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This court, in an early case, speaking of , except as against third parties, It might well that statute, said:
be argued that the state was not deemed to “This provision of law, we have no doubt, cre- be a party within its meaning. But the lanates a lien in favor of the state, on all of the guage is quite different. It declares, unconproperty of a person charged with a criminal ditionally, that the mortgage “shall be a lien offense, wheresoever it may be within the limits of the state, which attaches upon and binds on the mortgaged property from the time the it, not only in the hands of the accused, but also same is filed in the recorder's office for recin the hands of any other person who shall, in ord, and not before.” any manner, possess or hold it, from the time
When the two statutes involved in this case of the arrest or indictment found, as mentioned in the statute, until the accused is discharged are read together, the one which declares from the prosecution, or such fines and costs as that the property of an accused person shall shall be adjudged against him are paid." Law- be bound for the fine and costs from the time son v. Johnson, 5 Ark. 168.
of his indictment or arrest, and the one It is insisted by learned counsel for appel- which declares when a mortgage lien.shall lant that the lien which arises under the 'take effect, the conclusion is unavoidable statute from the time of the finding of the that the Legislature meant to give the state indictment or the arrest, whichever first a lien against an unrecorded mortgage. occurs, does not attach to after-acquired It does not follow that the state would property. But we think counsel are clearly have a lien as against equities of third parmistaken in their interpretation of the stat- ties not within the registration statutes; ute. The binding force of the statute be- but where the statute has, as in this case, gins at the time of the arrest or finding of unconditionally provided that there shall be the indictment, but it gathers within its no lien until the mortgage is recorded, it sweep all property owned by the accused would be straining the language of the from that time until the judgment subse-lawmakers to say that an unrecorded mortquently rendered for fine and costs be paid. gage should be valid as against the state's Similar language is used in the statute creat statutory lien. ing liens in favor of judgment creditors, We are of the opinion, therefore, that the the language being that a judgment shall be state's lien was superior, and that appellees a lien “from the date of its rendition," and acquired a superior title under their purthis court held in Real Estate Bank v. Wat- chase at the execution sale. son & Hubbard, 13 Ark. 74, 82, that the lien The decree of the chancery court is thereattached to any property acquired subse- fore affirmed. quent to the rendition of the judgment. The main question is whether the state's lien at- MIDLAND VALLEY R. CO. v. SCOVILLE. tached as against the unrecorded mortgage.
(No. 123.) It will be noted that, under the authorities
(Supreme Court of Arkansas. July 13, 1914.) cited above, a purchase-money mortgage must he simultaneous with the execution of the
1. RAILROADS ($ 350*)-INJURIES TO PERSONS
AT CROSSINGS-EVIDENCE-JURY QUESTION. deed of conveyance, in order to take preced In a personal injury action by one run ence over prior liens, for, if there is any in- down by a train at a railroad crossing, the questervening space of time during which the tion of plaintiff's freedom from contributory title rests in the purchaser, the prior liens negligence held, under the evidence, for the jury.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, attach to it in preference to the mortgage. Cent. Dig. $8 1152–1192; Dec. Dig. $ 350.*] Cohn v. Hoffman, 50 Ark. 108, 6 S. W. 511. 2. RAILROADS (8 350*)-INJURIES TO PERSONS
 The registration statutes of this state AT CROSSING-DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN. provide that:
One approaching an unfrequented spur “Every mortgage, whether for real or per: team at a point less than 20 feet from the
track of a railroad company, who stopped his sonal property, shall be a lien on the mortgaged tracks and looked in both directions and lisproperty from the time the same is filed in the tened, cannot, as a matter of law, be held guilty recorder's office for record, and not before." of contributory negligence because buildings Kirby's Digest, & 5396.
close to the track cut off his line of vision and This court has held that, notwithstanding prevented him from seeing an approaching train. the provision of the statute with reference to Cent. Dig. $g 1152-1192; Dec. Dig. $ 350.* ]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, registration of mortgages, an unrecorded mortgage is valid between the parties and as
Appeal from Circuit Court, Sebastian Counagainst persons holding the property under ty; Daniel Hon, Judge. voluntary conveyance. Main v. Alexander, 9
Action by James Scoville against the MidArk. 112, 47 Am. Dec. 732; Leonhard v.
land Valley Railroad Company. From a Flood, 68 Ark. 162, 168, 56 S. W. 781. This judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. is obviously so, because the registration stat
Affirmed. ute is not intended to apply between the par
See, also, 158 S. W. 954. ties to a mortgage or to a grantee under a This is the second appeal of this cause, a voluntary conveyance.
