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V. COURTS OF PROBATE JURISDIC-
TION.

§ 202 (Tenn.) While Shannon's Code, § 387, provides for a probate court in Shelby county, and for appeals therefrom to the Supreme court, yet since the creation of the court of civil appeals by Acts 1907, c. 82, appeals should be taken from the probate court to the Court of Civil Appeals, where the amount in controversy is within that tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction. -Gaines v. Eason, 169 S. W. 309.

VI. COURTS OF APPELLATE JURIS

DICTION.

(B) Courts of Particular States.

§ 223 (Ky.) In a suit to restrain the collection of a tax, the right to tax is the thing in controversy; and hence an appeal lies to the Court of Appeals, though the amount sought to be collected is less than $200.-Saunders v. City of Flemingsburg, 169 S. W. 575.

§ 231 (Mo.) Since an action by a township against a city for road and bridge funds levied and collected in the township, and wrongfully paid over by the township officers to the city treasurer, was an action involving a construction of the revenue laws, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction thereof on appeal.-Lamar Tp. v. City of Lamar, 169 S. W. 12.

COVENANTS.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA

TION.

(B) Covenants of Title.

§ 39 (Ky.) Where beneficiary of a deed to a trustee had previously taken an option to purchase, at which time the trustee, as his attorney, was informed of a sale of standing timber, he could not assert his ignorance of such sale in support of his claim of breach of warranty. -Sansom v. Ewell, 169 S. W. 571.

CREDIBILITY.

See Witnesses, §§ 337-410.

CREDITORS.

V. VENUE.

(A) Place of Bringing Prosecution. $110 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was charged as an accomplice to the commission of an abortion in P. county, venue was properly laid there, though the acts charged against accused were committed in another county.-Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411.

(B) Change of Venue.

§ 126 (Ky.) The refusal of a change of venue was not an abuse of discretion, where the evidence in support of the application was based on irresponsible talk and belief that defendant would be at a disadvantage because he, a negro, killed two white men.-Stroud v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 1021.

§ 126 (Tex.Cr.App.) Facts held to entitle defendant to a change of venue for prejudice of the inhabitants.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299.

Const. art. 1, § 10, guaranteeing to accused a trial by an impartial jury, means that the court shall not put accused to trial in a county unsentiment are such that the court can give abless the circumstances and conditions of public solute assurance that no sentiment against accused will creep into the jury box.—Id.

§ 134 (Ky.) An accused seeking a change of venue on the ground of local prejudice has the burden of showing such a state of public opinion as would indicate a reasonable probability of his being unable to obtain an impartial trial. -Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

IX. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS, AND
NOLLE PROSEQUI OR DISCON-
TINUANCE.

§ 274 (Ark.) In a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, refusal to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty, because of defendant's inability to obtain counsel and his allegation that the assault was in self-defense, held not an abuse of the trial court's discretion; defendant having made no application for the appointment of counsel, under Kirby's Dig. § 2273.-Cox v. State, 169 S. W. 789.

See Attachment; Bankruptcy; Fraudulent Con- (A) Judicial

veyances.

CRIMINAL LAW.

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§ 304 (Ky.) In view of Cr. Code Prac. § 137, and Ky. St. § 460, the courts will take judicial See Abortion; Bail; Burglary; Conspiracy, 88 notice that an indictment alleging the unlawful 40, 43; Constitutional Law, §§ 62, 270; Coun- prescribing of morphine charges an offense deties, § 139; Disorderly House; False Persona-nounced by Acts 1912, c. 86, regulating the pretion; Fines; Gaming; Homicide; Incest; 169 S. W. 514. scribing of opium.-Commonwealth v. Gabhart, Indictment and Information; Intoxicating Liquors, $$ 146-238; Libel and Slander, § § 304 (Tex.Cr.App.) The Court of Criminal 159; Municipal Corporations, § 1042; Ob- Appeals takes judicial notice of the terms of structing Justice, § 5; Pardon, § 2; Prisons; the district court of a county.-Knowlton v. Prostitution; Rape; Seduction; Threats; Va- State, 169 S. W. 674. grancy; Weapons; Witnesses, § 277.

III. PARTIES TO OFFENSES. § 69 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 79, defining "accomplice," an accessory before the fact is no longer an accessory, but an accomplice.-Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411. Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 87, declaring that the relations of accused in the ascending or descending lines by consanguinity or affinity cannot be accessories, a stepfather in aiding and counseling an abortion on his stepdaughter could not be an accessory.-Id.

