drones and in the Philippines. The latest report is that the question of the Philippines is to be held open for future adjustment, and that, meanwhile, we are to maintain what we now hold there, that is, the harbor of Manilla, perhaps the city itself. It is said that a cable dispatch from Admiral Dewey, saying that the native forces were becoming a source of anxiety to him, has inclined the Fresident to leave to Spain the task of dealing with them. Another dispatch represents that the only influence capable of quieting the natives is that of the Roman Catholic clergy, and that without them no military force which either Spain or the United States could muster and maintain there, could preserve the fruits of civilization in the islands.

"Against the policy of rithdrawing from the Philippines it is said that we are surrendering the islanders to Spanish tyranny and misrule, and that that is not decent. This objection overlooks the fact that we have never had control of either the territory or the inhabitants of the Philippines, that we did not go to war with any reference to the Philippines, that our being there at all is due to the accidental presence in Asiatic waters of Admiral Dewey's fleet. . .

Dear

"All these assumptions are marvels of crudity and misinformation. When we went to war, not one human being in the United States had a thought of the hilippines. Few persons knew that they belonged to Spain. Fewer still cared whether they did not ... Did Admiral Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet bring any such responsibility? in mind that it was Cuba, and Cuba only, that we were fighting about, and that Admiral Dewey's fight was only one means of crippling the power of Spain, so that she would have less fighting machinery and less money to use against us in other places, and so that she might sooner be brought to teras of peace.

"How idle then to talk about the res-
ponsibility we have incurred in respect
of the Filipinos. What does that respon-
sibility consist of? Most advocates of
annexation say that it is our duty to de-
liver the natives from Spanish rule, but
are we sure that they would relish our rule
any better? We have seen that the Cuban
insurgents want nothing of us except that
we shall drive out the Spaniards and leave
the rest to them. The Filipinos probably
want the same thing, and, if they are not to
have it, will make all the trouble for ug
they can. That these possibilities are weigh-
ing upon Admiral Dewey's mind seems clear
from his later dispatches.

"It is not moral responsibility, but
greed of gain, that prompts the most influ-
ential part of our Philippine annexationists.
They want the Islands for what they can make
out of them in the way of trade. That is an
intelligible reason, and is a proper one in
so far as it does not concern conflict with
the principles which we proclaimed to the
world as our justification for the war. This
was not to be a war conquest or a war for gain.
It was not even a war for the human race in
general. It was Cuban deliverance in particu-
lar. We promised when this was accomplished
to make peace.
Yet if peace is within
reach, consistently with the causes for which
we drew the sword, then the prolongation of the
war on account of the Philippines is the same
thing in effect as going to war afresh on ac-
count of the Philippines."

2.

A second editorial in the same number of the Nation suggests further the problems which the Administration was facing in the Islands. The editorial says:

"Public interest is no longer centered on the movements of our forces in the West

2. Nation, August 4, 1898, p. 84.