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the state's testimony, is properly denied.-Cyrus | (D) Record and Proceedings Not in Recv. State, 169 S. W. 679.

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§ 957 (Tex.Cr.App.) A sworn statement by one of the jurors that he at first favored an acquittal and only agreed to a verdict of guilty after other jurymen told him they would join in a petition for a pardon after a certain time does not present a ground for new trial, since a juryman cannot thus impeach his verdict after he has been discharged.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

$958 (Tex.Cr.App.) An application for a new trial on the ground that accused could prove a certain fact by his mother, not verified by the mother's affidavit as to the fact, and not shown to have been newly discovered evidence, was properly denied.-O'Fallin v. State, 169 S. W. 897.

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§ 980 (Ark.) Where a plea of guilty is entered, judgment may be entered at a subsequent term.-Spencer v. State, 169 S. W. 790.

$982 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the verdict of guilty failed to recommend suspension of sentence, the court could not suspend it.-Johnson v. State, 169 S. W. 1151.

996 (Ky.) Where accused on his own motion was sentenced to the House of Reform until his majority, he cannot complain that the court corrected that part of the judgment and sentenced him to the reformatory.-Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

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$1038 (Tex.Cr.App.) Objections to the charge, which are first made after verdict in the amended motion for new trial, cannot be considered on appeal.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 672.

ord.

§ 1090 (Ark.) Where accused pleaded guilty, and at a subsequent term the prosecuting attorney moved for sentence, but the evidence offered on the hearing of such motion was neither abstracted nor preserved by bill of exceptions, the only questions reviewable on appeal from the judgment were those appearing on the face of the record.-Spencer v. State, 169 S. W. 790.

§ 1090 (Ky.) Improper argument cannot be taken advantage of on appeal, where not presented by bill of exceptions.-Combs v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 879.

$1090 (Tex.Cr.App.) Alleged prejudicial remarks of the district attorney cannot be reviewed in the absence of a bill of exceptions showing that the remarks were in fact made.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

$1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions complaining of testimony by the wife of deceased that she remained in the home of M. because it was willed to her presents no error, where the qualification of the trial judge showed that it was accused's contention that deceased and his wife were trespassers in M.'s home.-McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

§ 1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions to the exclusion of offered evidence, alleging that accused "expected" to prove certain facts, instead of that he could and would have proven by the witness the facts stated, was insufficient. -Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, a bill of $1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for the exceptions, showing that the prosecuting witness was allowed, over objections, to state how long it was after he bad purchased the liquor that he told the prosecuting attorney about it, when qualified by the court to show that the defendant's contention was that the prosecuting wit ness was so intoxicated that he could have had no recollection of the transaction, shows no error.-Clark v. State, 169 S. W. 895.

§ 1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions, complaining of the refusal to permit the defendant to answer a question as to what was done at a certain time, which does not state the answer which would have been made, but states that it was sought to prove that defendant and the wife of deceased, who were indicted as accomplices, had made no attempt at that time to induce the principal to commit the crime, shows no error, where defendant did testify fully as to that fact.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

$1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, a bill of exceptions to the admission of evidence on the part of deceased's widow that $1043 (Tex.Cr.App.) An objection that an in- she had never, during deceased's lifetime, heard struction was misleading and calculated to prej-him utter a threat against defendant, held too udice accused is too general.-Brown v. State,

169 S. W. 437.

§ 1053 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where a bill of exceptions was not reserved to the action of the trial court in calling the case out of its regular order, its action is not reviewable.-Cyrus V. State, 169 S. W. 679.

$1056 (Tex.Cr.App.) The giving or refusal of

meager and insufficient.-Lamb v. State, 169 S.

W. 1158.

$1091 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions, showing that defendant objected to the court excusing jurors, and instructing the sheriff to acted improperly, presents no error.-Miller v. summon others, but not showing that the court State, 169 S. W. 1164.

A bill of exceptions, which states that a witness on impeachment testified that he had freS.quently arrested the defendant, but which does

instructions cannot be reviewed on appeal, in a misdemeanor case, where no exceptions are reserved thereto below.-King v. State, 169

W. 675.

(C) Proceedings for Transfer of Cause, and Effect Thereof.

