(289 F.) HILL et al. v. RANKIN. (District Court, E. D. Oklahoma. May 24, 1923.) No. 2712. Indians 18-Restricted allotments of Creek Indian dying intestate and without issue held to descend to heirs under the state law. Under Act May 27, 1908, § 9, on the death intestate of a Creek allottee of restricted lands, single and without issue, both his homestead and surplus lands descend to his heirs according to the laws of the state of Oklahoma, whether or not such heirs are citizens of the Creek Nation.. In Equity. Suit by Nigee Hill and others against E. B. Rankin. Decree for defendant. Jones & Foster, of Muskogee, Okl., for plaintiffs. WILLIAMS, District Judge. As to restricted lands in the Creek Nation, where descent was cast subsequent to the taking effect of Act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat. 312, c. 199), is such descent affected by the provisos to section 6 of the Act of June 30, 1902 (32 Stat. 500, c. 1323), known as the Supplemental Agreement, which provides that only citizens of the Creek Nation, male and female, and their Creek descendants, shall inherit lands of the Creek Nation, and provided, further, that, if there be no person of Creek citizenship to take the descent and distribution of said estate, then the inheritance shall go to noncitizen heirs in the order named in said chapter 49 of Mansfield's Digest of Arkansas? Said section 6 has its prototype in the laws as ordained by Moses. See Josephus' Works, Antiquities of the Jews, book 4, c. 7, § 5, which is as follows: "At this time the chief men of the tribe of Manasseh came to Moses and informed him that there was an eminent man of their tribe dead, whose name was Zelophehad, who left no male children, but left daughters, and asked him whether these daughters might inherit his land or not. He made this answer: That if they shall marry in their own tribe, they shall carry their estate along with them; but if they dispose of themselves in marriage to men of another tribe, they shall leave their inheritance in their father's tribe.' And then it was that Moses ordained that every one's inheritance should continue in his own tribe." See, also, Numbers, c. 36, verses 5, 6, 7. In this case descent was cast June 22, 1918, the date on which Gilbert Deere died. The second proviso to section 9 of said Act of May 27, 1908, provides: "That if any member of the Five Civilized Tribes of one-half or more Indian blood shall die leaving issue surviving, born since March 4th, 1906, the homestead of such deceased allottee shall remain inalienable, unless restrictions against alienation are removed therefrom by the Secretary of the Interior in the manner provided in section 1 hereof, for the use and support of such issue, during their life or lives, until April 26th, 1931; but if no such issue survive then such allottee, if an adult, may dispose of his homestead by will free from all restrictions; if this be not done, or in the event the issue herein before provided for die before April 26th, 1931, the land shall then descend to the heirs, according to the laws of descent and distribution of the state of Oklahoma [italics mine] free from all restrictions." For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes Said proviso to said section 9 relates to homesteads of allottees of one-half or more Indian blood who died leaving issue surviving born since March 4, 1906; such issue not receiving any allotment from the Creek Tribe. This proviso was inserted for their protection. Provision also is made that in case of death of such issue the allottee may dispose of said homestead by will, and if not by will the land shall descend to the heirs, whether full blood or not, according to the laws of descent and distribution of the state of Oklahoma, free from all restrictions. Why the provision as to the descent according to the laws of descent and distribution of the state of Oklahoma, unless such descent applies alike to the homestead and surplus, restricted and unrestricted? See Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238 U. S. 284, 35 Sup. Ct. 764, 59 L. Ed. 1310; McMurry et al. v. Producers' Oil Co. et al. (D. C.) 284 Fed. 181; McMurry v. Locke (C. C. A.) 287 Fed. 276. Under the agreed statement of facts the land involved in this action constitute the allotment, both homestead and surplus, of Gilbert Deere, a member of the Creek Tribe and enrolled as a half-blood. On July 22, 1918, he died at the age of 14 years in Hughes county, Okl., intestate, unmarried and without any issue surviving. His father, Paro Deere, who survived him, was a noncitizen, in that he was enrolled as a member by blood of the Seminole Tribe, as descended from his mother, but in fact he was a Creek descendant by blood through his father. Prior to the death of said Gilbert Deere, his mother, Wunche Deere, who was enrolled as a full-blood member of the Creek Tribe, died, leaving no other issue than himself, and with only her mother, Nigee Hill, and brother, Tiller Hill, and sister Munna Hill, surviving, and without leaving any issue of any deceased brother or sister surviving;, the said Nigee Hill and Tiller Hill and Munna Hill each and all being enrolled as full-blood members of the Creek Tribe. From the agreed facts it appears that the records of the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes show that the mother of said Paro Deere was an enrolled member of the Seminole Tribe of Indians, and his father, Lawyer Deere, was an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe of Indians. Subsequent to the death of the said Gilbert Deere, the complainants, Nigee Hill, Tiller Hill, and Munna Hill, filed in the county court of Hughes county, a court having jurisdiction of the estate of the said Gilbert Deere, deceased, a petition for the determination of heirship of said Gilbert Deere. On March 15, 1920, after a hearing, said court entered a judgment in which it was "adjudged and ordered that the said Paroah (or Paro, or Pelo) Deere, as he is sometimes called, be and he is hereby declared to be the sole and only heir at law of him the said Gilbert Deere, and that he take all the lands, effects, and property, both real and personal, whereof the said Gilbert Deere died seized, and that the said Nigee Hill, Tiller Hill, and all other claimants be forever barred from taking or claiming any right, title, or interest therein." No appeal appears to have been prosecuted from said county court judgment. The court concludes that the plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail in this action, and an order will be entered, dismissing plaintiffs' bill. (289 F.) BACON v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO et al. (District Court, E. D. Washington, N. D. May 10, 1923.) No. 4205. 