The Southwestern Reporter

tions, §§ 80, 123, 432, 548; Criminal Law, §§ 80, 134, 304-561, 1097, 1153, 1158, 1163, 1169–11702; Customs and Usages, § 18; Damages, 172; Deeds, §§ 196, 210, 211; Detinue, 18; Disorderly House, § 17; Divorce, 286; Ejectment, § 95; Elections, $$ 293, 295; Electricity, § 19; Executors and Administrators, § 443; Explosives, § 9; Fraud, 58; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 295; Homicide, §§ 148-257, 338; Husband and Wife, §§ 232, 262, 333; Insurance, $$ 659, 818, 819; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 226 236; Judgment, $$ 461, 495; Master and Servant, §§ 265-281, 330; Mortgages, §§ 38, 86; Negligence, § 121; Obstructing Justice, $5; Officers, § 94; Partnership, § 52; Principal and Agent, § 122; Public Lands, § 175; Railroads, §§ 9, 216, 348, 440, 442; Rape, $$ 47, 51; Reference, § 100; Release, § 57 Sales, §§ 52, 130, 358, 359, 417, 440, 441: Seduction, $ 49; Specific Performance, § 121; Taxation, § 810; Telegraphs and Telephones, $66; Trial, § 252; Trusts, $$ 88, 89, 110, 152; Vagrancy, § 3; Weapons, § 17: Wills, §§ 53, 55, 166, 292, 294, 400; Wit

nesses.

Reception of, see Criminal Law, §§ 673-686; Trial, 88 45-98.

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

§ 10 (Ark.) The court will take judicial notice that all the land in Crittenden county is in townships north of the base line and east of the fifth principal meridian.-Beck v. AndersonTulley Co., 169 S. W. 246.

The court will take judicial notice that lands are described under the United States government survey by designating first the section, then the township, and then the range.-Id.

$20 (Mo.) It is a matter of common knowledge that it is more hazardous to ride in a freight car loaded with stock and merchandise than in the caboose of the same train.-Scrivner v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 83.

§ 20 (Mo.) The court can take judicial notice that the dispatch with which the business of railroads is conducted does not admit of trains

coming to a full stop at junction points, but that signals have been devised by which the approaching engineer may be advised whether the track is clear.-Finnegan v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 969.

§ 23 (Tex. Civ.App.) The Courts will take judicial notice that the state was originally the owner of all lands not granted prior to the organization of the state.-State v. Post, 169 S. W. 401.

$35 (Ky.) The law of a sister state must be proved.-Williamson's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 169 S. W. 613.

$41 (Mo.) The Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the terms of the various circuit courts of the state.-Russ v. Sims, 169 S. W. 69.

IV. RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY, AND COMPETENCY IN GENERAL.

(C) Similar Facts and Transactions. $131 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action to rescind the sale of a traction engine, evidence that another engine of a different horse power and make, with a different driver and at a different place, pulled a greater number of plows held inadmissible.-Southern Gas & Gasoline Engine Co. v. Adams & Peters, 169 S. W. 1143.

(E) Competency.

$ 150 (Mo.) Exclusion of evidence of experiments was not error, where it was not shown that the circumstances surrounding the experiment were the same as those at the time of the accident.-Holzemer v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 102.

§ 155 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in an action for injuries to a brakeman, defendant offered proof

that he was discharged by his former employer for intoxication, plaintiff was entitled to introduce a service letter given him by such employer, reciting that he had resigned and that his services were generally_satisfactory.-Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Love, 169 S. W. 922.

V. BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. § 177 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an original telegram was outside the court's jurisdiction, a copy was admissible.-Spaulding v. Smith, 169 S. W. 627.

VI. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE.

§ 193 (Mo.) In a personal injury action by one run down by a street car, tried some two years after the accident, it is not error for the court to admit in evidence a rock identified by a witness as one which he removed from plaintiff's face after plaintiff was taken from beneath the car.-Holzemer v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 102.

§ 213 (Tex.Civ.App.) A letter from defendant's attorneys prior to suit on a note in question held not objectionable as a whole as an offer to compromise.-Sanford v. John Finnigan Co., 169 S. W. 624.

When any fact stated in an offer of compromise can be separated from the offer and stil! convey the idea in the writer's mind, it is admissible. Id.

