CO-TENANCY.
See PARTITION.
COUNTERCLAIM.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.
1. LIEN OF CREDITOR'S BILL. The filing of a creditor's bill and the service of process thereon create a lien on the equitable assets of the judgment debtor, without the issuance of an injunction or the appointment of a receiver, and no voluntary assignment by the debtor, nor intervening claims of other creditors, can impair the lien thus created. King v. Goodwin, 277.
2. LIEN OF CREDITOR'S BILL. -The lien upon equitable assets acquired by a creditor's bill is not extinguished by the death of the debtor before the appointment of a receiver, but survives against such assets in the hands of the administrator.
3. LIEN OF CREDITOR'S BILL SUPERIOR TO WIDOW'S AWARD. - The widow' claim to her award is against the estate of her deceased husband; and if there is no estate, she has nothing to rely upon for the payment of the award. If the estate is encumbered by a valid lien, created by a creditor's bill, the award does not set aside the lien, and she has only a claim on so much as may be left after satisfying the lien. Id.
Question of necessity of the receiver being a party to a creditor's bill should be raised by demurrer. Id.
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14.
1. INDICTMENT - JOINDER OF COUNTS IN. - Where an indictment containing two counts for the same act, one charging robbery, and the other larceny as bailee, against the defendant, is certified to the proper court for the trial of the higher offense, the defendant may be there tried and convicted of the larceny as bailee, although acquitted upon the count char ging robbery. Commonwealth v. Shutte, 773.
2. UNDER INDICTMENT charging a particular crime, the defendant may be convicted of a lesser offense included within it. Id.
8. COURT IS NOT PROHIBITED FROM INSTRUCTING JURY, IN ADVISORY FORM, AS TO LAW in a criminal case by a constitutional provision that "in the trial of all criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of law as well sa of fact," when the jury unanimously request such instruction. Beard v. State, 536.
4. JURY INTOXICATION. - VERDICT AND SENTENCE WILL BE SET ASIDE, where it appears that members of the jury, during their deliberations, were allowed to indulge in an excessive use of intoxicating liquors, and the consumption of a pint and a half of whisky by two members of the jury between the hours of midnight and the following eleven o'clock,
rendering them sick at the time that the verdict was reached, in such
excessive use of such liquor as will avoid the verdict. State v. Broussard,
396.
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE.- When a defendant in a criminal case has offered himself as a wit-
ness in his own behalf, but has not testified in chief to any communi.
cations between his wife and himself, he cannot, without his consent, be
cross-examined as to any such communications, although, since the time
they are claimed to have been made, the husband and wife have been
divorced. People v. Mullings, 223.
6. OBJECTIONS TO CLASS OF INCOMPETENT TESTIMONY NEED not be Repeated.
-Where objection has been clearly and pointedly made and overruled
several times to a certain line or class of testimony as privileged com-
munications between husband and wife, and therefore inadmissible, the
objection need not be repeated to every question of the kind asked, es-
pecially when a motion to strike out all such evidence is made and over-
ruled at the close of the examination of the witness. Id.
7. CONDITIONAL PARDON. A pardon granted a party sentenced to two
years' imprisonment, after he has served part of his term, on "condition
that he shall leave the state within forty-eight hours, never to return,"
is not illegal, and upon his return six years after having accepted the
benefit of the pardon, he may be recommitted to prison, to serve the re-
mainder of the unexpired term. State v. Barnes, 832.
8. FORCIBLE ENTRY. — To constitute offense of forcible entry or forcible tres-
pass, there must be either actual violence used, or such demonstration
of force as is calculated to intimidate or alarm, or as involves or tends to
a breach of the peace. Hence the offense is not established by proof that
the defendant went to a house occupied by the plaintiff, said it was his, that
he intended to take possession of it, and, though forbidden by plaintiff
to enter, entered such house, whereupon the plaintiff, to avoid a difficulty,
went away, leaving the defendant in possession. State v. Mills, 706.
9. DISORDERLY HOUSE, WHAT IS. — A bar-room and dance-hall, with music,
kept for the purpose and with the intent of bringing together and enter-
taining prostitutes, and men desirous of their company, and where such
persons habitually assemble to drink and dance together, is a disorderly
house, although it is quietly kept, and no conspicuous improprieties are
permitted inside. Beard v. State, 536.
10. BAWDY-HOUSE, Keeping of. - An indictment against a woman for the
keeping of a bawdy-house is not sustained by proof that both she and
her daughters, who resided with her, were lewd women, and she and
they, with her knowledge, frequently had sexual intercourse, in and
about her house, with men other than their husbands. State v. Calley,
704.
11. BAWDY-HOUSE. The living together of lewd women, doing acts of
prostitution in their house, or in the house of one of them, does not con.
stitute the offense of keeping a bawdy-house. Id.
12. DISORDERLY HOUSE. The crime of keeping a disorderly house is not es-
tablished against a woman by proof that she and her daughters, who
resided with her, committed frequent acts of prostitution, which acts
were not committed in so public a manner as to disturb the neighbor.
hood or passers-by. Id.
13. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER INDICTMENT FOR MAINTAINING DISORDERLY
HOUSE. - Under an indictment for keeping a disorderly house, and per-
mitting lewd persons to frequent it, it is competent to prove, by wit-
nesses, the reputation for lewdness of the women who frequented the
house, that they frequented the house in company with men, and also
specific acts of lewdness committed by some of the women elsewhere.
Beard v. State, 536.
14. MURDER CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF ACCUSED. Where a defendant
charged with murder becomes a witness in his own behalf, and denies
the killing, a wide range of cross-examination may be allowed, because
of the general nature of defendant's statement. People v. Mullings, 223.
15. NEW TRIAL - PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING INCOMPETENT QUES
TIONS TO BE PUT.- Conviction must be set aside, and a new trial granted,
where in a murder case incompetent questions are asked defendant,
which assume the existence of damaging facts, and are put with such
persistency and show of proof as to make it evident that the question
and not the answers, were what was considered important, and thus im-
press upon the minds of the jury the probability of the existence of the
assumed facts upon which the questions were based, although the prisoner
denies their existence, and there is no other proof. Id.
See BAIL, 1–3; Habeas Corpus, 1, 2; NegotiABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7; STAT-
See MORTGAGES, 15; Vendor and Vendee, 1, 2
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 4, 7, 8.
WHAT CONVEYANCE EXCLUDES.
Husband can have no estate as tenant by
curtesy, when the conveyance by which title is vested in his wife de-
clares that she is "to have and to hold the said granted premises, with
all the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, to her, to
her sole support and use, free from the interference and control of her
said husband, or any husband, and her heirs and assigns, to her and their
only proper use and benefit forever." Haight v. Hall, 122.
1. JURY IS CONFINED TO PECUNIARY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY PARENT, in
estimating the damages, in an action brought by him to recover for the
death of his child, caused by the negligence of the defendant. Agricul
tural etc. Ass'n v. State, 507.
2. EXPECTATION OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT to Parent FROM CONTINUANCE OF
'CHILD'S LIFE BEYOND MINORITY cannot be taken into account by the
jury in an action by a parent, brought under the negligence act of Mary-
land, to recover damages for the death of his minor child, although the
child had been emancipated by his father two years before he was killed,
had voluntarily given to his father each year after his emancipation a
portion of his wages, and “had said that after he had got of age he would
help to fix up the property." Id.
3. EXCESSIVE DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
A verdict for twenty-five thousand dollars for serious, though not per
manent, personal injuries received through the negligence of a railroad company, is excessive. Peyton v. Texas etc. R'y Co., 430.
4. MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. Substantial and compensatory damages should be awarded for serious, though not permanent, personal injuries received through the negligence of a railroad company, but speculative damages will not be allowed. Id.
See BANKS AND BANKING, 9; CORPORATIONS, 33; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2-5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1; SALES, 5, 6; TRESPASS.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA.
See WATERCOURSES, 1.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
See HOMESTEAD, 1.
1. DELIVERY ESSENTIAL TO VALIDITY. - Delivery, or that which is legally its equivalent, is as essential to the validity of a deed as is the signature of the grantor. Colee v. Colee, 345.
2. EXECUTION INCLUDES DELIVERY. - The finding that a deed was executed includes, as a necessary and essential incident, the delivery of the instru ment. Id.
3. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE BY WIFE - PRESUMPTION OF INTENTION. Where a married woman, for the purpose of putting her land beyond the reach of her husband, signs and acknowledges a deed conveying the land to her children, all of whom, with one exception, are infants, and three of whom, including the adult, assent to the conveyance, whereupon the grantor causes the deed to be recorded, and then takes it into her custody intending to retain possession of it and of the land until her death, these facts constitute prima facie a delivery and acceptance of the deed. Id.
4. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE BY PARENT - PRESUMPTION OF INTENTION ARISING FROM RECORDATION. A voluntary conveyance, absolute in form and beneficial in effect, by a parent, to one who is not sui juris, and placing it upon record, although possibly not effectual, without more, as a delivery and acceptance between adults, is deemed to evince an uomistakable intention on the part of the grantor to give the deed effect, and to pass the title to the grantee. The assent of the latter, if nothing further appears, is presumed from the beneficial character of the transaction. Id.
5. PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM RECORDATION. The fact that the grantor has possession of a deed after it has been duly recorded, where the statute makes the record admissible as original evidence of the conveyance, is not entitled to much consideration as rebutting the presumption of delivery arising in such case, especially where the grantees are minors and members of the grantor's family. Id.
6. NECESSITY FOR RECORDING WHEN TAKES EFFECT. — All deeds or other
instruments relating to or affecting the title to real property take effect
only from and after recording, as to all subsequent purchasers without
notice, under the Illinois statute. Anthony v. Wheeler, 281.
7. UNRECORDED DEEDS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO SUBSEQUENT PUR-
CHASERS. — Actual notice is not essential to give effect to a prior un-
recorded conveyance. Any fact or circumstance coming to the knowledge
of the subsequent purchaser which would put a prudent man on inquiry,
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual notice of a prior unrecorded
deed lying in the apparent chain of his title, is sufficient to invalidate
the subsequent purchase; and, in such case, notice is imputed to the
subsequent purchaser on account of his negligence in not prosecuting
his inquiries in the direction indicated. Enough must be shown to im-
pute bad faith to him in order to taint his purchase with fraud in law,
and mere want of caution as distinguished from fraudulent and willful
blindness is not sufficient to charge him with constructive notice of the
unrecorded deed. Id.
& Unrecorded ADMINISTRATOR's Deed when NOT NOTICE TO SUBSEQUENT
PURCHASER. - An unrecorded administrator's deed, in the absence of
actual notice thereof, or of the proceeding under which it was obtained,
is not such constructive notice as will invalidate the title of a subsequent
bona fide purchaser. Id.
9. UNRECORDED ADMINISTRATOR'S DEED - DECREE AUTHORIZING, not No-
TICE TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER. — A decree in a proceeding to sell
land to pay debts in the county court, in the county where the lands
are situated, is not constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
execution of an administrator's deed. Id.
10. VESTED REMAINDER CREATED BY Deed when. —A deed conveying to
'the grantee a life estate, and providing that after his death the title in
fee-simple shall go to and vest in the children and heirs at law of such
grantee, equally, to be divided among them as tenants in common,
creates a vested remainder in his children in being at the time of its ex-
ecution and delivery; and since the words "children and heirs at law,"
as used in the deed, constitute a class, the estate in remainder will open
and let in such of the same class as come into being during the continu-
ance of the particular estate, and they likewise will take a vested re-
mainder. Waddell v. Waddell, 575.
11. WORDS "HEIRS AT LAW," IN DEED, MAY BE CONSTRUED AS BEING
USED INTERCHANGEABLY WITH CHILDREN, or as meaning grandchil
dren or descendants, where such construction is just and reasonable, ac-
cords with the evident intent of the grantor, and is consistent with the
principles of law; and this is especially true under a statute which pro-
vides that the issue of a person entitled shall take the share of his ances
tor. Id.
See CORPORATIONS, 43, 44; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 7; TRUSTS and Trus-
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 8.
DEMAND NOTES.
See NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 12, 13.
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