price for the land after deducting what he might expend in the defense of appellant, but there is no averment that either Dupriest or Wilson agreed that this provision might be inserted in the deed, or that it was left out by mutual mistake of the parties, or that Dupriest or Wilson agreed to return to him the difference between the amount expended and the value of the property. that he should surrender all of this property | Dupriest was to pay appellant a reasonable to Dupriest to enable him to "finance his defense" and to employ Wilson as attorney to represent him in the criminal proceeding and secure his acquittal on the charge against him; "that he did turn over all of the foregoing personal property, which was of the value as stated, to the defendants, Dupriest and Wilson, jointly," the arrangement being that Dupriest was to "finance his defense" and Wilson, who was a lawyer, was to represent him in the trial. In another paragraph he averred that: "The consideration of purchase as is set out in said deed is inadequate and not as much as one-third of the actual value of the land; that The petition is defective in other particulars not noticed and, taken as a whole, does not state a cause of action that would entitle the appellant to any relief upon any ground. If the appellant has a meritorious case, the judgment dismissing this petition will not be a bar to another action upon a sufficient petition. The judgment is affirmed. he was aware of this fact at the time of the execution of said deed, and says he relied on the statements made to him by defendant, and that by mistake and oversight of the draftsman of same the following consideration should have been embraced therein, but by mistake was left out: 'After the party of first part shall have been tried on the charge now pending against MAIN JELLICO MOUNTAIN COAL CO. v. him in the Livingston circuit court, the party of the second part is to pay the party of the first part a reasonable price for said land after deducting therefrom whatever sums of money he may have to expend in financing the defense for the first party.' He further averred that the appellees only expended for his use and benefit the sum of $641.29, leaving them "indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,417." In another paragraph he averred that he had a lien on the land conveyed for the $1,417, and he asked judgment against the defendants for this amount, and that he be given a lien on the land to secure it. The deed which was executed to Dupriest recited a consideration of $600, for which a lien was retained. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and, the plaintiff declining to plead further, the petition was dismissed, and he prosecutes this appeal. YOUNG. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 20, 1914.) TIONS FOR INJURIES-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI- Where a coal miner was injured by slate falling from the roof at a point where it was reasonably safe condition, and he had neither his employer's duty to maintain the roof in a removed any coal nor done any act which could have occasioned the fall of the slate, the injury, under the circumstances, made a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the employer, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and was sufficient to take the case to the jury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 954, 956-958, 960-969, 1033. 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. 971, 972, 1001, 1006, 1008, 1010-1015, 1017§§ 278, 286.*] 2. DAMAGES (§ 144*) - SPECIAL DAMAGES Loss OF TIME-NECESSITY OF PLEADING. In an action for personal injuries, a complaint, alleging that slate falling in a mine cut off plaintiff's thumb and injured his shoulder and caused him great mental pain and physical suffering, and partially destroyed his power to earn money, and that his injuries were permanent in character, would not support a recovery for loss of time, since damages from loss of time must be specially pleaded. [1] The petition does not allege that Dupriest failed to "finance his defense," or that Wilson failed to defend him as an attorney, nor does it show that he has ever been tried on the charge against him, or that the prosecution had ended. There is no averment that in any respect either Wilson or Dupriest fail- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Damages, ed or refused to perform their undertaking, Cent. Dig. § 410; Dec. Dig. § 144.*] or that the appellant did not receive the bene- 3. DAMAGES (§ 142*) SPECIAL DAMAGES fit of their services and means. Nor do we Loss OF TIME-NECESSITY OF PLEADING. Such damages as may be presumed to natfind any averment that the services to be per-urally and necessarily result from an injury formed by Wilson and Dupriest were not rea- need not be stated with any very great particsonably worth what it is averred Dupriest ularity, but damages which are not thus imreceived. It does not appear from the peti- plied must be specially pleaded in order to apprise defendant of the facts intended to be tion that any fraud was practiced by these proved. defendants, or either of them. [2] The other paragraph of the petition in which it was attempted to show a mistake in the execution of the deed, is also insufficient. Indeed, there is no effort made to reform the deed; the prayer of the petition does not ask for a reformation but for the enforcement of a lien. It is true there is a charge that by mistake and oversight there was left out of the deed the provision that [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 413; Dec. Dig. § 142.*] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1052*)-HARMLESS ERROR-MEASURE OF DAMAGES. plaintiff was permitted to testify over objecWhere, in an action for personal injuries, tion that he lost three months' time, and that his loss was $50 or $60 each month, and that after he went back to work his earning power verdict was rendered for $650, the erroneous was decreased $15 or $20 a month, and a admission of this evidence as to loss of time *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes which had not been pleaded, and the error in charging that damages might be awarded for such lost time, was prejudicial, in view of the proven value of the time lost in proportion to the amount of the verdict. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. 88 4171-4177; Dec. Dig. § 1052.*] 5. DAMAGES (§ 216*)-INSTRUCTIONS-DOUBLE RECOVERY. An instruction, in an action for personal injuries, to award plaintiff such damages as would compensate him for the loss of time, if any, which he had suffered as the direct and proximate result of the injury, and for the permanent impairment of his ability to earn money, if any, which he had suffered as the direct result of the injury, authorized an award of damages for loss of time, and for impairment of plaintiff's power to earn money during the same period, and should be so modified as to state that the allowance for impairment of power to earn money should begin when the allowance for time lost ended. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 548-555; Dec. Dig. § 216.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County. Action by W. C. Young against the Main Jellico Mountain Coal Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded. Tye, Siler & Gatliff, of Williamsburg, for appellant. R. L. Pope, of Williamsburg, for appellee. NUNN, J. The appellee, Young, sued the appellant coal company to recover $2,000 damages, alleged to have been received, while in its employ, by the falling of a piece of slate from the roof of an entry in appellant's mine. The slate fell upon his thumb and cut it off. The negligent cause is alleged to be appellant's lack of care in maintenance of its mine, entry, and haulroad, so that the same were permitted to become dangerous and unsafe. [1] The jury returned a verdict in appellee's favor for $650. An appeal is prosecuted, and two grounds urged for reversal. The first is that the testimony fails to show any actionable negligence on the part of appellant. Appellee, Young, had been assigned to work on a pillar of coal abutting this entry, and had not been there more than 30 minutes. He had not removed any coal and no act of his could have occasioned the fall of slate. It fell from the roof of the entry directly over him, and it is not disputed that it was appellant's duty to maintain and keep in a reasonably safe condition this entry. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the court properly submitted the question of negligence to the jury. Plaintiff's injury, under the circumstances and at the place stated, implied a failure to perform a recognized duty on the part of the coal company, and therefore established a prima facie case. [2] The next ground of reversal is that the instructions authorized the jury to compen sate Young for time lost, in the absence of any claim or plea therefor in the petition. The petition described the injury for which damage is claimed in the following manner: "Said slate cut off the left thumb of this plaintiff, and injured his left shoulder, and caused him great mental pain and physical suffering, and partially destroyed his power to earn money, and that the injuries aforesaid are permanent in character." Instruction No. 3, given to the jury, reads as follows: then you will find for him such sum in damages "If your verdict is for the plaintiff, Young, as you may believe from the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate him for the pain and suffering, if any, he has endured, and for the loss of time, if any, he has suffered as the direct and proximate result of said injury, and for the permanent and lasting impairment of his power and ability to earn money, if any, he has suffered as the direct and proximate result of ever, the sum of $2,000, the amount claimed in the injury aforesaid, not to exceed in all, howplaintiff's petition." [3] Such damages as may be presumed as naturally or necessarily resulting from the injury need not be stated with any very great particularity. If the damages be not thus implied, or the extent of them, it will be requisite for the plaintiff to state the injury specially, in order to apprise the defendant of the facts intended to be proved. See Newman on Pleading and Practice, § 345. There is no rule of law more firmly established than that loss of time is a special damage, and if claim is made for such damage, it must be specially pleaded. Newman, supra, § 345c, illustrates the rule as follows: "Thus if the plaintiff, who has been assaulted and wounded, seeks to recover, not only the general damages for the battery, but also for the loss of his time and labor, and for the money paid out in physicians' bills incurred during his sickness resulting from such wounds, or if a plaintiff, who has been assaulted and imprisoned by the defendant, seeks to recover damages for the continuation of his imprisonment, and the consequent loss of health, etc., he must state the facts upon which his right to special damages is based." This subject is elaborately discussed in the case of Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Ingles, 140 Ky. 488, 131 S. W. 278: "But if the injured party desires to recover, in addition to general damages, what are called special damages,' by way of compensation for lost time, or expense incurred in effecting a cure, then the pleading must state the amount sought to be recovered for such special damages. and the instruction should limit the recovery on this account to the amount mentioned in the pleading.' L. & N. R. Co. v. Dickey, 104 S. w. 329, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 894; L. & N. R. Co. v. Roney, 108 S. W. 343, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1326; L. & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 150 Ky. 692, 150 S. W. 849. [4] The petition fails to allege that ap pellee had lost any time or claimed any damage on account thereof. Notwithstanding the absence of a plea for loss of time, plaintiff was permitted, over appellant's objection, to testify that he lost three months' time, and in that way his loss was $50 or $60 each For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes month, that being the average amount of his earnings, and that after he went back to work his earning power as a minor was decreased $15 or $20 per month. In view of the rule that claim for time lost must be specially pleaded, and there being no such plea, the introduction of this proof was clearly erroneous; and, in view of the proven value of the time lost, in proportion to the amount of the verdict, we cannot say that the error was not prejudicial. We are referred to the case of Southern Railway, etc., v. Bowlin, 143 Ky. 268, 136 S. W. 199, where the suit was to recover $50,000, while the verdict was for only $650. On complaint of a similar error, the court said: "While we are committed to the doctrine that no recovery can be had for special damages, such as loss of time, physicians' bills, etc., unless they are specially pleaded, we conclude, from the nature and extent of appellee's injuries and the smallness of the verdict, that the error complained of was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant." There was proof to show that Bowlin suffered a very serious injury as the result of an explosion of dynamite. After the accident he was adjudged insane and sent to the asylum. According to the verdict of the jury at the inquest, his insanity was due to this cause. It was from the nature of such injury that the court concluded from the smallness of the verdict that the error complained of was not prejudicial. But in the case at bar, we cannot say that appellee's injury is so out of proportion to the verdict as to conclude the error was not prejudicial. [5] Since the case must be reversed, and if the appellee amends to claim for time lost, the court should reform the instruction quoted so that the jury will not be authorized to make an allowance for loss of time and for impairment of appellee's power to earn money during the same period. As written, it permits appellee to recover double damages. As explained in the Blue Grass Case, supra, the instructions should state that the allowance, if any, for impairment of power to earn money should begin when the allowance, if any, for time lost ended. The cause is therefore reversed and re manded for a new trial. BAIN et al. v. TYE et al. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 21, 1914.) 1. DEEDS (§ 93*)-CONSTRUCTION-INTENT. A deed, especially when inartificially and untechnically drawn, should be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties, gathered primarily from a fair consideration of the entire instrument and the language employed, as applied to the subject-matter. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 231, 232; Dec. Dig. § 93.*] 2. DEEDS (§ 95*)-DESCRIPTION-CONSTRUC TION. In construing the description in a deed, effect must be given to every part of the deed, each course being considered separately and being governed by the intent deducible from the entire instrument, the separate parts being viewed in the light of other parts if it can be. done consistently with rules of law. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 238, 241-254; Dec. Dig. § 95.*] 3. DEEDS (§ 101*)-CONSTRUCTION-PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION. deed are ambiguous, and the parties by their Where words used in the description in a acts have given a practical construction thereto, such construction may be resorted to, to aid in ascertaining their intention. TION. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 233; Dec. Dig. § 101.*] 4. DEEDS (§ 100*)-CONSTRUCTION-DESCRIPWhere the description of property intended to be conveyed is ambiguous, the identity of the property must be gathered from the intention of the parties as shown from the instrument itself and accompanying circumstances, such as those surrounding and connected with the parties and the land at the time the deed was made. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 239; Dec. Dig. § 100.*] 5. DEEDS (§ 95*)-CONSTRUCTION-AMBIGUI On an issue whether a deed covered a 50acre tract surveyed and patented to the grantor May 29, 1855, the particular description of the property in the deed being unintelligible, the court would give controlling effect to a recital of general description that the above described land and boundary contains one 50-acre survey in the name of the grantor, dated May 29, 1855, and construe the deed as effective to pass the title to such tract. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 316-322, 326-329, 388; Dec. Dig. § 114.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County. Action by George W. Tye and others against Speed Bain and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. J. D. Tuggle and B. B. Golden, both of Barbourville, for appellants. Dishman, Tinsley & Dishman and J. M. Robsion, all of Barbourville, for appellees. MILLER, J. On May 29, 1855, Moses F. Ingram surveyed and procured a patent for 50 acres of land situated on the Oatfield branch of the waters of Greasy creek, in Knox county. The boundary of said land may be read in the opinion in Sprouls v. Hayes, 143 Ky. 532, 136 S. W. 1199, where this tract formerly was in litigation. Moses F. Ingram also acquired other tracts of land in the immediate neighborhood, including a tract of 50 acres surveyed August 16, 1866, and a third tract of 100 acres, surveyed December 15, 1870. Early in January, 1877, Moses F. Ingram having determined to move For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes to Texas, he "sold out" his lands in Kentucky to Powell Centers and William H. Ingram for $300 in cash. Moses F. Ingram made a deed to Centers and William H. Ingram on January 27, 1877, carrying out the sale, whereby he conveyed to his grantees "about three hundred acres, be the same more or less," and bounded as follows: "Beginning on the north side of the Pine Mountain at said Ingram's back line; running with a conditional line between M. F. Ingram and Wilk Thompson to Greasy creek; thence down said creek to Henry Nelson's line; thence crossing said creek, running up the Brush creek ridge with said Henry Nelson's conditional line to the top of the ridge and a corner of T. J. Ingram; thence with T. J. Ingram's line to a locust tree near the head of the Oatfield branch on the top of said ridge, T. J. Ingram's corner; thence across the head of the Oatfield branch with said M. F. Ingram's line to the Crank branch gap; thence down a spur of the ridge with M. F. Ingram's line to a corner of a survey made by George E. Golden; thence with said Golden's line down the ridge to Greasy creek; thence crossing said creek and up the Pine Mountain with M. F. Ingram's and Golden's line said M. F. Ingram's back line; thence with said Ingram's line to the beginning. "The parties of the second part, Powell Centers and Wm. H. Ingram and their heirs, to have and to hold free from M. F. Ingram and his heirs; and the said M. F. Ingram binds himself and his heirs as far as the title vested in him to them to hold said land. The above described land and boundary contains a portion of a tract of land deed to said M. F. Ingram by his father Wm. Ingram, and one fifty acre survey in his name bearing date the 29th day of May, 1855, one other fifty acre survey made in his name bearing date the 15th day of August, 1856, also one hundred acres surveyed by him on day of 18-; this the day and date above written, signed and delivered." This deed was duly recorded on November 26, 1877. By subsequent conveyances the land embraced in the 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, was conveyed to the appellees Tye, Hays, and Dishman, and by them to the appellee the Greasy Brush Coal Company, the present owner. Moses F. Ingram carried out his intention of leaving Kentucky, and went to Texas in 1877. The proof shows his intention was to live there permanently; but, on account of the ill health of some of his family, he returned to Kentucky in 1878, and settled in the immediate neighborhood from which he had removed the year before. He lived there, always as a renter, and without making any claim whatever to any of the land which he had formerly owned, until his death in 1889. His heirs at law, consisting of his children and grandchildren, also lived in the neighborhood, and none of them made any claim to this property until May, 1911, when they hurriedly built a "shanty" on the 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, and moved into it, all in one day. Their purpose was to assert title to this survey and support their title by possession. On the next day the appellees, Tye and his joint owners, brought this action against the heirs of Moses F. Ingram, seeking to enjoin them from trespassing upon said land, or from claiming title thereto, and to quiet the plaintiffs' title. Upon the hearing the chancellor granted the relief sought, and from that judgment the defendants prosecute this appeal. The sole question for determination is this: Is the Moses F. Ingram 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, embraced in the land conveyed by the deed of January 27, 1877, from Moses F. Ingram to Powell Centers and William H. Ingram? If it is so embraced, the plaintiffs below, who are appellees here, are unques tionably the owners of the 50 acres, and the judgment of the chancellor is correct. On the other hand, if the 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, was not embraced in the 300-acre tract, then the title to the 50-acre tract remained in Moses F. Ingram and descended to his heirs; and if that be true, the judgment of the chancellor is wrong and should be re versed. Appellants rest their case upon the wellknown legal proposition that in case of a conflict between the particular description and the general description in a deed, the particular and not the general description controls. It will be noticed that the particular description of the 300 acres sold by Moses F. Ingram to Powell Centers and William H. Ingram in 1877, and contained in the granting clause thereof, contains neither calls nor distances; they are confined to the natural objects for a boundary. The general description contained in the habendum clause expressly says the 300 acres contains, among other lands, the 50-acre survey in the name of Moses F. Ingram, bearing date the 29th day of May, 1855. It is apparent from the face of the deed that it was not drawn by an expert, and was in a large measure drawn from memory so far as the boundaries were concerned. This idea is borne out by the fact that in attempting to describe the 50acre survey of August 16, 1866, the deed describes it as the 15th day of August, 1856. [1] It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of deeds that the intention of the parties should be effectuated, and in doing this a liberal construction is given to deeds inartificially and untechnically drawn. The intent must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the entire instrument and the language employed therein, and should be consistent with the terms of the deed, including its scope and subject-matter. Heingley v. Harris, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 55; Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky. 672; Ferrill v. Cleveland, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 512. [2] Furthermore, effect and meaning must be given to every part of a deed, each course being considered separately and being governed by the intent deducible from the entire instrument, and separate parts being viewed in the light of other parts, if the same can be done consistently with the rules of law. 13 Cyc. 605. [3] The rule for determining what property has been conveyed by a deed is formulated as follows in 13 Cyc. 626: "The intention of the parties as apparent in the boundary "to a locust tree near the head a deed should generally control in determining of the Oatfield branch on the top of said the property conveyed thereby. But if the in-ridge, T. J. Ingram's corner," is substantialtent is not apparent from the deed, resort may ly correct. That corner has been located and be had to the general rules of construction. "Where the words used in the description in a deed are uncertain or ambiguous and the parties have by their acts given a practical construction thereto, the construction so put upon the deed by them may be resorted to, to aid in ascertaining their intention. "The entire description in a deed should be considered in determining the identity of the land conveyed. Clauses inserted in a deed should be regarded as inserted for a purpose, and should be given a meaning that will aid the description. Every part of a deed ought, if possible, to take effect and every word to operate." See Trimble v. Ward, 14 B. Mon. 8; Beatty v. Dozier, 34 S. W. 524, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1275. [4] Where the description of the property intended to be conveyed is ambiguous, the identity of such property must be gathered from the intention of the parties, as shown by the instrument itself and the accompanying circumstances, such as those surrounding and connected with the parties and the land, at the time. Bowe v. Richmond, 109 S. W. 359, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 173; Clark v. Northern Coal Co., 112 S. W. 629, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 1047; Tanner v. Ellis, 127 S. W. 995; Crews v. Glasscock, 107 S. W. 237, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 913; Jones v. American Association, 120 Ky. 413, 86 S. W. 1111, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 804; Hall v. Wright, 121 Ky. 16, 87 S. W. 1129, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1185; Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Dye, 146 Ky. 519, 142 S. W. 1057. [5] Furthermore, in case of an ambiguity in a deed, or where it admits of two constructions, the rule is that it will be construed most strongly against the grantor, or most favorably to the grantee. In 13 Cyc. 631, it is said: "In determining the effect of a general clause or recital which may operate to extend a grant, such a construction should be given as will, if possible, carry into effect every part of the deed. Where the construction, however, is doubtful, the instrument should be construed against the grantor. And a particular description which is clear and explicit and is a complete identification of the property intended to be conveyed will not be varied or enlarged by a more general and less definite description, as in such a case the former will be considered as expressing the intent of the parties rather than the latter. A particular description may, however, yield to a general description where the former is defective, where the grant is made certain under the general description and is less than under the particular, or where there is a clear intent to have the general control." identified by a large locust tree now standing there. But when it is attempted to run the next course, which reads, "thence across the head of the Oatfield branch with said M. F. Ingram's line to the Crank branch gap," it is admitted by all the parties concerned that it is impossible to run that line with any line of said M. F. Ingram. The appellants would run that line southwestwardly in order to reach one of M. F. Ingram's lines, and thence southwardly to Crank branch gap. This description would wholly exclude the 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, from the 300 acres sold to Centers and William H. Ingram. On the other hand, appellees would run the line in question from the large locust southeastwardly to a hickory and Spanish oak, admitted to be in one of M. F. Ingram's lines, and in this way the 50-acre survey of May 29, 1855, would be embraced within the 300 acre tract. Furthermore, in platting the 50-acre sur vey appellants' witness, by changing the second course from north 23 west, 50 poles, to north 72 west, 240 poles, and by supplying another line of 237 poles in the boundary, succeeds in closing the boundary, but by following the courses and distances given in the deed the boundary fails to close by threefourths of a mile. The 50-acre survey as thus platted contains 185 acres, the larger portion thereof lying outside of the boundary of the 300-acre tract. Most of the corners have been lost beyond identification. There are at least two identified corners, however, in addition to the large locust corner above referred to, which play an important part in the boundary of this 50-acre survey. They consist of the hickory and Spanish oak corner to Moses F. Ingram and William F. Collins, and a hickory and maple corner in the same line. By commencing at the hickory and Spanish oak corner and reversing the calls and supplying the lost corners in that way, appellees produce a boundary which includes the 50-acre tract in question. None of these results are, however, entirely satisfactory, for the reason, above given, that any course after leaving the large locust tree near the head of the Oatfield branch on the top of the ridge is mere guesswork. Strong arguments have been made in support of the courses contended for by either side, but these wholly [6] A large amount of proof has been tak- inconsistent courses and lines render both en for the purpose of showing the relative of them of little value. We must therefore locations of the 300-acre tract and the 50- fall back upon the rule that where the paracre survey of May 29, 1855. Two very in- ticular description is so doubtful as to be telligent surveyors, of high qualifications unintelligible, the general description must and great experience, have testified at great be called to its assistance and given its full length, and each has furnished a plat show- meaning; and, in doing this, it is competent ing the conclusions he has reached. It is to take into consideration the acts of the substantially conceded that the description parties under the conveyances. In the case of the 300-acre tract, in so far as it carries at bar the draftsman of this inartificial deed Applying these well-established rules to the deed before us, we have little difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. |