three years to run before maturity. It should bring 101 or $1,010:00/100. I have four of these bonds, and one of Va. Midlands, which is at a premium of 12%. Whoever takes this bond will have to pay this premium, or enough to equalize this bond down to the value of the others, and this excess premium will be divided with the other heirs. I will see that your interest is protected. "I wrote you yesterday, inclosing a 'quitclaim deed' from Mo. This land was sold some twenty years since, and the money paid to us for itthe letter will explain. When this paper arrives, please execute it with Mrs. De Lashmutt and return-you will place me under obligation. Hoping your health will improve rapidly under the operation to which you refer, and with kindest regards to family, I remain, "Very truly yours, A. Pearre." Along with this quitclaim deed, which was the same sent them in the summer of 1903 from Osceola, was a check to each of them for $1,019.20 and a receipt for same substantially like that signed by Frank T. De Lashmutt, which is as follows: J. C. Hargus and Geo. H. Daniel, both of Osceola, and W. E. Owen, of Clinton, for appellants. W. W. Lawton, of Osceola, and Parks & Son, of Clinton, for respondents. BROWN, C. (after stating the facts as above). 1. Both parties, plaintiffs and defendants, claim the land in controversy under John Sifford, the common source of title. Both claim through his will; the plaintiffs as remaindermen in fee after an equitable life estate in their mother, Cleanthe Eugenia De Lashmutt, and the defendants through a deed from Aubrey Pearre purporting to act in its execution, both as executor of the estate of John Sifford and as trustee under the will to one D. L. Dade, under whom, by the occupying claimant, deraigns his title. mesne conveyances, the defendant Teetor, The defendant Teetor also says that the plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitation by reason of the adverse possession of himself and those under whom he claims for more than 10 years, and that they are estop in the proceeds of the sale under which he claims. The force and effect of the Pearre deed is therefore the first question presented by the record. "Baltimore, 5/13/04. "Received of Mrs. Anna J. Pearre, trustee, one thousand nineteen 20/100 dollars-first installment of my interest in the estate of my grand-ped from disputing his title by participation father, Jno. Sifford, deceased-said interest having been held in trust for the use of my mother, Cleanthe De Lashmutt, during her natural life. "$1,019-20/100. Frank T. De Lashmutt." The checks were accepted, and the receipts were signed and returned to Mr. Pearre, but the quitclaim deed was held for investigation, all of which called forth the following letters from him: "5/24/04. [1] 2. It is not to be conceived that any government would permit the title to the lands which constitute the foundation and define the territorial limits of its sovereignty to depend upon the operation of the laws of any foreign state or nation. Real estate trans "Mr. Frank T. De Lashmutt, Shelburn, Sul-fers of every description, whether by act of livan Co. Ind.-Dear Sir: I have a letter from your brother, J. S. De Lashmutt, stating he is "5/24/04. "Mr. Jno. S. De Lashmutt-Dear Nephew: Your letter with receipt to hand. Accept thanks for candor regarding the quit deed. I have written Shelburn that if my word is worth nothing and they have to defend their interest from me, I don't care to communicate again with them, and have referred them for further correspondence to J. B. Egger, Appleton City, Mo. I have been working for their interest for the past 20 years, without even my postage stamp paid. Have thrown into your mother's estate $500 commission to which your aunt is entitled as trustee; and I don't care now to be regarded as one from whom you are compelled to defend yourself. "Very truly yours, Aubrey Pearre." All the living heirs of Mrs. De Lashmutt excepting Mrs. Jackson, who did not testify, swore positively that they never ascertained, until after the distribution in 1904, that any of the St. Clair county lands had been sold by Mr. Pearre, and that they did not know that any of the money which they received from Mrs. Pearre in that year was realized from the sale of any of those lands. the parties or by operation of law, depend for their validity and effect upon the laws of the jurisdiction in which the property is situated. Suits affecting the status of lands are local to the situs of the property. As is said by Wright, J., in Companhia de Mocambique v. British South Africa Company, 2 Q. B. 358, 366: "It is a general principle of jurisdiction, that title to land is to be directly determined, not merely according to the laws of the country where the land is situate, but by the courts of that country, and this conclusion is in accordance with the rule ordinarily adopted by the jurisprudence of other countries." See Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 