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BRIEFS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 768, 770.

BROKERS.

IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN. § 45 (Ark.) Where an applicant for a loan wrote the agent that he had procured the loan elsewhere, to which the agent replied that that was satisfactory provided the applicant made another loan through him in the future, but later the agent's company refused to make the later loan, the agent could not recover commission, for the former loan.-Stogsdill v. Holmes, 169 S. W. 961.

§ 49 (Ky.) A broker employed to sell defendant's farm "of 160 acres" for $8,800 was not entitled to recover commissions on procuring a buyer who would pay $55 per acre; there being, in fact, but 139 acres in the farm.-Gore v. Griffith Realty Co., 169 S. W. 685.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES, § 23 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action to cancel a deed on the ground of defendant's fraudulent representations as to the indebtedness on the stock of goods given in exchange, held that, as it was impossible to place the parties in statu quo, judgment was properly rendered for defendant.-Paschal v. Hudson, 169 S. W. 911. § 25 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant, in an action to cancel a deed on the ground of fraud, cannot plead plaintiff's fraud to defeat a recovery.Paschal v. Hudson, 169 S. W. 911.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. § 59 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant, in an has paid out money by reason of plaintiff's fraud action to cancel a deed on the ground of fraud, he may plead that fact and have it adjudicated in case a rescission is decreed.-Paschal v. Hudson, 169 S. W. 911.

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE.

§ 54 (Ky.) A real estate broker cannot recover commissions unless he furnishes a purchaser See Rape; Seduction, §§ 34, 49. who is ready, able, and willing to purchase at the price proposed.-Gore v. Griffith Realty Co., 169 S. W. 685.

V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION.

§ 86 (Ky.) In an action for a percentage of profits claimed to be due a broker on account of a purchase and sale of lands, a judgment, finding that the broker did not retain part of the purchase price at the subsequent sale as a commission, held authorized by the evidence.— Mann Bros. v. Reichert's Ex'x, 169 S. W. 707. VI. RIGHTS, POWERS, AND LIABILI

TIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS.

§ 105 (Ky.) Purchasers of land held not chargeable with knowledge of a broker as to bad faith of vendor.-Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 169 S. W. 535.

BUCKET SHOPS.

See Gaming, § 63.

BURGLARY.

See Witnesses, § 52.

I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY
THEREFOR.

§ 9 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 1162, construed liberally as required by section 460, the offense of housebreaking may be committed by an entry without breaking and a breaking out.-Lawson v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 587.

II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. $41 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of burglary of a storehouse.O'Fallin v. State, 169 S. W. 897.

CARRIERS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 1050, 1056; Commerce, 88 8, 14, 58; Courts, § 169; Evidence, 88 471, 514; Intoxicating Liquors, § 238; Justices of the Peace, § 119; Negligence, $ 97; Sales, § 418; Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 3, 54; Trial, §§ 194, 260, 296; Venue, § 22. I. CONTROL AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS.

(B) Interstate and International Trans

portation.

§ 30 (Ky.) Where a carrier has filed interstate rates graduated according to value of the articles shipped, the shipper's valuation automatically fixes the rate, though the difference in rates is not called to the shipper's attention.Robinson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 169 S. W. 831.

Where a carrier had no joint rates over its line and that of a connecting carrier, but the rates of each were duly published, that no through rates were published did not relieve the shipper of notice of the connecting local rates based on valuation.-Id.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

(A) Delivery to Carrier.

of railroads to furnish reasonable facilities $40 (Tex.Civ.App.) It is a common-law duty for the transaction of public business.-Crosbyton-Southplains R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 169 S. W. 1038.

(B) Bills of Lading, Shipping Receipts, and Special Contracts.

$68 (Tex.Civ.App.) A consignor of goods, which had been loaded and for which a bill of lading had been issued to his agent, as consign

§ 42 (Tex.Cr.App.) Recent possession of stol-ee, before any new interest had intervened, and en property, to sustain a conviction of burglary alone, must be exclusive in accused or those connected with the burglary.-O'Fallin v. State, 169 S. W. 897.