$80 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution against an accomplice, evidence to prove the guilt of the principal is admissible, the burden being on the state to prove the principal's guilt to the same extent as though he was on trial.-Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411.

(B) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues, and Res Gestæ.

8351 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence of a judgment nisi on a bail bond of accused because of his failure to appear for trial held inadmissible as evidence of flight.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299.

Where there was no evidence that defendant's trip to another state while on bail was with intent not to return in time for trial, evidence of an apology made by him to one of his bondsmen on his return for trial held inadmissible. -Id.

$ 351 (Tex.Cr.App.) Testimony of a threat to resist arrest held admissible, regardless of whether it constituted a part of the res gestæ. -Walker v. State, 169 S. W. 1156.

$ 363 (Ark.) "Res gesta" defined.-Spivey v. State, 169 S. W. 949.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

§ 363 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for hom- | grandparents and that the officers acted on a icide, evidence as to what was said and done statement obtained from prosecutrix before she between the parties from the time they first was in communication with her sister and her came in view of each other at the time of the husband.-Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411. killing, that defendant thereafter retired with a six-shooter in each hand and resisted arrest and shot the constable, was admissible as res gestæ. -Lamb v. State, 169 S. W. 1158.

§ 366 (Ark.) In a prosecution for murder against the wife and stepson of deceased, notes of deceased to his daughter and entries in his diary within two days of his death held inad- | missible as part of the res gestæ, because narratives of past events and mere suspicions indicating his feeling toward defendants, though his declaration that he was going to their house was admissible.-Spivey v. State, 169 S. W. 949.

§ 368 (Tex.Cr.App.) In the trial of one charged as accomplice to murder, declarations of the principal which are part of the res geste of the killing are admissible.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

(C) Other Offenses, and Character of Ac

cused.

§ 369 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for incest, prior acts of intercourse between the parties, a stepfather and his young stepdaughter, are admissible as original evidence.-Vickers v. State, 169 S. W. 669.

$ 376 (Ky.) Until a defendant offers evidence of his general reputation, to create an inference that he did not commit the crime charged, the state may not show his reputation for immorality, except to impeach him as a witness.-Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

$378 (Ky.) Where a person accused of crime offers evidence of his good reputation, the state, in rebutting such evidence, is confined to his reputation at or prior to the commission of the crime.-Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W.

879.

$396 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused having sought to show by cross-examination of the state's witness that there was, intense hostility between defendant and deceased, the state was entitled to prove the contrary.-Lamb v. State, 169 S. W. 1158.

(F) Admissions, Declarations, and Hear

say.

a

accused prior to the event which tend to show
8412 (Tex.Cr.App.) Acts and declarations of
his state of mind or mental status are admissible
in a prosecution for an offense of which intent
is a material element.-Brown v. State, 169 S.
W. 437.
$413 (Tex.Cr.App.) In
wife murder, declarations by accused long prior
prosecution for
to the killing, that he had saved his wife from
drowning, and that he would not permit her to
drive a horse because it would kill her, and
that she became angry about it, were self-serv
ing and inadmissible.-Brown v. State, 169 S.
W. 437.

by accused several hours after the alleged of-
$413 (Tex.Cr.App.) Self-serving declarations
fense are inadmissible.-Cyrus v. State, 169
S. W. 679.

A statement by accused to an officer several hours after the alleged offense is not admissible in his behalf merely because he was warned at the time that what he said might be used against him, and where the state did not seek to elicit any part of the statement.--Id.

(H) Documentary Evidence and Exclusion of Parol Evidence Thereby.

§ 429 (Ark.) In a prosecution for murder against the wife and stepson of deceased, the proceedings in the wife's divorce suit, including her complaint and the answer and cross-com

(D) Materiality and Competency in Gen- plaint of deceased therein, were inadmissible.

eral.

§ 386 (Ark.) There was no reversible error in allowing a sheriff to testify that he went to a certain place to get the defendant, since he was merely stating what he did through his deputy as a fact which he knew.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341.

§ 386 (Ark.) In a prosecution for murder, evidence of a telephone communication to deceased from his wife, one of the defendants, saying that he was not to come that night, identified through the telephone exchange as a conversation between them, held admissible.-Spivey v.