§ 1076 (Tex.Cr.App.) One convicted of a misdemeanor and not in custody can only perfect an appeal under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, arts. 918. 920, 923, by entering into a recognizance at the term at which he was convicted; an appeal bond, or a recognizance after the term being insufficient.-Knowlton v. State, 169 S. W. 674.

not negative the fact that the charges involved moral turpitude, shows no error.-Id.

$1092 (Tex.Cr.App.) Bills of exception must be filed before the adjournment for that term. -McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

$1092 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions, not filed until 69 days after adjournment, cannot be considered on appeal.-Schapiro v. State. 169 S. W. 683.

$1092 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 845, bills of exception filed more

than 30 days after adjournment cannot be considered where no order of extension was procured.-Bell v. State, 169 S. W. 1150.

$1092 (Tex.Cr.App.) Bills of exception should be presented to the judge who tried the case for his approval, or proven by bystanders, and bills approved by another district judge are not properly verified.-Miller v. State, 169 S. W. 1164.

$1095 (Tex.Cr.App.) On appeal from a conviction in the county court of simple assault, bills of exception, filed more than 20 days after adjournment, will be stricken on motion.-Gentry v. State, 169 S. W. 668.

81097 (Tex.Cr.App.) The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction cannot be reviewed, where no statement of facts accompanies the record.-Heidelberg v. State, 169 S. W. 1151. $1097 (Tex.Cr.App.) In the absence of a statement of facts, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction cannot be considered.-Johnson v. State, 169 S. W. 1151.

$1099 (Tex.Cr.App.) Statements of fact preserving the evidence heard in motion for a new trial must be filed before the adjournment for that term.-McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287. $1099 (Tex.Cr.App.) A statement of facts not filed until 63 days after adjournment of the term of the county court, cannot be considered on appeal.-Schapiro v. State, 169 S. W. 683. $1099 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the attorneys failed to agree upon a statement of facts, and the judge made a complete statement of the facts in evidence on the main trial and a separate statement of the evidence on the motion for new

trial, there was no error.-Ethridge v. State,

169 S. W. 1152.

Statements of facts showing the evidence heard on motions for new trial will not be considered unless filed within term time.-Id.

$1102 (Tex.Cr.App.) On appeal from a conviction in the county court of simple assault, a statement of facts filed more than 20 days after adjournment, will be stricken on motion.-Gentry v. State, 169 S. W. 668.

§ 1124 (Ky.) For review of the denial of a new trial for newly discovered evidence there should be in the record evidence of the facts alleged in the motion in explanation of the witness not being present at the trial.-Knipp v. Com

monwealth, 169 S. W. 494.

§ 1124 (Tex.Cr.App.) The trial court's refusal to disturb a verdict on the ground that the jury were affected by outside influences could not be disturbed, where the evidence heard by the trial court on that point was not brought up.-Hayter v. State, 169 S. W. 674.

(G) Review.

$1137 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused, having requested an instruction that certain evidence could be used for impeachment only, and not as proof that decedent spoke after she was injured, held not entitled to object that an instruction that if the jury believed that the son told B. his mother did speak, they could consider that in support of the son's evidence was objectionable as on the weight of the evidence. -Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

81144 (Tex.Cr.App.) Unless the statement of facts contains the evidence presented by accused in support of his motion for new trial, it will be presumed that the lower court correctly denied the motion.-Ethridge v. State, 169 S. W. 1152.

$1153 (Tex.Cr.App.) Reception of evidence out of its proper order will not be reviewed, unless abused.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299. $1156 (Tex.Cr.App.) Ruling on a motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence will not be reviewed unless discretion is abused.McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287; Taylor v. Same, Id. 672.

$1158 (Ark.) On appeal from a judgment of conviction, the testimony would be treated in the light most favorable to the state.-Quinn v. State, 169 S. W. 791.

$1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) When the punishment inflicted by the jury is within that prescribed by the Legislature, and the evidence supports a conviction, it will not be disturbed.-Bell v. State, 169 S. W. 1150.

$1163 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where an inadmissible statement by accused was intentionally introduced into the record and could reasonably be hurtful it will be presumed that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such was its effect.-Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299.

