The theory of the Constitution undoubtedly is that the electors are officers of their respective States. As such the method of their appointment is left entirely to the legislatures. From the beginning there was a marked difference in the States in this regard, for while in most of them the legislature itself made the choice, some entrusted the election to the people. It will be seen from what follows that the tendency to the system of popular election was not strong at first; but in Monroe's time it became general. When the election of 1824 took place three fourths of the State legislatures had renounced the privilege of appointment. During the whole period prior to 1824 there were numerous cases of the resumption of the right of choice directly, by the legislatures of States in which a political advantage was to be gained by so doing. At the election of 1828, in Delaware and South Carolina alone were the electors chosen by legislature. South Carolina clung to that method of appointment until the civil war. Another change in the mode of appointment accompanied or followed that just mentioned. Originally, in most of the States where the popular system prevailed, each voter cast his ballot for three electors -two for the State at large, and one for the congressional district in which he resided. But politicians soon discovered that the weight of the State's influence was increased by a general election of the whole number, by the plan known in France as the scrutin de liste. As soon as a few of the States had adopted this method it was necessary for the rest to do the same, for self-protection. Maryland was the last State to give up the district system, which she did after the election of 1832. Since then no State has reverted to it, with one exception, namely, Michigan in 1892. The party

accidentally in power adopted this device with the express purpose of dividing the electoral vote of the State, which it had no hope of obtaining upon a general popular vote. It is in this feature that the electoral plan of 1787 fails most conspicuously. The general ticket greatly increases the power of the large States. Since the first election of Jackson, when it became the usual rule of election, no President has been chosen in opposition to the vote of both New York and Pennsylvania, and but four in opposition to the vote of either of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be asserted that the general result would have been different in many cases, if the district method of election had prevailed universally. Gerrymandering might

effect almost as much as the general ticket. Inasmuch as the power to choose between the district and the general ticket system rests exclusively with the legislatures, and since the evil whatever it may be - can be reached by amendment of the Constitution only, the plan adopted will undoubtedly continue in use.

Since the electors of President and Vice-President are state officers, whose appointment is certified by the governor; who meet, discharge their one duty, and adjourn, within the State and under state authority, it follows that a fraud perpetrated with the connivance of the chief officers of a State is subject to no effective revision. Unfortunately there have been too many instances of subversion of the will of the people by fraudulent elections, falsified returns, and disfranchisement of citizens by rejection of their legal votes, to admit of this being regarded as a fanciful danger. Indeed, it may be asserted that from the time of the Plaquemines affair in 1844 to the present time there have been few presidential elections which are not believed by members of one party or another to be tainted with electoral frauds. So long as the elections are under state control this evil is beyond remedy. To introduce the system of popular election of the President would not be a cure, even in appearance. Moreover, the jealousy and alarm that are always excited by every proposition to put elections under national supervision, render the only possible remedy wholly impracticable. Yet it needs no argument to prove that fraud which gives the electoral vote of New York or Nevada, the largest or the smallest State, to electors who have not a plurality of votes, and by so doing changes the result of the presidential election, entails a political injury not merely upon the people of the State whose will has been nullified, but upon the whole country. The wrong must go unpunished and unredressed, because there is no appeal from the acts of state authority. There was no apprehension of such wrong when the Constitution was framed; but it has been suffered, repeatedly, if not frequently. In 1876 a complication of electoral disorders and controversies, in which neither party was innocent, brought the country to the verge of a terrible crisis. It would be sheer optimism to believe that evils equally perilous to peace will not occur hereafter.

In the early days of the Republic most of the States required election to all offices by a majority of votes; and when

no candidate had more than a plurality, a fresh election was held, and repeated until a majority appeared. At that time it would have been thought a peril to the Republic, had any candidate for President, elected under a popular system, obtained the office supported by less than a majority of the people. It is needless to repeat that the framers of the Constitution required a majority of electoral votes, representing the States as units in the Federal Union; or failing that, a majority of States represented in the lower House of Congress. In practice almost every President since Polk - the first on the list has had less than a majority of all the votes. The exceptions are Pierce, Lincoln (in 1864), Grant at both his elections, and McKinley. Two Presidents entered office backed by less than a plurality of popular votes: Hayes, and Benjamin Harrison. Even this cannot be deemed an argument for a change from the present electoral system, unless we are to abandon altogether the principle of election by States and adopt that of election by a plurality of individuals.

One phase of the practical working of the electoral system should, in conclusion, be mentioned and examined. It is customary for the newspapers, after each election, to draw attention, in the tone of an alarmist, to the fact that the change of a certain small number of votes from one candidate to another in a few States, would have given the election to that second candidate. The successful party in the contest of 1896 affected, to an unusual degree, to regard the result as a narrow escape, and the defeated party mourned that it missed a victory by so small a margin. Yet, as a matter of fact, Mr. McKinley was the first President since 1872 to receive a clear majority of votes; and he also had a larger electoral majority than any President during the same period, except Mr. Cleveland at his second election. The answer to the ever-repeated arithmetical speculation is that the votes never do have a tendency to redistribute themselves in the way suggested. One election does not resemble another; but the tendency in one State at any given election is substantially the same as in other States. It increases the majority of the winning party in its own States; it carries some States over to the opposition; it reduces majorities in the States held by the losing party, these changes all being, at any election, in the same direction. It appears that some

thing less than nineteen thousand votes transferred from McKinley to Bryan in the States of California, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, and West Virginia, would have given Bryan the election. It is overlooked that five of the six States named were gained by the Republicans from the Democrats, since they were carried by Mr. Cleveland in 1892; and that the change was a part of the movement which gave McKinley his election. It would have required a change of 8772 votes in Indiana to transfer that State from the Republican to the Democratic column. Since similar causes produce similar effects, we must suppose that in other States as well as in Indiana, the Republicans would have lost 2.7 per cent. of their vote, and the Democrats gained 2.9 per cent. That change throughout the country would have reduced McKinley's plurality by about 360,000 votes. Applying to the whole country the proportional change needed to give the vote of Delaware to Bryan, the position of the two candidates would be almost exactly reversed; Bryan would have a plurality of more than 600,000. This statement suggests strongly that the result in a single State cannot be dissociated from the result in other States. It is interesting as an arithmetical fact that twenty thousand voters, carefully located, might have reversed the verdict of 1896; but as a political fact it is valueless, and has no bearing upon the question of the practical working of the electoral system.

Almost identical conditions, it may also be observed, are found to exist at every election. In 1892, Mr. Cleveland had 277 electoral votes to 145 for Mr. Harrison a larger excess

than that of McKinley over Bryan in 1896. A change of 26,000 votes in California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, would have given Harrison 226 votes, and an election. In 1888 a change of 7200 votes in New York alone would have elected Cleveland over Harrison. A change of 600 votes in New York, in 1884, would have elected Blaine over Cleveland. Garfield might have been defeated in 1880 by the loss to Hancock of 10,517 votes in New York, or by the loss of 11,452 votes in Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Indiana, and Oregon. Hayes, but for circumstances favoring him, might have been replaced by Tilden without the loss of one popular vote. A study of the tables of popular votes in the following pages will reveal many similar facts, even back to 1836, when a slight change in

Pennsylvania would have compelled Van Buren to seek his election from the House of Representatives. It appears, then, that the situation in 1896 was nothing unusual, nor one to give the victors a lugubrious thrill, and the defeated a regretful sigh for what might have been. It is ordinarily the case at every election that some precincts, districts, counties, or States are carried by the victorious party by narrow margins; and it is those which make the difference between victory and defeat. That the same thing is true of our Presidential elections is not a good ground for criticism of the electoral system.

Summing up the merits and faults of the system as modified by experience, we may at least say this: that it has almost always resulted in giving effect to the popular will, as well as to the will of the States which was what it was designed to do. The restlessness which advocates radical change in any institution that has turned out not to be perfect, without due consideration of fresh evils that may be introduced by the reform, has devised many substitutes for the system which exists. Yet every substantial evil that has been experienced under the electoral clauses of the Constitution was introduced by politicians for party purposes, and might be cured granting the desire to cure it without altering these clauses. If any scheme can be presented which politicians might not pervert, it may be well to consider it.