State, 169 S. W. 949.

§ 386 (Ky.) Where a continuance for absence of witnesses was denied, and the affidavit alleged certain conclusions as to what the witnesses would testify as to an alleged witness for the commonwealth, who was not introduced in chief, the court did not err in excluding the affidavit as a part of defendants' main case.Lawson v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 587. $388 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence of experiments to determine whether a dent could be made in the wall of the room where decedent was killed, by the iron bar with which she was killed, in the hands of a person standing in the position where accused claimed the person that killed deceased stood at the time, held not rendered inadmissible because of accused's testimony that the bed across which the blow was struck had been slightly moved in the meantime.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

$396 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where, defendant claimed that his prosecution as accomplice to abortion was the malicious act of prosecutrix's brother-in-law, the court properly permitted the state to show that before her sister disclosed the facts she was advised to do so by her

Spivey v. State, 169 S. W. 949.

$ 430 (Ky.) A copy of a United States government license, taken from the books of the collector of internal revenue and certified by him, is competent evidence in a prosecution for having intoxicating liquors for the purpose of sale in local option territory, without further authentication.-Gossett v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 478.

fendant's handwriting and as to letters written § 444 (Ark.) Testimony of a witness as to deby him held to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the prosecuting witness authenticating the letters to allow their admission.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341.

(I) Opinion Evidence.

$448 (Tex.Cr.App.) A witness, who stated the distance from her home to the store burglarized and the length of time elapsing after accused had left her at home until shots were fired, could not give her opinion as to whether accused could have reached the store after leaving her.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 897.

(K) Confessions.

$519 (Ark.) A confession made without any official inducement, either from hope or fear and in the absence of any threat, held admissible as a voluntary confession.-Strong v. State, 169 S. W. 1189.

§ 528 (Tex.Cr.App.) In the trial of one charged as accomplice to murder, declarations made by the principal are not admissible on behalf of the defendant, since the principal himself is not permitted to testify on behalf of such accomplice under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 791.— Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

(L) Evidence at Preliminary Examination |inal trial, furnishes no ground for a continu

or at Former Trial.

§ 542 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where it appears on the second trial of a criminal prosecution that a witness, who testified at the first trial, has died in the meantime, his testimony at the former trial may be reproduced.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

$543 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held sufficient to authorize an introduction of the testimony given by a witness at the preliminary examination.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

(M) Weight and Sufficiency.

$ 561 (Ark.) A reasonable doubt cannot be created, apart from the evidence, by the ingenuity of counsel.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341.

ance.-Id.

In the trial of one charged as accomplice to the murder of the husband of a woman with whom defendant had had illicit intercourse, where the defense claimed robbery was the motive of the principal in committing the crime, evidence that at one time the principal attempted to pick another's pocket was immaterial, so that the absence of a witness who would testify to that fact furnished no ground for continuance.-Id.

§ 596 (Tex.Cr.App.) Denial of second continuance, because of absence of witness whose testimony was cumulative, held not error.-Whitfill v. State, 169 S. W. 681.

§ 596 (Tex.Cr.App.) The absence of a witness, whose testimony could be merely cumulative as to a fact which was undisputed, furnishes no Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

XI. TIME OF TRIAL AND CONTIN- ground for continuance of a criminal case.

UANCE.

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had

$ 598 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where no process been issued for an alleged absent witness and his residence at the time of trial was unknown, an application for continuance because of his absence was properly denied for want of diligence.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

tled to a continuance of a second trial on the § 598 (Tex.Cr.App.) A defendant is not entiground of absence of witnesses, who are not shown to have been in attendance at the former trial, where no process had been issued for them since that trial to secure their attendance at the second trial.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

§ 589 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution of accused as an accomplice to an abortion held, that he was not entitled to withdraw his announcement of ready for trial and to a continuance because during the cross-examination of prosecutrix a juror stated to accused's counsel, "You have asked that question a hundred § 600 (Ky.) Under Cr. Code Prac. § 189, times," and on the attorney's stating that he as amended by Act May 15, 1886 (Acts 1885would endeavor to make it clear, the juror 86, c. 1145), it was error to refuse a continuagain stated, "It is plain enough for me."-Fon-ance applied for by accused at the indictment dren v. State, 169 S. W. 411. term for absence of a material witness, where the commonwealth's attorney refused to admit that the matters stated in the affidavit for continuance as to what such witness would testify were true.-Lawson v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 494.

§ 590 (Ky.) The refusal of a continuance was an abuse of discretion where accused was brought to the county on the first day of the term, and was put on trial on the fifth day thereof, and counsel appointed for him on the first day was called away and had no opportunity to confer with him until the day of the trial.-Stroud v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 1021.

§ 594 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where a criminal case has been pending for some time, the absence of witnesses, whose residences the defendant admits are unknown, is not sufficient ground for continuance, since there is no probability that their attendance could be procured for the next term.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

§ 595 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused was not entitled to a continuance because of the absence of a witness, where the testimony intended to be offered by such witness was inadmissible.Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

$595 (Tex.Cr.App.) The absence of a witness, who would not have been competent to testify for the defendant in a criminal case, furnishes no ground for a continuance.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

In the trial of one charged as accomplice to murder, testimony of the principal's father that the principal was a grown man, a year older than the accomplice, is not material, so that the absence of the principal's father is not ground for continuance.-Id.

In the trial of one charged as accomplice to the murder of the husband of the woman with whom defendant had had illicit intercourse, the evidence as to why defendant separated from his wife is inadmissible, so that the absence of a witness, who would testify thereto, furnishes no ground for a continuance.-Id.

The absence of a witness, who would testify as to the character of a defendant in a crim

that the statements of affidavits for a continu§ 600 (Ky.) A consent by the commonwealth should be taken as true, and that the affidavit ance as to what the absent witnesses would say as to the statement of the character witness might be read as the witness' deposition, hela insufficient to justify a denial of the continu; ance, under Cr. Code Prac. § 189.-Biggs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 525.

dicted February 23d and her case called for § 603 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant was intrial March 28th, an application for continuance for the absence of her husband, which gave no reason why his attendance could not be secured, and which showed no diligence, was properly denied.-Miller v. State, 169 S. W.

1164.

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§ 636 (Ark.) Defendant, in a trial for murder, had the right to accompany the jury on their view of the scene of the killing, but where he was in court, and did not himself or by counsel request permission to accompany the jury, he thereby waived such right.-Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER 169 S.W.-77

§ 651 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 2379, held | that the refusal to postpone a view until witnesses whose testimony was disputed had testified to their respective positions at the time of the shooting was not error.-Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952.

Under Kirby's Dig. § 2380, held that a direction to the sheriff to take the jury to the scene of the killing was sufficient, though no special oath was administered, and though no other person was appointed to point out the scene. -Id.

(C) Reception of Evidence.

§ 673 (Tex.Cr.App.) In trial of one charged as accomplice to murder, the written confession of the principal, which was voluntarily made and was admissible against the principal, is also admissible against the accomplice, if limited by the instructions to the sole purpose of showing the guilt of the principal.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

§ 680 (Tex.Cr.App.) Reception of evidence out of its proper order is within the discretion of the trial court.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299.

§ 686 (Tex.Cr.App.) It was not an abuse of the court's discretion to permit the prosecution to rest before the testimony of an absent witness was heard, and to permit the witness to testify after the defense had begun its evidence. -Clark v. State, 169 S. W. 895.

(D) Objections to Evidence, Motions to Strike Out, and Exceptions.

$ 696 (Ky.) Delay from Saturday until Monday in striking out certain testimony held not prejudicial error.-Rutland v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 584.

(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel. 713 (Ky.) A conviction obtained in violation of the rules respecting the argument of counsel will be set aside on appeal.-Stroud v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 1021.

the same

$717 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where deceased abandoned a difficulty with accused and fled, after which accused pursued him and without provocation struck him with an ax and killed him a statement by the county attorney, that if deceased abandoned the combat it would be as if he had never engaged in it, was not error.-Harris v. State, 169 S. W. 657. §720 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused tendered his wife as a witness in his own behalf, but did not ask her any questions concerning an alleged abortion performed on her daughter, a statement by the county attorney to the witness, on her being tendered for cross-examination, that accused did not ask about the operation and therefore the state could not, was not improper. Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411.

§ 721 (Tex.Cr.App.) In the third trial of a prosecution for incest, where the accused, who did not testify at either of the former trials, was asked whether he had ever before had an opportunity to give a reason for certain things concerning which he had testified, where the objection was sustained by the court without the ground being made known to the jury, was not such a reference to the failure of defendant to testify at the previous trials as to require a reversal.-Vickers v. State, 169 S. W. 669. A slight indirect allusion to the failure of defendant to testify does not constitute reversible error.-Id.

