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any power to impose and collect tariff duties except for the purposes of revenue only." This radical position was not reaffirmed in 1896, but instead a rather colorless resolution on the subject was adopted.

In recent years the position of the Democracy on the money question has been vacillating or equivocal. For more than half a century every convention condemned the establishment of a national bank, and firmly supported a metallic currency. Opposition to a national bank has ceased to find a place in their platform. And in 1868 they went so far as to declare that “where the obligations of the government do not expressly state upon their face, or the law under which they were issued does not provide, that they shall be paid in coin, they ought in right and in justice to be paid in the lawful money of the United States." This was before the Supreme Court had decided that Congress had the power to make paper currency a legal tender, and while the subject was being warmly discussed, and when, in view of its traditions and antecedents, the Democratic party should have repudiated the suggestion that there could be any money but coin. Now they had become so converted to the greenback theory that they proposed to substitute paper for coin in discharging the debts of the government. In 1872 they veered around, and demanded the prompt resumption of specie payments. In 1880, 1884, and 1888 they pronounced for "gold and silver (1884 coinage of the Constitution ') and paper convertible into coin on demand." Silver had been demonetized in 1873, and had become a marketable commodity, the United States being by law compelled to be the purchaser. The exact purpose of the resolutions of 1880, '84, '88 is not clear; whether remonetization, open coinage, or both. The advocates of the white metal became more strenuous and imperative, and the convention of 1892 was constrained to be more specific. They said:

"We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal or charge for mintage; but the dollar unit coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, or be adjusted through international agreement, or by such safeguards of legislation as shall secure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts; and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par and redeemable in such coin.'

This furnished ample material for construction and inference. But the next clause was an unequivocal declaration in favor of an unlimited increase of paper money. "We recommend that the prohibitory ten per cent. tax on State bank issues be repealed."

Ambiguity or evasion upon the silver question could no longer be tolerated. Whatever may have caused the depression in business and the widespread distress, it was manifest that no relief could be hoped for while the great uncertainty as to the government's financial policy should continue. Everywhere, in all parties, there was a persistent demand that the issue should be fairly and frankly met. That the Democratic convention of 1896 was responsive to this demand cannot be questioned, whatever may be thought of the wisdom of its action. They proclaimed: "We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation.' They also demanded that the silver dollar should be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private; and that the option of deciding in which coin the obligations of the United States should be paid should belong to the government and not to its creditors; and that national banks had no constitutional power to issue paper money.

It is interesting to trace the evolution of the sentiment

in favor of free silver coinage. In 1880, the Greenback convention declared in favor of " the unlimited coinage of silver." The United Labor convention of 1888 said: "We should have free coinage of silver." In this year the National Farmers' congress took the same stand. In 1889 and 1890, the Farmers' Alliance (which developed into the People's party) made similar declarations, which were repeated by the National People's party in 1892, and by the Silver convention of 1895. So it grew: not having been fathered by any dominant party, nor nurtured by practical politicians, until adopted as a child of Democracy in 1896.

In 1884, the Democratic convention declared for "honest civil service reform,"-a phrase vague enough to be interpreted as supporting the civil service system established by law; or to mean merely general reform in the administration of public affairs. But in 1888, the convention commended civil service reform as “inaugurated and maintained by President Cleveland." The President having approved of the law on this subject and enlarged the sphere of its operations, this resolution fairly committed the party to the system. But in 1896 the platform says: "We are opposed to life tenure in the public service"; which is manifestly a declaration of hostility to the civil service system.

Absolute consistency is not to be expected of any political organization; and moreover it is not to be desired. It would be rank Bourbonism-forgetting nothing and learning nothing. While adhering to fundamental principles, a party should always adapt its policies to the varying conditions and existing interests and wants of the general public. How far the Democratic party has followed or departed from this rule may be gathered from this sketch of its history.

The Republican party came into power at the most critical period of the country's history since the Consti

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tution was adopted. States were passing ordinances of secession, and were arming for a bloody conflict. Lincoln's conciliatory attitude and his kindly assurances were powerless with the excited and fiery Southerners. When constrained to see that war was inevitable, he displayed as much of energy and wisdom as he had before shown of caution and calmness. His appeal to the patriotism of the nation was promptly, generously, and universally responded to throughout the North. Party spirit was suspended. But the Republicans were in power, and so continued until after peace was restored, and to them must be given the credit of carrying to success the greatest military struggle of modern times; it might almost be said of any time. To them belongs the credit of the direct and incidental results of the war. The most momentous of the direct results was the extermination of slavery; and perhaps the most important of the indirect results was the taxing out of existence of irredeemable or imperfectly secured paper money, and substituting the national banking system. As another incidental result, the Republicans are responsible for dumping into the political arena a million or more of voters, immediately investing them with the elective franchise, of which they were totally ignorant and for the use of which they were utterly unfitted.

The reconstruction policy and practices have been adverted to in the chronological order of events. An honest and calm examination, which may now be made, must leave on the debtor side of the Republican account a series of acts unauthorized by the Constitution, and unjustified by casuistry or any plea of necessity; and which produced a fearful carnival of crime.

During the first years of its existence, the Republican party was scarcely more stable or more clearly defined than the Democracy upon the tariff question. In 1855, the convention was silent on the subject. In 1860, they

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were for such an adjustment of these imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interests of the whole country"; which was substantially the one-time Democratic doctrine of incidental protection. In 1864, they were for "a vigorous and just system of taxation,' which conveyed no meaning as to the subject under consideration. In 1868, they were still more vague, if not retrograde, in their declaration, saying: " It is due to the labor of the nation that taxation should be equalized and reduced as rapidly as the national faith will permit." In 1872, they returned to the policy of incidental protection. In 1876 and 1880, they took virtually the same position. In 1884, they dropped the words" encourage and "promote," and for the first time adopted the term "protection," which has since become their shibboleth. But at the same time that they announced this dogma, they pledged themselves" to correct the inequalities and reduce the surplus-by such methods as will relieve the taxpayer without injuring the labor or the great productive interests of the country." In 1888 they took open, unequivocal, and bold ground, declaring: "We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection." The two conventions held since have reiterated this announcement, leaving no room for doubt as to the present attitude of the party. And they emphasized this attitude by nominating for President the man who formulated the platform of 1888, and who is universally recognized as one of the most steadfast, ablest, and most advanced advocates of protection for the sake of protec

tion.

The theory and practice of the Republican party as to the public lands cannot be easily harmonized. The FreeSoil party-which was the mother of the Republican party in 1852 - declared against selling or granting to corporations any of the public lands; that they should be held as a sacred trust for free homesteads to actual

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