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ing the north half of its other tract on the east for $6,000. After the explosion the number of barrels in the glaze was reduced from eight to six, thus reducing its capacity from 20,000 to 15,000 pounds. Mr. Olin, a powder expert, witness for defendant, testified that the comparative force of the explosion of different quantities of powder is in proportion to the square roots of the quantities.

Mr. Sloan, the real estate man of Kansas City, who acted for the defendant in purchasing the land in 1904 for the plant, testified on cross-examination that in the last few years lands south of Kansas City extending beyond defendant's plant had increased in value rapidly, the growth of the city and street car extension being in that direction. He further testified as follows:

A. No, sir. Q. It is incident to and belongs to the powder business, doesn't it? A. It is necessarily a feature in the process of manufacture, so far as determined yet by anybody.. Q. I bẹlieve you stated that 99 per cent. of the accidents by powder mill explosions were unavoidable and could not be foreseen? A. I should have qualified that by my own experience."

During the cross-examination of Mr. Gorman, the following occurred:

that, do you? A. Yes, I admit that, too.
"Q. Because powder is dangerous-you admit
Q.
When is it the most dangerous-at the time the
mill is running or not? A. I don't know any
particular time."

He also testified that 40 per cent. grade dynamite is 28 times as powerful as blasting powder. The defendant put in evidence the following statement of its business:

Investment.

Duplicate machine and supplies $ 1,680 89
Machinery, building, etc........ 119,413 72
Horses and vehicles.....

Land

Plant

.....

Betterments (repairs)......
Advertising and incidental ex-
pense (salaries, rent, station-
ery, etc.)

"Q. In your judgment as a real estate man, Mr. Sloan, would you consider property in that neighborhood and vicinity as being desirable as a place for investors to build rural homes? A. In my judgment, a powder mill would not be an attraction. Q. It would be a detraction rather than an attraction? A. Close to it, it would. Q. Well, take within a distance of two miles. What would you say about that? A. Well, I would be willing myself to go within two miles of the powder mill without any apprehension of fear. Q. Suppose it is in evidence here that this explosion affected property 2 miles, and 3 miles, and 4 miles, and 41⁄2 miles from this powder mill. How would you answer my question then about it affecting property within two miles? A. Well, I would answer it then this way: If you can show that it affected property 20 miles, Good will or 50 miles, then it wouldn't be desirable. If you show that the explosion 100 miles, then it wouldn't be desirable. Q. It would affect its market value, wouldn't it? A. Certainly."

The opinion of the witnesses as to the value of the lands around the powder mill, on the basis of what it would be without the presence of the powder plant, placed the land at from $150 to $400 an acre, varying according to the character of the land and the opinion of the witnesses. During the cross-examination of Mr. T. T. Moore, a witness for defendant, the following occurred:

"Q. What do you say as to the effect of the location of this powder mill there as to the property in that vicinity? A. It certainly damaged it. Q. How does it affect its sale or market value? A. I should judge it affected it according to the proximity to the powder mill. Q. What is its effect on the property situated nearest to the powder mill? How does it affect that, as compared with those farthest away? A. I think it almost destroyed the value of those right close to it."

The evidence shows that real estate sales, except in Holmes Park, have practically ceased in that vicinity.

The trial judge, in a colloquy at the time of making his decision said,

"Well, the evidence shows that the property around there would be doubled in value if this industry was destroyed."

Three of defendant's witnesses, expert powder men, including Mr. Gorman, the president of the defendant company, testified that powder is dangerous. One of them, Mr. Olin, testified as follows:

"Q. Do you know of any way to operate a powder mill without the hazard of explosion?

Discount on bank loans, other

interest items, reconstruction
amounts, etc.
Interest on original invest-
ment, $133,453.36, four years
at 6 per cent. per annum.....

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858 75 11,500 00

$133,453 36 22,789 51

55,351 82

27,333 31

32,028 80

275,000 00

$545,956 80

Mr. Gorman testified that the forced removal of the plant would entirely wipe out the good will of defendant's business.

Defendant put in evidence a statement of the amounts annually expended by it in Kansas City as follows:

Money Expended in Kansas City.
Pay roll per annum..
Charcoal
Coal ......
Kegs

........

Small parts machinery...
Rent, incidentals, stationery, etc.......
Inbound freight per annum..

$ 30,000 00

7,000 00

7,000 00

27,000 00

5,000 00

5,000 00

30,000 00

$111,000 00

Also a statement of its contract liabilities for future supplies as follows:

Contract Liabilities.

33,600 00

150 tons per month of sodium nitrate con-
tracted for last six months 1909, 900 tons,
2,016,000 lbs., at $2.50 per hundred....... $ 50,400 00
50 tons per month of sodium nitrate con-
tracted for year 1910, 600 tons, 1,344,000
lbs., at $2.50 per 100.
150 tons sulphur contracted for last six
months 1909, 336,000 lbs., at $1.50 per 100
750 tons charcoal contracted for to be de-
livered between July, 1909, and Decem-
ber, 1910, 1,500,000 lbs., at 60 cents per
hundred

250,000 kegs contracted for to be delivered
between July, 1909, and May, 1910........

5,040 00

9,000 00 27,500 00 $125,540 00

The evidence for the defendant showed that the closing of its business at the present location would result in the loss of 75 or

80 per cent. of the value of its machinery | tial in determining whether a powder house and apparatus.

The deposition of Elliott W. Major, who was Attorney General at the date of the institution of the suit, was read, showing that the original petition in the case was presented to him by Mr. J. McD. Trimble, counsel for the relators, on January 15 or 16, 1909, also some affidavits and a plat showing facts bearing on the propriety of such suit. That he took the matter under advisement for several days, then signed the petition and caused it to be filed. The legal services for plaintiff in the trial court and in this court have been rendered by counsel employed by

relators.

Elliott W. Major, of Jefferson City, and J. McD. Trimble, Jno. A. Eaton, and Dudley W. Eaton, all of Kansas City, for appellants. Kinealy & Kinealy, of St. Louis, and E. Wright Taylor, of Kansas City, for respondent.

amounts to a nuisance; but, considering the the book in which it is found, it is not entitled loose manner in which this case is reported, and to much, if any, consideration. The case of the King v. Taylor (Str. 1167) was also cited, but it throws no light on the question; it states merely the fact that the court of King's Bench granted an information against the defendant, as for a nuisance, for keeping great quantities of gunpowder to the endangering the church and houses where he lived."

He concluded his opinion by saying: "The fears of mankind will not alone create a nuisance, without the existence of real danger." In 1844, Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 292, 41 Am. Dec. 744, was decided. About 600 pounds of powder were kept in the vilion in that case is not clear as to whether lage of Syracuse. The language of the opinnegligence was necessary.

In 1816 Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. 616, was decided in the English Court of Chancery. Plaintiff conducted paper mills, and defendants were operating a powder mill. Both mills had existed for 51 years. At first ROY, C. (after stating the facts as above). defendants' corning mill was 209 yards from [1] A powder magazine, as to all property the paper mills. Thirty-seven years before and residents in such proximity to it that the suit was brought the corning mill exthey are subject to danger from its explo- ploded, and was rebuilt at the distance of sion, is a nuisance regardless of the ques-400 yards from the paper mills. Just before tion as to negligence in the manner of keeping it.

An anonymous case was decided by Chief Justice Holt in the King's Bench, in the year 1700, nisi prius, reported in 12 Mod. 342. The defendant was indicted for a nuisance for keeping several barrels of gunpowder in Brentford Town, sometimes two days, sometimes a week, till he could conveniently send them to London. Held, that, though gunpowder be a necessary thing, and for defense of the kingdom, yet if he kept it in such a place as it is dangerous to the inhabitants or passengers, it will be a nuisance. That case does not require that there shall be any negligence in keeping the powder, nor does it make any requirement as to how many passengers or inhabitants shall be subject to the danger.

In Rex v. Taylor, 2 Str. 1167, the Court of King's Bench, in 1742, granted an information against the defendant as for a nuisance, on affidavits of his keeping great quantities of gunpowder, to the endangering the church and houses where he lived.

Roger Williams was convicted of keeping 400 barrels of gunpowder near the town of Bradford. Rex v. Williams, E. 12 W.

In People v. Sands, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 78, 3 Am. Dec. 296, decided in 1806, the defendant was indicted for keeping 50 barrels of gunpowder at Brooklyn, near the dwelling houses of divers citizens and near a certain

public street. Chief Justice Kent held that it was necessary to show negligence in the manner of keeping the powder, and in speaking of the anonymous case, supra, said:

"This case, as far as it is any authority, goes in confirmation of the principle that the time, place, and manner are all important and essen

the suit defendants proceeded to rebuild it on the old site. The court said:

"It is conceived that at common law the erection of a corning house of this sort, if attended with danger to the public, would not be a gunpowder is an article of recent origin, the nuisance. To that I do not agree; as, though principle of law is that any subject of modern discovery cannot be used in such a manher as to constitute nuisance merely on the covery. The instance has occurred of a convicground that the materials are of modern distion upon a prosecution for employing a reservoir gas in a place where an explosion might be dangerous to the King's subjects or their property."

Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 213, 55 Am. Dec. 734, decided in 1851, was for damages caused by the explosion of a powder magazine in the town of Nashville, containing 500 kegs of powder. The court, speaking of the anonymous case above mentioned, said:

"Chief Justice Kent refers to this case, as re

ported in 12 Mod. 342, in the case of the People v. Sands, 1 Johns. [N. Y.] 78 [3 Am. Dec. 296] and discredits it, because of the loose manner in which it is reported and the book in which it is found. We understand the case as dis

tinctly asserting that if gunpowder be kept in a place dangerous to the inhabitants, it is a nuisance. And Lord Holt's report of it entitles it to full weight, as the judgment of one of the ablest common lawyers that ever sat in Westminster Hall."

And it was held that a powder magazine containing a large quantity of powder in a populous place is a nuisance per se.

18 B. Mon. (57 Ky.) 800, 68 Am. Dec. 750, In 1857, the case of Dumesnil v. Dupont, was a proceeding to abate as a nuisance a powder house on the plank road within half a mile of the limits of the city of Louisville, within about 300 yards of plaintiff's

residence, and but a short distance of his neighbor's houses. The quantity of powder kept was merely stated to be large. The decision was for the defendant, following People v. Sands and repudiating Cheatham v. Shearon. Concerning the latter case, the court said:

"This decision cannot be regarded as authority in the case before us for several reasons: First. Because it was rendered in an action on the case brought by the owner of certain houses in Nashville, to recover for injuries done to them by the explosion of a powder house owned by the defendant situated in a populous part of the town. The two cases are therefore essentially different, both with regard to the facts involved and to the nature of the relief sought. Secondly. Because the principles and reasoning upon which the decision rests are opposed to the unbroken current of modern authority, English and American, upon this subject."

That was a sweeping assertion made as to the English and American authorities. No English case was cited. We have here cited them, and have shown that they are against the opinion in Dumesnil v. Dupont. The only American case there cited supporting the assertion is People v. Sands, supra, and the Sands Case has long since been repudiated in effect by the courts of New York, as will be hereafter seen.

In the same year that Dumesnil v. Dupont was decided, the error of the court in that case was clearly shown by the decision in Regina v. Lister in the Queen's Bench (Dearsly v. Bell's Crown Cases, 209), in which it was said:

"The indictment certainly does not state that any noxious effluvia issued from the naphtha, or that the air was corrupted by it, or that any bodily harm was done by it to any of the Queen's subjects; but we conceive that to deposit and keep such a substance in such quantities in a warehouse so situate, to the danger of the lives and property of the Queen's subjects, is an indictable offense. The law of the country would surely be very defective if life and property could be so exposed to danger by the act of another with impunity. There is no ground for saying that, according to the doctrine contended for by the prosecutor's counsel, neither brandy nor wine, nor oil, nor any ignitible substance, could be kept in the cellar of a town house without the owner of the house being liable to fine and imprisonment. The substance must be of such a nature, and kept in such large quantities, and under such local circumstances, as to create real danger to life and property. The well-founded apprehension of danger which would alarm men of steady nerves and reasonable courage, passing through the street in which the house stands, or residing in adjoining houses, is enough to show that something has been done which the law ought to prevent by pronouncing it to be a misdemeanor. Accordingly, to manufacture, or to keep in large quantities, in towns or closely inhabited places, gunpowder (which for this purpose cannot be distinguished from naphtha) is by the common law of England a nuisance and an indictable offense."

the consequences, or set bounds to the injury, which, being instantaneous, extends alike to property and persons within its reach. The destructiveness of these agents results from the irrepressible gases once set in motion, infinitely more than from fires which might ensue as a consequence. Persons and property in the neighborhood of a burning building, let it burn ever so fiercely, in most cases have a chance of escaping injury. Not so when explosive forces instantly prostrate everything near them, as in the instances of powder, nitroglycerin and other chemicals of an explosive or instantly inflammable nature."

Then came the following cases, all holding that negligence is not necessary: McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J. Law, 189, 36 Am. Rep. 508; Heeg v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579, 36 Am. Rep. 654; Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., 22 S. C. 476, 53 Am. Rep. 730; Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 30 Ill. App. 321; Chicago W. & V. Coal Co. v. Glass, 34 Ill. App. 364; Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 23 N. E. 389, 7 L. R. A. 262, 19 Am. St. Rep. 34; Lounsbury v. Foss, 80 Hun, 296, 30 N. Y. Supp. 89; Wilson v. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 21 S. E. 1035, 52 Am. St. Rep. 890; Reilly v. Erie R. Co., 72 App. Div. 476, 76 N. Y. Supp. 620; Remsberg v. Cement Co., 73 Kan. 66, 84 Pac. 548; Bradford Glycerin Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio State, 560, 54 N. E. 528, 45 L. R. A. 658, 71 Am. St. Rep. 740; Ricker v. Shaler, 89 App. Div. 300, 85 N. Y. Supp. 825; State v. Paggett, 8 Wash. 579, 36 Pac. 487; Kerbaugh v. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 194, 80 C. C. A. 470, 10 Ann. Cas. 453.

The rule that it is not necessary to show negligence is affirmed in Kinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 22 South. 593, 37 L. R. A. 497, 67 Am. St. Rep. 119; Collins v. Railroad, 104 Ala. 390, 16 South. 140; Kleebauer v. Western Fuse & Explosives Co., 138 Cal. 497, 71 ́ Pac. 617, 60 L. R. A. 377, 94 Am. St. Rep. 62. It is thus seen that the courts of New York have repudiated, in effect at least, the position of Chief Justice Kent in People v. Sands, and are in harmony with the English courts. Ten states of our Union and the federal court agree on that proposition, while only those of Kentucky, Alabama, and California hold to the contrary.

In Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., supra, the court said:

a matter that makes it a nuisance, but it is "It is not the number of persons affected by its injurious, offensive, and noxious character; and it is none the less a nuisance because it affects only one or two instead of a multitude. There may be a private as well as a public nuisance, the distinction being dependent upon the number affected, but the fact of nuisance itself does not depend upon number."

Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Mo. App.

In Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, the court 358, is cited as holding that it is necessary said:

"It is not on the ground alone of their liability to fire, primarily, or even secondarily, that they may possibly be dealt with as nuisances, but on account of their liability to explosion by contact with the smallest spark of fire, and the utter impossibility to guard against

to show negligence. The defendant in that case was sued for damages for keeping gasoline and coal oil in large tanks near plaintiff's property, and the danger alleged was not of explosion, but of fire. We are not discussing the law as to mere combustibles, but

1

[3] III. It is a public nuisance. Joyce on Nuisances, § 5, says:

confine ourselves to explosives. It is true state does not place it above a citizen or that coal oil and gasoline may become gas, corporation of this state. Rev. Stat. § 3037. and thus become explosive, but they were It still remains subject to the laws as to not in that condition in the Harper Case. nuisances. We thus see that the overwhelming weight of authority supports the conclusion we have reached that powder is dangerous however carefully kept. If there were any doubt on that question as a matter of law, it is proved to be a fact by three of the defendant's own expert witnesses, who say that powder is dangerous, one of them saying that he knew of no way of operating the mill without the danger of explosion. And that is the case whether the powder is in the mill or magazine.

But counsel for respondent say that there is a mere possibility, and not a probability, of an explosion, and that such mere possibility will not constitute a nuisance. They cite Dumesnil v. Dupont, supra, which does use such language. We have declined to follow that case in its conclusion, and shall not adopt the language used in reaching such er

roneous result.

A powder magazine may cause damage in two ways: By explosion, which can only occur at irregular intervals; by danger, which is always present as to property and persons near enough. That danger, of itself, without an actual explosion constitutes it a nui

sance.

In the anonymous case, supra, which is the very fountain of the law on this subject, the Chief Justice said, "To support this indictment there must be apparent danger or mischief already done." The apparent danger is sufficient.

[2] II. Defendant makes the claim that because it is licensed to do business in Missouri, and because it is conducting a lawful business and its products are useful and necessary for the public welfare and defense, therefore its plant should not be adjudged a nuisance.

3 Blackstone, p. 217, says:

"A like injury is, if one's neighbor sets up and exercises any offensive trade; as a tanner's, a tallow chandler's, or the like; for though these are lawful and necessary trades. yet they should be exercised in remote places; for the rule is, 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas' (So use your property that you do not injure that of another).'

Joyce on Nuisances, § 16, says:

"A business lawful in itself cannot be a nuisance per se, although, because of surrounding places or circumstances, or because of the manner in which it is conducted, it may become a nuisance. Certain kinds of business or structures, as powder houses or nitroglycerin works, are so dangerous to human life that they may be maintained only in the most remote and secluded localities."

"A public or common nuisance is an offense against the public order and economy of the state, by unlawfully doing any act or by omitgood, public decency, or morals, or the public ting to perform any duty which the common right to life, health, and the use of property requires, and which at the same time annoys, with, or obstructs the rights or property of the injures, endangers, renders insecure, interferes whole community or neighborhood, or of any considerable number of persons, even though the extent of the annoyance, injury, or damage may be unequal, or may vary in its effect upon individuals. Another factor in defining a nuisance is that consideration should be given to places where the public have the legal right to go or congregate, or where they are likenuisance is not public though it may injure a ly to come within the sphere of its influence. A great many persons, the injury being to the individual property of each. A nuisance is public when it affects the rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public, as the right of navigating a river, or traveling a public highway; rights to which every citizen is entitled.'

On that proposition the authorities are practically agreed. The evidence shows that within the circle of danger there are public roads, two villages with post offices, a railroad over which two railroad systems run numerous trains, a public schoolhouse, and an entire community. The defendant put in evidence a list of 38 persons to whom it paid damages caused by the explosion of November 12, 1908.

[4] IV. Respondent says that this suit is not prosecuted by the state of Missouri or its Attorney General, but by individuals in the name of the state, and that the Attorney General has no power to permit this to be done. The petition itself shows that it is brought by the Attorney General. The evidence shows that the Attorney General satisfied himself as to the propriety of the suit, signed the petition which had been prepared by counsel for the relators, and authorized it to be filed. The result shows the propriety of this action. The fact that the legal services for the plaintiff in the trial court and in this court were rendered by counsel employed and paid by the relators does not affect the question.

[5] V. We now enter upon the consideration without the exercise of great care and cauof the question that should never be decided tion. A court of equity must always use a wise

discretion in granting injunctions. Counsel for respondents say that we should consider the “relative advantages and disadvantages to the parties concerned." If it is meant by that assertion that substantial, certain, and irreparable damages to the plaintiff, which might be prevented by injunction, are to be left without remedy because of the fact that greater damages and disadvantages would result to the defendant, a wrongdoer, by the issuing of the injunction, we are driv

In the anonymous case above mentioned it was said that a powder magazine in a dangerous place is a nuisance even though powder is necessary for the defense of the kingdom. "Misplaced benefactions are malefactions." De Officiis, Lib. 2, cap. 18. Defendant's license to do business in this en to emphatically say no. 169 S.W.-18

Respondent cites Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo. 531, loc. cit. 540. But in that case the court said:

We find the facts to be that the defendant's owners in the depreciation of their lands. glaze at the time of its explosion contained But it is a loss which no court can contemabout 20,000 pounds of powder. As operated plate without an impulse to prevent it by any since then, it contains about 15,000 pounds. legitimate means. There was during the year 1908 an average In 1904, the growth of Kansas City co-opof over 400,000 pounds in the powder maga-erating with the general enhancement of zine. The dynamite on hand runs from com- values, began to rapidly increase the value paratively a small amount to 20,000 pounds or of lands in that rural community, just ready more. Each one of these three places is a to assume a suburban character. The peonuisance, dangerous in itself, and the danger ple there knew nothing of powder works. of each is increased by the proximity of the The defendant was organized by men who others. The explosion of the glaze damaged were powder experts. They knew its dangers a passenger train and injured the people in to the community, and they knew of the danit. Its effect on the schoolhouse was such ger that they might be enjoined. Their conas would have severely injured the pupils tract with the railroad company shows that had it been in school hours. Large met- fact, and it can be reasonably presumed in al shafts were thrown great distances the absence of such evidence. The defendant across the road and the railroad, and on- deliberately made its choice of location, and to the adjoining lands, and a plate glass we are called upon to say that the disastrous window in Grand View, four miles away, was results of that choice shall fall upon innocent destroyed. A cistern at Hickman's Mills, over sufferers rather than on the one who invoked a mile and a quarter away, was cracked. the disaster. If the damages caused were Window glass and sash, doors, plaster, flues, not substantial, we could refuse to interfere. and roofs were broken and injured within a If they could be remedied at law, that course radius of two or three miles, the damage should be pursued; but that cannot be done. diminishing by distance. Dangerous frag- This is a proceeding to abate a public nuiments of all kinds were thrown on the adjoin- sance, detrimental to a large community, to ing lands. A few frame buildings have been travelers on the public roads and on the railconstructed in Holmes Park by reason of the roads, and to the public school. There is no business growing out of the defendant's practical way in which those interests can be factory. In all other respects, building and adequately protected except by abating the real estate business within the circle of nuisance. danger have practically ceased. The trial judge who found the issues for the defendant was impelled to say that the value of the land adjoining defendant's plant has been depreciated thereby one-half. We have made a calculation based on the depreciation of value. For illustration, we have placed a depreciation of $75 an acre on all land except the defendant's within a radius of a half mile from the glaze as a center; $37.50 on all land in the next half mile zone; $12.50 on all within the next mile zone. It aggregates over $160,000. We do not hold that such amount is the exact one; but we feel confident that it is the minimum that could be reasonably fixed. It is bound to increase rapidly as the city grows in that direction. Defendant calls attention to the small amount of damages paid for broken glass and other things. If that were all, we could easily dismiss plaintiff's bill under the doctrine, "De minimis non curat lex." But the "Of course, great interests should not be mere replacing of the apparent, superficial where the maxim 'De minimis non curat les, overthrown on trifling or frivolous grounds, as damage where a house has been wrecked by is applicable, but every substantial, material such an explosion does not make the building right of person or property is entitled to prowhat it was formerly. Its integrity is de- tection against all the world. It is by protecting the most humble in his small estate against stroyed and confidence in it is lost. Ordina- the encroachments of large capital and large inrily prudent people will not buy or build sub-terests that the poor man is ultimately enabled ject to such danger. to become a capitalist himself. If the smaller The evidence shows that the defendant, if interest must yield to the larger, all small propcompelled to close its works will lose three-erty rights, and all smaller and less important enterprises, industries, and pursuits would soonfourths the value of its buildings, machinery, er or later be absorbed by the large, more pow and equipment, amounting at first cost to erful few; and their development to a condiabout $120,000, making the loss about $90,000, tion of great value and importance, both to the individual and the public, would be arrested not allowing for depreciation. That is only a in its incipiency. But if the comparison could little over half of what is lost by the land-be made in this instance, it would be impossible

"The right of the plaintiffs, if regard be had to the findings and action of the lower courts, is doubtful; the damage which they will sustain, if any, is inconsiderable, while if their prayer were heard and granted, it would be disastrous in the extreme to the defendants, resulting in the practical destruction of their building, without any material advantages accruing to the plaintiffs."

So it will be found that where the comparative injury or inconvenience has resulted in the refusal of relief, it has been where the plaintiff's injuries were trivial, uncertain, or remediable by suit at law, or else there have been other considerations which are not in this case. The correct principle was declared by Judge Sawyer in Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gr. Mining Co. (C. C.) 18 Fed. loc. cit. 807, as follows:

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