§ 46 (Tex.Cr.App.) On trial for stealing harness, found in defendant's possession, instructions held to have sufficiently submitted his defensive plea that he purchased the harness from a trader.-Whitfill v. State, 169 S. W. 681. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 715, 1066; Attachment, § 381; Carriers, § 68; Corporations, § 548; Deeds, §§ 17, 211; Drains, § 91; Equity, § 199; Estoppel, § 94; Pleading, § 258; Public Lands, § 173; Quieting Title; Taxation, $$ 799, 810.

subject to the carrier's claim for full freight, had the right to cancel the contract of shipment and to require a redelivery.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Hargrove, 169 S. W. 925.

(D) Transportation and Delivery by Carrier.

$94 (Tex.Civ.App.) A consignor whose goods had been loaded and for which a bill of lading had been issued to his agent, as consignee, on

the carrier's refusal to redeliver them at the

place of shipment, held entitled to recover the difference, if any, between their market value there and when they were delivered at destination.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Hargrove, 169 S. W. 925.

Petition alleging ownership of goods shipped under a bill of lading to the shipper's agent as

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

consignee, a demand and a refusal to redeliver | depreciation in value of each animal not in exbefore the goods had left the point of shipment, cess of such cost, and in no event in excess of without alleging a tender of the bill of lading or $100.-H. E. Wilson & Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. an offer to pay the freight, held to state a good Co., 169 S. W. 311. cause of action for damages.-Id.

On refusal of carrier's agent to halt on request a shipment of goods and redeliver them without any demand by him for the bill of lading or denial of the consignor's ownership, held that the failure to tender the bill of lading was immaterial to the consignor's right of action for damages.-Id.

$218 (Tenn.) While a consignee of poultry, which was injured by defendant's delay, cannot recover for the physical injuries to the birds unless he gives notice before delivery, as required by the bill of lading, he may recover for damages occasioned by the depreciation in the market price before delivery.-Jett & Brooks v. Southern Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 767.

to furnish proper cars for the transportation of $218 (Tex.Civ.App.) A carrier, having failed cattle and to see that they were securely fastened, held not relieved from liability for the escape of the cattle from the cars by a stipula tion in the contract binding the shipper to infastened, and report any defect therein.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boger, 169 S. W. 1093.

(E) Delay in Transportation or Delivery § 105 (Tenn.) A carrier is liable for loss on the value of property intrusted to it for transportation, which results from a decline in the market price pending the carrier's negligent delay in forwarding the consignment to its destina-spect the cars, see that they were properly tion.-Jett & Brooks v. Southern Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 767.

(F) Loss of or Injury to Goods.

§ 135 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a private car never reached its destination through the negligence of connecting carriers, but the carrier was not informed that the car was to be loaded for plaintiff's business, plaintiff could not recover for loss of profits from failure to receive the freight. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Houston Packing Co., 169 S. W. 642.

(H) Limitation of Liability.

§ 147 (Tex.Civ.App.) In Texas, by statute, a common carrier may not limit by contract its common-law liability as to domestic shipments, nor can it contract to relieve itself from its common-law liability for damages occasioned by its negligence.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boger, 169 S. W. 1093.

(I) Connecting Carriers.

§ 180 (Tex.Civ.App.) A stipulation of a contract made by a connecting carrier in the course of transportation under a through contract of shipment was violative of Interstate Commerce Act, § 20, as amended by Act June 29, 1906, § 7, where it attempted to exempt the carriers from liability in case a claim was not filed within 30 days from date of injury, and hence was not enforceable.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 169 S. W. 1035.

III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK. $209 (Tex. Civ.App.) A railroad carrier must furnish cars suitable to transport cattle, and cannot shield itself by proving that the shipper contracted to inspect the cars furnished and reject them if improper.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boger, 169 S. W. 1093.

as

$211 (Tex.Civ.App.) "Feed and water," used in Rev. St. 1895, art. 326 (now Rev. St. 1911, art. 714), requiring a carrier to feed and water stock during transit unless otherwise contracted for, refers to the internal necessities of the animal, and a contract for the shipment of hogs, requiring the shipper to feed and water the hogs, did not relieve the carrier from the duty to flush the hogs if necessary to prevent injury from overheating.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Morrison, 169 S. W. 1098.