1. Appearance 9(1)-"Special appearance" and "general appearance" defined. Appearances are of two kinds: Special, for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of service or the jurisdiction of the court; and general, where the defendant waives defects of service and submits to the jurisdiction. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, General Appearance; Special Appearance.] 2. Appearance 9(1)-Rule as to effect of special appearance not applicable, in view of stipulation of parties. Circuit Court rule 22, requiring a special appearance to embody a statement that, if not sustained, the defendant will enter a general appearance, and unless such agreement is included the special appearance will be considered general, has no application, where the parties with the court's approval have established a status by stipulation to extend the time to plead, reserving to defendant the right to object to the jurisdiction, and in any event the failure of the special appearance to embody such agreement is unavailing as a general appearance; the requirement of rule 22 being unavailing, as beyond the power of the court. 3. Courts 345-Conformity Act does not require federal courts to observe state statutes in regard to general and special appearances. Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash. § 241, providing that every appearance made in an action shall be deemed a general appearance, unless the defendant in making the same states that it is a special appearance, is not, under the Conformity Act, controlling on the federal courts; but the determination of whether or not an appearance is general or special is for the federal court alone. 4. Courts294-Suit against Federal Reserve Bank one arising under laws of United States, of which federal court has jurisdiction. A suit against a Federal Reserve Bank is one arising under the laws of the United States, over which the District Court of the United States has jurisdiction, under Judicial Code, § 24 (Comp. St. § 991). 5. Courts 274-Corporation is citizen of state of its creation, and its domicile at place of principal office or business; "Inhabitant." For the purposes of jurisdiction, a local corporation is a citizen of the state of its creation, and the general rule is that the domicile of a local corporation is in that county, city, or town in which it has its general or principal office, and conducts its business, the word "inhabitant," being variously defined as "one who has established a domicile; one is an inhabitant of his principal place of residence, business, pursuits, and connections; a corporation is regarded as an inhabitant of the district in which its principal office is situated." [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Inhabitancy-Inhabitant.] 6. Courts 274-Federal Reserve Bank entitled to be sued in district of Its habitat as fixed by its certificate of incorporation. A Federal Reserve Bank being incorporated under an act of Congress, the Federal Reserve Bank Act, and its activities not being confined to a single state or locality, it cannot be said to be a citizen of any particular state, but is in truth a citizen of the United States, deriving all its powers and rights from the laws of Congress, and its habitat for the purpose of jurisdiction is fixed by the certificate of its organization, and there it is entitled to be sued. 7. Courts 274-Federal Reserve Bank suable "only" in district of its habitat. Judicial Code, § 51 (Comp. St. § 1033), providing that a suit between citizens of different states, where the only ground of jurisdiction is For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes 289 F.-33 diversity of citizenship, shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, requires that a suit against a Federal Reserve Bank shall be brought in the district of its habitat; the word "only" meaning "exclusive," "nothing more," and the provision of Act July 12, 1882, excepting national banks, having no application to a Federal Reserve Bank. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Only.] At Law. Action by Mrs. George T. Bacon against the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and others. On motion to dismiss by the named defendant. Motion granted. The plaintiff, a resident of the state of Idaho, seeks to recover from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Cal., the Farmers' National Bank of Pomeroy, Wash., the First National Bank of Clarkston, Wash. (each of said national banks being organized under the laws of the United States), and George H. Waterman, president of the Farmers' National Bank of Pomeroy and vice president of the First National Bank of Clarkston, damages alleged to have been sustained in excess of $3,000. The complaint was served on an employee of the Spokane Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank on December 14, 1922. The following stipulation was signed by the attorneys for the plaintiff and the attorney for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, approved by the judge of this court, and filed in the office of the clerk of this court on December 30, 1922: "Stipulation Extending Time to Plead. "It is hereby stipulated by and between counsel for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action and counsel for Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, one of the defendants above named, that said defendant Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco may take and have to and including the 3d day of February, 1923, within which to answer the complaint on file in said action, or to file such other pleading or pleadings or make such other motion or motions in respect thereto and in respect to the cause of action set forth in said complaint as said Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco may, by it counsel, be advised, including objections which may be raised by such motions to the jurisdiction of the court in which said action is brought." On February 1, 1923, special appearance was filed by the attorney for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco as follows: "You will please enter my special appearance as attorney for Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, one of the defendants above, in the aboveentitled cause, and service of all subsequent papers except writs of process may be made upon said Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco by leaving same with W. L. Partner, manager Spokane Branch Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Post office address: Spokane, Washington. "Albert C. Agnew, "Attorney for Defendant Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. "This appearance is special, and is made only for the purpose of urging a motion to dismiss the above-entitled action as to this defendant." The Federal Reserve Bank, appearing solely for the purposes of the motion, says to the court that the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is created by an act of Congress known as the Federal Reserve Act (38 Stat. 251); that it has its existence by virtue of said act of Congress and acts amendatory thereof; that its principal office and place of business is in the city and county of San Francisco, Cal.; that it holds the meetings of its stockholders, directors, and executive officers, maintains its records, keeps its seal, and transacts its principal business, in said city and county and state; that it is an inhabitant of the said state and of the judicial district of the Northern division of California, and is not an inhabitant of the state of Washington nor of the Eastern district of Washington. Proofs and affidavits are filed tending to show: (289 F.) That pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act the board of directors of said Reserve Bank established a branch of said Reserve Bank at Spokane; that the powers and duties and functions of said Spokane Branch are defined and limited by its by-laws, and the functions, duties, and operations of said Spokane Branch are subject to the rules, regulations, supervision, and final approval of the head office of said Reserve Bank; that the directors of the Branch Bank have power to rediscount from member banks of the Branch district paper under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act and regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, within limitations prescribed; that said Branch, Bank may clear and collect checks for the accounts of those drawn upon member and nonmember banks located within the territory assigned to it on the same plan followed by the head office. The Branch Bank may not engage for its own account in open market transactions, bankers' acceptances, trade acceptances, warrants, or government bonds, except to the order and for the account of the head office. The compensation of the officers, clerks, and employees of the Branch Bank are fixed by the head office, subject to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. All expenditures of the Branch Bank are subject to the approval of the head office. Minutes are to be kept by the discount committee and transmitted to the head office upon approval, and the discount committee is vested with special powers prescribed by the board of directors of the head office. The directors of the Spokane Branch consist of five members, the manager of which is ex officio chairman of the board, and who is appointed annually by and holds office at the pleasure of the board of directors of the Reserve Bank; two members of the board are appointed annually by the board of directors of the Reserve Bank and hold office at the pleasure of the Reserve Board; two members are appointed annually by and hold office at the pleasure of the Federal Reserve Board at Washington, D. C. That said board acts in an advisory capacity only, and has no power to determine policies or make final decision. That said Spokane Branch is only a business agency of said Reserve Bank, and is so placed, operated, and conducted for the convenience of member banks situated at a distance so remote from the head office that the business of said member banks with the Reserve Bank may be transacted without a great loss of time. The defendant contends that it has not made a general appearance; that the action should be dismissed because the Federal Reserve Bank of SanFrancisco is not an inhabitant of this district; that the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act do not enlarge the jurisdiction of this court as to the Reserve Bank; while the plaintiff contends that the defendant bank has made a general appearance by the stipulation which was filed with the approval of the judge, and that it is an inhabitant of this judicial district. Davis, Heil & Davis, of Spokane, Wash., for plaintiff. Albert C. Agnew, of San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. NETERER, District Judge (after stating the facts as above). [1, 2] Appearances are of two kinds: Special, for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of service or the jurisdiction of the court; and general, where the defendant waives defects of service and submits to the jurisdiction. Emphasis is placed upon rule 22 of this circuit, which provides in substance that the special appearances must embody a statement that, if not sustained, the defendant will enter a general appearance, and unless this agreement is included the special appearance will be considered a general appearance in the cause. The purpose of rule 22 is for the protection of the parties to the cause and the |