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XVI

TIPPECANOE AND TYLER TOO

THE canvass of 1840, the "log cabin" and "hard cider" campaign, stands unique in the political history of the country. It was marked by intense and extraordinary enthusiasm on the part of young men for a candidate who was close upon seventy years of age. The party which won the victory was a party in name only, for it had no other bond of union than opposition to the administration of the day. It announced no positive principles, it had no definite policy. Yet it triumphed over the closely organized party which had governed the country since the beginning of the century, unless the four years' term of the second Adams is to be excepted, which was strongly intrenched in the offices, and was using the public patronage without scruple to perpetuate its own power.

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Many writers have put on record their estimate of Mr. Van Buren's character, and of his rank in the list of those who have occupied the presidential chair; but neither his warm partisans nor those who have placed the lowest estimate upon him as a statesman attribute the disastrous defeat of the Democracy in 1840 to causes personal to him. That he drew the first breath of his public life in the atmosphere of political intrigue, bargain, treachery, and confusion, which has hung over the State of New York from the days of Washington to the days of McKinley, explains much in the story of his career. In his young manhood he was a distinguished party manager, and owed his advancement to the arts which he then cultivated. His adroitness in maintaining a non-committal attitude until it was practically certain which side was to win, and then coming out strongly on that side, was proverbial. Age, responsibility, and experience made him almost a statesman. He intended to make his administration a continuation of Jackson's.1 In

1 William Allen Butler, in his brief but beautiful tribute to his lifelong friend, remarks: "Mr. Van Buren followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor.' The predecessor had been too illustrious, and his footsteps had so shaken the whole social system that a great shock was inevitable."

adherence to the political principles of his predecessor, the purpose was carried out. But Van Buren was a gentleman, in the sense of possessing culture and polished manners, and in preferring peace and order to quarrel and turmoil; and in this he differed so greatly from General Jackson that his adminis tration could not be the same. He surrounded himself with gentlemen, bore himself with dignity, and evinced a most laudable desire to efface the memory of his achievements in the political field as "the Little Magician," and the subserviency to Jackson which insured him the succession. It was not unlikeness to his predecessor that caused his defeat. It had required all of Jackson's authority to carry him through in 1836, and his margin was small. To make use of an arith. metical calculation much in vogue at the present day, which is of little significance (see p. 17), a change of 2183 votes in Pennsylvania would have lost him the electors of that State and thrown the election into the House of Representatives. More than the small change necessary to defeat him was forthcoming in 1840, and the opposition had learned to unite for that one purpose. It was Van Buren's misfortune that the storm which Jackson had called from the sky, by his reckless use of high explosives, burst just as Jackson reached shelter and as the "Magician" stepped forth to take the great rainmaker's place. The terrible panic of 1837 began when the administration was but two months old, -a direct consequence of the financial disorder produced by Jackson's war on the Bank. The enforced liquidation of the greatest monetary institution in the country; the transfer of the public funds to banks much weaker and far more loosely managed than the Bank of the United States; a wild speculation induced by the excessive note-issues of state banks which had a fictitious capital only; and the inability of the banks to respond when called upon to refund the sums intrusted to them, under the law for "depositing" the surplus revenue with the States, such were the events which brought about the suspension of specie payments on the 10th of May, 1837.

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It is true, as the defenders of Mr. Van Buren say, that he met the crisis with courage. No man in his position was ever known to admit that the catastrophe which he had to face and which in this case dealt his administration a deadly blow was caused by the measures which he had supported. Rather, it confirmed him in his former opinions, and led him to

recommend more radical steps in the direction of his previous policy. That the members of his party did not all agree with him is shown by the political history of his administration. Although, during his whole term, there was a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress, he suffered repeated defeats in carrying through his one favorite scheme and great measure, the establishment of the Independent Treasury, — a device contrary then and ever since to all sound views of public and private finance. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to represent either that Mr. Van Buren was abandoned by his party, or that his administration was an unpopular one among Democrats. On the contrary, a large majority of them believed in him, approved his measures, and desired his reelection. They were in favor of completing the work which Jackson had begun, by divorcing the state altogether from private banking corporations. Mr. Van Buren was then, and to the end of his life, as his "Political History" shows, an enemy of banks as well as of The Bank. It is probable that if the issue in the canvass of 1840 had been made wholly upon the bank question, the result would have shown that the people were with Van Buren. The Whigs were too shrewd to avow friendliness to the Bank, or to any bank. They took advantage of the opposition to, and the bad results of, the Jackson-Van Buren fiscal plans, without declaring themselves in favor of restoring what had been destroyed; and they also profited by the Southern hostility to the administration, without promising to reverse or even to modify the policy of the general government on the subject of State Rights. In short, the Democrats had principles and a policy, right or wrong, as people may think; the Whigs were united only in condemning, and, whatever they may have intended, whatever they may have done or attempted to do when they were in power, did not venture to declare principles or policy beforehand.

The state elections in 1837 and 1838 resulted unfavorably to the Democrats. The most of the elections of members of the twenty-sixth Congress took place in 1838; and they were so decidedly adverse to the Democrats that extraordinary exertions were required in the spring elections of 1839 to rescue their majority from extinction. So close was the contest that, when the House assembled in December, 1839, there were 119 Democrats, 118 opposition, and 5 members from New Jersey

whose seats were contested. The certificates were held by Whigs, who were not allowed to participate in the organization. On that occasion Mr. Adams, the ex-President, who had returned to the House of Representatives, prevented anarchy by calling the members to order and persuading them to choose a temporary chairman, a position which was assigned to Mr. Adams himself.

Long before this time, the plans of the Whigs had been forming; and, two days after the assembling of Congress, the National Whig Convention met at Harrisburg, - on December 4, 1839. The leaders were resolved on union, and the only question was as to the candidate who would command the largest support. Mr. Clay had the advantage of a long public service, and of having been a leader in national affairs for almost thirty years; but he also labored under the double disadvantage of being a Freemason, and as such not acceptable to the faction which still mustered many followers in the Eastern States, and of having been a conspicuous advocate of the "American system," or protective tariff, which was highly unpopular in the South Atlantic States. General William Henry Harrison was not a great leader; but he had been more or less in the public service, military and civil, for nearly half a century, and was well known throughout the country. Moreover, he had made a gallant run for the presidency in the Northern States in 1836, and was open to neither of the objections urged against Mr. Clay. It was evident that one of these two would be selected to lead the Whig opposition. Each had his strong partisans. Not only they, but the candidates as well, were anxious chiefly that the Whig party should carry the election. Mr. Clay's earnest and laudable ambition to be President was not so great that he would put it before the cause. Moreover, he was aware of the objections to his candidacy which some Whigs entertained. When the autumn elections of 1839 indicated a reaction in favor of the Democrats, and the necessity of a complete union of the opposition, he wrote, in a letter which was read at the Harrisburg Convention, that, "if the deliberations of the Convention shall lead them to the choice of another as the candidate of the opposition, far from feeling any discontent, the nomination will have my best wishes and receive my cordial support." He further begged his friends to "discard all attachment or partiality to me, and be guided solely by the

motive of rescuing our country from the dangers which now encompass it." Already, during the preceding summer, he had said in an address at Buffalo: "If my name creates any obstacle to union and harmony, away with it, and concentrate upon some individual more acceptable to all branches of the opposition." The action of the great "union and harmony" convention of Pennsylvania, held at Harrisburg on the 4th of September, probably did much to concentrate the Whig forces on Harrison; for, while that convention extolled Clay in extravagant phrases, it expressed the opinion that General Harrison was the only man who could unite the anti-Van Buren party.

Two hundred and fifty-four delegates attended the Whig convention, from twenty-two States. South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Arkansas were not represented. The Whig committee of Arkansas sent a letter authorizing Judge Porter, of Louisiana, to cast the vote of Arkansas; but the remembrance of the Whig derision of "ruckerizing," at the Democratic convention of 1835, forbade that the credentials should be accepted. Isaac C. Bates, of Massachusetts, was the temporary chairman, and Governor James Barbour, of Virginia, the permanent president, of the convention. After a long debate, a plan of nomiAs this scheme was peculiar, and is order of the convention is given en

nation was agreed upon. now quite obsolete, the tire:

That the delegates from each State be requested to assemble as a delegation, and appoint a committee, not exceeding three in number, to receive the views and opinions of such delegation, and communicate the same to the assembled committees of all the delegations, to be by them respectively reported to their principals. And that thereupon the delegates from each State be requested to assemble as a delegation, and ballot for candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President, and, having done so, to commit the ballot designating the votes of each candidate, and by whom given, to its committee. And thereupon all the committees shall assemble and compare the several ballots, and report the result of the same to their several delegations, together with such facts as may bear upon the nomination. And said delegations shall forthwith reassemble and ballot again for candidates for the above offices, and again commit the result to the above committees; and if it shall appear that a majority of the ballots are for any one man for candidate for President, said committee shall report the result to the convention for its consideration. If there shall be no such majority, then the delegations shall repeat the balloting

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