$215 (Tex.Civ.App.) A carrier is an insurer of the safe transportation of animals delivered to it for carriage, unless the loss results from act of God, act of the owner, the proper vice of the animals, or the public enemy, subject to the exception provided by Rev. St. 1895, art. 326 (now Rev. St. 1911, art. 714).-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Morrison, 169 S. W. 1098.

§ 218 (Tenn.) Where a contract for the transportation of horses provided that the value of each should not exceed $100, and that the carrier's liability should not exceed the actual cost at point of shipment or the contract valuation, the owner's measure of damages was the

Where a carrier undertook to bed cattle cars before the cattle were loaded or the shipping contract signed, it could not rely on a provision of the contract subsequently executed to relieve it from liability for a failure to provide proper bedding.-Id.

$218 (Tex.Civ.App.) The statute providing that carriers shall not restrict their commonlaw liability held applicable to the transportation of live stock.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Morrison, 169 S. W. 1098.

§ 227 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for damages for injuries to a shipment of live stock, evidence of the intrinsic value of the stock at the place of destination is admissible under a general allegation as to their value at such place, where there was no market at the point. -International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Parke, 169 S. W. 397.

§ 227 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's cattle were injured as the result of a failure to properly bed the cars, and the carrier pleaded that the shipping contract required the shipper to bed the cars, the answer was defective for failure to further allege that the shipper was given an opportunity to do so, and that, if the cars were not properly bedded, it was through his default.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boger, 169 S. W. 1093.

Where the contract with the initial carrier provided for notice of claim within 91 days, and it was not alleged that two of the carriers did not acquiesce in the through bill of lading, it was binding on them, as provided by Rev. St. 1911, arts. 731, 732; and hence an allegation that their contracts provided for notice within 120 days, followed by introduction of the 91-day contract, constituted a variance.-Id.

§ 228 (Tenn.) Where a contract provided that the carrier's liability should not exceed actual cost of horses at the point of shipment, such cost was sufficiently proven by proving the market value at that point, in the absence of proof that the horses were purchased below the market value.-H. E. Wilson & Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 169 S. W. 311.

§ 229 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for damages to a shipment of live stock, some of which died, the measure of damages is the value of the stock at the time at which it should have been delivered, which value, if there is a market at the place of destination, will be measured by the market value, and, if not, by the intrinsic value.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Parke, 169 S. W. 397.

§ 230 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where there was an unreasonable delay in shipping plaintiff's horses, and evidence that the delay tended to cause them to contract "shipper's cold," a request to charge that there should be a verdict for defendant if the horses were damaged by such disease, without reference to the causes thereof, was properly refused.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Meadors, 169 S. W. 1106.

IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (A) Relation Between Carrier and Pas

senger.

$238 (Tenn.) Plaintiff, who boarded detoured train knowing that company's rules forbade carriage of local passengers on such train, held not a passenger, and not entitled to be carried. -Southern Ry. Co. v. McNabb, 169 S. W. 757. One who procures a ticket and procures passage upon a railway train by fraudulent misrepresentations is not a passenger, but a trespasser.-Id.

$247 (Ark.) A person entering a coach before the train was made up for the purpose of taking passage thereon_held a passenger.-St. Louis South Western Ry. Co. v. Overton, 169 S. W.

364.

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(B) Fares, Tickets, and Special Contracts. § 254 (Mo.) That a contract between a railroad company and a shipper of household goods and live stock required the shipper to feed and water the stock does not avoid other provisions of the contract requiring the shipper to ride in the caboose at all times the train is in motion. -Scrivner v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 83.

$ 261 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Pen. Code 1911. arts. 1527, 1528, 1529, relative to redemption of unused railroad tickets, company held entitled to provide a channel or employ processes of disbursement most orderly to it, and not liable for penalty for agent's refusal to pay redeemable value immediately upon presentation without forwarding it to the auditor pursuant to a rule of the company.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Beaird, 169 S. W. 1050.

ers who have a right to go there.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 169 S. W. 786. $314 (Mo.) In an action by a shipper of live stock injured while riding in the freight car instead of the caboose, waiver of the provision of the contract, whereby the railroad company required him to ride in the caboose, must be pleaded. Scrivner v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 83.