former judgment having been reversed be But is it valid as against the state's cause of an erroneous instruction on the claim? We think not. If the statute, by measure of damages. Upon the remand of express language, made the mortgage good 'the cause appellee again recovered judgment, For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
which is not now claimed to be excessive. Į such circumstances, the fact that the person Indeed, the present appeal questions only the injured did not use the proper degree of care sufficiency of the evidence to support the so clearly appears that it leaves no inference
or fact in doubt; and, where such evidence is verdict of the jury.
undisputed, the question of contributory negliUnder the evidence, the jury might have gence becomes a question of law for the court, found that appellee was driving west on
and not of fact for the jury. As is said in the Parker avenue in the city of Ft. Smith, in case of St. L, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dillard,
78 Ark. 520 [94 S. W. 617], the traveler 'is a delivery wagon which was covered and deemed to have seen or heard what is plainly had side curtains extending to the front, and to be seen or heard.' But, where the evidence that he was standing near the front of his is conflicting, the question as to whether or not wagon as he drove down the center of this the traveler at the public crossing did look and
listen for an approaching train before reaching street, and that, as he reached a point about the crossing, and whether or not he did con25 feet from the railroad track, he stopped tinue with vigilance and care until the point of his team and both looked and listened for an danger was past, is ordinarily one of fact for approaching train. The train which struck either uncontradicted or is indisputable to the
the jury to determine. Unless the evidence is appellee approached from the south; but ap- effect that he did not look and listen, the verdict pellee says he did not see this train because of a jury finding that the traveler did so look a building 18 feet high stood on the corner and listen should not be set aside as a matter of the lot adjoining the railroad track behind not there was a possibility for the traveler to
of law. Where it is uncertain as to whether or which the train approached, and that the have been able to see or hear the approaching building itself was only 3 or 4 feet from the train, either because the evidence is conflicting track, and that a telephone pole also stood or because there is doubt as to the inference to
be drawn from the facts proved, the question at the corner of the building, a few feet of contributory negligence is properly one to be from it. Appellee and the witnesses who tes submitted to the jury, Under such circumtified in his behalf stated that the train stances, the question is left in doubt as to neither blew its whistle nor rang its bell, whether or not the party did look and listen
for the approach of a train, and it cannot be and the proof further shows that this was said that it is conclusively shown that he did not the main track of the railroad, but was not do so when he testifies that he did. If there a spur track connecting with only one busi- was an obstruction which obscured the view of ness house in that city, and that the track the train within the line of the traveler's vision, was used only a few times a week by the did not look, although by looking he did not
then it cannot be conclusively inferred that he appellant company. From the appellee's see the train." evidence the jury might have found that he [1, 2] Here the circumstances were such drove as near to the track as it was prudent that appellant could not see the approaching to do, when he both looked and listened, and train, therefore, as he approached the track, could neither see nor hear the approaching he was under the greater duty to listen; but train, and that he started to drive across the he had the right to cross the track, and, in track with his team in a trot, looking to the so doing, he was only called upon to exercise left and then to the right; that as he drove ordinary care in looking and in listening for upon the track the train approached and an approaching train. Here the appellee lisstruck the rear end of his wagon just before tened, but did not hear the approaching he had succeeded in crossing over. The evi- train, because it neither blew a whistle nor dence shows that the train which struck ap- rang a bell, and he did not see the train bepellee was running at a speed not to exceed cause of the obstruction of the building and ten miles per hour, and was composed of two the telephone pole. Of course, as he apbox cars, which were being pushed by the proached nearer the track the angle of his engine.
vision widened, but we cannot say, as a matEdgar A. de Meules, of Muskogee, Okl., ter of law, that he should have approached and Pryor & Miles, of Ft. Smith, for appel- nearer the track before stopping than he did. lant. Kimpel & Daily, of Ft. Smith, for He was himself within 25 feet of the track, appellee.