§ 1166 (Tex.Cr.App.) Error, if any, in denying an application for a continuance because of the absence of certain witnesses was cured where they were present at the trial.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

$11662 (Ark.) In a prosecution for murder, where the prosecuting attorney requested that accused be required to stand up, but on objection abandoned his request before any ruling thereon, and where accused afterwards voluntarily stood up while the same witness was being cross-examined, held that there was no prejudice in the failure of the court to rule upon the request.-Strong v. State, 169 S. W. 1189.

§ 11662 (Tex.Cr.App.) A conviction will not be reversed for remarks by the judge to the panel for the week cautioning them against laxity, where accused was tried by only four members of the panel, and, though he had not exhausted his peremptory challenges, he accepted them.-McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

§ 1167 (Tex.Cr.App.) The overruling of a plea of former jeopardy by a defendant charged

in two counts as accessory and accomplice,
based on a former trial at which he was convict-
ed only as accomplice, is not prejudicial, where
the verdict in the second trial was the same as
the first, and no evidence was admitted which
Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.
was not admissible under the second count.-

§ 1169 (Ark.) There was no prejudicial error be read in evidence, since if the facts set forth in permitting affidavits made by witnesses to in them were true, as the witnesses testified, it testimony.-Taylor v. State, 169 S. W. 341. was harmless as being but a repetition of their

cused to testify that he had been convicted on § 1169 (Tex.Cr.App.) Error in compelling aca prior trial of the same case was not harmwho testified that they had heard of the forless because he was required to accept jurors mer conviction, and because he had filed pleas before the jury was impaneled stating the fact. -Sorrell v. State, 169 S. W. 299.

§ 1170 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution of one accused as accomplice to murder, a question by the district attorney, asked the defendant on cross-examination, if he had not debauched the dead man's wife, to which question the defendant's objection was sustained, was not error, where the defendant had admitted illicit intercourse with the woman.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

In the trial of one charged as accomplice to murder, where it appeared that the principal came to accused the morning after the homicide, and was taken by defendant to his hiding place, and the defendant was allowed to testify that at that time he did not know that the deceased had been killed, it was not error to exclude testimony as to what the principal said to the defendant on that occasion.-Id.

$11702 (Tex. Cr.App.) The improper repetition of a question to which objection had been sustained in a different form is not prejudicial, where the question was not such as to tend in the least to show that the defendant had any connection with the crime.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

$1171 (Tex.Cr.App.) An argument of the county attorney not prejudicial in itself, and which could not have resulted in injury to accused, held not available for error, especially where the jury were directed not to consider it for any purpose.-Fondren v. State, 169 S. W. 411.

§ 1171 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a trial of one charged as an accomplice for murder, where the codefendant, also indicted as accomplice, was not called to testify, a statement by the district attorney in the hearing of the jury that the codefendant was not a competent witness could not prejudice the defendant.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

$1216 (Tex.Cr.App.) The sentence of one convicted of forgery, who was out upon recognizance pending an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, two successive motions for rehearing, and the stay of the issuance of a mandate upon his own request, does not begin to run in any event prior to the issuance of the mandate.-State v. Hamblen, 169 S. W. 678. CROSS-EXAMINATION.

See Witnesses, §§ 268-288.

CURTESY.

See Descent and Distribution, § 82.

CUSTODY.

$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, an instruction that if the jury believed decedent's son told the witness B. that his See Criminal Law, §§ 850-866. mother spoke after the son came to her, they could consider B.'s testimony in support of that of the son, if error, was in favor of and not prejudicial to accused.-Brown v. State, 169 S. W. 437.

An instruction on certain impeaching testimony on an issue as to whether deceased spoke to her son after she was injured, though objectionable as on the weight of the evidence, was not prejudicial, where nothing deceased was claimed to have said had any bearing on whether defendant, and if not he, who, inflicted the injuries.-Id.

(H) Determination and Disposition of Cause.

§ 1183 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the trial court sentenced a defendant to a definite term, instead of imposing an indeterminate sentence, as required by law, the Court of Criminal Appeals will reform the sentence.-Millner v. State, 169 S. W. 899.

