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death of William G. Ardrey, which occurred the quitclaim deed, what construction should be 19th day of December, 1909, his said undivid- given to this deed? Appellants claim that it ed seven-thirteenths interest in said 136-acre tract passed to, and vested in his said children created an estate by the entirety; respondas tenants in common, subject to the dower es- ents contra. Taking the deed alone, it untate therein of the said widow, Margaret V; doubtedly creates an estate by the entirety. Ardrey, which said dower estate became vested in her upon the death of her husband. Upon Respondents contend that the facts considthe delivery said quitelaim deed from Mar- ered show a different character of instrugaret V. Ardrey to her said two children as ment. This is one of the vital questions in aforesaid, all of her interest in said lands, in
the case. cluding said dower interest, passed to and vested in, her said two children.
If there was nothing in this record but "Under the second count of the petition the the naked quitclaim deed to the husband and court finds that fact as above found under wife, we would be obliged to say that an escount No. 1 of said petition, and the court further finds: That the plaintiff Elzena Moss is tate by the entirety had been created, and entitled to partition of the lands in contro- that upon the death of the husband the versy. That from the nature and amount of whole estate vested in the wife, the survivor. the property sought to be divided and the num: Gibson v. Zimmerman, 12 Mo. loc. cit. 386, ber of owners it is apparent to the court that the assignment of dower and partition of said 51 Am. Dec. 168; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. lands in kind cannot be made without great 68; Bins v. Bullock et al., 129 Mo. 117, 31 prejudice to the owners.
** it is therefore ordered, adjudged, and de- S. W. 342; Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65, 41 creed by the court that the ownership of said S. W. 781; Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 136-acre tract is as follows, to wit: That the loc. cit. 523, 108 S. W. 9, 1134, 123 Am. St. defendant Pansy L. Ardrey and Clifton Ardrey Rep. 495. are each the owners in fee simple of an undivided three-thirteenths interest in said 136
But in this case we have more than the That the defendants Pansy L. Ardrey mere naked deed from which to determine and Clifton Ardrey are the owners of the said the character of the estate conveyed theredower estate in the undivided seven-thirteenths interest in said lands, held by her said husband, by. We have here a case where the husand acquired by him from the children of his band, without the written assent of the wife, first wife as aforesaid; said dower interest and invested her separate money in the lands in estate being an undivided one-third in said last; question, and took the title in the name of mentioned seven-thirteenths interest, for and during the life of the said Margaret v. Ardrey. the two. In such case when such a deed is That, subject to said dower interest, the plain- attacked in equity by the wife or her heirs, tiff Elzena Moss, and the defendants Pansy L. the husband is declared to hold that portion Ardrey, Clifton Ardrey, William S. Ardrey, James T. Ardrey, and Evelena Burch are each of the land paid for out of the wife's money the owner of an undivided one-sixth interest in in trust for her and her heirs, in case of her said last-mentioned undivided seven-thirteenths death, and holds the other portion for himinterest in said lands.
self and his heirs, subject to all marital "It is therefore ordered by the court that at and during the regular February term, 1911, rights. Such seems to be the well-recognized of the county court of Pike county, Mo., said doctrine in this state. In the early case of above described 136-acre tract be by the then Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. loc. cit. 72, it is sheriff of said county sold at public sale to the
said: highest bidder, for cash in hand, after giving notice of such sale as required by law, and that "It may be conceded that, if a husband inat the regular February term, 1911, of this vests the separate funds of his wife in real escourt said sheriff make due report to said cir: tate and takes a deed to them jointly, a court cuit court of his proceedings under this order." of equity would protect her in the enjoyment I. The court found against the plaintiff on
of the property and declare a trust in her favor.
But no such point arises in this case. This is her theory of there being fraud or undue in a plain deed made to husband and wife as an fluence in the making of the quitclaim deed advancement to her without any words securby the plaintiff and the other three children ing to her sole and separate use. Under this described in the first count of the petition, husband as an entirety, and her heirs took
view, at her death the estate remained in the and this question is not now urged here. It nothing by descent.” could not well be here under any circumstanc
 The Garner Case was one where the es, because the evidence in the record does
character of the title was dependent solely not warrant such a contention. The finding of the trial court was right under the facts, upon the deed, and, as indicated in the opinand that leaves this deed and the character show a trust estate. And such is the rule
ion, there was no proof aliunde tending to of the estate conveyed by it open for dis
now, as we have above said. If we have in cussion, and that question we take next.
evidence only a naked deed to husband and [1, 2] 11. The trial court found that in the wife, we should declare an estate by the enpurchase of this land the husband used $600 tirety to have been created. But, on the othof the wife's money. This finding is borne out by the record, and we shall not disturb er hand, the rule is just as clear that by it. In fact, the evidence tends to show that proper proof such a conveyance may be one-half of the money used in the transac- shown to create a trust estate in proportion
to the amounts invested by the two parties. tion was the wife's money. The difference
In Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. loc. cit. 651, 45 would be that between $600 and $650, and we
S. W. 262, Brace, P. J., said: shall not disturb the finding. Proceeding,
“It would seem to follow as a necessary sethen, upon the theory that the husband used
quence that if the husband invests his wife's $600 of the wife's money in procuring this statutory separate money in land, without her
written assent, and takes the legal title jointly, ship exist as to real estate where the land is to himself and his wife, the title which he takes purchased by the husband without the wife's to himself will be held by him upon the same express written consent, partly with the money trust (Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68; Modrell v. of the husband, but the wife will be decreed a Riddle, 82 Mo. 31); and where he purchases resulting trust in the land by a court of equity land and pays for it with the separate money in the proportion that her money bears to the of his wife in part, without her written assent total purchase price of the land." authorizing him so to do, and in part with his
To the same effect is Donovan et al. V. own money, and takes the legal title jointly to himself and wife, the title which he takes to Griffith, 215 Mo. loc. cit. 166, 114 S. W. 625, himself will be held by him upon the same 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, 128 Am. St. Rep. 458, trust pro tanto as the amount the separate 15 Ann. Cas. 724, whereat Fox, J., said: money of the wife that was used by him in procuring the title bears to the whole of the pur; complaints of the defendant appellant, James
"This leads us to the consideration of the chase” money. Bowen v. McKean, 82 Mo. 594.” R. Griffith. Learned counsel for defendant in
Later, in McLeod v. Venable, 163 Mo. loc. sist that the conveyance of the Pritchett 40cit. 545, 63 S. W. 849, Marshall, J., said:
acre tract to James R. Griffith and Leona Grif"In fact, it is more reasonable to so construe that upon the death of the wife the defendant
fith, his wife, created an estate by entirety, and her actions. She is charged with knowledge of became the absolute owner in fee of said 40 the law, and hence is as conclusively presumed acres by right of survivorship. It must be conto have known the rule announced in Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 647 [45 S. W. 261), as she is record in this cause other than the conveyance
ceded that, if nothing else was disclosed by the to have known that laid down in Garner v: itself, the contention of counsel for the deJones, 52 Mo. 68. Indeed it must be held that fendant would be unanswerable. The authorishe knew that, under the facts of this case, the ties are all one way on that proposition; but $1,200 was her separate property, and accrued the suit involves a contest
as to the nature and to her after the passage of the act of 1875, character of the estate created by this conveyand that it was invested in this land, in their ance, and all the facts were developed concernjoint names, by her husband, without her writing the execution and delivery of the deed. ten consent, and hence, under the rule announced That the purchase money for this land was in Jones v. Elkins, as well as under the exception partly furnished by the defendant, James R. in Garner v. Jones, she had a trust estate in Griffith, and partly by money constituting the the land in the proportion of $1,200 to $3,712 separate estate of the wife, the testimony shows
beyond dispute. We have read in detail the which a court of equity would protect, and therefore there was no necessity for a sever testimony developed upon the trial, and it fully ance of her interests from her husband's. The supports the finding of the court concerning the trial court took this view, and decreed her in; wife which was applied to the payment for the
amount of money belonging to the husband and terest in that way, and then gave her husband purchase of the Pritchett 40, as well as the one half of her interest, the whole of his own, interests of the parties in said' lands. and divided the other half of her interest among
"Upon the facts disclosed by the record apher collateral heirs."
plicable to this case, it comes directly within In Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. loc. cit. the rules of law announced in McLeod v. Ven118, 73 S. W. 210, 61 L. R. A. 166, 96 Am. trine as announced in those cases is a full and
able and Jones v. Elkins, supra, and the docSt. Rep. 486, the same judge said:
complete answer to the contention of the de"In Missouri, since the passage of the Mar- fendant that the deed to Griffith and wife conried Women's Acts, it has been uniformly held stituted an estate by entirety. that if a husband invests any his wife's sep- "It was expressly ruled in Jones v. Elkins, arate money, acquired by her after said acts supra, that where the husband purchases land took effect and in the manner therein specified, and pays for it with the separate money of his together with money of his own in real estate wife in part, without her written assent auin their joint names, without her express writ- thorizing him so to do, and in part with his ten consent so to do, it will not create an estate own money, and takes the legal title jointly to by the entirety, but the wife will, by a court of himself and wife, a court of equity will protect equity, be decreed a resulting trust in the land the wife in the enjoyment of her interest in the to the extent represented by her money.
property, and declare a trust in her favor. "In Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 61 (52 S. W. 27, "In McLeod v. Venable, supra, the case of 74 Am. St. Rep. 517), it was held that if the Jones v. Elkins was unqualifiedly approved, husband takes his wife's money, arising as and it was held that, under the rule announced aforesaid, and uses it in his business, his wife in the Elkins Case, as well as under the excepcould treat him as her debtor or as her trus- tions to the common-law rule announced distee as she chooses.
tinctly in Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo, 68, and under "In all these later cases, except Winn v. the facts in that case, the wife had a trust esRiley, the investment of the wife's separate tate in the land in proportion to the amount money, with other money of the husband, was contributed by her to the full amount of the in real estate, while here it was in personal purchase money, which a court of equity would property. But this is an immaterial difference. protect. An examination of those cases will For at common law there was no difference be- demonstrate that the facts upon which the rules tween the right of survivorship as to real prop- of law arę predicated are nearly identical with erty or as to personal chattels. And, as here the facts in the case at bar. inbefore shown, section 4600, Revised Statutes "Counsel for defendant manifestly rely upon 1899, excepts grants to husband and wife, and the case of Garner v. Jones, supra. That case, leaves the rule as to them as it was at common it is true, very clearly and correctly announced law, so far as real estate is concerned, and the the rules of law applicable to estates by the enMarried Women's Acts have abolished the com- | tirety, and in a clear, painstaking manner sets mon-law unity of the husband and wife and forth the reasons upon which the doctrines of placed married women, as to their separate per- estates by the entirety are predicated. With sonal, as well as their real, property, on the the doctrine announced upon that subject in same footing towards their husbands as any Garner v. Jones we have no fault to find or other persons occupy towards each other. The criticism to suggest. It is entirely in harmony result is that only in the other jurisdictions re- with the uniform unbroken line of decisions by ferred to, and according to the text-writers this court, as well as most of the courts of our quoted from, but also by the more recent de sister states where the subject has been in cisions of this court, an estate by the entirety judgment before them. However, it is apin that case, which is strikingly applicable to pressed, and that the judgment nisi is wrong. the case at bar. The learned judge, after dis- It will be noted that the cases cited and cussing the law applicable to estate by the entirety, in conclusion announced this rule in the quoted from are cases where the deed creating following language: “It may be conceded that the estate by the entirety is being attacked if a husband invests the separate funds of his in equity by the wife or her heirs. We find wife in real estate and takes a deed to them jointly, a court of equity would protect her in the no case where the husband, who has done the enjoyment of the property and declare a trust in legal wrong, has been allowed in equity to her favor. But no such point arises in this have the character of the estate as created case.'
"The cases to which I have directed atten by the deed changed by making proof of his tion treating of this proposition cite numerous wrong. Nor have we found a case where authorities in support of the conclusions there. his heirs were permitted to change the charin reached, and it is sufficient to say that, if acter of the estate fixed by the terms of the the doctrine as announced in the cases, ap. deed by making similar proof. If the husplicable to this proposition are longer to be followed, then there can be but one conclusion band takes the funds of the wife and invests reached upon this question, and that is that it in lands and takes the title in his own Leona Griffith, the wife of the defendant appellant, had an interest in the lands involved in name, a court of equity will declare a resultthis proceeding, which a court of equity would ing trust, because not to so declare it would protect, and, she being dead, that the plaintiffs be to work a fraud upon the wife, and the were entitled to the interests as designated in husband has been the author of such fraud. the written finding of the court, and the court was warranted, as was done in the case of Mc- So, too, it is upon this principle that, if the Leod v. Venable, supra, to decree partition and husband takes his wife's money, and, along order the land to be sold and the proceeds dis with some of his own, buys land, taking the tributed in accordance with
the interests of the title in the name of the two, thus creating an parties." Upon the facts found in this case and the will, at the instance of the wife, seize upon
estate by the entirety, that a court of equity law as declared in the cases quoted from the situation, and as to her, declare that as above, it is clear that, if the wife was attack- to such proportionate part of the land as was ing this deed in equity, or if in the event of paid for by the wife's money, a trust arises her death her heirs were so attacking it, in her fa and she is the absolute owner there would be no question that the chancel- of such interest. But these are cases where lor should say that the husband held in trust the wife or her heirs attack the deed. And for the wife such portion of the estate as her it must be remembered further that the prinmoney paid for in the first instance. In this ciple invoked is that it would be a legal fraud case it would be six-thirteenths of the whole upon the wife to permit the transaction to tract. But does this rule apply here? That stand. But does it follow from this that the question we take next.
husband, who is the wrongdoer, can appeal III. We have changed our views from to equity, or, in the event of his death, can those expressed in the division. We were his heirs, who stand in bis shoes, invoke the then impressed with the view that the trial aid of such court? This is the vital question court was right when it said:
in this case. We do not believe that the hus“The fact of such payment was testified to by band could, in equity, change the character the defendant Margaret V. Ardrey as a witness in the case, testifying therein in behalf
of plain- of a deed which had been made at his intiffs, and was conceded by counsel for defend- stance and in wrong of the wife any more ants in their briefs furnished the court. The than he could attack the validity of a deed fact of such payment prevented said quitclaim deed from creating an estate by the entirety in which he might have made in fraud of his said William G. Ardrey and his wife. If after creditors. His wrongdoing in either case such conveyance Margaret V. Ardrey had died prevents him from getting relief in equity. before her husband, it clearly appears that nei; What would prevent him would prevent his ther he nor his heirs after him could be heard to claim that he took the entire estate as sur- heirs; for they stand in his shoes. That it viving tenant by the entirety. If it were such is upon the ground of fraud that the wife estate as to one, it was to the other. It would and her heirs can attack a deed creating an be an estate by the entirety as to both, or as to neither. The court finds and declares, as a
estate by the entirety is made plain by Valproposition of law that, under and by virtue of liant, J., in Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. loc. cit. said quitclaim deed, the grantees therein took 483, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St: Rep. 689. For title in and to said lands as tenants in com- these reasons we do not believe the heirs of mon; the said William G. Ardrey thereby becoming the owner in fee of an undivided seven the husband can attack this deed, and, if thirteenths interest in said 136-acre tract, and not, then the wife took the whole estate uping the owner of an undivided six-thirteenths on the death of the husband. The judgment interest in said 136-acre tract, subject to the nisi did not take this view of the case. The said curtesy estate therein of the said Wil- plaintiffs were not entitled to question the liam G. Ardrey."
character of the estate created by this deed. We were impressed with the idea that if They could not reap a benefit from the wrongthe facts of the transaction prevented it ful act of the husband. The deed should from being an estate by the entirety in the have been held to have created an estate by interest of the wife or her heirs, that it could the entirety. With this question out of the not be an estate by the entirety so far as to case there is nothing left in the other conbind the husband and his heirs. We believe tentions. now that we were wrong in the view then ex- It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and cause remanded to be proceeded , ed in the different counts. The motion to with in accordance with the views herein ex- quash was sustained, and the state has appressed
pealed. It is so ordered. All concur.
John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., Ernest A. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jerry M. Jef
fries, Pros. Atty., of Moberly, for the State. STATE v. LONG. (No. 18073.)
Walter Bachrach, of Chicago, Ill., E. M. Har(Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2. ber, of Trenton, and Whitecotton & Wight, June 23, 1914. Motion to Transfer to of Moberly, for respondent. Court in Banc Denied July 14, 1914.)
ROY, C. (after stating the facts as above). 1. GAMING ($ 63*)-STATUTORY PROVISIONS (1) The bucket shop law was enacted in REPEAL.
1887, and was amended in 1907. As thus Rev. St. 1909, 8, 4776, punishing the carry. amended, it appears as sections 4772 to 4779, ing on of a bucket shop, is not repealed by section 4781, punishing option dealing, as the sec- inclusive, of the Revised Statutes. The stattions have distinct objects, and the enactment of ute against option dealing was enacted in one has no effect on the other.
1889, and, with amendments not important (Ed. Note.-For_other cases, see Gaming, to be discussed at this time, appears as secCent. Dig. $ 120; Dec. Dig. 8 63.*]
tions 4780 to 4788 of the Revised Statutes. 2. GAMING (8 63*)-STATUTORY PROVISIONSREPEAL.
Respondent seriously contends that section Rev. St. 1909, $ 4782, forbidding the keep- | 4776 of the bucket shop law, enacted in 1907, ing of an office, store, or other place for deal. is almost verbatim the same as 4781 of the ing in options, is not repealed by Bucket Shop option dealing law, enacted in 1889, and that Law 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 236), repealing Bucket Shop Law 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 171) 83, though the former section, being later in date of the sections were the same.
enactment, operates as a repeal of the latter. (Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Gaming, It should suffice to say that on its face secCent. Dig. $ 120; Dec. Dig. $ 63.*]
tion 4776 is a supplement to the four sec3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ($ 275*)-GAMING tions immediately preceding it. Those pre(8 63*)-DEPBIVATION OF PROPERTY WITH- ceding sections are incorporated into it, and OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Rev. St. 1909, $$ 4780, 4781, prohibiting it has no force or effect except as modified dealing in options, and section 4782, forbidding by the four sections referred to. On the the keeping of an office, store, or other place for other hand, section 4781 is supplementary to the purpose of dealing in options, do not violate the next preceding section. Const. U. S. Amend. 14 or Const. art. 2, 8
Thus sections 30, as depriving one of his liberty and proper 4776 and 4781 have distinct offices to perty without due process of law.
form, and the enactment of one has no effect [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitution on the other. al Law, Cent. Dig. $8 830, 835, 839, 843–846 ; Dec. Dig. 275;** Gaming, Cent. Dig. & 120; of 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 171) is practically
 II. Section 3 of the bucket shop law Dec. Dig. $ 63.j
the same as section 4782 of the Revised StatAppeal from Circuit Court, Randolph utes 1909, prohibiting the keeping of a place County; James D. Barnett, Judge.
for option dealing. That section was W. A. Long was indicted for crime, and pressly repealed by the bucket shop law of the State appeals from a judgment quashing 1907. Laws 1907, p. 236. Respondent conthe indictment. Reversed and remanded for tends that, as those two sections are the trial,
same, the repeal of one was a repeal of the Defendant was indicted in 25 counts, of other. We think not, and shall state our which 18 are based on section 4782 of the reasons. Revised Statutes, forbidding the keeping of As between section 3 of the bucket shop an office, store, or other place for the pur- law of 1887 and section 4782 of the Revised pose of dealing in options. The other 7 Statutes, of the option dealing law, enacted counts are based on sections 4780 and 4781, in 1889 (Laws 1889, p. 98), the latter, being probibiting dealing in options.
enacted last, would supersede the former, The defendant promptly moved to quash and operate as a repeal thereof. No doubt, the indictment on the grounds that it did the only reason for expressly repealing secnot charge any offense; that the statute on tion 3 by the act of 1907 was the fact that which it is based has been repealed; that it had been superseded by section 4782 of the indictment and each count thereof are our present statute. contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the All rules for the interpretation of statutes Constitution of the United States, and to sec- are merely for the purpose of discovering the tion 30 of article 2 of our state Constitution, legislative intent. We cannot believe that it in that it seeks to deprive defendant of his was the legislative purpose to withdraw the liberty and property without due process of ban against the keeping of an office, store, law; that the indictment is contrary to sec- or other place for dealing in options. If it tion 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the was the purpose to repeal section 4782 of the United States; and that different, sepp rate, Revised Statutes of 1909, there should have distinct, and inconsistent offenses are alleg- | been an amendment of sections 4785 to 4788,
inclusive, in which that section is expressly defense that the funds were derived from a void referred to by number.
tax levy.  III. Counsel for respondent have made
(Ed. Note.-For_other cases, see Highways, no attempt to cite authority on the proposi- Cent. Dig. § 387; Dec. Dig. & 130.*)
3. HIGHWAYS (8 130*) tion that the law is unconstitutional. It
ROAD AND BRIDGE
Tax-DISPOSITION OF FUND. was said in State v. Kentner, 178 Mo. loc.
Under Const. art. 10, $ 22, authorizing a cit. 495, 77 S. W. 522, that such a contention township special levy of road and bridge taxes, is without merit.
and forbidding diversion to any other purpose, The judgment is reversed, and the cause by a township from citizens living within the
the road and bridge taxes levied and collected remanded for trial.
corporate limits of a city comprised within the township belong to the township, and not to
the city. WILLIAMS, C., concurs.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways,
Cent. Dig. 8 387; Dec. Dig. 8 130.*] PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of
4. HIGHWAYS ($ 122*) ROAD AND BRIDGE ROY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the
Tax-DISPOSITION OF FUND. court. All concur, except FARIS, J., not sit To construe Rev. St. 1909, § 11767, to auting.
thorize a township to pay over to a city road and bridge taxes collected from citizens living within the corporate limits of the city would
render it violative of Const. art. 4, § 46, proSTATE v. LONG. (No. 18072.) hibiting the General Assembly from making a (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. grant of public money to a municipal corporaJune 23, 1914. Motion to Transfer to Court
tion. in Banc Overruled July 14, 1914.)
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph Coun
Cent. Dig. $8 380, 393; Dec. Dig. $ 122.*] ty; James D. Barnett, Judge.
5. HIGHWAYS (8 130*) ROAD AND BRIDGE W. A. Long was indicted for crime, and, Tax-WBONGFUL DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT TO from a judgment quashing the indictment, the
RECOVER. State appeals. Reversed and remanded for Where the officers of a township, under a trial.
mistake of law, wrongfully pay over road and
bridge funds to the treasurer of a city whose John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., Ernest A. Green, corporate limits are within the township, the Asst. Atty. Gen.,' and Jerry M. Jeffries, Pros. township may recover the amount of such Atty., of Moberly, for the State. Walter Bach- funds from the city. rach, of Chicago, Ill., E. M. Harber, of Trenton, and 'Whitecotton & Wight, of Moberly, for re- Cent. Dig. g 387; Dec. Dig. $ 130.*]
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, spondent.
6. OFFICERS (8 1*) — DEFINITION - AGENCY ROY, C. The facts so far as necessary to be
TRUSTEES. stated are the same in this case as in another
"Officers" are creatures of the law, whose
In case just decided against the same defendant, duties are usually provided for by statute. 169 S. W. 11, and, in accordance with the opin- a way they are agents; but they are never genlon in that case, the judgment is reversed, and eral agents in the sense that they are neither the cause remanded for trial.
hampered by custom nor law, and in the sense
that they are absolutely free to follow their WILLIAMS, C., concurs
own volition. Persons dealing with them do so with full knowledge of the limitations of
their agency and of the laws prescribing their PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of duties. They are trustees as to public money ROY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. which comes to their hands. All concúr, except FARIS, J., not sitting.
[Ed._Note.–For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. $s 1, 4; Dec. Dig. 8 1.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phras
es, vol. 6, pp. 49334951; vol. 8, p. 7737.) LAMAR TP. v. CITY OF LAMAR. (No. 18020.)
Appeal from Circuit Court, Barton Coun(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. ty; B. G. Thurman, Judge. July 14, 1914.)
Action by Lamar Township against the
City of Lamar. From a judgment for plain1. COURTS (8 231*)-JURISDICTION-SUPREME COURT-CONSTRUCTION OF REVENUE LAWS.
tiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Since an action by a township against a city for road and bridge funds levied and col
J. B. McGilvray, of Kansas City, and Edlected in the township and wrongfully paid win L. Moore, of Lamar, for appellant. H. over by the township officers to the city treas- W. Timmonds, of Lamar, for respondent. urer was an action involving a construction of the revenue laws, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction thereof on appeal.
FARIS, J. (1] This is an appeal from the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, circuit court of Barton county. We get juCent. Dig. && 487, 491, 644, 646-648, 650, 652- risdiction because the case involves a con659, 661; Dec. Dig. § 231.*]
struction of the revenue laws. State ex rel. 2. HIGHWAYS ($ 130*) ROAD AND BRIDGE
v. Adkins, 221 Mo. 112, 119 S. W. 1091; Tax-WRONGFUL DISTRIBUTION-ACTION TO RECOVER FUND-DEFENSE-ILLEGALITY
State ex rel. v. Hawkins, 169 Mo. 615, 70 S. Tax.
W. 119; St. Louis & San Francisco RailIn a township's action against a city within road Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo. 472, 29 S. W. 579; its boundaries to recover road and bridge funds Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155, 11 S. W. 48. wrongfully paid over to the city by the township officers under a mistake of law, it was no
The learned trial judge with commendable
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes