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Action by John V. Andrews against the, that date it was late and did not leave until Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Com- 4:47. No proof was made when that train pany. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant arrived at Ft. Worth, nor when it was schedappeals. Reversed and remanded.

uled to arrive at that station, and none was

offered to show when the train which was S. P. English and A. P. Wozencraft, both met by Will Andrews at Wills Point was of Dallas, and J. C. Chesnutt, of Henrietta, scheduled to leave Ft. Worth, nor when it acfor appellant. Taylor & Humphrey, of Hen- tually did leave. For lack of such testimony rietta, for appellee.

the judgment of the trial court must be re

versed. Plaintif testified that on DecemDUNKLIN, J. John V. Andrews recovered ber 25, 1912, he left Henrietta on the early a judgment against the Southwestern Tele- morning train of the Ft. Worth & Denver graph & Telephone Company for $750 as City Railway, and from Ft. Worth traveled damages for mental anguish alleged to have on the Texas & Pacific Railway, passing been sustained by him as the proximate re through Wills Point, and arrived at Grand sult of the negligence of the defendant com- Saline, about 30 miles east of Wills Point, pany in failing to transmit a telephone call at 11 o'clock on the same morning. He teswhich plaintiff's brother, Will Andrews, at- tified that he did not recollect the exact hour tempted to send from Wills Point to Henriet- he left Henrietta on that trip, nor the exact ta, plaintiff's home. From that judgment the time he reached Ft. Worth, but gave it as defendant company has appealed.

his best recollection that he left Henrietta The call was put in by Will Andrews at about 4 o'clock and arrived at Ft. Worth Wills Point on September 16, 1913, and his near 7 or 8 o'clock. This was the only tes. purpose was to inform plaintiff, then residing timony introduced by the plaintiff to show at Henrietta, that his half-sister, Mrs. Alme- that he could have reached Martin's Mill in dia Stone, was very ill and not expected to time to attend the burial of Mrs. Stone, it live. Mrs. Stone, who was then at Martin's he had promptly received the telephone mesMill, about 23 miles from Wills Point, died sage which his brother attempted to send on very early on the morning of September 17th, the evening of September 16th. In the case and was buried on the afternoon of that day. of W. U. Tel. Co. v. McDavid, 103 Tex. 601,

[1] According to evidence introduced by 132 S. W. 115, it was held that proof of plaintiff the call was placed with defendant's schedules of two connecting railroads acagent at Wills Point about 8:30 o'clock on cording to which a trip could have been made the evening of the 16th, and if it had been from Abilene to Newark in time for plainpromptly communicated to plaintiff, he would tiff's wife to have attended the burial of her have taken the early morning train of Sep- father, was sufficient to support a finding tember 17th on the Ft. Worth & Denver City that she could have attended such burial if Railway to go to the bedside of his half- the telegram announcing the death had been sister. He alleged in his pleadings that by promptly delivered at Abilene. But plaintaking that train he would have reached tiff's testimony in this case, as shown above, Martin's Mill in time to have attended the was not sufficient to show even the schedules burial of Mrs. Stone. In order to make that of the two trains upon which he said he trip, it would have been necessary for him to would have traveled if the message had been travel to Ft. Worth on the Ft. Worth & Den- promptly transmitted, to say nothing of the ver City Railway, from Ft. Worth to Wills fact that the train upon which he would have Point over the Texas & Pacific Railway, and started was more than one hour late reachfrom Wills Point to Martin's Mill by private ing Henrietta, and the absence of any testiconveyance. His brother met a Texas & Pa- mony to show whether the train which reachcific Railway passenger train coming from the ed Wills Point about one hour late left Ft. direction of Ft. Worth to Wills Point, due to Worth on schedule time, whatever sucb reach Wills Point at 10:06 a. m. of Septem- schedule may have been. ber 17th, but it was an hour late, and did not

[2, 3] Appellant insists that the relationarrive until 11 o'clock. He waited for this ship of half-brother and half-sister was not train to meet plaintiff and take him out to sufficiently close to sustain any recovery by Martin's Mill. After the arrival of the train the plaintiff. It seems to be well settled in he proceeded to Martin's Mill, and arrived this state and other states that, in the abthere just as the casket was being loaded in- sence of personal injury, damages are recor. to the hearse for the trip to the cemetery, erable for mental anguish resulting from a and attended the burial of Mrs. Stone. If failure to properly deliver a telegram anplaintiff had been upon that train he would nouncing the sickness or death of parent or have gone with his brother upon the trip so child, husband or wife, sister or brother, made. The wife of Will Andrews had noti grandparent or grandchild. In W. U. Tel. fied plaintiff over defendant's telephone line Co. v. Ayers, 131 Ala. 391, 31 South. 78, 90 about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 17th of Am. St. Rep. 92, the Supreme Court of Alathe death of his sister, Mrs. Stone. The bama announced that the rule would not be morning train of the Ft. Worth & Denver extended so as to include relationships any City Railway was scheduled to leave Hen- more remote than those named, and of like rietta for Ft. Worth at 3:40 o'clock, but on effect is the decision of the Supreme Court

of Kentucky in Lee v. W. U. Tel. Co., re-, tice and proof of injury. The right of the ported in 130 Ky. 202, 113 S. W. 55. Re- plaintiff to recover, and the liability of the telecoveries were denied in the following cases graph company to respond in damages in such

cases, depends upon the general rules of law by our courts: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 97 applicable to all classes of breach of contract. Tex. 22, 75 S. W. 482, in which the relationship was that of uncle and niece; W. U. Tel. relations alleged to have existed on the part of

"In the case under consideration, the tender Co. v. Coffin, 88 Tex. 94, 30 S. W. 896, in the plaintiff towards deceased was a special conwhich the relationship was that of brothers- dition of things not known to be usual between in-law; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Gibson (Civ. App.) brothers-in-law; and in order to make the de39 S. W. 198, where the relationship was fendant liable for the injury arising out of these that of mother-in-law and son-in-law; Rich special circumstances, notice must have been

given to it when the telegram was delivered v. W. U. Tel. Co. (Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 93, for transmission. where the relationship was that of son-in-law “There being neither proof of notice to the and father-in-law; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kanause telegraph company of the special circumstances

nor of the actual suffering by plaintiff, the (Civ, App.) 143 S. W. 189, where the relation-judgment was unauthorized by the proof, and ship was that of stepfather and stepson. In the Court of Civil Appeals erred in not reverseach and all of those cases no notice was ing it." given to the telegraph company at the time The decision last noted was cited with apthe messages were sent of any special af- proval in W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wilson, supra. fection existing between the plaintiff and the According to the foregoing decision, plainperson whose sickness or death was announc- tiff's right to recover for the breach of the ed in the telegram; the only recovery sought defendant's undertaking to place Will Anbeing for such grief as could reasonably drews in communication with the plaintiff dehave been anticipated from the relationship pends upon the general rules of law applicashown. In the case of the W. U. Tel. Co. v. ble to all classes of breach of contract, and Coffin, supra, which was a suit for damages does not depend upon the mere question of for a negligent failure to deliver a telegram kinship which affects only the issue of the announcing the death of plaintiff's brother- mental suffering sustained by him and that in-law, our Supreme Court used the follow- of notice of the probability of such suffering ing language:

at the time defendant's agent at Wills Point "The former decisions of this court have set- was requested to put in a call for the plaintled the following propositions of law applica- tiff at Henrietta. According to that rule, if ble to the case :

the defendant was negligent, plaintiff was “1. That the person for whose benefit a tele- entitled to recover damages for such mental graphic message is sent, and who is named in the message, or of whose interest therein notice suffering as was reasonably within the conis given to the company at the time, may sue templation of the defendant as a result of upon it in case of injury from the negligence the breach of its contract at the time its of the telegraph company.

agent undertook the service requested by Will “2. That the telegraph company is charged with notice of the relationship which actually

Andrews. Will Andrews testified that he exists between the parties named, whether dis- told defendant's agent at Wills Point, at the closed by the terms of the message or not. time he tried to get in communication with

"3. That the company receiving the message plaintiff, that he "wanted to put in a call for must take notice of the purposes for which the John V. Andrews at Henrietta that his sister message was sent as disclosed by the language of the message, and in case of messages relating was dangerously sick, lying at the point of to serious sickness or death, it must be held to death.” There was no evidence of any furknow that the person for whose benefit it is sent ther notice of probable mental suffering on has a serious interest in the prompt delivery the part of plaintiff in the event of a failure of it.

*4. From the fact of blood relationship, if it to receive the information. exists, a jury may, without other proof, infer Independent of the reasoning last advancthat mental anguish was occasioned by the failed, the relationship of half-brother and halfure to be present at the bedside of the sick or sister is as close as that of grandparent and at the funeral of the deceased relative.

"5. The mental anguish, whether accompanied grandchild, and if the latter relationship is by injury to the person or not, is a proper ele- a sufficient predicate to establish the prement of actual damages, and when caused by sumption of mental suffering in case of a the negligence of the telegraph company in failing to deliver a message, compensation there failure to deliver a message of this characfor may be recovered by the injured party. ter, no reason is perceived why the same

should not be said of the other relation. No"That husband and wife, parent and child, tice to the defendant company that Mrs. and brothers and sisters, may recover under the principles before announced is settled by the de- Stone was a sister of the plaintiff was sufficisions of this and other courts which have cient to apprise the defendant of probable agreed with the decisions made in this state mental suffering by plaintiff even greater on that subject. To what degree of remote re than that which would ordinarily result from lationship the inference of injury may be extended is not necessary for us to determine at the failure of a brother to attend the burial this time, but it is evident that there may be of his half-sister. If, as testified to by plainblood relations so far removed that no such tiff, his mental suffering resulting from a presumption could be indulged by the jury.

“The right to recover, however, for such in. failure to attend the burial of Mrs. Stone was juries cannot, upon principle, be placed upon

as great as if she had been his full sister,

fied he gave to the defendant would be suffi-y of an objection to the refusal of the requestcient to embrace the same, and no reason is ed instruction. In other words, the record perceived why, under the decision in the case entirely fails to show that appellant called of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Coffin, supra, damages attention of the trial judge, or of opposing even to that extent should not be recoverable. counsel, to this contention at any time; and, For the reasons stated there was no error in under the circumstances, we think that the the court's refusal to give the requested plaintiff's failure to deny the special pleas peremptory instruction for a verdict in favor in accordance with the statute was waived of the defendant.

by the defendant. Of course if the requested [4] The trial was upon special issues. Pre-instruction had embodied the failure of plainliminary to the statement of the special is- tiff to deny the special pleas as a reason sues the court gave instructions in the na- why the same should be given, possibly it ture of a general charge upon the material might have been sufficient to raise the ques. issues in the case and one assignment of tion, but it was in general terms and read as error is predicated upon that action of the follows: “You are instructed to bring in a court. This criticism should be avoided upon verdict for the defendant in this cause." See another trial, as that method of instruction T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Tomlinson et al., 169 S. has a tendency to confuse and mislead the W. 217 (No. 7985, by this court, and not yet jury. Of course such suggestion has no ref- officially published). erence to the definitions of ordinary care and

[7] By the Acts of the Legislature of 1913, negligence, as those definitions were entirely page 256, article 1827 of the Revised Statutes proper in connection with the special issues has been amended so as to require a petition submitted. Whether or not Will Andrews filed in a suit to state "each fact going to notified defendant's agent at Wills Point of make up such cause of action and other alle the purpose of his call for the plaintiff at gations shall be pleaded by separate paraHenrietta was not submitted by any special graph and each paragraph numbered consecuissues as should have been done.

tively." Complaint is made of the court's ac[5] Two special issues were requested by tion in overruling a special exception, adthe defendant which, in general terms, called dressed to plaintiff's petition, that divers and for all information given to the defendant's sundry facts constituting a part of plaintiff's agent by Will Andrews at the time he at- cause of action were alleged in the same partempted to get in communication with the agraph of the plaintiff's petition contrary to

this statute. plaintiff. Of course the only material fact

Evidently this statute was sought was whether or not the defendant's passed for the convenience of the defendant agent was notified of the fact that Will An- in preparing an answer to the petition to drews expected to tell the plaintiff that his the end that the different facts may be adsister was lying at the point of death and mitted or denied without the necessity of re not expected to live, but the proposed issues the present suit the facts so alleged were

peating them. It seems, however, that in called for all the information given, and were specifically and specially answered in the detherefore too general, and perhaps would fendant's answer, and hence, if error was have been misleading to the jury.

committed in the ruling complained of, the [6] In addition to a general denial the de- same will work no harm or inconvenience to fendant pleaded in general terms that the the defendant upon another trial. plaintiff's failure to receive the call in question was due to the contributory negligence stone was dearer to him than his full sisters

[8-10] The testimony of plaintiff that Mrs. of himself and his agents, and also that we think was improperly admitted, since no plaintiff and his agent or agents were each notice of such special affection was given to guilty of contributory negligence in failing to the defendant. The further objection that prevent or minimize bis damages. Plaintiff the proof was at variance with the allegafiled no pleading in reply to these pecial pleas by the defendant. Appellant now in- tions being that Mrs. Stone was plaintiff's

tions in the plaintiff's petition, such allegasists that, by reason of the failure of plaintiff sister, we think is untenable for the reasons to file a reply to those special defenses in ac. already noted. We are of the opinion, fur. cordance with the act of the Thirty-Third ther, that there was no merit in defendant's Legislature, amending article 1829 of the Re- objection to proof of Mrs. Stone's death and vised Civil Statutes (see Acts 1913, p. 256) burial at Martin's Mill rather than at Wills the court erred in refusing to peremptorily Point, as alleged in plaintiff's petition; the instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor objection being that the same constituted a of the defendant. It does not appear from material variance. the record that the defendant called atten

[11] We are of the opinion that the re tion to this point upon the trial by request. marks made by counsel for the plaintiff in ing that its special pleas mentioned should his closing argument to the jury, upon which be taken as confessed, as we think should the eleventh assignment of error is predicathave been done, if defendant sought to in- ed, to the effect that the jury should allow voke the provisions of the statute mentioned. such damages as would compensate them for Besides, it does not appear that this conten- the grief that they would have suffered untion was presented to the trial court by way der the same circumstances, were improper,


and should have been excluded upon the de-13. EXEMPTIONS ($ 2*)-LAW GOVERNING. fendant's request.

Exemption laws are not a part of a con[12] Plaintiff testified that on the night of tract, but pertain to the remedy, and the law of

the forum relative thereto governs. Septemebr 16th he called up defendant's op

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exemptions, erator at Henrietta over his residence phone, Cent. Dig. $ 2; Dec. Dig. 2.*] and asked whether or not she had received 4. EXEMPTIONS (827*) — PERSONS ENTITLED a long-distance call for him, saying that he TO CLAIM EXEMPTION-RESIDENCE OF CLAIMhad been absent from home for a short time; that his sister was sick, and he was expect- tion laws (Const. art. 9, $$ 1, 2, 6, 10; Kir:

Under the express provisions of the exemping a call. He further testified that this con- by's Dig. 88 3882, 3903–3905), only residents of versation occurred about 9 or 9:30 o'clock in the state can claim the benefit thereof. the evening. We think this testimony was (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exemptions, admissible, over the objection urged thereto, Cent. Dig. § 30; Dec. Dig. $ 27.*] that the same was incompetent, irrelevant, 5. EXEMPTIONS ($ 2*) - EXEMPTION STATUTES and immaterial to any issue presented by


A resident of Oklahoma sued in Arkansas plaintiff's pleadings. According to testimony cannot avail himself of the exemption laws of of Will Andrews the operator at Wills Point Oklahoma, as exemption laws have no extrahad stated to him that she was informed territorial effect. over the long-distance telephone that plaintiff

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exemptions, was absent from home and could not be Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. $ 2.*] reached on that account, and that later, about


A resident of Arkansas recovered judg11 o'clock p. m., the operator told him that ment in Oklahoma against a resident of that she had received a report from the operator state and brought suit on the judgment in Arat Henrietta, to the effect that plaintiff bad kansas and sought to subject to garnishment

the amount due defendant from an insurance no telephone at his residence.

company doing business in both states on ac[13] One of the special issues submitted to count of a loss under a policy covering properthe jury read:

ty in Oklahoma exempt from seizure and

sale under the laws of that state. Held, that "If John Andrews, plaintiff, had gotten in this was not such an attempt to evade the ex; telephone connection with "his brother, Will An- emption laws of the debtor's domicile as would drews, on the night of the 16th of September, be relieved against, since a citizen of a state could he and would be have attended the funeral has the right to proceed under the forms of law of Mrs. Almedia Stone? Answer Yes or No." of his own state in the collection of a debt,

and it is only when he attempts to evade the Upon another trial if special Issues are sub- exemption laws of his own state by resorting mitted, we think the two questions embodied to attachment proceedings in another state in this issue should be submitted separately, state that he will be enjoined from prosecuting

against the property of a resident of his own as the same answer might not be given to his suit. both questions.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, For the reasons indicated the judgment is Cent. Dig: § 162; Dec. Dig. $ 134.*] reversed, and the cause remanded.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sebastian Coun

ty; Daniel Hon, Judge. SPEER, J., not sitting.

Action by the Williams-Echols Dry Goods Company against W. C. Person and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants ap

peal. Affirmed. PERSON et al. v. WILLIAMS-ECHOLS DRY

The appellee, a domestic corporation with GOODS CO. (No. 63.)

its principal place of business at Ft. Smith, (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 22, 1914.) Ark., brought suit in the circuit court of 1. EXEMPTIONS ($ 2*) - CONFLICT OF LAW8 - Sebastian county against appellants to rePROPERTY SUBJECT.

cover upon a judgment obtained against W. Plaintiff, a resident of Arkansas, recovered judgment in Oklahoma against a resident of C. Person and others in Oklahoma for $1,553.that state, and brought suit on the judgment in 22. A garnishment was issued and served Arkansas. An insurance company doing busi- upon the Westchester Fire Insurance Comness in both states was indebted to defendant on account of a loss under a policy covering pany, and the garnishee answered, admitting property in Oklahoma exempt under the laws of that it owed W. C. Person, one of the appelthat state from seizure and sale. Held, that lants, $950, but alleged that it was for inthe amount due was subject to garnishment. surance upon a house and household goods

[Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Exemptions, that were exempt from seizure for his debts Cent. Dig. & 2; Dec. Dig. $ 2.*]

under the laws of the state of Oklahoma. 2. GARNISHMENT (8 81*)-PROPERTY SUBJECT The appellants admitted the recovery of the -SITUS OF DEBT.

A debt is subject to garnishment in any judgment, and that it had not been paid. state where the debtor does business, though They alleged that they were citizens and contracted in another state, as the situs of the residents of Oklahoma, and that the money debt for purposes of garnishment is in any owing by the garnishee was due upon an state in which the debtor may be found, if the insurance policy for loss of their homestead laws of that state provide for garnishment.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Garnish- and household effects by fire, and was exempt ment, Cent. Dig. $$ 146, 147; Dec. Dig. So 81.*] | from garnishment and seizure for such debt

under the laws of Oklahoma, where the judg- ! Deer, 200 U. S. 176, 26 Sup. Ct. 207, 50 L. Ed. ment was recovered, and asked that it be de- | 426; Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah, 58, 110 Pac. clared exempt from the payment of it in this 356; Railway v. Swartz, 53 Tex. Civ. App. state, and that appellee be enjoined from any 389, 115 S. W. 275. further proceeding to collect and subject it (3-6) Exemption laws are not a part of the to the payment of their judgment. Appellee contract and pertain to the remedy, and the demurred to the answer, and the demurrer law of the forum relative thereto governs. was sustained, and, upon appellants declining Stone v. Drake, supra; 18 Cyc. 1376. Only to plead further, judgment was rendered for residents of the state of Arkansas are entitled the full amount of the debt, and, the gar- to claim the benefit of our exemption laws. nishee having paid the amount due on the article 9, 88 1, 2, 6, 10, Constitution of 1874; policy into court, $950, it was paid to the ap- sections 3882, 3903–3905, Kirby's Digest. The pellee and the garnishee discharged. Appel- appellants are not residents of the state of lants prosecute this appeal to reverse the Arkansas but of the state of Oklahoma, and judgment.

cannot claim the benefit of our laws, being Geo. F. Youmans, of Ft. Smith, for appel- nonresidents, nor can they avail here of the lants. Kimpel & Daily, of Ft. Smith, for ap- exemption laws of Oklahoma, which have pellee.

no extraterritorial effect. Nor do we agree

with appellants' contention that this proceedKIRBY, J. (after stating the facts as ing is such an attempt to evade the exempabove). [1] Can appellee, a citizen and resi- tion laws of the debtor's domicile as will be dent of this state, subject to the payment of relieved against. It is only when a creditor his debt, by garnishment, the money due ap- attempts to evade the exemption laws of his pellants, residents of the state of Oklahoma, own state by resort to attachment proceedfrom an insurance company, which also does ings in the court of another state against the business in this state, for a loss under a fire property of a debtor who is a resident of the insurance policy issued in that state upon

state of the creditor's domicile that he will their homestead and household effects, all of be enjoined by the courts of the latter state which were exempt from seizure and sale from prosecuting his suit in the foreign for the payment of the debt in that state, jurisdiction. Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. where the judgment upon which this suit is 73, 13 S. W. 733, 22 Am. St. Rep. 182; Cole brought was obtained? This proceeding was

v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. instituted by a citizen and resident of this 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; Greer v. Cook, 88 Ark. state to collect a debt due it from a resident 95, 113 S. W. 1009, 16 Ann. Cas. 671. of the state of Oklahoma, and the garnish

If appellee was a resident of the state of ment was served upon a corporation doing Oklahoma and had resorted to the courts of business in this state, and, if it be conceded this state to collect his claim in evasion of that the debt due from the garnishee to ap-idence, our court would not lend its aid; but

the laws of his own and his debtor's respellants was exempt from seizure and garn this proceeding is by a resident of this state ishment in the state of Oklahoma, it in no wise affects the creditor's right to subject in the courts thereof, to collect a claim the garnished debt to the payment of his against a nonresident debtor by garnishment, judgment here.

subjecting to its payment money due to such [2] The garnishee became indebted to the nonresident in the hands of the garnishee insured under a policy of insurance upon a

within this jurisdiction, and cannot be said loss, for the payment of the amount due to be an attempt to evade the exemption laws thereunder, and could have been sued by the of another state, since a citizen of every insured, its creditors, in the courts of this state has a right to proceed under the forms state, where it also does business, and it is of law of his own state in the collection of his liable to process of garnishment here, not-claims under the method provided by the

laws thereof. withstanding the debt was contracted in another state for as was stated in Stone v.

The court properly sustained the demurrer Drake, 79 Ark. 386, 96 S. W. 197, quoting to the answer, and the judgment is affirmed. from Railway v. Parker, 69 Ark. 401, 63 S. W. 996, 86 Am. St. Rep. 205:

"The situs of a debt, for purposes of gar- HEISEMAN et al. v, LOWENSTEIN et al nishment, is not only at the domicil of the debt

(No. 43.) or, but in any state in which the garnishee may (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 15, 1914.) be found, provided the law of that state permits the debtor to be garnished, and provided 1. WILLS (8 695*)-CONSTRUCTION JURISDICthe court acquires jurisdiction over the garnishee through his voluntary appearance or ac

A court of equity has jurisdiction to contual service of process upon him within the strue a will creating a trust, state."

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. See, also, Railway v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, Dig. 88 1665–1669; Dec. Dig. § 695.*] 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144; Harris v. 2. WILLS (8 439*)–CONSTRUCTION-INTENTION

OF TESTATOR. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. Ed.

The court in construing a will must ascer. 1023, 3 Ann. Cas. 1084; L. & N. Ry. Co. v.) tain the intention of testator as gathered from •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes


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