PERSONAL PROPERTY where a will directs that land be sold and the proceeds be divided, and a beneficiary dies before the sale, the interest passing under the beneficiary's will is taxable as personal property. See MATTER OF MILLS..
Architect's building plans — after they have been filed with a building department and the architect has been paid for his services he has no further property rights therein. See WRIGHT v. EISLE...
Conversion - the withdrawal from a bank of money of a corporation deposited by its treasurer to his credit as treasurer contrary to its by-laws. See SANITARY CAN Co. v. MULLINS..
Specific performance of a contract relating to personal property — when See BATEMAN v. STRAUS
PLEADING — Reply — not compelled to an answer containing statements denying what the plaintiff must prove in order to succeed - - a waiver of the requirements of a contract cannot be proved under an allegation of performance.] 1. The complaint in an action upon a bond, given by the defendant to insure the performance of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party, alleged that the third party had failed to perform the contract and that the defendant was liable upon the bond. The complaint specifically alleged that the plaintiff had complied with all the conditions of the contract made and entered into by the defendant, upon his part to be kept and performed, and then set out the contract of guaranty in full.
The defendant's answer contained a general denial, and then set forth an allegation that it was provided in the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the defendant should be notified in writing of any act on the part of the principal which would involve loss for which the defendant would be liable: that no such notice was given, and that the defendant was thereby relieved from obligation upon the bond.
It further alleged that the bond contained a provision that any action thereon should be brought within six months after the breach of the con- tract, and that the action was not brought within said six months.
Held, that the allegations of the answer above set forth were simply specific denials of the allegations of the complaint, supplementing the gen- eral denial incorporated in the answer;
That such allegations did not consist of new matter, and that the defend- ant was not entitled to require the plaintiff to serve a reply thereto;
That the plaintiff, having alleged in his complaint performance of the contract made between himself and the defendant, would not be entitled to prove upon the trial a waiver by the defendant of the provisions of the con- tract in the particulars specifically set forth in the answer.
BURR v. UNION SURETY & GUARANTY Co....
Motion to dismiss because the complaint does not state a cause of action · waiver thereof — amendment, on appeal, of the complaint to conform it to the proof] Where a motion made at the opening of a case to dismiss the com- plaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is denied with leave to renew such motion, if the defendant fails, in motions subsequently made by him for the dismissal of the complaint, to specify the insufficiency of the pleading as one of the grounds of such motions and also neglects to object to evidence introduced as not being within the pleadings, he must be deemed to have waived the objection that the complaint did not state a cause of action, so far as to authorize the trial court, if the evidence given upon the trial warrants a judgment for the plaintiff, to amend the complaint to conform to the proof; in such a case the
power to amend the complaint may be exercised by the Appellate Division upon an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, if it is necessary to do so in order to sustain the judgment. JOHNSON v. CITY OF ALBANY... 567 3. Matter not stricken out as irrelevant or redundant, where any reason- able doubt exists as to its being so.] An order expunging allegations from a pleading as irrelevant and redundant should not be made unless it is very clear and manifest that such allegations are not material or relevant, and that no evidence under them can be introduced upon the trial of the action.
If there is any reasonable doubt on this point relief against the sup- posed y objectionable allegations should be sought by demurrer or other objection at the proper time. JOHN CHURCH Co. v. PARKINSON..
4. Striking out allegations therefrom—not encouraged · not done, where they are averments of evidence · - it is discretionary.] Motions to strike out allegations contained in pleadings are not encouraged or granted save on grievance shown; if the only fault of the allegations in question is that they are averments of evidence, the motion will not be granted.
The relief rests largely in the discretion of the court. VOGT v. VOGT.... 437 5. Corporation—a director thereof may verify a pleading served by it.] A director of a domestic corporation is an officer thereof within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the verifi- cation of a pleading interposed by such a corporation must be made by one of its officers. EASTHAM T. YORK STATE TELEPHONE Co...
— Slander - charge that the plaintiff, a supervisor, "is short six thou- sand dollars in his accounts and ought to be behind the bars' a justification thereof, that for other acts the plaintiff "ought to be behind the bars" is bad- the charge must be proved, and the justification cover it, in its entirety. STOCK . KEELE...