$1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under the direct provisions of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743, as amended by Acts 33d Leg. c. 138, conviction cannot be reversed for nonprejudicial error.McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287.

XVII. PUNISHMENT AND PREVEN-
TION OF CRIME.

$1206 (Ky.) Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of 1910, the judge was obliged to sentence accused for a term not less than the minimum nor greater than the maximum punishment fixed, while under the act of 1914 (Acts 1914, c. 19) the jury fixes the punishment and may fix the minimum sentence at any period not less than the minimum nor greater than the maximum prescribed by law.-Coleman v. Commonwealth, 169 S. W. 595.

Under Ky. St. § 465, person indicted and tried after enactment of indeterminate sentence law of 1914, for offense committed prior thereto, held not entitled to have the jury fix the punishment under that act, as it does not definitely mitigate the punishment imposed under the act of 1910 (Acts 1910, c. 4).-Id.

Under Ky. St. § 465, a defendant, wishing the benefits of an act mitigating the punishment for an offense committed prior to its enactment, must consent on the record to have the punishment fixed thereunder.-Id.

§ 1206 (Tex.Cr.App.) The indeterminate sentence law (Acts 33d Leg. 1st Called Sess. c. 5), amending Acts 33d Leg. c. 132, did not operate to impliedly repeal those statutes, authorizing the assessment of the death penalty for specified offenses.-Harris v. State, 169 S. W. 657.

§ 1208 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under the statute prescribing as punishment for an assault with intent to murder imprisonment for not less than 2, nor more than 15, years, the sentence should be indeterminate, and, if made for a given term of years, will be reformed on appeal.-Bell v. State, 169 S. W. 1150.

CUSTOMS AND USAGES.

See Contracts, § 176.

§ 18 (Mo.) For admission, under a petition charging common-law negligence of a custom, and its nonobservance, as evidence of negligence, the custom need not be pleaded.-Kinney v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 23. CUSTOMS DUTIES.

See Wills, § 55.

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VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. (C) Breach of Contract.

§ 117 (Tex.Civ.App.) The proper measure is pecuniary compensation for the injury suffered. -Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chamberlain, 169 S. W. 370.

VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES.

§ 132 (Ark.) A verdict for $1,000 for personal injury to a child, causing serious bodily injury. great pain and suffering, and affecting her mind, will not be disturbed as excessive.-St. Louis South Western Ry. Co. v. Overton, 169 S. W. 364.

§ 132 (Ark.) An award of $38,000 in favor of one injured in a railroad collision held excessive by $18,000.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 169 S. W. 822.

§ 132 (Ky.) In an action for injuries resulting in a permanent enlargement and inflammatory condition of the knee joint, a verdict for

$500 was not excessive.-Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Peel, 169 S. W. 689.

§ 132 (Ky.) Evidence that plaintiff received injuries on the arm and head that rendered him unconscious at the time and prevented him from following his usual vocation for several weeks, and which resulted in partial deafness in one ear, held to warrant the jury in returning a verdict for $275.-Kentucky & T. Ry. Co. v. West, 169 S. W. 728.

§ 132 (Ky.) Where a servant suffered great pain, together with the loss of a leg, a verdict awarding him $10,500 held not excessive.East Tennessee Telephone Co. v. Jeffries, 169 S. W. 825.

§ 132 (Ky.) In an action for personal injuries, a verdict allowing plaintiff $5,498.75 held not excessive.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nethery, 169 S. W. 883.

§ 132 (Mo.) An award of $15,000 damages in favor of a railroad switchman 34 years of age, in good health, and earning $100 a month, who suffered injury requiring the amputation of one leg nearly to the hip, and sustained other slight injuries, is excessive by $5,000.-Ostertag v. Union Pac. R. Co., 169 S. W. 1.

§ 132 (Mo.) Verdict for $9,000 for injuries to electric light lineman, earning $65 a month, destroying his hearing in one ear and making one arm useless, among other results, held not excessive. Rutledge v. Swinney, 169 S. W. 17. § 132 (Mo.) A verdict for loss of a leg will not be allowed to stand for more than $10,000 -Kinney v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 169 S.

