him from business and from meeting the Resident-General ; although it did not prevent him from sending Colonel Shervinton to Europe to purchase large consignments of warlike stores, which were easily landed at various ports which could not be always patrolled by the French cruisers. At last the patience of the French was worn out. After the assassination of President Carnot, fortified by the support of M. Casimir Perier and backed by a strong Colonial party, M. Hanotaux-the Minister for Foreign Affairs in M. Dupuy's second administration-determined to bring matters to a crisis and to enforce an effective Protectorate over the African island, by arms if necessary. With this end in view, M. Le Myre de Vilers was dispatched to the island armed with an ultimatum and full powers as a plenipotentiary; whilst General Mercier concerted the plan of campaign with General Duchesne and Colonel de Torcy, the officers who were selected to carry it out. The French War Office had taken precautions to have the ground between the Hova capital and the coast well surveyed by military experts. Already a small detachment of the Resident's infantry escort had marched on foot from Tamatave to Antananarivo during the hot season; and it was now determined to effect the retreat of the whole escort by the longer route, down the valley of the Ikopa river, to Majunga, the more commodious port on the North-West coast. The result of M. de Vilers' mission was a foregone conclusion. The chief object of the plenipotentiary was to enable the French non-combatant subjects-priests, nuns, women and children to retire to Tamatave without danger. This withdrawal of the small French community was carried out safely, for the Hovas were not as yet greatly excited against the French, whilst their experiences of war were confined to remembrances of the former operations during 1883-85, when Imerina had remained altogether intact, the coast-line alone having suffered from the common enemy. After the presentation of the ultimatum and the withdrawal of all French subjects from Imerina, M. de Vilers, having awaited for a specified number of days at Tamatave the submission demanded in his ultimatum, hauled down his flag and embarked on the mail steamer for Europe. At the same time Commodore Bienaimé, who had a force of marine infantry ready for the event in the islands of Ste. Marie and Réunion, landed without experiencing any resistance, took possession of Tamatave, and quickly put the peninsula on which it stands in a state of defence. Thus active hostilities commenced on the 12th of December, 1894. A month later, on the 14th of January, January, 1895, Majunga was similarly occupied by Commandant Denis, and the two principal seaports commanding the routes to the capital were in the hands of the French navy. Meantime M. Hanotaux had obtained from Parliament a grant of sixty-five millions of francs, forty millions for the military and twenty-five millions for the naval portion of the projected expedition, which General Mercier had decided was to be dispatched against the Hova stronghold in the interior of Madagascar by way of the Betsiboka river, a stream navigable with boats of shallow draught upwards of one-third of the distance to the objective point to be reached by the invading column. The retreat of the marine escort under Captain Lamolle, accompanied by horses, asses, bearers laden with baggage and oxen, had been effected in good order, at a late period of the year-between the 27th of October and the 14th of November -on which date the infantry reached Suberbieville, where boats conveyed the party, after three days' delay, to Majunga by the 21st of November. The journey of 277 miles was thus easily accomplished in twenty-two days, eighteen by land including halts, whilst the transit down stream from Suberbieville to the seaport at the mouth of the Betsiboka occupied four days. General Mercier's council of war proposed that a flotilla of shallow gunboats and flat-bottomed barges should be constructed and sent out to Majunga before the commencement of the dry season, in readiness to transport the expedition immediately on its arrival up the river to Suberbieville, where a secondary base for the accumulation of provisions, stores, &c., was to be established. Ample hospital accommodation was to be especially provided, and thence a month's marching ought to bring the leading columns on to the highlands of Imerina. Promises of assistance had been received from many Hova chiefs of repute, and it was understood that even Queen Ranavalona had expressed herself as anxious to accomplish the overthrow of Rainilaiarivony's oppressive thraldom. The river-boats were in due course built, but difficulties were at once experienced in finding means of taking their sections out to their destination. Enquiries at the French ports showed that there were no steamers whose construction was available for such purposes; and eventually recourse had to be made to an English firm of ship-brokers, who readily undertook the operation. At this juncture M. Dupuy's Cabinet was upset; and, although M. Hanotaux retained his portfolio, General Mercier was replaced under M. Ribot's new administra tion by General Zurlinden, who was at once called to account in the Chamber of Deputies for his predecessor's act in giving the above contract to a British firm. General Metzinger with the advance-guard of the expedition landed at Majunga on the last day of February 1895; his object being to clear the Hova garrisons away from the banks of the river as far as Suberbieville, to enable the stores and the main body of General Duchesne's army to be landed at that stage without delay or difficulty. If the river-boats, with the steam launches to tow them, had been on the spot and in readiness, all might have gone well. But many unforeseen delays occurred. Owing to various mishaps en route, the sections of the riverboats arrived late, and when they had arrived it was found they could not be landed or put together easily, because the piers and unloading wharves had not been constructed, owing to miscalculations as to the depths and formation of the shore for which the naval officers were responsible. It was said that considerable friction between the naval and military services at Majunga caused a vast deal of unnecessary transhipment and inconvenience in disembarking the troops at Majunga, and in forwarding stores up the river. No difficulty whatever was experienced in driving the Hova garrisons from the camps and slightly fortified villages within range of the shells from the gunboats on both banks of the Betsiboka. The resistance encountered was practically nil; and after the first experience of the effects caused by the explosion of a mélinite projectile, the mere act of placing a gun in action was sufficient to cause the Hova rabble to evacute any position they had taken up. General Metzinger, however, soon found that, in the absence of boats to take the stores to Suberbieville, it was imperative to transport them by land; and for this purpose his men had to cut a road along the right bank of the river over very broken country intersected by innumerable streams, gullies, and morasses, which entailed numbers of bridges, for which all the material had to be carried from the primary base. The military train was furnished with numbers of peculiar vehicles-the famous Lefebvre carts-which were in fact light iron tanks, open and closed, on two wheels, each constructed to carry a load which could be drawn by a single mule. To admit of their usage a track 5 yards in breadth was required, and the extra labour thus entailed on the combatants was extreme, for the soldiers had to perform the work of navvies, work severe enough for unaccustomed hands in any climate; whilst under the climatic influence of 18° south of the Equator it was cruel, and, as it proved, unbearable. On the 12th of April General Duchesne, accompanied by his Head-quarter |