contended, in this case, that the defect in the declaration has been cured by the verdict. In trespass the day laid in the declaration is not material, provided it is previous to the bringing of the action; and it appears from the cases cited, that if no day is laid, or an impossible day, which is considered as no day, the defect will be cured after verdict. The case of Bemis versus Faxon (a) was much relied upon, as a case bearing strong analogy to the present. In that case the dates on the face of the declaration are inconsistent with each other. The promise is alleged to be made at a day to come, but the breach is alleged to be committed afterwards on a day then past; the whole weight of that case, so far as it bears upon the one before us, is derived from the respect paid by the court to the case of Sorrel versus Lewin; (b) but it does not appear that even that case is similar to the present. It was an indebitatus assumpsit, 1 Jan. 26, Car. 2, which is not yet come." It was excepted, that here was no day, but it was allowed to be well enough after verdict: from the expression used, the day had not come at the time of the trial. The case of Blackall versus Eale in Carthew 389, appears to be a similar case; there the day laid was not come at the time of the trial, and cured after verdict. The case of Blackhall versus Eccles, (c) is another case of the same description. The day laid in the declaration was not come at the time of the trial. The counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged, that if the time in the declaration had been after the bill filed and before the trial, the judgment must be arrested; because then it would have appeared that the jury gave damages for an action arising since the suit commenced; but, in that case, the time being after trial, it was as if there was no time; and Sorrel versus Lewin was cited as being a similar case. In these cases the day laid not being come at the time of trial, was considered as no day, and it was presumed that a cause of action had been proved be fore the commencement of the suit. In the case before us 1813. CHARLES against DELPUX. 1813. CHARLES against DELPUX. the day laid in the declaration was past at the time of the trial. The case of Skinner versus Robinson (a) was relied upon as a case in point for the plaintiff. The judgment of the court of Common Pleas having been reversed. We have seen the manuscript opinion of the Supreme Court on the reversal of this judgment, and it is by no means favourable to the plaintiff in this case. In the conclusion, it is stated that, as to the real time of issuing the writ, that did not appear in the record and could not be enquired into by this court. So that the point of law, decided by the Common Pleas, has not been disturbed, although the judgment was reversed. The court cannot well intend, in this case, that the jury have not given damages for a cause of action, arising after the commencement of the suit. The declaration states, that "the said "Bonnette for a long space of time, to wit, from the day and year first above mentioned, (which was a day after the "suit brought) hitherto became and was unable to do and per"form the necessary affairs and business, &c."" and the " said Catharine, during all that time, lost and was deprived "of the service of her daughter and servant &c." "By means "whereof she had necessarily paid, laid out and expended di"vers sums of money, to wit, the sum of $ 500, in and about the nursing and taking care of the said Bonnette, her said daughter and servant." The whole cause of action is laid subsequent to the bringing of the action. No case has gone so far as this; here is no inconsistency of date appearing on the face of the declaration, nor impossible dates; and the day laid was past at the time of the trial. Our wishes incline us to support the verdict if we could, but we think it cannot be done upon legal principles. The judgment must be arrested. (a) 1 Browne rep. 357. R LIVEZLY against PENNOCK. ULE to shew cause why the judgment should not be set aside. 1813. 13 November. Judgmen having been Common Pleas In this case a judgment was entered by the party in this entered in the court by virtue of the 22nd section of the act of the 24th February 1806. of of Delaware County, by vir tue of a bond A judgment had been previously entered in the same manner in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware county, by virtue of the same bond and warrant of attorney. and warrant of attorney which warrant was directed to Wm. Lewis esq. attorney of the Supreme Court, attorney in the or any other The warrant is directed to William Lewis, attorney of the Supreme Court, or any other attorney in the said Court or any Court elsewhere; it authorises the attorney to appear in an action, then brought or to be brought, on the said obliga- any Court elsetion &c. and to confess judgment thereupon, for the sum of where, &c au$3000. said Court or thorised the attorney to ap The question is, whether a judgment can be entered in pear in an acdifferent counties by virtue of the above bond and warrant. tion then to confess judg BY THE COURT. We never entertained any doubt on this subject, but tion &c. and held the case under advisement at the request of the plain- ment thereupon tiff's attorney to make some enquiry as to what had been the for the sum of $3000, the practice. We have not been able to learn, that it has been Court set aside the practice to enter judgments in different counties upon judgment subsequently warrants similar to the present. If instances of the kind entered therehave occurred, they have been rare. It is said that where the on, in this warrant contains the words, " to confess judgment or judg ments in any court or courts," it has been thought by some a sufficient authority to enter judgments in different counties; but we do not know that this has been recognized by any deeision, and as the warrant, in this case, is differently worded, we need not express any opinion on that point. To us it is very clear, that as soon as the judgment in this case was entered in Delaware county, the power contain-" ed in the warrant was fully complied with: the debt was then merged into a debt of a higher nature, and the judgment must be pursued, either by bringing an action of debt upon it in another county, or proceeding in the usual way by a testalum fi fa or ca sa. Court: 1813. LIVEZLY against If the authority goes further, it extends to every court in the State or perhaps in the Union, and costs must follow. The pretension is 'so repugnant to principle that we FENNOCK. should require an express decision or words in the warrant, evincing a plain understanding of parties, before we could give it our sanction. We consider the prothonotary as only possessing the same power that was given to the attorney named in the warrant. He is by the act, merely substituted in the place of the attorney, to enter the judgment, and there is great reason why the warrant of attorney should be left in the office and filed, as the evidence of his authority to enter the judgmert: And this would be impracticable if judgments could be entered in different counties, unless a copy of the record under the seal of the Court, would be deemed sufficient. In this case, however, we do not ground our opinion upon any inconvenience that might arise in this respect; but upon the want of power, contained in the warrant, to enter two judgments. Let the rule be made absolute. CASES IN THE COURT OF OYER AND TERMINER, AND GENERAL GAOL DELIVERY, OF THE COUNTY OF PhiladelPHIA. JANUARY SESSION, 1814. COMMONWEALTH against CLARK, et al. accused of a jury. persons summoned on the grand Jury, being called A person and empanelled, and the clerk being about to administer crime may to them the oath, Wilcocks, J. R. Ingersoll and Browne, on be- challenge any of the personS half of Asher Clark, Thomas M.Roy, John Moor and returned on the grand Henry Kelly, who were confined in Jail on a charge of murder,* and against whom, it was understood, a bill of indictment was intended to be sent, at the present Session, claimed the benefit of challenging Michael Freytag, Esquire, who was returned, called and empanelled as one of the grand Jurors, for cause, viz. for having formed and expressed his opinion of the guilt of some of the prisoners. This right being contested by Ingersoll, Attorney General, assisted by Edward Ingersoll; the counsel for the pri soners proceeded to support their claim as follows. Every Juror must be liber homo, by which must be understood, that he is not only a free man and not bond, but also one who has such freedom of mind as will enable him to stand indifferent, as he stands unsworn (a). • The prisoners were all acquitted. (a) 1 Co. Lit. p. 155, a. sec. 234. M |