W. 23.

§ 132 (Mo.) An award of $15,000 damages in favor of a boiler maker 57 years old, earning over $100 a month, who was run down by a street car, and whose arm was broken, spinal column injured, and the bones about his face badly broken, held excessive by $3,000.-Holzemer v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 102.

§ 132 (Mo.) Verdict for $22,500, reduced by trial court to $18,000, for injuries to telephone trouble man from electric shock, necessitating the amputation of nearly all his fingers and thumbs and causing a large reduction in earning capacity, held not excessive.-Hill v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 169 S. W. 345.

§ 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) In case of injury to a man 49 years old, healthy and industrious, previously earning $100 to $125 a month, held a verdict of $20,000 was not excessive.-Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. Geary, 169 S. W. 201.

§ 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a laborer, 43 years old, resulting in the amputation of both feet at the junction of the instep with the heel, crippling him so that he could not thereafter walk without crutches, a verdict awarding him $10,000 held not excessive.-La Grange & Lockhart Compress Co. v. Hart, 169 S. W. 373.

VIII. PLEADING. EVIDENCE, AND

ASSESSMENT.

(A) Pleading.

§ 142 (Ky.) Such damages as may be presumed to naturally and necessarily result from an injury need not be stated with any very great particularity, but damages which are not thus implied must be specially pleaded in order to apprise defendant of the facts intended to be proved.-Main Jellico Mountain Coal Co. v. Young, 169 S. W. 841.

§ 144 (Ky.) In an action for personal injuries, petition held insufficient to support recovery for lost time.-Main Jellico Mountain Coal Co. v. Young, 169 S. W. 841.

§ 147 (Ark.) Complaint, in an action for breach of contract, whereby defendant agreed to bring plaintiff his entire furnishing trade for a certain time held to sufficiently allege

a right to recover profits as damages.-Wilkes v. Stacy, 169 S. W. 796.

(B) Evidence.

§ 172 (Tex.Civ.App.) As bearing on the earning capacity and loss thereof of plaintiff, evidence of his profits from the boarding of the section crew, a perquisite of his position of section foreman, is admissible.-Trinity & B. Ry. Co. v. Geary, 169 S. W. 201.

(C) Proceedings for Assessment. § 208 (Ark.) In an action for personal injuries, evidence held to justify the submission to the jury of the issue of future pain and suffering.-St. Louis South Western Ry. Co. v. Overton, 169 S. W. 364.

§ 208 (Ark.) In a personal injury action by a servant, the question whether he was feigning injury held for the jury.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 169 S. W. 940.

§ 216 (Ky.) In an action for personal injuries, instruction held to authorize recovery for loss of time and for impairment of earning power during the same period, and to be modified to state that the allowance for impairment of earning power should begin when the allowance for lost time ended.-Main Jellico Mountain Coal Co. v. Young, 169 S. W. 841.

§ 216 (Mo.) In action for personal injuries, instruction as to measure of damages held not erroneous because of its failure to limit the

award for loss of earning capacity to the
amount alleged in the petition; a separate as-
sessment as to each element of damages not be-
Power Co., 169 S. W. 345.
ing necessary.-Hill v. Union Electric Light &

DEATH.

See Abatement and Revival, § 68; Appeal and Error, § 1060; Executors and Administrators, 51; Insurance, § 449; Judgment, § 588; Master and Servant, §§ 87, 101, 102, 265, 270, 285, 286, 289; Municipal Corporations, § 733; Partnership, § 243.

II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. giving a right of action for damages for death 89 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, §§ 5425-5427. by wrongful act to be brought by the personal representative of the deceased or by the surviving husband or wife, etc., are in derogation of common law, and are to be strictly construed.-Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 169 S. W. 337.

§ 31 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 54255427, defining the parties who may maintain an action for wrongful death and those for whose benefit damages are recoverable, the public administrator has no right of action, where there are no known persons capable of receiving the amount to be recovered, and for whose benefit the action might be prosecuted.-Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 169 S. W. 337.

(E) Damages, Forfeiture, or Fine. § 78 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 5425, giving the benefit of the surviving husband or wife, an action for damages for wrongful death for minor children, parents, etc., held penal in character, while the damages recoverable under sections 5426, 5427, are compensatory.-Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 169 S. W. 337.