Slander- -a general denial and in a single count a defense in justifica- tion and in mitigation. a demurrer to the latter, where it is sufficient as a defense in mitigation and insufficient as one in justification, is bad.
under a complaint alleging performance thereof, excuse for non- performance cannot be shown-nor where such proof is received over objection can the complaint be thereafter made to conform to the proof. ROWE v. GERRY...............
Complaint alleging a cause of action both for criminal conversation and for alienation of a wife's affections- the unlawful intercourse constitutes matter in aggravation of damages.
How far the demand for relief determines whether an action is at law
or in equity. BATEMAN v. STRAUS..
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Fire insurance —a defense of fraud must be specifically pleaded. CHEEVER V. BRITISH-AMERICAN INS. Co......
POWER-Transfer tax-date of payment thereof determined by the exer- cise of a power of appointment - the amendment of 1899 as to property
PRACTICE—A complaint containing two causes of action, to each of which a counterclaim is interposed· action and granting a new trial involves a new trial of both causes of action an order setting aside a verdict as to one cause of and of the counterclaim-right thereto, not waived by not moving to resettle an improper order.
See VERNON v. O'BANNON Co...
Settlement of a case without the knowledge of the defendant's attorney. application by such attorney to put the case on the calendar with a view to his recovering costs—appeal in the defendant's name from its refusal — proper pro- cedure for its review. See POMERANZ v. MARCUS...
Reference "to take proof and report the same to the court" superseded by a reference "to hear and determine" in an action subsequently brought in which by stipulation the issues under the first order of reference are tried.
See VALENTINE v. STEVENS..
New trial- -a plaintiff who obtains a verdict cannot object to a condi- tion, on compliance with which by him the verdict is allowed to stand the costs should be paid by the moving party where a new trial is granted because of error in the amount of the verdict.
Order-extent of relief granted when the order is made on default, and where it is made after a hearing of both parties—defect in an affidavit of merits not available for the first time upon appeal. See HEADDINGS v. GAVETTE..
When an action in partition is not barred by another suit to partition the same premises although the plaintiff in the action had knowledge of the com- mencement of the other action.
Short decision under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1022 — when the grounds thereof are not sufficiently stated. longer on the bench, a new trial will be ordered. -the judge who made it being no
Motion to dismiss because the complaint does not state a cause of action — waiver thereof — amendment, on appeal, of the complaint to conform it to the proof. See JOHNSON v. CITY OF ALBANY.....
Guardian's sureties—when they may be sued, although proceedings for an account have not been instituted against the guardian. See KURZ v. HESS
When a complaint may be dismissed although a verdict has been rendered in favor of the plaintiff — when a new trial should be granted. See GLENNON v. ERIE R. R. Co..
Change of a railroad grade crossing injured thereby is by action and not by proceedings under the Village Law. -the remedy of a property owner See MATTER OF TORGE
A judgment sustaining a demurrer to a portion of an answer should be interlocutory - it should not authorize the collection of costs.
PRE-EXISTING DEBT — As a consideration for a note.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Real estate broker — when his commissions are earned.] 1. William Dempsey, who was attorney in fact for Mary E. Dempsey, the owner of a tenement house in the city of New York, employed Thomas F. Cody to sell or exchange the tenement house in such a way as to realize $35,000 or $40,000 in cash. On January 20, 1902, through Cody's efforts, a contract was entered into between Mary E. Dempsey and Florence L. E. Willmann for the exchange of the tenement house for certain lots.
The contract contained a clause reciting that it was "predicated upon the procurement by the party of the first part of a loan of forty thousand ($40,000) dollars, **which loan is to be made simultaneously with the closing of title mentioned herein, but upon failure to procure said loan by either party from any source whatever, each of the parties will be released from any and every obligation, covenant or agreement thereunder, express or implied." Cody agreed to waive his commission in the event of the failure of the contract by reason of the loan not being secured.
The contract was not consummated on February 3, 1902, as was provided by its terms. March 20, 1902, the parties, who had continued to treat the original contract as still in force, without consultation with or further agree- ment on the part of Cody, entered into an agreement modifying the original contract by providing for a loan of $35,000 instead of $40,000, and in some other incidental matters. The agreement, as modified, was carried out and the exchange effected.
Held, that Cody was entitled to recover his commissions. CODY v. DEMPSEY...
What writing constitutes a substantial compliance with section 640d of the Penal Code requiring the written authority of the owner of land to one offering it for sale.] Where the attorney in fact for the owner of a parcel of real property in a city of the first class employs a broker to effect an exchange of such real estate and executes and delivers to such broker, with the inten- tion of authorizing him to negotiate the transfer, the following instrument: "They will takes 86 st. subject to 1st and 2nd mortgages. We to take 26th ward lots subject to taxes and assessments not to exceed $6,500.00. William Dempsey," such instrument is a substantial compliance with section 640d of the Penal Code, which provides that in cities of the first and second class, "any person who shall offer for sale any real property without the written authority of the owner of such property, or of his attorney in fact, appointed in writing," etc., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.
3. When a failure to comply with the section does not bar commissions.] Assuming the statute in question to be constitutional, the failure of a broker, employed to effect the sale or exchange of real estate in the city of New York, to procure the written authority required by the statute, will not, where the contract of sale or exchange has been executed, prevent the broker from recovering his commissions. Id.
4. The section is unconstitutional.] Semble, however, that the statute is unconstitutional. Id.
5. Violation of a penal statute in making a lawful contract.] Where a contract, not unlawful in itself, has been executed, and the parties have enjoyed the benefits of the contract, the mere fact that one of the parties has violated a penal statute in the approach to the contract will not prevent the court from enforcing payment. Id.
6. — Rejection, upon a specified ground, of a loan procured by a broker — it precludes the principal from setting up, in an action by the broker for his
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - commissions, another ground of objection.] Where a. person, who employs a broker to secure a loan for him, refuses to accept the loan from a responsible party procured by the broker solely because he is dissatisfied with the amount of the commission to which the broker claims to be entitled, he cannot, upon the trial of an action brought against him by the broker to recover his commission, justify his refusal to accept the loan upon the ground that the letter in which the party procured by the broker accepted the application for the loan contained a provision that the application was approved, “provided the rules of this company are complied with and the loan is accepted within ten days from the date of this notice."
7. Real estate broker's commissions — effect of an admission by his prin- cipal that he was entitled to them.] In an action brought by a broker to recover commissions upon a sale of real estate, evidence that subsequent to the sale the defendant admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to his commissions, is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's employment and that he was the procuring cause of the sale and that the sale was effected upon terms and conditions which were within the scope of the employment.
8. Broker's failure to disclose the name of his customer.] The fact that, previous to the sale, the broker did not disclose to his client the name of the party who subsequently purchased the property, although he did disclose to his client a description of the purchaser, has an important bearing upon the determination of the question whether the broker was the procuring cause of the sale, but is not necessarily controlling upon that question. Id. 9. Real estate broker · the mere fact that a lease is made to a person procured by a broker does not entitle the latter to commissions.] To entitle a broker to recover from a lessor commissions for effecting a lease of the latter's real estate the broker must show that he was employed by the lessor to do so; if the broker, without a previous request by the lessor, brings the lessee to the lessor and the latter, without further acceptance of the broker's services, executes the lease to such lessee, the broker is not entitled to compensation. BRADY v. AMERICAN MACHINE & FOUNDRY CO.. 267 See MASTER AND SERVANT.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY Agreement that the principal would pay all persons supplying “labor and materials in the prosecution of the work"-it does not cover the services of a steam lighter used on the work in question and two other works.] 1. Joseph J. Churchyard had three separate contracts with the United States government for the erection of certain buildings, one of which was a marine barracks at Coaster's Harbor island. The contract for the construction of the latter building provided that Churchyard would "provide, furnish and deliver, at his own risk and expense, at Coaster's Harbor Island, Rhode Island, all the necessary materials, labor, tools and appliances for the construction and completion, in all respects, of a barracks."
As security for the performance of this contract, Churchyard gave a bond subject to the provisions of an act of Congress passed August 13, 1894, which provides that the sureties shall assume an obligation that such con- tractor or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supply- ing him or them labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract."
The bond was conditioned that Churchyard should "promptly make pay. ments to all persons supplying him or them labor and materials in the prose- cution of the work provided for in the aforesaid contract."
Churchyard chartered a steam lighter with a crew of six men and the necessary supplies to transport lumber and materials used in the perform- ance of the three government contracts.
Held, that the surety upon Churchyard's bond was not liable for any sum due from Churchyard for the use of the steam lighter, even to the extent that such lighter was used in delivering materials to be used in the performance of the particular contract, to secure the performance of which the bond was given. U. S. EX REL. MCALLISTER v. FIDELITY & D. Co.... 475
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