§ 315 (Mo.) In an action by one injured while riding in a freight car, evidence that he was there riding to protect his property held inadmissible under the reply.-Scrivner v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 83.

$318 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by a passenger hurt in a fall from a train, caused by stumbling over a box left on the platform, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that servants of the railroad company were negligent in placing the box on the dimly lighted platform.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Battle, 169 S. W. 1048.

§ 319 (Ark.) In an action for injuries to a passenger by falling on the steps leading from the depot platform to the ground, a verdict allowing her administrator $1,500 held not so excessive as to justify interference by the Supreme Court.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 169 S. W. 786.

§ 320 (Ark.) Where a passenger fell on the steps leading from a depot platform after she had alighted from a train, and was injured, evidence held to require submission of the question S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 169 S. W. 786. of the carrier's negligence.-St. Louis, I. M. &

$320 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a personal injury action by a passenger, who fell from a train when he stumbled over a box left on a dimly lighted platform, the question of his contributory negligence held, under the evidence, for the jury.Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Battle, 169 S. W.

1048.

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§ 347 (Ark.) Where defendant's depot platform was surrounded by a retaining wall, which (C) Performance of Contract of Trans- projected four or five inches above the floor at

portation.

§ 267 (Tenn.) Rule that local passengers would not be carried on detoured trains held reasonable and within the rights of the railway company, and its enforcement did not render the company liable in damages, though local train was two hours late.-Southern Ry. Co. v. McNabb, 169 S. W. 757.

Railway companies may adopt, and in a lawful and proper manner enforce, reasonable regulations, not in contravention of law or public policy, for the carriage of freight and passengers and the transaction of their business generally, and may decline to accept as a passenger a person who refuses or fails to comply with

such rules.-Id.

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the place where steps were provided to reach the ground, and decedent, after debarking from a train, caught her foot on the projection and fell, she was not negligent, as a matter of law.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 169 S. W. 786.

entitled to an instruction to find for it, if the § 348 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant carrier held had he not been under the influence of liquor.passenger would not have fallen from the coach St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Christian, 169 S. W. 1102.

In an action for injuries to an intoxicated passenger by a fall from the open vestibule of a railroad coach, instructions given held not to present the isolated question of plaintiff's intoxication as a contributing cause as explicitly as defendant had a right to demand.-Id. (F) Ejection of Passengers and Intruders. § 355 (Ky.) The conductor may eject a pasfare after a proper demand.-Chesapeake & O. senger failing to tender a ticket or to pay Ry. Co. v. Friend, 169 S. W. 509.

carrier was authorized to eject a passenger for § 381 (Ky.) Evidence held to show that a nonproduction of ticket or fare.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Friend, 169 S. W. 509.

§ 280 (Ark.) A passenger on a mixed train assumes the risks reasonably incident to travel thereon, though the carrier assumes as to him the same high degree of care to protect him from injury as if he were on a passenger train subject to the necessary difference in their operation.-St. Louis South Western Ry. Co. v. Över- See Taxation, § 855. ton, 169 S. W. 364.

§ 286 (Ark.) A railroad company must exercise ordinary care to keep its platform in a safe

CAVEAT EMPTOR.

CERTIFICATE.

condition for the use of its passengers and oth- See Elections, § 139; Evidence, § 342.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (8) NUMBER

CERTIORARI.

CHOSE IN ACTION.

See Justices of the Peace, § 196; Taxation, § See Assignments. 597.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.

§ 16 (Tenn.) Under Acts 1907, c. 82, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to issue certiorari to review an order of the Court of Civil Appeals overruling a motion to discharge a writ of supersedeas, theretofore issued by that court to supersede an injunction granted by the chancery court.-Sharp v. Rose, 169 S. W. 765.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

See Evidence, § 587.

CLAIMS.

See Executors and Administrators, § 272; Receivers, 155.

CLASSIFICATION.

CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.
87 (Ky.) A conveyance made at a time when
the land was in the actual adverse possession of
defendants and largely under fence held cham- See Quieting Title.
pertous under Ky. St. § 210.-Begley v. Valen-
tine, 169 S. W. 1026.

See Municipal Corporations, § 71.
CLOUD ON TITLE.