$95 (Ky.) In an action for the death of a railway engineer, brought under the federal Employers' Liability Act, the measure of damages stated.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kelly's Adm'x, 169 S. W. 736.

$99 (Ky.) A verdict for the aggregate amount of $19,011 for the death of a railway engineer, who was 48 years old and earning $192 per month, and who left a wife 45 years

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes sec same topic and section (§) NUMBER

old and five dependent children whose ages ranged between 3 and 16 years, is not excessive.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kelly's Adm'x, 169 S. W. 736.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

shown by the deed and the circumstances surrounding the parties and the land when the deed was made.-Bain v. Tye, 169 S. W. 843.

§ 101 (Ky.) Where words in a deed are ambiguous and the parties by their acts have given a practical construction thereto, such construcW. 843.

See Attachment; Bankruptcy; Fraudulent Con- tion may be resorted to.-Bain v. Tye, 169 S.

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(B) Property Conveyed.

$114 (Ky.) On an issue whether a deed contained a particular 50-acre tract patented by the grantor May 29, 1855, the particular description being unintelligible, the court would give controlling effect to a general statement that it was intended to convey such tract.-Bain v. Tye, 169 S. W. 843.

(C) Estates and Interests Created. § 133 (Ky.) Under a deed conveying land to a married woman for life, and at her death to de

See Criminal Law, §§ 412, 413; Evidence, §§ scend to the heirs of her body, remainder held 271, 272.

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(A) General Rules of Construction.

$93 (Ky.) A deed, especially when inartificially drawn, should be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the parties, gathered from a fair consideration of the entire instrument and the language employed as applied to the subject-matter.-Bain v. Tye, 169 S. W. 843.

contingent, and purchaser of interest of son who died in his mother's lifetime acquired nothing. -Turner v. Johnson's Ex'rs, 169 S. W. 988.

(E) Conditions and Restrictions. $156 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a deed conveys only an easement and not the fee, the right to maintain an, action of forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent is not limited to the grantor or his heirs, but may extend to the H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 644. assignee of the grantor.-Stevens v. Galveston,

§ 160 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a condition subsequent, providing for forfeiture in case the land should cease wholly to be used for railroad purposes, the condition, construed against the forfeiture, is not violated by the leasing of a crusher.-Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. part of the premises to be occupied by a rock Co., 169 S. W. 644.

§ 165 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where property is conveyed upon condition subsequent, the title remains unimpaired even after breach, unless forfeited by the grantor or his heirs; the right to forfeit not being one which the grantor can convey.-Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 644.

had conveyed land upon a condition subsequent, § 166 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the grantor, who requiring continuous performance, thereafter quitclaimed all his interest in such land to another, the land is freed from the condition.Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 169

S. W. 644.

of land, conditioned that all except the outer § 168 (Mo.) Under a deed to a city of a tract rim of 200 feet wide, be used as a park, and that the city lease such strip for villa residences, and pay over the rents to the grantor or assigns, there can be no relief, whether the provision be a condition subsequent or a covenant, under a petition in equity by the assigns under the will of the grantor, not only not alleging willful neglect, but proceeding on the theory that the property cannot be so rented.-Lackland v. Hadley, 169 S. W. 275.

IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE. § 188 (Ky.) A petition, alleging that plaintiff while in jail conveyed property to defendant to enable him to finance the defense, held not to show actionable fraud as against a demurrer.

$95 (Ky.) In construing the description in a deed, effect must be given to every part of the deed; the separate parts being viewed in the light of other parts if it can be done consistent--Crawford v. Dupriest, 169 S. W. 840. ly with rules of law.-Bain v. Tye, 169 S. W. 843.

Where a deed is ambiguous, or will admit of two constructions, it will be construed most strongly against the grantor and most favorably to the grantee.—Id.

$ 100 (Ky.) Where the description in a deed is ambiguous, the identity of the property must be gathered from the intention of the parties, as

A petition which alleges that a stipulation was omitted from a deed executed by plaintiff, but which does not allege that the grantee agreed that the stipulation might be inserted, or that it was omitted by mutual mistake, is fatally defective as against a demurrer.-Id.

§ 196 (Ky.) Facts held not to raise a presumption that a conveyance by an aged man was the result of undue influence by his widow

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