause by a township from citizens living within the remanded for trial. WILLIAMS, C., concurs. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of ROY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All concur, except FARIS, J., not sitting. STATE V. LONG. (No. 18072.) (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. June 23, 1914. Motion to Transfer to Court in Banc Overruled July 14, 1914.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; James D. Barnett, Judge. W. A. Long was indicted for crime, and, from a judgment quashing the indictment, the State appeals. Reversed and remanded for trial. John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., Ernest A. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jerry M. Jeffries, Pros. Atty., of Moberly, for the State. Walter Bachrach, of Chicago, Ill., E. M. Harber, of Trenton, and Whitecotton & Wight, of Moberly, for respondent. ROY, C. The facts so far as necessary to be stated are the same in this case as in another case just decided against the same defendant, 169 S. W. 11, and, in accordance with the opinlon in that case, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for trial. WILLIAMS, C., concurs. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of ROY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All concur, except FARIS, J., not sitting. LAMAR TP. v. CITY OF LAMAR. (No. 18020.) corporate limits of a city comprised within the township belong to the township, and not to the city. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 387; Dec. Dig. § 130.*] 4. HIGHWAYS (§ 122*) ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX-DISPOSITION OF FUND. To construe Rev. St. 1909, § 11767, to authorize a township to pay over to a city road and bridge taxes collected from citizens living within the corporate limits of the city would render it violative of Const. art. 4, § 46, prohibiting the General Assembly from making a grant of public money to a municipal corpora tion. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 380, 393; Dec. Dig. § 122.*] 5. HIGHWAYS (§ 130*) ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX-WRONGFUL DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT TO RECOVER. Where the officers of a township, under a mistake of law, wrongfully pay over road and corporate limits are within the township, the bridge funds to the treasurer of a city whose township may recover the amount of such funds from the city. Cent. Dig. § 387; Dec. Dig. § 130.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 4; Dec. Dig. § 1.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 4933-4951; vol. 8, p. 7737.] Appeal from Circuit Court, Barton Coun (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. ty; B. G. Thurman, Judge. July 14, 1914.) 1. COURTS (§ 231*)-JURISDICTION-SUPREME COURT-CONSTRUCTION OF REVENUE LAWS. Since an action by a township against a city for road and bridge funds levied and collected in the township and wrongfully paid over by the township officers to the city treasurer was an action involving a construction of the revenue laws, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction thereof on appeal. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 487, 491, 644, 646-648, 650, 652659, 661; Dec. Dig. § 231.*] 2. HIGHWAYS (§ 130*) ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX-WRONGFUL DISTRIBUTION-ACTION TO RECOVER FUND-DEFENSE-ILLEGALITY TAX. Action by Lamar Township against the City of Lamar. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. J. B. McGilvray, of Kansas City, and Edwin L. Moore, of Lamar, for appellant. H. W. Timmonds, of Lamar, for respondent. FARIS, J. [1] This is an appeal from the circuit court of Barton county. risdiction because the case involves a conWe get justruction of the revenue laws. State ex rel. v. Adkins, 221 Mo. 112, 119 S. W. 1091; State ex rel. v. Hawkins, 169 Mo. 615, 70 S. W. 119; St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo. 472, 29 S. W. 579; Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155, 11 S. W. 48. The learned trial judge with commendable *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes |