money from the United States, however arising, of whatsoever nature, and whenever and wherever prosecuted. Emmons v. U. S. (C. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 414.

The provisions of this section do not apply to undisputed claims, or any claim about which no question is made as to its validity or extent. (1883) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 545.

An assignment of an indebtedness admittedly due by the United States is not prohibited by this section. (1894) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 75, approving (1881) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 545.

This section applies only to such claims as require allowance by some accounting officer, an ascertainment of the amounts due thereon, and the issuance of a warrant for their payment. (1899) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 637.

An assignment of a claim against the United States for work unperformed, with power to certain trustees to prosecute the unfinished work, and to collect moneys that may thereafter become due, confers no rights on the assignee, as against the United States, in view of this section. American Surety Co. v. U. S. (1898), 24 South. 388, 76 Miss. 289.

Claims pending before missions. A commission

in

courts or comcalled together, pursuance of treaty stipulations or otherwise, to settle and adjust disputed claims, with a view to their ultimate payment and satisfaction, is, for that purpose, a quasi court; and there is nothing illegal, immoral, or against public policy in an agreement by an attorney at law to present and prosecute a claim before it, either at a fixed compensation, or for a reasonable percentage upon the amount recovered, and such agreement is not within this section, as it does not constitute a lien on funds. Wright v. Tebbitts (1875), 91 U. S. 252, 253, 23 L. Ed. 320.

This section applies to suits in the Court of Claims established by act 1855, incorporated into R. S. 1059. Emmons v. U. S. (C. C. 1891), 48 Fed. 43, 44.

Claims not payable by warrant.-The only cases where assignments of any claim on the United States or any part thereof are recognized is where a warrant has already been issued, and, where there are any cases where the claim can not be paid by a warrant, they do not come within the exception, but are affected by the general language. Hager v. Swayne (1893), 13 Sup. Ct. 841, $43, 149 U. S. 242, 37 L. Ed. 719.

Moneys due on contracts.- Under this section and R. S. 3737, post, 777, an assignment by a public contractor of a claim against the United States for money aceruing on a building contract was void, beth as against the United States, the con

tractor's surety, the laborers, and materialmen. Henningsen v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1906), 143 Fed. 810, 74 C. C. A. 484; decree affirmed, (1908), 28 Sup. Ct. 389, 208 U. S. 404, 52 L. Ed. 547.

Claims for rent.--Where a demand for rent due from the United States is assigned as security before the claim has been allowed, the assignee may assert his right against persons named in warrants subsequently issued by the Treasury therefor, and against a mortgagee of the premises not entitled to the rents, notwithstanding this section, as the object of the section is merely to prevent frauds on the Treasury. Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd (1888), 8 Sup. Ct. 1250, 1256, 127 U. S. 494, 32 L. Ed. 163.

Pay accounts of Army officers.-This section does not forbid the transfer or assignment of their pay accounts by Army officers after the same become due. Such accounts may be lawfully transferred or assigned when due, the regulations of the Army relating to this subject (par. 1349, art. XLV, Regulations of 1863) being complied with. (1877) 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 271. (Present provision is found in par. 1258, Army Regulations of 1913.)

Vouchers. The sale of a quartermaster's voucher by a contractor to a third person works a transfer of his claim against the Government, or of so much of it as may be represented by the voucher. But such vouchers are not in any sense negotiable paper, and the purchaser will take them subject to all the equities that may exist against the contractor. Nevertheless they are evidences of indebtedness sufficient in themselves to support prima facie an action. Lawrence v. U. S. (1872), 8 Ct. CI. 252.

The assignment of a voucher is void Harris v. U. S. (1892), 27 Ct. Cl. 177.

An approved account or voncher for transportation performed for the Navy De partment by F. & C., contractors, was issued by the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering in favor of and delivered to I. & Son, who were brokers for F. & C. The latter claim that the amount appropriated by act June 14, 1878, to pay for the transportation, should be paid to them, and not to II. & Son. Held, that the account or voucher issued as aforesaid is not a negotiable paper; that a transfer or assignment thereof would be void under this section; that the appropriation was made for the purpose of paying F. & C., and not any alleged claim of H. & Son; and that the Navy Department may treat such approved account or voucher as a nullity, and issue an approved account in favor of F. & C. and transmit it to them directly. (1878) 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 191.

Right of assignor to repudiate assignment. Powers of attorney to collect claims upon the United States, and voluntary assignments of such claims, are revocable at will, prior to the payment of the claims by the Government. Milliken v. Barrow (C. C. 1895), 65 Fed. 888, 891, affirmed (1896) 74 Fed. 612, 20 C. C. A. 559.

Where an assignment of a claim against the Government is void under this section, the assignor may repudiate the assignment at any time before actual payment, and bring an action in his own name. Belt's Executrix e. U. S. (1879), 15 Ct. Cl. 92.

S., having a contract with the Engineer Department for dredging in the Occoquan River, by the terms of which the compensatien named therein was to be paid to him from time to time, gave to I. a power of at torney (declared in the instrument to be irrevocable), "to demand, receive, and receipt for, to the proper disbursing officer of the United States, all moneys, warrants, drafts, vouchers, and checks that may become due and payable to me (S.) from the United States for work," etc. Subsequently S. notified the engineer officer in charge that he revoked the power of attorney. Hold, that by force of this section said power of attorney was without legal effect with respect to the claim of the contractor against the United States for his compensation; that he might at any time revoke it, and when revoked it is not for the officers of the United States to consider whether the revocation was rightful or wrongful. (1879) 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 261.

A power of attorney given to collect a claim against the Government, with an agreement that the donee of the power shall receive "a sum equal to 50 per cent of the amount allowed" on the claim, is not a power coupled with an interest, and is revocable, and, such power having been given to a firm, one of the members of which has since died, whereby the firm became dissolved, such power can not be executed by the surviving members, and power should

not be recognized. (1890) 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 483.

Rights of assignee under invalid assignment against persons receiving fund. This section is intended only to protect the Government, and does not affect the rights of an assignee of a fund due and to become due a government contractor, as against one who subsequently receives such fund with notice of the prior assignment. York v. Conde (1892), 66 Hun, 316, 20 N. Y. Supp. 961. Assignments

specifically describing a claim against the United States may pass it, or portions of it, to those who pay a value for it, and the first in order of time is first in right. Appeal of Mann (1852), 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 249.

Effect as between parties to assignment. Under this section all assignments of claims on the United States are void in law and equity, and can not be enforced between the parties. Wood's Ex'rs v. Dialogne (Pa. 1881), 3" Leg. Int. 209.

This section was enacted to protect the Government, and not the parties to the assignment, so that an assignment of shipbuilding contracts with the Federal Government, with power to collect the payments to become due thereunder, being valid between the parties, was not made invalid by the statute, where the Government voluntarily deposited the money in court to be disposed of by the parties upon completion of the contracts. S. H. Hawes & Co. v. Wm. R. Trigg Co. (1909), 65 S. E. 538, 110 Va. 165.

Right of set-off as affected by assign. ment. The right of set-off is not affected by an assignment of the claim. U. S. v. Harris (1897), 77 Fed. 821, 23 C. C. A. 483.

Effect of assignment as to rights of a surety. The equity of a surety of a contractor held superior to an assignment. Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1908), 28 Sup. Ct. 389, 208 U. S. 404, 52 L. Ed. 547; Id (1906), 143 Fed. 810, 813, 74 C. C. A. 484.

* * This subdivision shall

Feb. 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1137).

Operation and effect in general.-The salary of a judge appointed under authority of an act of Congress, which has also fixed his compensation and appropriated money for its payment, is not a claim against the Government, but is a demand fixed by law; an unadjudicated cross-claim on behalf of the Government can not be asserted against it. Smith v. Jackson (C. C. A. 1917), 241 Fed. 747; affirmed (1918), 246 U. S. 388.

The authority to settle claims due to and from the United States by setting one off against the other, as provided in this section, is thereby conferred exclusively on the Secretary of the Treasury, and not on any court. U. S. v. Griswold (D. C. 1887), 30 Fed. 604.

The right of set-off where the Government is both debtor and creditor is established and provided for by R. S. 1766, post 1610, and by this act, but it exists independently of those enactments and is founded upon R. S. 236, ante, 329. Taggart v. U. S. (1881), 17 Ct. Cl. 322.

It is the duty of the accounting officers in proper cases to set off the demand of the United States against the moneys due its debtor. George Howes & Co. v. U. S. (1889), 24 Ct. Cl. 170. See also Schooner Henry v. U. S. (1900), 35 Ct. Cl. 393.

The Treasury has authority to set off an indebtedness due from a claimant to the Government against a judgment recovered by him. Labadie v. U. S. (1898), 33 Ct. Cl. 476.

Nature of remedy.-This act does not create a lien on the money due to the claimant in favor of the Government. U. S. v. Ennis (C. C. 1904), 132 Fed. 133. Set-off differs from a lien, inasmuch as the former belongs exclusively to the remedy, and is merely a right to insist, if the party

thinks proper to do so, when sued by his creditor, on a counter demand, which can only be enforced through the medium of judicial proceedings; whilst the latter is, in effect, a substitute for a suit. (1834) 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 663.

Right of executive officers to reexamine judgment or set off debits litigated in the suit. This statute gives the accounting officers of the Government no authority to reexamine the judgment, but provides a way of payment and satisfaction if the creditor shall at the time of the presentation of his judgment be a debtor of the United States for anything except what is included in the judgment, which is conclusive as to everything it embraces. U. S. v. Jones (1886), 7 Sup. Ct. 283, 285, 119 U. S. 477, 30 L. Ed. 440.

This act gave the accounting officers of the United States no authority to reexamine the judgment, but merely to offset it with another claim, and hence the Treasury hadno appellate jurisdiction, but that the same was vested in the United States Supreme Court. Id..

Where the Government, as defendant, has sought to use an independent demand against the claimant by way of set-off, the Secretary of the Treasury can not afterward use it to reduce a judgment recovered by the claimant; but where the Government did not set up in the suit its independent cross-demand, the Secretary may assert it as a set-off against the judgment in the manner provided by this act. In the former case his action would be an unconstitutional assumption of judicial power; in the latter, constitutional and legal. Bonnafon v. U. S. (1878), 14 Ct. Cl. 484.

Conclusiveness of set-off acquiesced in by creditor. Where a judgment creditor of the Government elects to allow a cross-de

mand or set-off asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury in the manner provided by this act, he can not afterwards maintain an action on his judgment for the balance so set off. Bonnafon v. U. S. (1878), 14 Ct. Cl. 484.

Failure to withhold money due contractor as affecting sureties on contractor's bond. The failure of the Treasury Department to withhold any part of a payment due to a Government contractor on account of a claim of the United States against him for a prior breach of the contract, as authorized and required by this ac, does not release the sureties on the contractor's bond from liability for such claim. U. S. v. Ennis (C. C. 1904), 132 Fed. 133.

Necessity of suit or action to enforce or preserve right of set-off.-A judgment against the United States can neither be enforced by process nor transferred so as to prevent the Government from setting off against it any cross-demand against the judgment plaintiff, especially in view of this act, expressly requiring such set-off. Hence there is no necessity nor ground for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or restraining order by a court of equity, in a suit by the United States to set off cross judgments, to prevent the transfer of his judgment by the defendant. Teller v. U. S. (1901), 113 Fed. 463, 51 C. C. A. 297.

Amount to be withheld.-If there be due the claimant any sum over and above that which is necessary to make good the debt, it ought not to be retained, but

should be paid to him, or to his lawful assignee. (1844) 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 316.

Debts and claims to set-off in general.Where a disbursing agent of the Government is in apparent default in respect to the moneys intrusted to him, and there be sufficient due him from the Government to make good the deficiency, it is proper thus to satisfy the claim for such dues. (1844) 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 316.

Where the same person is contractor for two articles under separate contracts, and fulfills one and fails in the other, and presents his account to the Treasury for settlement,, the accounting officer may set off, in the adjustment, such amount as may be due from him to the Government upon his claim against it. (1845) 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 380.

Where a contractor for supplies for the Navy, who was bound in separate contracts to furnish sugar and tea in stipulated quantities during a fiscal year, made default in respect to the sugar, but furnished the tea by causing it to be shipped to the naval storekeeper by a firm in New York, to whom the contractor indorsed over bills for the same made out in his name, payment of which has been refused on account of the contractor's defalcation on the contract for sugar, held, that the sale of the tea was made by the firm to the contractor, and not to the Government, and that the amount due therefor may be withheld and set off as against the damages sustained by the Government on account of the nonfulfillment of the other contract. (1847) 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 551.

205).

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