and his team was of course nearer by its
length to the track than he was. As he SMITH, J. (after stating the facts as drove upon the track he was in duty bound above). Many cases have discussed the duty to look in both directions; but this could be of a traveler at a crossing to look and listen done only by looking in one direction and as he approached a railroad track, and, dis- then in the other, and we cannot say, as a cussing this duty in the case of Arkansas matter of law, that the jury might not have Central Railway Co. v. Williams, 99 Ark. found that appellee decided in the emergency, 167, 137 S. W. 829, this court said:
when he discovered the approaching train, "Where the undisputed evidence shows that that the şafe thing to do was to drive on the injured person had an opportunity to see and hear the approach of the train, at or be
At any rate, we think the evidence in this fore the time of the accident, and that his opportunity was such that he could not have faii- case presents a question of fact as to appellee ed to have seen or heard the train in time to being guilty of contributóry negligence, and have avoided the injury if he had used due care the jury has found, under instructions which in looking and listening, then be will be deemed are conceded to be correct, that he was not, to have seen and heard the train, even though he should testify that he looked' and listened and the judgment of the court below is there and did not either hear or see the train. Under I fore affirmed.
county the sum of $15,000, which defendants PELTZER et al. v. GILBERT et al., County are threatening to expend in defraying the cost Judges. (No. 18318.)
of bringing into this state numerous physi(Supreme Court of Missouri. July 2, 1914. Re- cians and other persons to be used as withearing Denied July 14, 1914.)
nesses on behalf of the prosecution in the 1. PLEADING (8 381*)—SUFFICIENCY—Issues case of State v. B. Clark Hyde, charged with AND PROOF.
the crime of murder in the first degree. Improper motives or misconduct of com- Plaintiffs also ask that defendants by mandaplainants which would prevent them from securing equitable relief on the ground that they tory injunction be compelled to restore to did not come into equity with clean hands could the treasury of Jackson county the sum of be shown during the trial of the cause without $8,974.04, which it is charged they have herebeing pleaded. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading from the public funds of said county in se
tofore audited and caused to be expended Cent. Dig. 88 1238, 1253–1279; Dec. Dig. 8 381.*]
curing expert witnesses, and for other serv2. INJUNCTION (8 1*)-NATURE OF REMEDY-ices, in a former trial of said B. Clark Hyde RIGHT TO WRIT.
upon the same charge which is now pending An injunction is not a writ of right, but a against him. Plaintiffs do not charge that writ of grace and discretion, and will only be issued when the court's own conscience is moved defendants have acted fraudulently or corand the chancellor is convinced that complain- ruptly in causing the public funds of said ants have come into equity with clean hands, county to be paid out in defraying the exand that a proper case has been made.
penses of the trial of said case of State v. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Injunction, Hyde, nor in the threatened expenditure of Cent. Dig. $1; Dec. Dig. 8 1.*]
other moneys in that behalf, but the gist of 3. EQUITY (8 65*)-MAXIMS-CLEAN Hands.
Where, pending the trial of a physician for their complaint is that there is no law emmurder, the county attorney applied to the coun- powering defendants as such judges to audit ty court for an order making an appropriation and cause such expenses to be paid, and that, of $15,000 for the payment of expenses, includ- while defendants would be personally liable ing the cost of bringing nonresident experts into for causing such an unlawful disbursement of the state to testify, whereupon two taxpayers, one paying $16.25 and the other 61 cents tax- public funds, the right to sue for such mises for the current year, employed an attorney appropriated funds “resides with the counto enjoin the county from paying such expenses, and the taxpayers were not actuated by a desire ty,” and plaintiffs will possess no individual to protect the county treasury, but were prose- right to maintain an action or actions at law cuting the suit to hamper the prosecution of the to recover such funds for the county after criminal case, they were not entitled to equita- they have been unlawfully audited and disble relief, since they did not come into equity with clean hands.
bursed. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent.
The particular order entered by defendants Dig. $8 185–187; Dec. Dig. § 65.*]
regarding future disbursements of which peti. 4. COUNTIES (8 139*)-LIABILITIES-EXPENSES tioners complain is predicated upon a letter
OF NONRESIDENT EXPERT WITNESSES-CRIM- written by the prosecuting attorney of JackINAL PROSECUTION.
There is no warrant in law for payment by son county, which letter and the order made the county of the fees and expenses of non- pursuant thereto are as follows: resident expert witnesses in a criminal prose
"December 18, 1913. cution.
"To the Honorable County Court of Jackson [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Counties, County, Mo. Kansas City, Missouri--GenCent. Dig. 8$ 203–207; Dec. Dig. § 139.* ] tlemen: I am submitting this letter to you in Woodson and Walker, JJ., dissenting in part. ative to the financing of the coming trial of the
pursuance to our conversation of yesterday relIn Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jack- State of Missouri versus Hyde. Of course it is
impossible for me to definitely state how much son County ; Allen C. Southern, Judge.
money will be required to try this case since Suit by Theodore C. Peltzer and another that is altogether regulated by the length of against Hugh C. Gilbert and others, Judges time wbich the nurses and experts and other of the County Court of Jackson County, to witnesses from outside the State remain in Kan
sas City. During the last trial one expert in restrain defendants from auditing and pay- particular, Dr. Wesner, was in Kansas City for ing out of the county treasury certain ex- several weeks, and I am hoping that no such penses of the county attorney for the trial condition will arise this time. This would ma
However, of one B. Clark Hyde for the murder of one terially cut the expenses in this case.
for expert testimony and the bringing of a Swope. From a decree dismissing the bill, large number of witnesses from all parts of the complainants appeal. Reversed and United States I estimate that $15,000 will cover manded.
the expenses of this trial. Of course I am not
asking for any money to be placed in my hands-Action to restrain defendants from audit only the right to get these people to come here
I want ing and causing to be paid out of the county and to have them paid by the court. treasury certain expenses in a criminal case. placed in my hands.
no funds of any character or description to be
I will say this to the The plaintiffs bring this action in equity as court-that I shall be as economical as possible taxpayers of Jackson county, to enjoin the in the trial of this case, and it will please me defendants as judges of the county court of probably more than any one else if the expenses
of this trial can be greatly reduced. that county from auditing, allowing, and caus
"Trusting this letter meets your requirements ing to be paid out of the public funds of said ) and you can each of you vote to allow the funds •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
to try this very important murder case, I beg | ing the trial of the cause without being plead. to remain,
ed at all. 16 Cyc. p. 148; Creamer v. Bivert, “Respectfully yours,
214 Mo. 473, loc. cit. 485, 113 S. W. 1118; and “[Signed] Floyd E. Jacobs."
Houtz v. Hellman, 228 Mo. 655, loc. cit. 671, “Order.
128 S. W. 1001. "This cause now coming on for hearing, the We will now review the evidence which court orders, by unanimous vote, that in com- tends to prove the motives of the plaintiffs pliance with the above communication from the and their attorneys in prosecuting this suit: county prosecuting attorney dated December 18, 1913, requesting this court to pay out of
In the trial of this cause it was shown the general funds of Jackson county, Mo., the that plaintiff Peltzer paid to Jackson counexpenses (estimated by said prosecuting attor: ty, through its collector, taxes aggregating ney at not to exceed $15,000) for the payment of expert witnesses and the expenses of bring- $16.25 for and during the year 1912, and that ing a large number of witnesses to Kahsas City, plaintiff Bowling paid to said county 61 cents Mo., from different locations in the United for the same year. Roland Hughes is the States for the trial of the case of State of principal attorney for plaintiffs in the proseMissouri v. B. Clark Hyde, said expenses be paid out of the general funds of the said county cution of this action. The firm of Johnson upon the presentation to the court of said bills & Lucas and one Cleary were part of the atapproved by the prosecuting attorney."
torneys employed by B. Clark Hyde to deThe defendants by answer assert that the fend him against the beforementioned charge money which they intend to disburse out of of murder. the public funds of Jackson county is a nec To prove that this suit was brought and essary expenditure to procure the attendance maintained at the suggestion and expense of of witnesses residing outside the state of the attorneys of B. Clark Hyde, or for the Missouri; that said witnesses have made a benefit of said Hyde, the defendant introducchemical analysis of the stomach and other ed one James W. Broaddus, who testified as vital organs of one Thomas H. Swope, the follows: person who it is charged was murdered by “My name is James W. Broaddus. I am an B. Clark Hyde; that the presence of such attorney; have been since last June. My office physicians and other nonresident witnesses ly judge of the Court of Appeals in this dis
is with my grandfather, E. J. Broaddus, formeris necessary to prove the charge which the trict, at 1305 Commerce building. I know public prosecutor has preferred against said where Hughes & Whitsett's office is on the same Ilyde; that the public prosecutor has no au: phone once in awhile. Q. I will ask you whetha
floor with ours. Mr. Hughes uses our Bell thority to compel the aforesaid nonresident er or not Mr. Hughes came in there a few days witnesses to attend the trial of said B. ago and had a conversation in which he called Clark Hyde, and cannot procure their attend-up Johnson & Lucas's office? A. Monday aftance in any way except by paying them a said, it anything? What was said in that con
ernoon, the 12th of this month. Q. What was reasonable sum for their time to be consumed versation, the first thing that was said? and expenses to be incurred in attending said "Mr. Hughes: We object to that conversation trial. For further answer defendants admit as immaterial and irrelevant. that plaintiff's are taxpayers of Jackson coun
"The Presiding Judge: Ti objection will be
sustained." ty, but assert that the amount of taxes which plaintiffs have paid and the amount which
Here followed an argument between counthey might have to pay towards defraying the sel and court as to the admissibility of this expenses complained of would not amount to evidence. Whereupon the presiding judge more than three cents each, and that such said: amount is so trivial that the court ought not the fact that testimony along the same line was
“This testimony will be admitted in view of to take jurisdiction of the cause and grant let in without objection on your part at all, and the relief prayed for.
it might be deemed in the way of impeachment All the evidence introduced by defend- of former testimony." ants quite clearly demonstrates that they are To which ruling and action of the court the seeking to defeat this case by showing that plaintiffs and each of them then and there plaintiffs are not prosecuting the action in duly excepted and still except. good faith to prevent the unlawful disburse
"Q. What was the first thing done by Mr. ment of public funds, and that the chief pur- Hughes when he came into your office? A. This pose of the action is to impede or render im- kind of embarrasses me, I didn't intend for this
to happen. This is all I know about it. He possible the successful prosecution of B.
came in there Monday and took the telephone Clark Hyde. It is true that the asserted im- and called up and said, 'Is this Johnson & Luproper motives of plaintiffs, and the alleged cas's oflice?' He said, I would like to speak to fact that they did not come into court with Judge Johnson.'.Q. Who said that? A. Mr.
He said, “This is Roland Hughes, clean hands, are not pleaded by defendants. Roland Hughes talking.' Then he said, 'Peltzer It would have been more in harmony with informs me that there has been no arrangement the rules of good pleading for defendants to made in regard to my fee in this matter,' and he have specifically challenged the motives of said, 'I would like to know about it.' Of course,
ordinarily, I don't pay any attention to those plaintiffs in their answer filed herein, but things but there has been so much of this in the general rule seems to be that the im- the newspapers that it just attracted my atten
Mr. Hughes listened, and pretty proper motives or misconduct of a plaintiff tion to that. which would prevent him from securing relief about it. 'I told Mr.'Hughes this morning that
soon said, 'All right,' and that is all I know from a court of chancery may be shown dur-lI had been subpænaed. I wanted him to know
about it. I told him what I would testify to. I recollection of calling up Judge Johnson relative He said he had some recollection about saying to this matter over the Bell phone in Judge something. He did not say he said it, he said he Broaddus' office? A. It is not very distinct. I had no recollection of saying it, he admitted think I did though. Q. Have you any recolleche came in there, and asked me what I re- tion whatever of talking to him about Mr. Peltmembered, and I told him just what I have zer? A. I think so. Q. When was that? A. told here."
Well, that was probably--this is Friday, isn't Cross-examination by Mr. Hughes :
it? Q. Yes. A. I wouldn't be positive about
the day, but it was probably Monday or Tuesday "Q. What did I tell you about it after you evening after this suit was brought. I rode told me? A. You said you had no recollection home with him in an automobile. Q. Have you about that. Q. No, what did I say about tes a recollection now of that? A. Yes, sir. Q. tifying to the conversation? A. You said, go And you have a recollection of a conversation ahead; you said you didn't care. You said, 'All relative to Mr. Peltzer? A. I think so. Q. right. I wanted you to know it before I got Well, have you or not? A. What I mean is that on the stand. I told Mr. Jacobs last night I while we rode home something was said about wanted to see you first."
Mr. Peltzer. Q. What was that? A. I couldn't After witness Broaddus had testified, W. tell you now what was said. Q. Don't you T. Johnson was called by plaintiff, and testi- ask you if you discussed with him at that time
know? A. No, I don't think I do. Q. I will fied as follows:
the question of your fee from Mr. Peltzer. A. "My name is W. T. Johnson, I am an attor- No, sir. Q. Are you positive of that? A. I ney for B. Clark Hyde charged with murder, think I am positive that we did not discuss and have been since the beginning of the suit. any question as to Mr. Peltzer. Q. I didn't ask Q. I will ask you whether or not Roland Ilughes you that; I asked you if you discussed the quescalled you up on the 12th day of this month, tion of a fee from Mr. Peltzer with Judge Johnlast Monday, at your office in this city, and son in his automobile. A. That is what I un. talked to you about his fee from Mr. Peltzer derstood the question to be. Judge Johnson, as I in this injunction suit? A. He did not. Q. started home, came from his office, and his autoHe never said a word to you? A. No, sir. Q. | mobile was standing at the curb, and he inNeither one way or the other? A. No, sir. Q. vited me to ride home with him, and I did, and I will ask you if he didn't call you up and ask we talked about this case, and I don't know, it you about why he was to get his money from may have been in that conversation-I wouldn't Peltzer? A. He never did. Q. Never at any be positive about it-that something was said tine or on any occasion? A. No, sir. Q. Never about the fee, and I said to Mr. Johnson that said a single word to you? A. No, sir. Q. Did whatever compensation came to me it would you ever discuss the fee with him at all? A. have to come from my clients. No, sir. Q. Did you ever have an automobile ride with him in which you discussed the fee
"Q. How did you come to be discussing this with him? A. I did not."
matter of your fee in this case with Judge JohnRoland Hughes, attorney for plaintiff, did son? A. Oh, I don't know, just like lawyers not testify after Broaddus gave the evidence riding along and talking about everything. Q.
How did you come to talk to him about such hereinbefore quoted. However, Mr. Hughes a matter? A. I don't know. I couldn't tell you was called by the plaintiff before Mr. Broad that. That is a psychological question. I can't dus was sworn, and, when interrogated re answer that question. I am not an expert. garding any conversation he had had with W. T. Johnson (attorney for Hyde) about this attorney for Hyde have anything to do with
"Q. Did the fact that Judge Johnson was an suit, testified as follows:
your discussion of that fee? A. I think not. "Q. Hare you ever talked with Judge John-Q. Will you say it did not? A. No, sir. Q. son about this matter, J. M. Johnson? A. I What would you say about it? A. I don't don't think I ever did. Q. I mean W. T. John- know what prompted the conversation in his
A. Yes, sir. Q. When did you talk to mind. I couldn't say. Q. I am talking about Mr. Johnson about the matter? A. Oh, I don't your mind. You are the man that told him know. I expect it was last summer some time. about the fee. A. About how that conversation Q. When did you talk to him last? A. I don't came up? Q. Did he suggest the question of know whether it was yesterday or the day be the fee, or did you? A. I don't know. fore. Q. You know he is attorney for Dr. Hyde? A. I know he is so reported in the news "Q. I want to call your attention to a cerpapers.
* * I think I was in the court- tain conversation and ask you if it transpired a ruom one day when that trial was going on. I few days ago, where you went in the office of do not think I have discussed with him the fact Judge Broaddus, formerly Judge of the Court he was attorney, or in any way connected with of Appeals in this district, and took_their Bell that matter. Q. Would you say you have not | phone and called up the office of Johnson & in any phase? A. You mean in connection with Lucas. A. I think I told you I did that. Q. this suit? Q. Yes, sir. A. No, I don't think so. I will ask you whether or not when you got
that number you asked for Judge Johnson to "Q. Did you talk to him about Mr. Peltzer? come to the phone? A. I don't know. Q. Will A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever had any con you say whether you did or did not? A. No, versation with him about Mr. Peltzer ? A. I won't. Q. You won't say you did and you Well, I don't know; I think I have since this won't say you didn't? A. I won't say that I suit was brought. Q. When? A. I don't know. didn't, and I don't have any recollection now Since this suit was brought. Q. Where? A. of asking that question. Q. I will ask you if Let me see if I can recall that. I don't know you finally did get Judge Johnson on the phone. whether I met him on the sidewalk or called A. I told you I thought I talked with him over him up over the telephone. I called him up that phone. Q. I will ask you if you made a probably by telephone once. Q. Where were statement of this character to him: That you Fou? A. Probably in Judge Broaddus' office, were getting skittish about your fee from Peltbecause I have no telephone that connects with zer. A. No, sir; I never used any such word his office. He uses the Bell phone. Q. You as that to Judge Johnson or anybody else. Q. haven't the Bell phone? A. No, sir. Judge I will ask you if you said anything over that Broaddus' office is probably 150 to 200 feet from telephone to him relative to your fee from Peltmy office on the same floor. Q. Do you use A. I don't know. If I did, it was somethat Bell phone frequently? A. Not frequently, thing like this: That no arrangement had been but occasionally. Q. Have you any distinct made with Mr. Peltzer about my fee. Q. Why