Our act of assembly enforces a service till twenty-one years of age of males, and of females till eighteen; and all the provisions must be predicated on allowing and effectuating that end. Can it be said that an agreement between a master and a man of thirty or forty years of age, to learn the art of brewing, or any other trade, calling or occupation, by the name of apprentice, that such a person, is within the scope, spirit and meaning of the act of one thousand seven hundred and seventy? It may be expedient to extend the remedies in the case of minors, as in the statute of George 3d, but cases, of persons above age, in this state, becoming apprentices, are so rare, that the construction now given can be of little inconvenience; whilst on the contrary, to subject persons, who on equal terms became parties to the contract, to the power of the sessions by a disgraceful punishment for a breach of duty, appears harsh and inexpedient. This construction, I admit, is not conformable to a case reported in Browne's Cases in the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county, before Judge Rush.(a) That decision is of authority, and every deference is due to so respectable a judge, and it induced this court to postpone its determination. I am informed however, that Mr. Recorder Wilcox, determined differently. There has been also a late decision in the Mayor's Court, I understand in conformity to the opinion of Recorder Wilcox; and this highly respectable opinion I might also mention, if authorised.(b) Under all these considerations I am of opinion that Negro Henry be discharged, it appearing that he was of age at the time of the contract, and consequently that recourse must be had to the covenants, if any breach of any of them in the indenture, and that the summary remedy in such case before a Justice does not apply. (a) 1 Vol. 24. (6) Vide 1 Browne's Rep. 374, in note, 1812. COMMON WEALTH ug inst STURGEON. MAYOR'S COURT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 1811. March 9th A COMMONWEALTH against HILL, PPLICATION by Susannah Hill against her husband Hugh Hill, for an order of maintenance, under the 30th Sect. Poor Law, of the 29th March 1803. The recognizance taken before the Mayor, and returned to the Court was entitled as follows. Commonwealth Nov. 1, 1810. Charged on oath of Susannah Hill, &c. Addis, moved to discharge the recognizance of Hugh Hill the defendant, on two grounds, viz. 1st That it did not appear on the recognizance taken and returned, that the wife was deserted so as to become a public charge: and, 2ndly That the application to the Mayor was not on behalf of the guardians. Per CURIAM. Reed, Recorder, The practice of the magistrates, and of this court, -appears to have been various; in some cases, the wife has applied without the agency or interposition of the guardians of the poor; and the orders in such cases have been, to make payments to her, but at the same time limiting the continuance of them, to the time she continues chargeable; in many instances, the order has been made on the application of the guardians, and the payments directed to be made to them, for the support of the wife. The Preamble to the 30th Sect. (a) recites the mischief for which the enacting clause provides the remedy. [The words are, whereas it sometimes happens that men separate themselves without reasonable cause from their wives, and desert their children, and women also desert their children leaving them a charge on the said city, district or township, although such persons may have estates which should contribute to the maintenance of such wives and children :] The first part of the section directs the mode of proceeding when the husband has property, and then, as was admitted on the argument, the wife or children must be left or neglected, so as to become a public charge. This connection is preserved throughout the section, which in the latter clause, provides a remedy against the person of the husband, where no property can be found. The great object of the poor law is the maintenance and support of the poor, and none others, and, when it can be obtained, indemnity to the public against persons chargeable, or likely to become so. In this case, the woman never having been a public charge, no application was made to the guardians for relief, and they, of course, could make none to the magistrate; at the time therefore when this recognizance was taken, there was no fact to authorize the binding over, and, as the wife has not been since that time, to use the words of the law, so neglected as to become a public charge; the guardians of the poor cannot now interpose their authority, to sustain the application. Whether these facts should appear on the face of the recognizance is quite another question, which on this occasion it is unnecessary to decide: we would, however, by no means be understood to say, that it is necessary. As at present advised, we see no reason why the court should not either hear evidence of the facts, or if necessary, permit the magistrate to amend the return. For the reasons mentioned, and on (a) 7 vol. Bioren's ed. 123. 1812. COMMON WEALTH against HUGH HILL. 1812. COMMON- against HUGH HILL. the authority of the decision of Mr. Levy, formerly recorder of this Court, and Mr. Rush, President of the court of quarter sessions of Philadelphia County, the court quash the recognizance and discharge the defendant.* Recognizance quashed, and defendant discharged. Mr. Dallas, when recorder, decided, that the application might be made by the wife alone. Mr. Levy, who succeeded him, declared, that in consequence of this decision, he gave the subject the most mature consideration, and much as he respected the opinion of his predecessor, he was obliged to differ from him. President Rush inclined to Mr. Dallas's sentiments, but when the question was brought before him, on the authority of Mr. Levy's opinion, he decided as he had done: Indeed, he went further, and said, that the facts must appear on the record. REPORTER. CASES IN THE District Court, FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1812. B CLEMSON against BEAUMONT. 1812. September 19. Arbitrators re inventus subsequently EFORE the return of the writ, the plaintiff expressed An award of his determination to have arbitrators chosen agreea- gularly made, bly to the act of the 20th of March, one thousand eight hun- is not affected by the return dred and ten. The arbitrators were chosen accordingly; and of non est an award was made and entered upon the docket previous to commencement of June Term; at which term "non est made by the sheriff to the inventus" was returned by the sheriff, to the writ of capias. capias by At September Term following, the defendant's attorney ob- which the tained a rule to shew cause why the judgment should not be commenced.' set aside in consequence of the above return. No objection was made to the award for want of notice, or any irregularity in the proceedings. After argument the court gave the following opinion. Hemphill, President. In the case of Hertzog against Ellis,(a) a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court, in giving a construction to the arbitration act of the 20th March one thousand eight hun (a) 3 Bin. Rep. 212. action was |