551-555. In the citation quoted, Mr. Story says: "Real actions ought to be brought in the place rei site; and this is the rule, not only when the property in controversy is situate in the same kingdom, but also when the parties, being domiciled in one country, engage in a litigation as to property locally situate in another country. If, therefore, a judgment should be rendered in one country respecting property in another, it will be of no force in the latter." The author then quotes from Vattel, who, in treating of controversies relating to estates in land, says: "In such a case, as property of this kind is to be held according to the laws of the country where it is situated, and as the right of granting it is vested in the ruler of the country, controversies relating to such property can only be decided in the state in which it depends." The existence of government requires that it be supreme in the control of persons and things within its territorial jurisdiction, and it is inconsistent with that supremacy that any other sovereignty should be permitted to exercise any governmental function within its limits. It is by these principles that we have to judge the Pearre deed. [2] By his will John Sifford devised his St. Clair county lands, of which the tract in controversy formed a part, to his son John E. Sifford and two others (the other trustees having died before the probate of the will, it is not necessary to bear them in mind in this connection) and to their heirs and assigns, in trust that they or the survivors or survivor of them sell and convey said lands and turn over the proceeds to his executors, to be distributed according to the provisions of his will. The will was probated, and his trust accordingly became effective November 8, 1878. On October 31, 1887, John E. Sifford presented an ex parte petition to the circuit court of Maryland for Frederick county, a court of general law and equity jurisdiction then sitting in equity, declining to further execute his said trust, and asking to be relieved of the same, and the court then made an order: "That John E. Sifford be, and he is hereby, at his own instance relieved of the trust referred to in the will of John Sifford, deceased, and that Aubrey Pearre be and he is hereby appointed trustee in his place and stead, for the same uses and trusts." It was under this authority that he made the deed; for, although it recites his capacity as administrator with the will annexed, the defendants' counsel do not suggest that it adds anything to its effect. It must stand upon his title and power as an instrument of the Maryland court, executing its orders in this jurisdiction, or not at all. The respondent has favored us with citations of our own decisions, including McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997, to sustain the power of the trustee of the Maryland court to convey, if not to hold, the title to the Missouri land. They do not reach the question now under consideration. They simply hold that, the court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit and of the parties, the judgment will conclude them, even upon such questions as may affect their tenure of foreign lands. On the other hand, the jurisdictional line in such cases has been closely drawn in the recent case of State ex rel. v. Grimm, 243 Mo. 667, 148 S. W. 868. It follows that the Pearre deed was ineffectual to transfer the title to the land in question. 3. Defendants Teetor, Darrow, and Henry, who alone answered, say that although the court held that the sale and conveyance by Pearre to Dade is void for want of power in the former as trustee under the will of Sifford to make it, and that there was therefore no actual conversion of the land into money, yet by the terms of the will an equitable conversion took effect at the time of the death of the testator. Although the respondents do not advise us as to the effect of this upon their own rights, the inference is that the land, the real subject of the litigation, has fallen from under the appellants, leaving them no foundation to stand upon other than some proceeding to secure the sale of the property in accordance with the terms of the will. As this question affects both the rights and remedies of the parties it requires consideration. [3, 4] One may, by the provisions of his will, convert real estate into personalty whenever his plan of distribution of his estate among his creditors and the objects of his testamentary bounty requires it, and this is perhaps most frequently and simply done by an absolute requirement that the land be sold and the proceeds applied by the executor to the payment of debts and legacies, or for apportionment under the statutes of distribution among the next of kin. The conversion, that is, the change in the nature of the property from real estate to personalty, then takes place at the moment of the testator's death. It is subject, however, to be reconverted to its original character in various ways. One of these is by the election of the ultimate and absolute owner under the will, being at the time sui juris, before the sale of the land, to take it in its original state. This is of course reasonable, for the right to make any lawful use of one's own is the fundamental idea of property. Reconversion also results from the failure of the purpose of the conversion; for if that purpose is or becomes impossible, unlawful, or sometimes inexpedient, so that it cannot or ought not to take place, the fiction, which is a favor of the law, fails with the failure of its reason. Underhill on Wills, § 715 et seq. In this case the testator devised the land in controversy to his son John E. Sifford and his sons-inlaw John Loats and John I. Boyd, "upon trusts that they, or the survivor or survivors of them, shall sell said lands in whole or in parts at public or private sale and upon such terms and at such time as they or the survivor or survivors of them shall deem most advantageous to my estate." This power is highly discretionary. It exhibits the most perfect confidence in the judgment, reliability, and integrity of these three relatives and in each of them. One of the principal impressions we receive from the language quoted is that the personality of these men must have greatly influenced the testator in clothing them with so important a power, and that this confidence is an important element in the legal interpretation of this part of the instrument. The devise is also made "upon the further trust: and with full power and authority in them or the survivor or survivors of them to convey said lands when sold to the purchaser or purchasers," and upon the further trust to pay over the proceeds to his executors, to be distributed according to the provisions of the will. This trust consists of the naked power and duty to sell the land when and as they shall deem best, and to turn over the proceeds to the executor for distribution. They are invested with the legal title for that purpose only. They have under the provisions of the will no right to the possession, direction, or management of the land in any respect whatever, and by the failure of that use it reassumes its original quality as realty, and, the legal estate only remaining in the trustees, it becomes vested by the statute of uses (R. S. 1909, § 2867) in the person or persons entitled to the equitable estate under the will, which was, in this case, during the lifetime of Mrs. De Lashmutt, Ann Josephine Pearre. Whether this situation arose at any time before the bringing of this suit is the question. and discharge of the administrator, the legal title to that part of the one-sixth interest in the land remaining unsold passed to and vested, by the terms of the will, in Mrs. Pearre, in trust for Mrs. De Lashmutt during her life, and at her death to convey it all to her children. The statute of uses having made this conveyance a work of supererogation, the title to all lands constituting the onesixth part of the Sifford estate so held in trust for Mrs. De Lashmutt during her life became fully executed in her children. The power of sale having died with its only object, the sole surviving trustee also died, and with him the last of the instrumentalities of the trust disappeared. We accordingly hold that, at the time of the institution of this suit, the title to the De Lashmutt interest in such of the Missouri lands as were unsold had vested in the parties ultimately entitled to the estate under the will, free from the trusts created by that instrument in John E. Sifford and his heirs and Ann Josephine Sifford, afterward Pearre. 4. Perhaps the most difficult of the many interesting questions presented in this record arises upon the plea of defendants that plaintiffs are estopped in equity from disputing the validity of the sale because the $1,000 for which the land was sold was accounted for by Pearre as administrator of the John Sifford estate, and was included in the final distribution, in which one-sixth of the entire amount remaining in his hands, and in which it was included, was paid over by him to his wife as trustee for Mrs. De Lashmutt, upon whose death it was distributed among her children including these plaintiffs. [5] Three of the executors named in the will were named as trustees for the sale of these lands. A good reason for the exclusion of the other, Mrs. Loats, was that she was a married woman, which would introduce an unnecessary legal complication into the situation, as well as impress upon her a duty in connection with the sale of lands situated so far from her home, which might be so onerous as to amount to an imposition, so that, in effect, a committee of the executors was invested with the legal title for the benefit of all; that is to say, for the performance of a duty for all in the collection of the estate. Had this power been vested in the executors themselves as such there can be no question that it must have been executed during their continuance in office or not at all. Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 647, 81 S. W. 1151; Francisco v. Wingfield, 161 Mo. [6] We have already said that Mrs. Pear542, 61 S. W. 842; Littleton v. Addington, re's trust included no duty toward the De 59 Mo. 275. In the case we are considering Lashmutt children other than to turn over it is the necessary intention of the testator the property to them upon the extinguishto limit the power to the period included in ment of the equitable life estate of their the execution of his will, because its exercise mother. It then became her duty to account was made a part of such execution and the for and deliver to them the personal propmoney was to be paid to the executors for erty. For this purpose she occupied no difdisposition in the performance of their offi- ferent position than would the administrator cial duties as such. The trust was evidently of the life tenant had no trustee intervened. created because they could not perform those As for the real estate, it automatically vestofficial duties in a foreign state, and to avoid ed in fee in the life tenants as tenants in the costs and intermeddling of strangers that common, by force of the statute of uses. would necessarily result from the appoint- Being trustee of the life estate alone, she had ment of ancillary administration with the at no time any power to bind the remainderwill annexed in this state. It was evidently men or their title in any way that her benethe intention that when, the power of the ficiary, the life tenant, could not have bound executors to receive the money from their them by her acts had no trustee intervened. trustees should cease, the power of the trus- She could not, of course, dispose of the retees to raise it and pay it to them should mainder by estoppel, or the ratification of a also cease. The Maryland court evidently void deed, any more than she could do it by had this idea in mind when it attempted to her own deed. She could not do by indirecappoint Mr. Pearre, then sole administrator tion what she had no power to do directly. of the Sifford estate with the will annexed, The whole matter resolves itself into the sole trustee for the sale of these lands. question whether, as pleaded in the answer, When the activities of Mr. John E. Sifford the plaintiffs, by receiving the money sent as trustee for the actual conversion of this them by Mrs. Pearre in the spring of 1904 land into money for the benefit of the estate to apply upon their respective interests in had ceased with the extinguishment of the that part of their grandfather's estate held estate itself by final distribution, settlement, by her for the use of their mother during her life, have estopped or otherwise disabled! themselves from recovering their interests in these lands. "If no one has been misled to his hurt, if no injury has arisen from the conduct, declarations, or silence of a party, he will not be estopped from contradicting them, even though they would be conclusive against his right if uncontradicted. But there is no such thing as estoppel in pais for neglecting to speak or act when the party did not know the facts which, if known, would have made it his duty to speak or act." That case is instructive on the very point involved in this. In 1877 Mrs. Grubb was the owner of an interest in the tract of land involved in the suit, and joined with her husband in attempting to convey it to the plaintiffs, receiving full consideration therefor. By mistake in the description of the land the conveyance failed, and it was held by this court, in McReynolds v. Grubb, 150 Mo. 352, 51 S. W. 822, 73 Am. St. Rep. 448, that it could not be corrected in equity. After the death of her husband it was asserted that Mrs. Grubb, while a widow, had received personal property in satisfaction of her claim for this same land, and was estopped from asserting her title. In disposing of this point adversely to the claim, this court (183 Mo. 549, 82 S. W. 125) said: "Mrs. Grubb's title to the undivided one fourth in the northwest of the southeast quarter was of record, and directly in the chain of title of defendants from their father. By the slightest diligence they could have ascertained if Mrs. Grubb had conveyed her interest. The search to that extent would have disclosed the mistake which they claim was made, and before dividing the land they could have ascertained her rights. We have already ruled that such alleged mistakes because Mrs. Grubb was neither a court of law nor equity could correct at that time a married woman and her estate a legal one and not her separate estate." [7] Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, is that condition in which justice forbids that one speak the truth in his own behalf. The law has adopted the latter term from the old French estoupail, meaning a bung; and it indicates that in such a case one's mouth is plugged against the flow of truth. A healthy instinct immediately suggests that it cannot be under all circumstances that one is deprived of the use of so clean a weapon, even in defense of his own. We do not have to go to the special books of the law for information on this point, for it is, as it should be, the learning of all. Webster, in his dictionary, defines "estoppel in pais" or "equitable estoppel" as that "which, when a party by his conduct or language has caused another reasonably to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and (having a legal right so to do) to act upon the belief, precludes him from averring or setting up, to the prejudice of the latter, that a different state of things existed at the time in question." The act or conduct invoked as an estoppel may be the simple failure of the one against whom it is invoked to speak when it is his duty to do so; but, whether his conduct be the result of negligence or design, it may be corrected before the party invoking it has acted upon it to his prejudice. These elements of definition have been incorporated in all the law dictionaries, where they may be found under the heading of estoppel. Nor do the text-books overlook them. Bigelow on Estoppel (3d Ed.) 484. And the wealth of adjudication to the same effect in this court is, from the standpoint of right and justice, extremely gratifying. Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482, 55 Am. Dec. 113; Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 207, 90 Am. Dec. 378; Bales v. Perry, 51 Mo. 449, 453; Austin v. Loring, 63 Mo. 19; Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63, 69; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, 273, 10 S. W. 891, 10 Am. St. Rep. 307; Burke v. Adams, 80 Mo. 504, 514, 50 Am. Rep. 510; Monks v, Belden, 80 Mo. 639, 642; Gentry v. Gentry, 122 Mo. 202, 221, 26 S. W. 1090; Bank v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 185, 71 S. W. 178; Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. 417, 422, 78 S. W. 597; Harrison v. McReynolds, 183 Mo. 533, 547, et seq., 82 S. W. 120; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 57, et seq., 103 S. W. 946. In all these cases, except, perhaps, the first two, in which the point was not involved, it is held that another element must enter into estoppel. In the case last cited it was said by Judge Lamm for the court that the act If one's deed be on record, he may saferelied on must have been made with knowl-ly remain silent. Spence v. Renfro, supra; edge, actual or virtual, of the facts. In Harrison v. McReynolds, supra, Judge Gantt, in applying the same principle to a case of ignorance of her legal rights on the part of the one against whom estoppel was alleged, quoting from Acton v. Dooley, supra, said: This recognizes another well-established rule applicable to such cases. The party invoking the estoppel must himself be ignorant of the title of the other. In Austin v. Loring, supra, this court expressed the same rule as follows: "If no one has been misled to his damage, if no injury has arisen from the conduct, declarations, or silence of a party, he will not be estopped from contradicting them, and a party will not be allowed to avail himself of an estoppel when he knew or had the same means of knowledge as the other party." We had also expressed the same idea in Bales v. Perry, 51 Mo., supra, loc. cit. 453, as follows: parties, or if they have equal means of knowl"If, therefore, the truth be known to both edge, there can be no estoppel." And again in Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. 417, 422, 78 S. W. 597, 598, we said: "So if the facts be known by both parties, or if they have equal means of ascertaining them, there can be no estoppel." Bales v. Perry, supra; Harrison v. McReynolds, supra. [8] Although the defendants pleaded these matters as an estoppel in equity, they now say that the receipt of this distribution from their mother's trustee was a ratification or will. This trust consists of the naked power and duty to sell the land when and as they shall deem best, and to turn over the proceeds to the executor for distribution. They are invested with the legal title for that purpose only. They have under the provisions of the will no right to the possession, direction, or management of the land in any respect whatever, and by the failure of that use it reassumes its original quality as realty, and, the legal estate only remaining in the trustees, it becomes vested by the statute or uses (R. S. 1909, § 2867) in the person or persons entitled to the equitable estate under the will, which was, in this case, during the lifetime of Mrs. De Lashmutt, Ann Josephine Pearre. Whether this situation arose at any time before the bringing of this suit is the question. and discharge of the administrator, the legal title to that part of the one-sixth interest in the land remaining unsold passed to and vested, by the terms of the will, in Mrs. Pearre, in trust for Mrs. De Lashmutt during her life, and at her death to convey it all to her children. The statute of uses having made this conveyance a work of supererogation, the title to all lands constituting the onesixth part of the Sifford estate so held in trust for Mrs. De Lashmutt during her life became fully executed in her children. The power of sale having died with its only object, the sole surviving trustee also died, and with him the last of the instrumentalities of the trust disappeared. We accordingly hold that, at the time of the institution of this | suit, the title to the De Lashmutt interest in such of the Missouri lands as were unsold had vested in the parties ultimately entitled to the estate under the will, free from the trusts created by that instrument in John E. Sifford and his heirs and Ann Josephine Sifford, afterward Pearre. 4. Perhaps the most difficult of the many interesting questions presented in this record arises upon the plea of defendants that plaintiffs are estopped in equity from disputing the validity of the sale because the $1,000 for which the land was sold was accounted for by Pearre as administrator of the John Sifford estate, and was included in the final distribution, in which one-sixth of the entire amount remaining in his hands, and in which it was included, was paid over by him to his wife as trustee for Mrs. De Lashmutt, upon whose death it was distributed among her children including these plaintiffs. [5] Three of the executors named in the will were named as trustees for the sale of these lands. A good reason for the exclusion of the other, Mrs. Loats, was that she was a married woman, which would introduce an unnecessary legal complication into the situation, as well as impress upon her a duty in connection with the sale of lands situated so far from her home, which might be so onerous as to amount to an imposition, so that, in effect, a committee of the executors was invested with the legal title for the benefit of all; that is to say, for the performance of a duty for all in the collection of the estate. Had this power been vested in the executors themselves as such there can be no question that it must have been executed during their continuance in office or not at all. Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 647, 81 S. W. 1151; Francisco v. Wingfield, 161 Mo. [6] We have already said that Mrs. Pear542, 61 S. W. 842; Littleton v. Addington, re's trust included no duty toward the De 59 Mo. 275. In the case we are considering Lashmutt children other than to turn over it is the necessary intention of the testator the property to them upon the extinguishto limit the power to the period included in ment of the equitable life estate of their the execution of his will, because its exercise mother. It then became her duty to account was made a part of such execution and the for and deliver to them the personal propmoney was to be paid to the executors for erty. For this purpose she occupied no difdisposition in the performance of their offi- ferent position than would the administrator cial duties as such. The trust was evidently of the life tenant had no trustee intervened. created because they could not perform those As for the real estate, it automatically vestofficial duties in a foreign state, and to avoid ed in fee in the life tenants as tenants in the costs and intermeddling of strangers that common, by force of the statute of uses. would necessarily result from the appoint- Being trustee of the life estate alone, she had ment of ancillary administration with the at no time any power to bind the remainderwill annexed in this state. It was evidently men or their title in any way that her benethe intention that when, the power of the ficiary, the life tenant, could not have bound executors to receive the money from their them by her acts had no trustee intervened. trustees should cease, the power of the trus- She could not, of course, dispose of the retees to raise it and pay it to them should mainder by estoppel, or the ratification of a also cease. The Maryland court evidently void deed, any more than she could do it by had this idea in mind when it attempted to her own deed. She could not do by indirecappoint Mr. Pearre, then sole administrator tion what she had no power to do directly. of the Sifford estate with the will annexed, The whole matter resolves itself into the sole trustee for the sale of these lands. question whether, as pleaded in the answer, When the activities of Mr. John E. Sifford the plaintiffs, by receiving the money sent as trustee for the actual conversion of this them by Mrs. Pearre in the spring of 1904 land into money for the benefit of the estate to apply upon their respective interests in had ceased with the extinguishment of the that part of their grandfather's estate held estate itself by final distribution, settlement, by her for the use of their mother during her |