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life, have estopped or otherwise disabled !. "If no one has been misled to his hurt, if no themselves from recovering their interests injury has arisen from the conduct, declarain these lands.

tions, or silence of a party, he will not be estop

ped from contradicting them, even though they [7] Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, would be conclusive against his right if unconis that condition in which justice forbids tradicted.

But there is no such thing that one speak the truth in his own behalf.

as estoppel in pais for neglecting to speak or

act when the party did no know the facts The law has adopted the latter term from which, if known, would have made it his duty the old French estoupail, meaning a bung; to speak or act. and it indicates that in such a case one's That case is instructive on the very point mouth is plugged against the flow of truth. involved in this. In 1877 Mrs. Grubb was A healthy instinct immediately suggests the owner of an interest in the tract of land that it cannot be under all circumstances involved in the suit, and joined with her husthat one is deprived of the use of so clean a band in attempting to convey it to the plainweapon, even in defense of his own. We do tiffs, receiving full consideration therefor. not have to go to the special books of the By mistake in the description of the land the law for information on this point, for it is, conveyance failed, and it was held by this as it should be, the learning of all. Web-court, in McReynolds v. Grubb, 150 Mo. 352, ster, in his dictionary, defines "estoppel in 51 S. W. 822, 73 Am. St. Rep. 448, that it pais" or "equitable estoppel” as that “which, could not be corrected in equity. After the when a party by his conduct or language has death of her husband it was asserted that caused another reasonably to believe in the Mrs. Grubb, while a widow, had received perexistence of a certain state of things, and sonal property in satisfaction of her claim (having a legal right so to do) to act upon for this same land, and was estopped from the belief, precludes him from averring or asserting her title. In disposing of this setting up, to the prejudice of the latter, that point adversely to the claim, this court (183 a different state of things existed at the time Mo. 549, 82 S. W. 125) said: in question." The act or conduct invoked as "Mrs. Grubb's title to the undivided onean estoppel may be the simple failure of the ter was of record, and directly in the chain of

fourth in the northwest of the southeast quarone against whom it is invoked to speak title of defendants from their father. By the when it is his duty to do so; but, whether slightest diligence they could have ascertained his conduct be the result of negligence or de- if Mrs. Grubb bad conveyed her interest. The

search to that extent would have disclosed the sign, it may be corrected before the party mistake which they claim was made, and be invoking it has acted upon it to his preju- fore dividing the land they could have ascerdice. These elements of definition have been tained her rights. We have already ruled that incorporated in all the law dictionaries, such alleged mistakes because Mrs. Grubb was

neither a court of law nor equity could correct where they may be found under the heading at that time a married woman and her estate a of estoppel. Nor do the text-books overlook legal one and not her separate estate.” them. Bigelow on Estoppel (3d Ed.) 484. This recognizes another well-established And the wealth of adjudication to the same rule applicable to such cases. The party ineffect in this court is, from the standpoint of voking the estoppel must himself be ignorant right and justice, extremely gratifying. Tay of the title of the other. In Austin V. Lorlor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482, 55 Am. Dec. 113; ing, supra, this court expressed the same Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 207, 90 Am. Dec. rule as follows: 378; Bales v. Perry, 51 Mo. 449, 453; Austin “If no one has been misled to his damage, if v. Loring, 63 Mo. 19; Acton v. Dooley, 74 po injury has arisen from the conduct, decMo. 63, 69; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, larations, or silence of a party, he will not be

estopped from contradicting them, and a party 273, 10 S. W. 891, 10 Am. St. Rep. 307; Burke will not be allowed to avail himself of an esV. Adams, 80 Mo. 504, 514, 50 Am. Rep. 510; toppel when he knew or had the same means of Monks v, Belden, 80 MO. 639, 642; Gentry v. knowledge as the other party." Gentry, 122 Mo. 202, 221, 26 S. W. 1090;

We had also expressed the same idea in Bank v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 185, 71 s. Bales v. Perry, 51 Mo., supra, loc. cit. 453, W. 178; Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. 417, 422, as follows: 78 S. W. 597; Harrison v. McReynolds, 183

"If, therefore, the truth be known to both Mo. 533, 547, et seq., 82 8. W. 120; Keeney v. edge, there can be no estoppel."

parties, or if they have equal means of knowlMcVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 57, et seq., 103 S. W. 946.

And again in Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. In all these cases, except, perhaps, the first 417, 422, 78 S. W. 597, 598, we said: two, in which the point was not involved, it

"So if the facts be known by both parties, is held that another element must enter into or if they have equal means of ascertaining estoppel. In the case last cited it was said them, there can be no estoppel.” by Judge Lamm for the court that the act If one's deed be on record, he may saferelied on must have been made with knowl- ly remain silent. Spence v. Renfro, supra; edge, actual or virtual, of the facts. In Har- Bales v. Perry, supra; Harrison v. McReyrison v. McReynolds, supra, Judge Gantt, in nolds, supra. applying the same principle to a case of ig- [8] Although the defendants pleaded these norance of her legal rights on the part of matters as an estoppel in equity, they now the one against whom estoppel was alleged, say that the receipt of this distribution from confirmation of the void sale by Pearre. | left Pennsylvania with their father and Mr. Bigelow, in his careful treatise to which mother, Dr. De Lashmutt and wife, before we have already had occasion to refer (page their grandfather had written the will which 493), says that the most acquiescence or rati- made this small provision for them. They fication can do “is to supply an element nec- established their home at Shelburn, Ind., essary to the estoppel, and otherwise want where the family continued to reside up to the ing, as, e. g., knowledge of the facts at the death of the mother in 1903, when, as we time of making the representation.” This is have pointed out, the property in question a way of saying that, while "estoppel by became vested in them under their grandconduct" may result from negligence in that father's will. There is nothing in the record concerning which we owe care to others, the to indicate that either of them had ever seen first element in the making of contracts is their aunt's husband, Mr. Pearre, who sold the meeting of the minds of the parties. the land in question, excepting on two ocWhether they come into existence by adop- casions when he came West on his way to tion, acquiescence, or ratification, or by the Missouri to look after these lands. He was more ordinary process of original execution, not a menīber of the family when they left there must exist the ground of knowledge on Pennsylvania. His talk with the De Lashwhich these may meet. To this ground each mutts at the time of these visits is a matter is held to contribute those matters peculiarly of dispute. He says he told them that John E. within his own knowledge. For example, Sifford had sold some of the Missouri lands, should a man steal my horse, and come after and that he himself intended to sell the rewards and sell it to me for cash, being able to mainder; while they say he told them that do so because, perhaps I had never seen the Sifford had thrown away some of them, and animal, or had I seen him, could not recog. that he was going to recover them. They all nize him, ought the law for that reason insist that they never knew nor heard that charge me with acquiescence in the theft? he had ever sold or attempted to sell any of Would it be too much to say that in holding the lands in Missouri until after the final that I was estopped by acquiescence from distribution. Dr. De Lashmutt testifies that denying the title of my vendor, the law would prior to any visit of Mr. Pearre to his home reduce itself to the position of an accomplice he had written to "the bondsmen (meaning with the wrongdoer? Another example will no doubt, the bondsmen of the executor), forrecommend itself to the personal experience bidding them selling the land or lands of of every country lawyer who practiced in John Sifford, deceased, away from the chil. Missouri when its rural counties consisted dren." largely of wild lands, owned by nonresidents,

On May 13, 1904, each of the plaintiffs, on many of whom were poor, perhaps soldiers receipt of the funds expressed in it, gave of the Mexican War and their widows and Mrs. Pearre a receipt in the following form: children. In those days enterprising people

“Received of Mrs. Anna J. Pearre, trustee, one kept agents in these counties whose names thousand nineteen 20/100 dollars, 'first install

ment of my interest in the estate of my grandwere household words, as bidders at tax father, Jno. Sifford, deceased, inherited through sales, and other agents in the field to look my mother, Cleanthea De Lasbmutt." up and compromise with owners over whose

It is even claimed that up to that time titles they had spread the shadow of their these parties had ever seen any letter, deed, purchases. Upon the enactment of the Reve- or other writing referring to the sale of any of nue Law of 1877 the payment of the taxes was these lands by Pearre. no longer a defense against the sale. When

On April 26, 1904, Mr. Pearre wrote J. S. at the instance of the purchaser the owner De Lashmutt among other things as follows: was notified of the judgment and sale, and

"I wrote you yesterday enclosing a quitclaim that the surplus was awaiting him in the deed from Mo. This land was sold some twenty hands of the court, many of these who years since, and the money paid to us for it could not afford to obtain copies of the record rives, please execute it with Mrs. De Lash

the letter will explain. When this paper arand legal advice, and relied upon the state- mutt and return-You will place me under obments of those whose duty it was to inform ligation.” them of the true facts, have been constrained This deed was to one Knowles, and covered to save from the wreck the little surplus. a tract of the St. Clair county land that had Is it right that upon ascertaining that they been sold to him by John E. Sifford as trushad been deceived, and that the judgment tee. The quitclaim was held by J. S. De had been a nullity, they should not be per- Lashmutt for investigation, which so irritatmitted to return the money to those who had ed Mr. Pearre that he wrote that if his statedeceived them, who had taken it knowing ment was not worth believing, or if they had and concealing the facts, and retain their to defend their interests from him, he did not own? This question, it seems to us, answers care to continue his correspondence with itself; and it is also answered by a line of them, and referred them to J. B. Egger at authorities which are a credit to our juris- Appleton City, Mo. This reticence and exprudence.

treme sensitiveness to inquiry does not argue 5. Applying these principles to the case in strongly in favor of the proposition that he hand: The plaintiffs, then little children, I was ready and willing to explain when called



upon. The young men took him at his word, came to St. Clair county, investigated the STROTHER v. KANSAS CITY MILLING CO. matter, and without any unreasonable delay,

(No. 16717.) as it seems to us, brought this suit. They (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. find, as they say in their petition, that the

July 2, 1914. Rehearing Denied purchase price paid for this land was includ

July 14, 1914.) ed in the distribution of the Sifford estate, 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (8 197*)—IN. BIE

SERVANT and ask for an accounting in which their


SERVANT. share shall be charged against them. There Where decedent, a millwright, was is nothing in the papers or correspondence dered by his superintendent, who had exclusive attending the distribution of the De Lash- supervision of the acts of decedent and others

employed in defendant's mill, to assist in putmutt fund which indicates notice to the disting on a heavy belt, and was injured by the tributees that any part of it resulted from a superintendent's alleged negligence in failing sale of any part of these lands by Pearre, and to warn him when the belt had been so placed the testimony of the parties who know pre- tion, decedent and the superintendent were not

that it was affected by the live pulley in moponderates greatly against that conclusion. fellow servants. That the defendants who answer and claim [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and the land knew the character of the sale and Servant, Cent. Dig. $8 489, 490; Dec. Dig. $

197.*] conveyance under which they claim, and which appears fully of record, is not only a


INSTRUCTIONS. fact, but a legal conclusion, which the law

Where decedent was injured by the alleged will not permit them to deny, and nothing negligence of defendant's superintendent whom can be more reasonable and just than the he was assisting to adjust a belt, and both rule which denies them the right to shift the plaintiff and defendant introduced evidence to

show that one of the superintendent's bands burden of their own carelessness to the shoul

was disabled, the fact that the crippled hand ders of one innocent of all participation in was not claimed to have had anything to do the transaction, without a full disclosure of with the accident under the theory of either the facts. The plaintiff's say in their plead-in any causal way, did not make the giving of

party, and was not connected with the accident ings that they want nothing but to be reim an instruction for defendant, that there was no bursed their loss through the illegal sale, and evidence that the condition of the hand directly there is nothing more just than that this jury, and the jury's finding on that issue must

caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's inshould be done by those who, with a knowl- be for defendant, ground for sustaining an oredge, both actual and imputed, of all the der granting plaintiff a new trial. facts, have received the property.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, There is nothing in Hector v. Mann, 225 Cent. Dig. $8 57-61; Dec. Dig? § 39.* ] Mo. 228, 124 S. W. 1109, nor in the line of 3. NEW TRIAL ($ 39*)-GROUNDS-INSTRUC

TIONS-EVIDENCE. cases it cites in its support, inconsistent

Where, in an action for injuries to decewith the view we have taken in this case. dent by the alleged negligence of his superinThey simply hold that in case of execution tendent in failing to warn him when a belt they and judicial sales a party to the suit who,

were setting began to catch the pulley, wheth

er the warning was, in fact, given was the with knowledge of all the facts affecting his main issue in the case, an instruction directrights, takes down a surplus of the purchase ing a verdict for defendant, though it was negprice coming to him from the sale on the the ligent, and though such negligence was the di

rect cause of plaintiff's injury, provided the ory of its validity thereby ratifies the pro-jury found that defendant's negligence consisted ceeding to the extent of the part so adopted. “solely" in the superintendent's choice of the The principle does not apply to this case.

“method of place performing such work," and

also found that both defendant and decedent 6. We have already in the previous para- were, or by ordinary care should have been, graph disposed of the statute of limitations equally advised that such method was not reapleaded by the defendants upon the theory sonably safe, and equally advised of all the that John E. Sifford and Mrs. Pearre were method, which instruction was wholly unsup;

dangers incident to the work according to such active trustees for the De Lashmutt children, ported by the evidence, was erroneous and so that the statute running against them, or ground for new trial. either of them, operated vicariously upon [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, these plaintiffs. There having been no such Cent. Dig. $8 57-61; Dec. Dig. g 39.**]

- INJURIES relation, as we have already shown, the con- 4. MASTER AND SERVANT (203*)

TO “. clusion founded upon it falls. The plaintiffs

"Assumption of risk” is a term or condiare therefore not barred.

tion in a contract of employment, either exThe judgment of the St. Clair circuit court press or implied from the circumstances of the is reversed, and the cause remanded, with the dangers of injury ordinarily or obviously

employment, by which the employé agrees that directions to proceed to an accounting and incident to the discharge of his duty and the final judgment in accordance with the views | particular employment shall be at his own risk. herein expressed.

In Missouri, however, the doctrine is subject to modification, in that there is another provi

sion, express or implied, that the master will PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of exercise ordinary care to protect the servant BROWN, C., is adopted as the opinion of the by providing him with a safe place to work, the

risks assumed being only those which remain court. BOND, J., concurs in result.

after the master has exercised ordinary care,

the servant not being required to assume the the accident, plaintiff, a millwright, was emrisks of the master's negligence in a situation ployed by Superintendent Brown to make springing suddenly and imperiously demanding the instant use of care and caution.

some alterations in or put in some new [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and bleachers. The bleachers or alterations were Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 538-543; Dec. Dig. 8 completed ready for testing, and while to 203.*

that end plaintiff was assisting Brown in For other definitions, see Words and Phras; putting on a belt connecting the bleachers es, vol. 1, pp. 589–591; vol. 8, pp. 7584, 7585.] with the power he was thrown off a ladder 5. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 882*)-INSTRUCTIONS and severely injured by the sudden and un-RIGHT TO ALLEGE ERROR.

Where decedent in his own instructions expected starting of the machinery. His suit submitted the issue of due care, he could not for damages is bottomed on those injuries, object to an instruction submitting the issue of and there is no question here as to their contributory negligence as an affirmatiye defense.

gravity. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and

It will not be necessary to set forth even a Error, Cent. Dig. 88 3591-3610; Dec. Dig. g summary of the petition; for plaintiff's prin882.*]

cipal instruction was within its allegations, 6. MASTER AND SERVANT ($ 296*)—CONTRIBU- and we reproduce that to show the pleaded TORY NEGLIGENCE-INSTRUCTIONS.

grounds of negligence and the theory, on An instruction on contributory negligence which recovery was sought, viz.: that decedent "was bound to use his senses and intelligence and experience" in and about the

“The court instructs the jury that it was the doing of his work, and, if he failed to use ei- duty, of defendant to exercise ordinary care to ther to the extent to which a person of ordi- furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place in nary care of his age and experience would have which to do his work, and to do no act of neg. used them under the circumstances, and such ligence, as defined by these instructions, which failure directly contributed to cause his inju- would render such place not reasonably safe for ries, then he could not recover, was improper plaintiff to perform the usual and ordinary work in the use of the clause quoted, as calculated required of him by defendant, while engaged in to mislead.

its performance, taking into consideration the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and kind and character of work to be done and the Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 1180-1194; Dec. Dig. place in which it was to be done. If, therefore,

you shall find and believe from the evidence that $ 296.*)

on or about the 20th day of August, 1904, plainAppeal from Circuit Court, Jackson Coun- tiff was in the employ of defendant as mill

wright, at its mill in Kansas City, Mo., and if ty; Edward E. Porterfield, Judge.

you shall further find and believe from the eviAction by Edward B. Barker, revived after dence that the defendant, at said time and place, his death pending appeal in the name of had in its employ Patrick Brown as superinSam B. Strother, as administrator of plain- said Brown had authority to hire and discharge

tendent or head miller at its said mill, and that tiff's estate, against the Kansas City Milling plaintiff and direct him what to do and how to Company. From an order granting plaintiff perform his duties in said mill, and if you shall a new trial after verdict for defendant, it ap- further find and believe from the evidence that

on or about the said date plaintiff was or.peals. Affirmed.

dered and directed by said Brown, in his caBoyle & Howell, Joseph S. Brooks, D. W. pacity as superintendent or head miller as aforeJohnson, E. R. Morrison, and Edw. J. White, thereby assist said Brown to put a belt upon the

said, to get a ladder and go upon same, and all of Kansas City, for appellant. Shannon pulley mentioned in evidence, and if you shall C. Douglass, Isaac N. Watson, and Walter W. further find from the evidence that, in obedience Calvin, all of Kansas City, for respondent.

to said order, plaintiff did go upon said ladder, and while standing thereon it became reasonably

necessary for plaintiff to occupy a stooping posiLAMM, J. In a case sounding in tort in tion for the purpose of raising the slack in said the Jackson circuit court, wherein the dam- belt, and that he did occupy said stooping poages were laid at $15,000, the jury found for said at and immediately before the happening

sition on said ladder for the purpose aforedefendant. Thereat, on motion, the court of the injury complained of, and if you shall furordered the verdict set aside, granting a new ther find and believe from the evidence that trial on the ground of error in defendant's while plaintiff was in such stooping position on

said ladder for the purpose aforesaid, if you given instructions. Thereat defendant, a find he was in such position, defendant's sucorporation, appealed from such order. perintendent or head miller, Patrick Brown, Plaintiff dying pending appeal, Strother, ad- without warning to plaintiff, and without plainministrator, is substituted. For convenience ligently and suddenly threw the belt into position

tiff's knowledge of his intention so to do, neg. we continue to use "plaintiff."

ou said pulley to start said belt and pulley reDefendant owned a flouring mill in Kansas volving, and if you shall further find and believe City of a capacity of 600 barrels daily. In from the evidence that by reason of such act

of suddenly throwing said belt upon said pulthis mill were devices known as bleachers, ley and starting it to revolving as aforesaid, agitators, and conveyors operated by belts, if you find he did so, the position or place in pulleys, and shafting and run by steam pow. which plaintiff was working was rendered exer. These bleachers, etc., were devices to tra or unusually hazardous, and not a reason

ably safe place for plaintiff to work, and was whiten the flour by the use of a current of not a usual and ordinary danger of such emair and electricity. One Brown was defend-ployment, and if you shall further find from the ant's superintendent and in full control and evidence that said Brown knew, or, by the exermanagement of the mill and all the men em-known, of the position in which plaintiff was

cise of ordinary care on his part, could have ployed therein. About four weeks before I situated immediately before and at the time of •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes the putting on of said belt, and of the in- , while experienced in putting on belts, had creased and unusual hazard, if any, of starting never put on one with Brown, and was said belt and pulley while plaintiff was in such stooping position, if you find he was in such not familiar with his ways and methods. stooping position at said time, and that said Brown's left hand was crippled, and plaintiff Brown, under all the facts shown in evidence did not know that fact. At a certain time could, by the exercise of ordinary care on his Brown directed plaintiff to assist him in part, have warned plaintiff that he was going to put said belt on said pulley in time to have putting on the new belt that hung over the permitted the plaintiff to have let go of upper shaft hard by the dead pulley, and, said belt, if you find he had bold of the same, as we understand it, also hung limp about but said Brown failed to do so, and if you shall further find and believe from the evi- the driving or live pulley on the lower shaft. dence that at said time and place plaintiff The usual way of putting on such a belt is was in the exercise of such care for his own to first put it on the dead pulley and then on safety as a reasonably prudent person would the live one, but in this case that plan was exercise under like or similar circumstances, and that as a direct result of said Brown's sud' impossible, because there was no room on denly throwing said belt into position to start either side of the live pulley for the belt to said belt and pulley revolving, without any play in. Plaintiff knew that fact, and knew warning to plaintiff, if you find that he did so the belt would be brought in contact with the without any warning to plaintiff, and that he thereby put the plaintiff in a position of in- live pulley first, and while in such contact creased and unusual danger or hazard as afore the edge of the belt above would be pressed said, if any, and that as a direct result thereof or slipped on the dead pulley until by fricplaintiff was thereby thrown from his position on said ladder to the foor of said mill and in- tion the power from below would be comjured thereby, as a direct result thereof, then municated through the driving pulley to the your verdict must be for the plaintiff.”

dead one. All sides agree that in putting on Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to a belt in that way there comes an instant of prove the facts hypothesized and outlined in time, as the belt is being shoved over toward that instruction and the averments of his pe- the crown of the dead pulley, when it begins tition. The case will proceed on appeal more to bite or feed (one witness used the term understandingly by summarizing the tend-crawl on”), and that such fact can be “felt" ency of plaintiff's proof, viz.: The bleachers, by the man pressing it on. When that precise agitators, etc., were in an upper story of the time is reached, then, by pressure on the edge mill. The shaft operating them was close of the belt by a gloved hand, it goes on, and to the ceiling of the story below. This shaft the full power is at once communicated from may be called the “upper shaft." On this the driving to the dead pulley. In order to upper shaft was a pulley 40 inches in diam- put on a heavy belt like the one in question eter and 10 inches wide, which, for the pur- in said way and with ladders (as here) two poses of this case, we will call the "dead men are necessary; one to put the belt on the pulley.” The edges of this pulley were ar- dead pulley, and the other to lift the belt, ranged so that the pulley had a rise towards or, as expressed by plaintiff, "to hand up the center, called a “crown." In the room the slack”-in this instance several feet. below this upper shaft close to the ceiling When Brown directed plaintiff to assist in was another shaft directly connected by gear- putting on the belt, plaintiff suggested that ing and belts to the power. This shaft may Bennett take part. We get the idea that be called the “lower shaft.” On this lower plaintiff's proposition was that Bennett act shaft was a pulley 30 inches in diameter and instead of Brown, and that plaintiff preferred 10 inches wide, which, for the purposes of to work with Bennett, because putting on a this case, will be called the "live" or "driv- new, stiff, and heavy belt in the way proing pulley." It revolved at the rate of 280 posed was a ticklish operation attended with revolutions per minute. The live pulley was danger, and it is better for the two men to not directly under the dead one, but to one have worked together till they think and act side, so that when the belt connecting the two in accord. Brown did not take plaintiff's sugwas on it stood at an angle of, say, 45 de gestion, but directed plaintiff to assist him, grees. Holes were made in the floor at the and plaintiff acquiesced. Brown was a man right places above the live pulley through of experience in putting on belts, and did a which the endless belt passed. The altera- great deal of it as a part of his daily routine tions had been made in the bleaching devices of duty as superintendent; sometimes with or new ones installed by plaintiff and another the assistance of others. The shaft carrymillwright, Bennett, and the two had tested ing the dead pulley was so far from the floor the machinery by an old, light, 6-inch belt, that ladders were necessary to stand on. which was found insufficient. Thereupon, by Two were at hand, to wit, a long and a short direction of Brown, the two made a new, one. Brown took the long ladder and left heavy, stiff, 8-inch belt of two-ply leather, the short one for plaintiff. The significance about 75 pounds in weight and 64 feet long. of this was that Brown would be higher than They put it over the upper and lower shafts, plaintiff in putting on the belt, and this in and made an endless belt of it by beveling turn meant that Brown, having the farther the ends (making tongue laps) and fastening reach-up, would put the belt over the dead them together with “cement" and by hammer- pulley, and that plaintiff, from a lower posiing the tongue laps and leaving the cement tion, would pull up the slack and hand it to

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