§ 214 (Tex.Civ.App.) In order to exclude distinct admissions of facts as offers of compromise, they must have been made without prejudice, and into which the party might have been led by the confidence of effecting a compromise. -Sanford v. John Finnigan Co., 169 S. W. 624. (B) By Parties or Others Interested in

Event,

$ 222 (Ky.) In an action for fraud in the sale of a horse, in which plaintiffs alleged that other horses, declarations by them that the inthe horse was a "ridgeling" and had injured jury to the other horses was caused by disease or accident are competent.-Stewart & Whitesides v. Mackin, 169 S. W. 469.

(D) By Agents or Other Representatives.

his agent in reinstating his insurance, her dec§ 242 (Ky.) Where insured's sister acted as

larations as to the matter were admissible on the

issue of his health at that time, but her declarations as to other matters were incompetent.— Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cosgrove, 169 S. W. 999.

(E) Proof and Effect.

$ 265 (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try title to land conveyed by deed claimed to be a mortgage, evidence as to declarations by defendant that plaintiffs' father bought the land held insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiffs.Yates v. Caswell, 169 S. W. 1104.

VIII. DECLARATIONS. (A) Nature, Form, and Incidents in General.

$ 271 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence that plaintiff complained of suffering a good deal more when on his side held admissible.-Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Love, 169 S. W. 922.

§ 272 (Ky.) In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover insurance upon a stock of goods, which was burned after the petition in bankruptcy was filed and before adjudication, a declaration which one of the stockholders of the bankrupt corporation made after the adjudication, that he procured another to burn the property, is not admissible as a declaration

against interest.-Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. [sible.-Southern Gas & Gasoline Engine Co. v.'
Co. of Hamburg, Germany, v. Ohio Valley Dry Adams & Peters, 169 S. W. 1143.
Goods Co.'s Trustee, 169 S. W. 724.

§ 272 (Ky.) On an issue as to insured's health
at his reinstatement, statements by the benefi-
ciary were admissible in favor of defendant.-
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cosgrove, 169 S.
W. 999.

IX. HEARSAY.'

§314 (Ark.) In an action for damages for de-
lay in the transmission of a death message, tes-
timony by the son and son-in-law of the de-
ceased, who assisted his wife in making the
funeral arrangements, that, had the addressee
notified them of his intention to come, the
funeral would have been postponed is not hear-
say.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Blake,
169 S. W. 240.

$317 (Ky.) Where the testamentary capacity

of testatrix was in issue, testimony that wit-
ness' son did not purchase land because he be-
lieved she could not make a valid deed was prop-
erly excluded as hearsay.-Campbell v. Adkins,
169 S. W. 996.

Testimony that the witness did not purchase
testatrix's land because he had heard that she
was not competent to make a valid deed was
hearsay.-Id.

$317 (Ky.) On an issue as to insured's health
at his reinstatement, declarations of the benefi-
ciary's two sisters and brother, who lived with
her and insured, as to his health at different
times before his death, were inadmissible.-Su-
preme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cosgrove, 169 S. W.
999.

$317 (Tex.Civ.App.) Testimony that a sur-
veyor told persons for whom he surveyed land
that a mound was an established corner is inad-
missible as hearsay, not being evidence of gen-
eral reputation.-McSpadden v. Vannerson, 169
S. W. 1079.

X. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
(A) Public or Official Acts, Proceedings,
Records, and Certificates.

$335 (Mo.) Laws 1907, p. 271, makes Carle-
ton's abstracts prima facie evidence of land
titles in Pemiscot county; the register's and
receiver's books from which Carleton made the
abstract, are also admissible.-Russ v. Sims, 169
S. W. 69.

(B) Exemplifications, Transcripts, and
Certified Copies.

$ 342 (Mo.) Copies of patents to public lands
authenticated by a certificate of the recorder of
the General Land Office at Washington, D. C.,
reciting that the annexed copies are true and
literal exemplifications from the records in the
office and signed and sealed by the officer, are
admissible in evidence under Act Cong. April 19,
1904, and Rev. St. 1909, § 6293.-Chilton v.
Nickey, 169 S. W. 978.

(D) Production, Authentication, and Ef-

fect.

§ 366 (Mo.) A deed executed by an assignee
in bankruptcy and by a substituted trustee un-
der a deed of trust is admissible in evidence,
where it recites that the property was sold un-
der an order of the court in bankruptcy and
under the deed of trust, in the absence of any
objection on the ground that the order was not
shown.-Stone v. Kansas City & W. B. Ry. Co.,

169 S. W. 88.

XI. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
AFFECTING WRITINGS.

(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to
Terms of Written Instrument.
$413 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence that the form
of the contract of sale of a traction engine was
a form used for stationary engines held inadmis-

(B) Invalidating Written Instrument.
§ 434 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a stock subscrip-
tion contract was obtained by fraud, evidence of
the fraud was not objectionable as varying a
provision of the contract that no conditions, rep-
resentations, or agreements other than those

printed therein should be binding on the cor-
poration.-Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Bomar, 169 S. W. 1060.

(D) Construction or Application of Lan-
guage of Written Instrument.
$457 (Ark.) The meaning of the term "fur-
nishing trade" as used in an exhibit evidencing
the terms of a contract, might be shown.-
Wilkes v. Stacy, 169 S. W. 796.

$ 457 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action to rescind a
contract of sale of a traction engine guaranteed
to develop 20 horse power, parol evidence wheth-
er it was to develop such power at the belt or at
the draw bar held admissible to explain what is
meant by scientific or trade terms.-Southern
Gas & Gasoline Engine Co. v. Adams & Peters,
169 S. W. 1143.

$ 460 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for a ven-
dor's breach of contract, a letter offered to iden-
tify the land, but which added nothing to the
description as contained in other letters which
constituted the contract, was irrelevant.-
Spaulding v. Smith, 169 S. W. 627.

XII. OPINION EVIDENCE.
(A) Conclusions and Opinions of Witness-
es in General.

$471 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a witness tes-
tified that he knew the ordinary running time
made with cattle shipments between two points
and that if a shipment took a given time the run
was a bad one, such testimony did not involve
conclusion of law.-International & G. N. Ry.
Co. v. Parke, 169 S. W. 397.

§ 471 (Tex.Civ.App.) Pledgor's testimony that
he did not authorize pledgee to transfer or deal
with pledged certificate of stock in any other
way than as collateral security held a statement
of fact, and not a mere conclusion.-Feather-
ston v. Greer, 169 S. W. 912.

§ 471 (Tex. Civ. App.) Evidence by plaintiff
that there had been friction between himself
and certain witness, who had testified against
him, held not objectionable as a conclusion or
opinion.-Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Love, 169 S. W. 922.

§ 474 (Ky.) Neighbors and friends may, with-
out qualifying as experts, in an action against
an administrator for services to deceased, testi-
fy to the value of services.-Moore's Adm'r v.
Pierce, 169 S. W. 620.

(B) Subjects of Expert Testimony.
§ 514 (Mo.) In an action for injuries to a rail-
road engineer, where the defense was his viola-
tion of the company's rules, testimony by ex-
perienced railroad men as to purpose and mean-
ing of signals, switch lights, and the customary
manner of running trains at that point is ad-
missible as expert evidence.-Finnegan v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 969.

missible on the question whether a shipment of
§ 514 (Tex.Civ.App.) Expert testimony is ad-
live stock was made in the usual time.-Inter-
national & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Parke, 169 S. W.
397.

§ 518 (Mo.) Where the defense to an action
for injuries to a railroad engineer was that he
violated a rule requiring him to approach a
junction with his train under full control, tes-
timony by the plaintiff and others as to the
meaning of the term "full control" is admissi-

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

ble as evidence of the technical meaning of a
term.-Finnegan v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169
S. W. 969.

III. ASSETS, APPRAISAL, AND IN-
VENTORY.

$51 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 5425-
5427, giving an action for damages for wrongful

$536 (Ky.) Experienced carpenters held prop-death, held, that the amount recoverable was
erly permitted to testify as to strength of plank,
quality, and size of nails required to fasten it
and the weight required to wrench it from its
supports if properly nailed.-Interstate Coal Co.
v. Shelton, 169 S. W. 546.

not an asset of decedent's estate, but belongs to
the persons designated therein, and where the
suit is brought by the administrator, he is a
mere trustee to maintain the action for those
entitled to the damages sought to be recovered.

§ 5392 (Mo.) A train dispatcher is competent-Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 169 S. W. 337.
to testify as an expert as to whether an engineer
in approaching a junction point handled his IV. COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT
train in the usual and proper manner.-Finne-
gan v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 969.
XIV. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY.

§ 587 (Tex.Civ.App.) Matters may be proven
by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct
testimony.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Battle,
169 S. W. 1048.

EXAMINATION.

See Witnesses, §§ 268-308.

EXCEPTIONS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 263-273.

EXCEPTIONS. BILL OF.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 263, 499, 501, 525,
547, 692, 784, 907; Criminal Law, §§ 1090
1092, 1095.

I. NATURE, FORM, AND CONTENTS
IN GENERAL.

$14 (Ark.) Under Sp. Acts 1911, p. 927, rel-
ative to the Third judicial district, an appellant
may prepare a bill of exceptions containing his
own recital of the testimony, or file a skeleton
bill and later incorporate the stenographer's
transcript, but after the time for filing a bill
a recital of the oral proceedings can only be
corporated as prescribed by the statute.-Dent
v. People's Bank of Imboden, 169 S. W. 821.

OF ESTATE.

(B) Real Property and Interests Therein.
$129 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 186, pro-
viding that real estate of an intestate shall be
assets for the payment of debts, the probate
court had no jurisdiction to authorize an ad-
ministrator of an estate, possessing sufficient
personalty to pay debts, to complete a hotel
building in process of construction at testator's
death.-Doke v. Benton County Lumber Co.,
169 S. W. 327.

§ 137 (Ark.) An executor has no power to
sell the land of his testator unless directed to
do so by the will, either expressly or by neces-
sary implication.-Heiseman v. Lowenstein, 169
S. W. 224.

§ 138 (Ark.) A testator who directs his ex-
ecutor to dispose of his real estate thereby con-
fers by implication on him the power to exe-
cute the requisite deeds of conveyance.-Heise-
man v. Lowenstein, 169 S. W. 224.

Any words in a will which show an intention
to confer on the executor power to sell real
form of will which imposes duties which can-
estate and execute the requisite deeds, or any
not be performed without a sale, necessarily
creates a power of sale.-Id.

Where the bulk of the estate of a testator di-

in-recting his executors to deposit specified sums
with trust companies to pay to named benefi-
ciaries was real estate, and testator directed the
executors to close up the estate as speedily as
possible, the executors had power to sell.-Id.

EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY.
See Fraudulent Conveyances, § 51; Specific
Performance, §§ 21, 53.

EXECUTION.

Vendor

See Homestead; Subrogation, § 16;
and Purchaser, § 232; Wills, § 111.
V. STAY, QUASHING, VACATING. AND
RELIEF AGAINST EXECUTION.

§ 161 (Ark.) Supreme Court held authorized
to quash execution issued by its clerk on one of
its judgments upon proof of payment of the
judgment.-American Ins. Co. v. McGehee Liq-
uor Co., 169 S. W. 251.

§ 171 (Ark.) Chancery court held to have
jurisdiction to prevent parties to Supreme Court
judgment from enforcing it, though it could not
coerce the officers of the Supreme Court.—
American Ins. Co. v. McGehee Liquor Co., 169
S. W. 251.

VII. SALE.

(A) Manner; Conduct, Validity, and Con-
firming or Vacating.

$226 (Ky.) Where appraisers appointed to
value land levied upon under execution ap-
praise the wrong tract of land, the sale must
be considered as if there had been no appraisal
whatever.-Likens v. Pate, 169 S. W. 734.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 334, 1050; Death, $$
9, 31; Descent and Distribution; Mechan-
ics' Liens, § 57; Wills; Witnesses, § 149.

will to sell real estate exercises the power of
§ 142 (Ark.) Where an executor authorized by
sale of land, incumbered by a lease made by tes-
tator, the sale must be subject to the rights of
the lessee.-Heiseman v. Lowenstein, 169 S. W.
224.

§ 151 (Ark.) Where the bulk of the estate of
a testator directing his executors to deposit
specified sums with trust companies to pay the
named beneficiaries was real estate, and testator
directed the executors to close up the estate as
speedily as possible, the executors had no power
to mortgage.-Heiseman v. Lowenstein, 169 S.
W, 224.

A mere power of sale of real estate conferred
on executors by will does not include a power
to mortgage.-Id.

Where the will merely authorizes the executor
by implication to sell the real estate, the court
may not construe the provision to authorize.—

Id.

§ 154 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a husband died
leaving community property to the widow, and
children, who had no separate estate, and debts
of various classes, the fact that the widow was
entitled to sell community property as a sur-
vivor of the community, and made an assign-
ment thereof for the benefit of her husband's
creditors, did not bar her right, as administra-
trix thereafter appointed, to recover the prop-
erty for administration from the assignee and
his vendee.-Rotan Grocery Co. v. Pate, 169 S.
W. 378.

VI. ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF
CLAIMS.

(D) Priorities and Payment.

§ 272 (Ark.) Lands and tenements are only as-
sets in the hands of an administrator for the
payment of the debts of the intestate when the
personal property of the estate is insufficient to
pay the debts.-Doke v. Benton County Lumber
Co., 169 S. W. 327.

VII. DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE.

$314 (Ark.) In a suit to settle an estate in-
volving a determination of the rights of the
issue of a void marriage, there having been no
sale of property, the court could not make an
allowance for attorney's fees out of the estate
to such children.-Evatt v. Mier, 169 S. W.
817.

X. ACTIONS.

§ 431 (Ky.) Defendant administrator by not
objecting before filing answer to want of affi-
davit and demand by plaintiff waives the same.
-Moore's Adm'r v. Pierce, 169 S. W. 620.

§ 443 (Ky.) As regards demand, it is enough
for the petition to allege the claim had been
proven and payment demanded.-Moore's Adm'r
v. Pierce, 169 S. W. 620.

$451 (Ky.) The value of services rendered
deceased for which the administrator is sued is,
on conflicting evidence, for the jury.-Moore's
Adm'r v. Pierce, 169 S. W. 620.

XI. ACCOUNTING AND SETTLEMENT.
(E) Stating, Settling, Opening, and Re-

view.

§ 2 (Ark.) In suit by a resident of Arkansas
against a resident of Oklahoma on an Oklahoma
judgment, amount due defendant from insur-
ance company doing business in both states un-
der a policy on property in Oklahoma exempt
from seizure and sale held subject to garnish-
ment.-Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods
Co., 169 S. W. 223.

Exemption laws are not a part of a contract,
but pertain to the remedy, and the law of the
forum relative thereto governs.-Id.

A resident of Oklahoma sued in Arkansas can-
not avail himself of the exemption laws of Ok-
lahoma, as they have no extraterritorial effect.
-Id.

(B) Persons Entitled.

§ 27 (Ark.) Under the express provisions of
the exemption laws (Const. art. 9, §§ 1, 2, 6,
10; Kirby's Dig. §§ 3882, 3903-3905), only resi-
dents of the state can claim the benefit thereof.
-Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co.,

169 S. W. 223.

(D) Liabilities Enforceable Against Ex-
empt Property.

$77 (Ky.) The exemption statute in favor

IV. PROTECTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF RIGHTS.

§ 134 (Ark.) In suit by resident of Arkansas
against resident of Oklahoma on an Oklahoma
judgment, garnishment of amount due defend-
ant, under insurance policy covering property
exempt under the laws of Oklahoma, held not
such an attempt to evade the exemption laws of
the debtor's domicile as would be relieved
against.-Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods
Co., 169 S. W. 223.

EXPERIMENTS.

See Criminal Law, § 388; Evidence, § 150.
EXPERT TESTIMONY.

See Evidence, §§ 474-5392.

EXPLOSIVES.

See Master and Servant, §§ 286, 332; Nuisance,
§§ 62, 81-84.

§9 (Ark.) Where defendant sold soda pop, to
be retailed in a business owned jointly by
plaintiff and her husband, there was sufficient
privity between plaintiff and defendant for her
to maintain an action for injuries received by
the bursting of a bottle, though plaintiff might
not be a partner with her husband and was
merely acting under his direction.-Colyar v.
Little Rock Bottling Works, 169 S. W. 810.

A company engaged in bottling soda pop and
charged waters is guilty of actionable negli-
gence in overcharging the bottles in such a
manner that they will explode, because it owes
the duty of care, not only to prospective pur-
chasers, but to its employés.-Id.

Where defendant had knowledge that bottles
in the past had broken by reason of being too
heavily charged, it is liable for the injuries re-
ceived by a purchaser of bottled goods upon
explosion of the overcharged bottle.-Id.

Evidence of defendant's negligence in over-
charging the bottle held sufficient to go to the
jury. Id.

Where a bottling company purchased its bot-
tles from a responsible manufacturer, and they
were of the standard grade and quality, it is not
liable for injuries received by a purchaser of
its goods upon the explosion of a bottle, which
was properly charged, but contained a hidden
defect.-Îd.

See Colleges and Universities, § 8.

FALSE PERSONATION.

§2 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1964, forbid-
view of section 2122, defining arrest, held, that
ding the impersonation of a peace officer, and in
defendant's claim to have a warrant authorizing
him to arrest a witness and his expressed inten-
tion to do so unless witness paid a certain
amount as damages, without any actual under-
taking to arrest witness, did not constitute the
offense.-Martin v. State, 169 S. W. 776.
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY
ACT.

of householders applies against fines and pen-
alties due the state, though the state is not
specifically included.-Commonwealth v. Cass- See Commerce, § 27; Death, § 95; Judgment,
ady, 169 S. W. 497.
§ 588; Master and Servant, §§ 87, 204.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER
169 S.W.-78

FRAUD.

FELLOW SERVANTS.

See Master and Servant, §§ 180-201.

FENCES.

See Fixtures, § 21; Public Lands, § 173.
FINDINGS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 999-1022; Trial, § 365.

FINES.

See Exemptions, § 77.

83 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 2467, making the property of an accused, from the time of the finding of an indictment, liable for all fines and costs, the lien attaches, not only in the hands of accused, but in the hands of any other person holding it from his indictment until his discharge or payment of such fines, and also attaches to accused's after-acquired property.-Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Campbell, 169 S. W. 253.

FIREARMS.

See Weapons, §§ 4, 6, 10, 13.

FIXTURES.

(Ky.) There is no well-defined general rule by which the legal character of fixtures may be determined; it depending on the relation of the litigants, the kind and use of the property, and the intention of the owner, rather than the permanent annexation to the freehold.-Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Barkley, 169 S. W. 747.

§7 (Ky.) Permanent annexation is not in all cases essential to constitute a fixture.-Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Barkley, 169 S. W. 747.

$21 (Ark.) Certain fence posts brought on land by a vendor, but not fixed in the ground, and a sprayer and a harrow which he had used on the land, held not fixtures, and the vendor was entitled to remove them.-Harrell v. Taylor, 169 S. W. 779.

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See Appeal and Error, § 1066; Banks and Banking, § 49; Bills and Notes, § 494; Cancellation of Instruments, §§ 23, 25, 59; Carriers, § 238; Corporations, § 80; Deeds, §§ 17, 188, 211; Equity, § 430; Evidence, $ 222, 434, Frauds, Statute of; Fraudulent Conveyances; Husband and Wife, § 216; Indemnity, § 13; insurance, §§ 280–286; Limitation of Actions, §§ 99, 100, 177; Mortgages, § 78; New Trial, §§ 79, 140; Principal and Agent, § 23; Specific Performance, §§ 53, 121; Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, § 85; Trial, § 365; Trusts, § 95; Wills, §§ 155, 166, 329, 332, 400.

I. DECEPTION CONSTITUTING
FRAUD, AND LIABILITY
THEREFOR.

V. AGREEMENTS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR.

§ 49 (Ark.) An agreement whereby defendant was to furnish plaintiff with funds to purchase timber land, plaintiff to take the deed in his own name, and give back a mortgage for security, is not within the statute of frauds as an agreement not to be performed within one year, though it was not so performed, for the contract is one which might well be performed within a year.-Bouner v. Kimball-Lacy Lumber Co., 169 S. W. 242.

See Corporations, § 123; Criminal Law, § I. TRANSFERS AND TRANSACTIONS

1216.

FORNICATION.

See Incest; Prostitution.

FRANCHISES.

See Monopolies, § 26; Taxation, § 366.

INVALID.

(C) Property and Rights Transferred. § 51 (Ark.) Where an insolvent trades exempt property for land taking title in his wife, the transaction is not subject to attack by his creditors.-Baxter County Bank v. Copeland, 169 S. W. 1180.

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The Southwestern Reporter, Volume 169