See Equity.

CHANCERY.

CHANGE OF VENUE.

COLLATERAL ATTACK.

See Judgment, §§ 495, 518.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.

See Conspiracy, § 1; Counties, §§ 1531⁄2, 162. § 8 (Mo.) A denominational college, whose

See Criminal Law, §§ 126, 134; Venue, § 50. charter forbade any religious test for its in

CHARACTER.

See Witnesses, §§ 337-361.

CHARGE.

structors, engaging plaintiff as a member of its faculty, with power to remove him when in its judgment the interest of the college required it, held justified in removing him after his acts and conduct had subjected him to attacks on the ground of unsound religious views and un

To jury, see Criminal Law, §§ 763-829; Trial, fitness to teach, as to which he engaged in a §§ 186-296.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

See Sales, § 464.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Transfers of Chattels as Security.

§6 (Ky.) Under a provision in a contract of sale against passing of title to the buyer until after payment in full, the title passes and the transaction becomes a sale with a mortgage back.-Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Beuris, 169 S. W. 986.

(D) Validity.

§ 73 (Ky.) A provision in a contract of sale, construed as a sale with a mortgage back for the purchase price, authorizing the seller to retake possession upon default in payment, is not contrary to public policy; but, upon retaking possession, the seller holds it as the property of the buyer for the purpose only of paying the debt.-Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Beuris, 169 S. W. 986.

IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES.

§ 166 (Ky.) The seller of personal property, reserving title until payment and having a mortgage back for the purchase price, after lawfully retaking possession of the property, and if so provided in the contract, may sell it upon notice to the owner; such procedure not violating Civ. Code Proc. § 375, forbidding the foreclosure of a mortgage.-Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Beuris, 169 S. W. 986.

§ 169 (Ky.) The seller of a piano under a contract reserving title and providing for a retaking, but not for a resale, on retaking possession, held it as the property of the buyer, and upon a resale, without notice, was guilty of a conversion and liable to the buyer for its actual value, less the balance due.-Montenegro-Richm Music Co. v. Beuris, 169 S. W. 986.

CHILDREN.

See Bastards; Infants; Parent and Child.

public controversy.-Darrow v. Briggs, 169 S. W. 118.

COLOR OF TITLE.

See Adverse Possession.

COMBINATIONS.

See Monopolies.

COMMERCE.

See Carriers; Constitutional Law, § 43; Corporations, § 636.

I. POWER TO REGULATE IN GENERAL.

$8 (Ky.) The interstate commerce act and its amendments supersede all regulations of particular states as to interstate transportation contracts, including Const. § 196, prohibiting a carrier from contracting for relief against its common-law liability.-Robinson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 169 S. W. 831.

§ 13 (Mo.) Foreign and domestic corporations engaged in manufacturing and selling lumber at wholesale are, when forming a conspiracy to limit the output and fix the price for lumber to be sold in the state, guilty, of violating the ground that their acts are governed by the instate anti-trust law, and cannot defend on the General v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 169 S. W. terstate commerce law.-State ex inf. Attorney

145.

$14 (Ky.) The Webb-Kenyon Act, relative to the interstate shipment of intoxicating liquor, is not violated where the liquor is intended for the personal use of the consignee.-Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 602.

Under the Webb-Kenyon Act interstate shiplation of state laws are not protected by the ments of intoxicating liquor to be used in viofederal Constitution, and may be punished by the states when in violation of their laws.—ld.

II. SUBJECTS OF REGULATION. § 27 (Ky.) A section hand, injured while engaged in preparing the track of defendant railway for use in interstate commerce, is within the federal Employers' Liability Act.-Trues

dell v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 471.

§ 40 (Tenn.) One who sells intoxicating liquors solely in interstate commerce does not violate local prohibitory laws because he did not purchase his liquors in interstate commerce; the sale and not, the purchase of liquors being prohibited. State v. Chadwell, 169 S. W. 1170. III. MEANS AND METHODS OF REG

ULATION.

§ 58 (Tex.Civ.App.) A state regulation, which required a railroad company to stop through trains engaged in interstate commerce at a particular point, was not invalid as an interference with interstate commerce, where the railroad company, as a public carrier, owed the inhabitants of that locality the duty of stopping its trains there.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 169 S. W. 385.

Prosecuting Attorneys, § 5; Eminent Domain, §§ 2, 71, 303; Improvements, § 4; Municipal Corporations, § 186; Officers, § 100; Prisons, § 8; Receivers, §§ 155-199.

COMPETENCY.

See Evidence, §§ 150, 155, 222, 536, 5391⁄2;
Witnesses, §§ 52-211.

COMPLAINT.

See Indictment and Information; Pleading.
COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS.
See Compromise and Settlement.

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
See Evidence, §§ 213, 214.

Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6676, subd. 2, the $11 (Ky.) A contract of settlement of a suit Railroad Commission has jurisdiction to order a to clear the title of certain coal land construed. railroad company to stop through trains engaged-Dotson v. Patterson, 169 S. W. 497. in interstate commerce at a county seat station, where the stopping of such trains is necessary to furnish the inhabitants of that locality with adequate train service.-id.

§ 24 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for amount due on labor contract, held that it was a question for the jury whether there had been a binding settlement between the parties.-Aycock v. Ross, 169 S. W. 1037.

CONCLUSION.

$59 (Ark.) Kirby's Dig. § 7947, authorizing recovery for mental anguish for delay in delivering a death message, held inapplicable to a message sent from Arkansas to Oklahoma, where such was not the law, since to so apply it would See Evidence, § 471. be an invalid restriction on interstate commerce. -Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Compton, 169 S. W. 946.

CONCLUSIVENESS.

See Judgment, §§ 688-715.

CONDEMNATION.

§ 60 (Ark.) Where liquor was ordered by intestate in Arkansas from a dramshop keeper in Missouri, where sales on credit were declared void by Rev. St. Mo. 1909, § 7189, there was no See Eminent Domain. interference with interstate commerce.-Landrum v. Lindsey, 169 S. W. 801.

CONDITIONAL SALES.

See Sales, § 464.

CONDITIONS.

$61 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 2569a, relative to the transportation of intoxicating liquors, is constitutional and operative as to intrastate shipments, but not as to interstate shipments prior to the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act.-Adams See Deeds, §§ 156, 160, 165, 166, 168. Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 603. The Webb-Kenyon Act is a valid exercise of

the power to regulate interstate commerce con

CONFESSION.

ferred on Congress by Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, See Criminal Law, §§ 519, 528. subsec. 3.-Id.

COMMERCIAL PAPER.

See Bills and Notes.

COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONERS.

See Banks and Banking, § 77; Commerce, § 58;

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Dower, § 2; Exemptions, §§ 2, 134: Intoxicating Liquors, § 326; Negligence, § 1031⁄2; Partnership, § 111; Property, § 6.

CONNECTING CARRIERS.

Constitutional Law, §§ 62, 297; Judicial Sales, See Carriers, § 180.
§ 61; Prisons, § 7; Public Lands, § 172;
Railroads, $$ 9, 10, 58, 216; Reference, $$
47, 100; Schools and School Districts, § 37.

COMMISSIONS.

See Brokers, §§ 45-54.

COMMITTEE.

See Insane Persons, §§ 29, 38.
COMMON CARRIERS.

See Carriers.

COMMON LAW.

See Carriers, §§ 40, 147; Death, § 9.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

See Husband and Wife, § 262.

COMPENSATION.

See Attorney and Client. §§ 123, 150; Brokers, §§ 45-86; Counties, §§ 69, 70; District and

CONSIDERATION.

See Deeds, §§ 17, 210; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 95.

CONSPIRACY.

See Commerce, § 13; Indictment and Information, § 124; Monopolies, §§ 12, 26; Pleading, § 64; Witnesses, § 52.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY.

(A) Acts Constituting Conspiracy and Liability Therefor.

§ (Mo.) Where the act of the individual defendants, as trustees of defendant college, in removing plaintiff from his position as a member of its faculty was justified by the terms of plaintiff's employment and by the charter of the college, no civil action could be maintained against them for conspiracy.-Darrow v. Briggs, 169 S. W. 118.

A civil action against several for conspiracy can only be sustained against them, where the acts complained of would sustain an action

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

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