"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. . . The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.”

The key-word in this stirring message was the one which called for an end to the war in the name of "humanity." The term was received with something like derision in European countries, which were then engaged in one of the greatest eras of expansion that the world has ever known. It was "obvious" to most of the world that the McKinley message was a mere excuse for the conquest of the island. Anyone familiar with American interest in Cuba throughout the nineteenth century will, of course, recognize that the United States had a very substantial concern over the island that well-informed members of the executive branch of the government could not fail to take into account. Nevertheless, Americans in general, including their representatives in Congress, had little knowledge of the importance of Cuba to the United States, and the appeal in the name of "humanity" in fact represented the overwhelming sentiment of the American people. This was reflected in the action of Con

gress in the famous Joint Resolution of April 20, which empowered the President to use the army and navy to bring about a relinquishment of Spanish authority in Cuba. The Senate at first wished to go beyond the recommendations of McKinley by recognizing the Cuban republic, but, when the House refused to concur (as a result of the personal intervention of the President, who "in effect compelled the omission from the resolution"),1 the following oddly worded paragraph was nevertheless retained:

"That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be independent."

A further expression of American disinterestedness was added in the shape of the Teller Amendment, as follows:

"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

It will be necessary to revert to these paragraphs later, in connection with the establishment of the republic.

The passing of the Joint Resolution amounted to a declaration of war, and hostilities commenced soon afterward. The powers of continental Europe were for a time disposed. to lend at least moral support to Spain, but England came out strongly for the United States. That ended Spain's only remaining hope of escape from the dilemma. And yet, though Spain's expulsion from the island was now virtually sure, there was strangely little enthusiasm in Cuba. Gómez wished that no American troops might be landed there, unless perhaps some artillery, of which he was greatly in need. He did desire help in the form of shipments of ammunition!

'See statement of John Bassett Moore, quoted infra, pp. 643-645.

and the prevention of supplies from reaching the Spaniards. No doubt, the Cubans wanted the credit of winning their own independence, but they also almost certainly believed that an American intervention would mean a transfer of Spanish sovereignty to the United States. The language of the Joint Resolution, for all that it seemed to promise, was not reassuring, for it had been the habit of various European powers during the previous quarter of a century to make sounding phrases the preliminary of a conquest. And what reason was there to expect any other course of action from the United States? There was no idea of resisting the great northern republic, but there was little wholehearted support of the American campaign. This attitude continued, even after the American forces were landed in Cuba, and was a source of no little surprise to the invaders, who expected to be received with open arms.

This is not the place for the details of the war. On May 1st Admiral Dewey won a fine naval victory at Manila Bay, and this was followed by an American occupation of the Philippines. Later on in May the major part of the Spanish fleet was blockaded in the Bay of Santiago, Cuba, and toward the end of June an American army was landed near that city. It is worth noting, with an eye to later events in the era of the republic, that Theodore Roosevelt played a prominent part in this campaign as second in command of the "Rough Riders" regiment, an organization recruited by Roosevelt himself and made up largely of western cowboys. Another man who was destined to fill a great place in Cuban history was at the head of this regiment, Roosevelt's friend, Colonel Leonard Wood. Other matters of greater import from the standpoint of the war, as such, may here be passed by. The Spanish fleet attempted to run the blockade on July 3, but was utterly destroyed. Two weeks later, on

July 17, the Spanish army in Santiago surrendered.2 Meanwhile, too, the American forces had entered Porto Rico, and presently they conquered that island.

Spain was now ready for peace, and on July 26 sent an enquiry to the United States through the French government to find out upon what conditions the war might be brought to an end. The President replied, naming the following terms as a preliminary to negotiations for peace:

1. The "relinquishment" by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.

2. In lieu of indemnity, a cession to the United States by Spain of "Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones."

3. The retention of Manila by the United States until it should be determined in the treaty of peace what disposition was to be made of the Philippines.

Spain accepted these terms, rather unwillingly, and they were presently embodied in more ample form in the protocol of August 10. The provisions of the protocol virtually repeated the paragraphs just recited, except that more ample provision for the evacuation of Spain's possessions in the West Indies was made in a new article. Article five of the protocol concerned the appointment of peace commissioners, and article six called for an armistice immediately following the signing of the protocol. The document was signed on August 12.

On October 1st, five commissioners from each country met at Paris, to draw up a definitive treaty of peace. There

'It is a temptation to tell more whom have since taken up their resiabout the Santiago campaign, espe- dence in Cuba. They pretty genercially from the standpoint of Amer- ally take much of the glamor away ican participants therein, many of from the story.

were several controversial points, but the work was carried on so expeditiously that everything was ready by December 10. Of particular interest was the discussion over the meaning and effect of Spain's "relinquishment" of Cuba. In the earlier negotiations the Spanish minister of State had written a communication (presently forwarded to the American Secretary of State) that Spain was ready to accept "absolute independence, or independence under an American protectorate, or annexation to the United States, preferring annexation, because this would guarantee better the security of the lives and property of Spaniards who resided or had estates there." The answer of Secretary Day set forth that the United States did not share Spain's apprehensions over Cuban independence, but in the disturbed condition of the island felt that it might need aid, which the American government was disposed to give. The Spanish commissioners in Paris must have felt that this left the question open, for they endeavored to get the United States to annex Cuba, but the American commissioners were unwilling to entertain any such proposition. This drew forth the following eulogy from Luis Estévez Romero, the later first Cuban VicePresident:

"It should be said very emphatically in honor of the American commissioners that few times in political history has there been a grander inflexibility, rejecting all insinuations, all advances, all offers of the Spanish commissioners for the United States to keep Cuba. The honor of their nation forbade it."

It was decided that the United States should for the time being act as a trustee of the island, and take responsibility "for the protection of life and property." Another clause of the treaty provided that on the termination of American

See statement of John Bassett Quoted in Martínez Ortiz, I, Moore, quoted infra, pp. 643-645. 112.