$721 (Tex.Cr.App.) The defendant cannot assign error for reference to the fact that he did not make a statement at his preliminary examination, where the prosecutor was allowed only to show that defendant was informed he could make a statement, and the fact that defendant did not make the statement was brought to the jury's attention by the defendant himself. Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

8721 (Tex.Cr.App.) Argument of counsel as to accused's failure to introduce a witness held not objectionable as a reference to accused's failure to testify in his own behalf.-Ethridge v. State, 169 S. W. 1152.

§ 7222 (Tex.Cr.App.) Argument of county attorney, that an indictment for another offense was strong evidence of guilt held highly improper.-Whitfill v. State, 169 S. W. 681.

$728 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused approached the judge and asked that an exception be reserved to argument of the county attorney, but upon being told to make his objection openly declined to do so, and requested no instruction regarding the matter, held, that he could not complain.-Whitfill v. State, 169 S. W. 681. § 730 (Tex.Cr.App.) An improper statement made by the county attorney at the end of a hypothetical question having been withdrawn by him and an apology offered, and the court having twice instructed the jury not to consider the same, the error was cured.-Harris v. State, 169 S. W. 657.

$730 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, the questioning of defendant as to whether he did not, shortly before the alleged sale, get off a train with liquor and get into a closed carriage and drive away rapidly was not reversible error, where objection to the question was sustained.Clark v. State, 169 S. W. 895.

(F) Province of Court and Jury in General.

§ 742 (Ark.) Testimony that a witness for the state was not present when facts, as to which he testified, occurred made a question for the determination of the jury.-Quinn v. State, 169 S. W. 791.

$7552 (Tex.Cr.App.) Remarks by the trial judge to the jurors, drawn for the week during which accused was tried, before they were drawn for the several cases, held not instructions, within Cr. Code 1911, art. 736, prohibiting the judge from charging on the facts.-MeGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

§§ 763, 764 (Ark.) In a trial for murder, defendant's requested instructions as to his good character held properly refused, as requiring an expression of the court on the weight to be given to such evidence.-Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952.

§§ 763, 764 (Tex.Cr.App.) An instruction that the truth or falsity of certain statements and declarations by accused could be proved by circumstantial as well as positive evidence was not objectionable as on the weight of the evidence.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437. (G) Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency

of Instructions.

§ 782 (Ark.) In a trial for murder, defendant's requested instructions on the effect and weight of evidence as to his good character held properly refused.-Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952.

circumstantial evidence held proper.-Brown v. $784 (Tex.Cr.App.) An instruction on cirState, 169 S. W. 437.

rea

§ 789 (Ky.) An instruction held erroneous as requiring the jury to believe, beyond a sonable doubt, that accused's theory of the case was true, before they could acquit him on the ground of self-defense.-Biggs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 525.

§ 800 (Ky.) In a prosecution for homicide, the failure of the court to define the terms "feloniously" and "malice aforethought" is not reversible error.-Collier v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 740.

§ 804 (Tex.Cr.App.) Remarks by the judge to the jurors for the week before the jurors for the several cases had been selected, urging them not to treat offenders with laxity, are not in

(J) Custody, Conduct, and Deliberations

of Jury.

structions, within Code Cr. Proc. 1911; art. special charges requested by defendant.-Millner 736, requiring instructions to be in writing, v. State, 169 S. W. 899. etc.-McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287. 8807 (Ark.) In a prosecution under Kirby's Dig. § 2043, for seduction, the striking out, in an instruction that the indictment was not of itself any evidence of guilt, of the words "and no juror in this case should permit himself to be, to any extent, influenced against the defendant because or on account of the indictment in this case," was not error, since they were but cautionary, and, in effect, argumentative.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341.

$850 (Ky.) Where it was reputed that the deputy sheriff, in whose charge the jury were placed with accused's consent, was related to deceased, but that fact was denied by the deputy, and it did not appear that he in any way improperly influenced the jury, accused cannot complain of the relationship if any between deceased and the deputy.-Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

§ 812 (Tex.Cr.App.) Remarks by the trial judge to the jurors, drawn for the week during § 865 (Ark.) In a trial for murder, instrucwhich accused was tried, before they were tion urging the jury to agree on a verdict aftdrawn for the several cases, held not instruc-er their report of a disagreement held not error. tions, within Code Cr. Proc. art. 736, prohibit--Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952. ing the judge from using arguments tending to $866 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homarouse the passions of the jury.-McGaughey v. icide, evidence held to require a finding that the State, 169 S. W. 287. term of punishment had not been arrived at by the jury by the quotient method.-Lamb v. State, 169 S. W. 1158.

§ 814 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where, in a prosecution for inciting a minor, in violation of Pen. Code 1911, art. 37, to loiter on school grounds in violation of article 1514, after he had been expelled, defendant admitted that he knew of such expulsion, the court properly refused to instruct that he was not guilty, unless he knew thereof.-King v. State, 169 S. W. 675.

§ 823 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused held not entitled to object that other instructions did not charge with sufficient definiteness that all exculpatory statements which raised a reasonable doubt of guilt must be falsified.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

(H) Requests for Instructions.

$ 829 (Ark.) In a prosecution under Kirby's Digest, § 2043, a requested instruction that, if a reasonable doubt of any fact necessary to convict is raised by the evidence itself, or the ingenuity of counsel, it is decisive in favor of acquittal was not error, being covered by an instruction that the prosecution had the burden of proving defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341.

§ 829 (Ark.) Refusal of defendant's requested instruction was not error, where it was fully covered by the given instructions.-Whitley v. State, 169 S. W. 952.

§ 829 (Tex.Cr.App.) It is not error to refuse a requested charge substantially covered by the charge of the court.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299; Fondren v. Same, Id. 411.

§ 829 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where there was no evidence other than that of accused, and his statements and declarations, that another killed deceased, the court having sufficiently charged as to such statements and declarations, it was not error to omit to present the question whether deceased was killed by another as an affirmative defense.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437. It is not error to refuse to charge as to questions fully covered by the court's main charge.

-Id.

§ 829 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for incest, a charge as to the corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice and the effect of testimony as to prior acts held correct and sufficient, so that the refusal of a charge requested by defendant was not error.-Vickers v. State, 169 S. W. 669.

(K) Verdict.

§ 885 (Tex.Cr.App.) Form of verdict held a specific finding that they did not recommend suspension of sentence.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 897.

XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
AND IN ARREST.

$913 (Ky.) In a prosecution for murder, the mere fact that deceased belonged to an influential family and had many relatives in the county is not, standing alone, sufficient to render the denial of a new trial requested on the ground of local prejudice an abuse of discretion. Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

fend accused could not contend for the first $916 (Tex.Cr.App.) Appointed counsel to detime after verdict that he should have been given more time to prepare the case, in the absence of some showing of newly discovered evidence.-Harris v. State, 169 S. W. 657.

$922 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Act April 5, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 138), objections to omissions

in the charge cannot for the first time be made in the motion for new trial.-Bell v. State, 169 S. W. 1150.

§ 9252 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor the question asked by one juror of another during deliberation, whether defendant was the man who had a fight with the deputy sheriff, which was answered in the affirmative, held not to entitle defendant to a new trial.-Clark v. State, 169 S. W. 895.

$933 (Tex.Cr.App.) The right to object to the failure of the verdict to make any recommendation of suspension of sentence was waived where the accused first complained thereof in his amended motion for a new trial filed on May 16th after rendition of the verdict on May 6th. -Walker v. State, 169 S. W. 1156.

$938 (Tex.Cr.App.) A motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.-McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

The essentials to the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence stated.-Id.

§ 829 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court instructed to acquit if they found that the prosecuting witness procured the liquor in any way except by purchase from defendant, it was not error to refuse a requested charge directing an acquittal if the jury found it was procured as defense claimed it was.-Clark v. State, 169 S. W. 895. $829 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the charge of the court presents all the issues fairly and fully, and in a way to which defendant makes no objection, it is not error for the court to refuse For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

$939 (Ky.) To show diligence in obtaining the testimony of H., for which defendant asks a new trial, the testimony of a witness for the state on rebuttal having shown H. was present at the event, defendant should have made some effort to get H. before closing his case.-Knipp v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 494.

§ 940 (Tex.Cr.App.) A new trial for newly discovered evidence not tending to discredit the testimony of a witness, and not contradicting

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