the survey by the United States, would deprive Congress of the power of disposing of any part of the lands in Nevada, until they were segregated from those granted. In the mean time, further improvements would be arrested, and the persons who prior to the surveys had occupied and improved the country, would lose their possessions and labor, in case it turned out that they had settled upon the specified sections. Congress was fully advised of the condition of Nevada, of the evils which such a measure would entail upon her, and of all antecedent legislation upon the subject of the public lands within her bounds. In the light of this information, and surrounded by these circumstances, Congress made the grant in question. It is ambiguous; for its different parts can not be reconciled if the words used receive their usual meaning. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44, establishes the rule that, "unless there are other causes in a statute restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be taken in their natural sense." We do not seek to depart from this sound rule; but, in this instance, words of qualification restrict the operation of those in present grant. Literally construed, they refer to past transactions; but evidently they were not employed in this sense; for no lands in Nevada had been sold or disposed of by any act of Congress. There was no occasion of making provision for substituted lands; if the grant took effect absolutely on the admission of the State into the Union, and the title to the lands then vested in the State, Congress can not be supposed to have intended a vain thing, and yet it is quite certain that the language of the qualification was intended to protect the State against a loss that might happen through the action of Congress, in selling or disposing of the public domain. It could not, as we have seen, apply to past sales or dispositions, and, to have any effect at all, must be held to apply to the future. This interpretation, although seemingly contrary to the letter of the statute, is really within its reason and spirit. It accords with a wise public policy, gives to Nevada all she could reasonably ask, and acquits Congress of passing a law which in its effects would be unjust to the people of the territory. Besides, no other construction is consistent with the statute as a whole, and answers the evident intention of its makers to grant to the State in præsenti a quantity of lands equal in amount to the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in each township. Until survey Congress reserved power over the granted sections. Until the status of the lands was fixed by a survey, and they were capable of identification, Congress reserved absolute power over them; and if, in exercising it, the whole or any part of a sixteenth or thirty-sixth section had been disposed of, the State was to be compensated by other lands equal in quantity, and as near as may be in quality. By this means the State was fully indemnified, the settlers ran no risk of losing the labor of years, and Congress was left free to legislate touching the national domain in any way it saw fit to promote the public interests. It is argued that, conceding the soundness of this construction, the defense can not be sustained, because the land in controversy was not actually sold by direction of Congress until after the survey. This position ignores a familiar rule in the construction of statutes, that they must be so construed as to admit all parts of them to stand, if possible: 1 Bouv. Inst., p. 42, sec. 7. The language used is, "sold or otherwise disposed of by any act of Congress." The point made by the plaintiff would reject a part of these words, and defeat one of the main purposes in view. Congress knew, as did the whole country, that Nevada was possessed of great mineral wealth, and that lands containing it should be disposed of differently from those fit only for agriculture. No method for doing this had then been provided; but Congress said to the people of the Territory: "You shall, if you decide to come into the Union, have for the use of schools, sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every township, if, on survey, no one else has any valid claim to them; but until this decision is made and the lands are surveyed, we reserve the right either to sell them or dispose of them in any other way that commends itself to our judgment. If they are sold or disposed of, you shall have other lands equivalent thereto." The right so reserved is subject to no limitation, and the wisdom of not surrendering it is apparent. The whole country is interested in the development of our mineral resources, and to secure it adequate protection was required. for those engaged in it. The act of Congress of July 26, 1866, supra, passed before the land in controversy was surveyed, furnishes this protection, by disposing of the mineral lands of the United States to actual occupants and claimants, and providing a method for the acquisition of title. The defendant, and those under whom it claims, occupied the land prior to the survey, and were entitled to the purchase. Patent relates back to original location. The patent subsequently obtained from the United States. relates back to the time of the original location and entry, and perfects their right to the exclusion of all adverse intervening claims. These views dispose of this case; but there is another ground equally conclusive. Congress on the fourth of July, 1866, 14 Stat. 85, by an act concerning lands granted to the State of Nevada, among other things, reserved from sale all mineral lands in the State, and authorized the lines of surveys to be changed from rectangular, so as to exclude them. This was doubtless intended as a construction of the grant under consideration; but whether it be correct or not, and whatever may be the effect of the grant in its original shape, it was clearly competent for the grantee to accept it in its modified form, and agree to the construction put upon it by the grantor. The State, by its legislative act of February 13, 1867, ratified that construction and accepted the grant with conditions annexed. We agree with the Supreme Court of Nevada, that this acceptance "was a recognition by the legislature of the State of the validity of the claim made by the government of the United States to the mineral lands." It is objected that the constitution of Nevada inhibited such legislation; but the Supreme Court of the State, in the case we are reviewing, held that it did not: 10 Nev. 314; and we think their reasoning on this subject is conclusive. Judgment affirmed. 37 No. 4. FORBES v. GRACEY. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court. This was a suit brought by appellant to enjoin the collector of taxes for Storey county, Nevada, from collecting a tax imposed by the law of that State upon the property of the Consolidated Virginia Mining Company, the appellant being a stockolder in the company, and an alien, subject of the Queen of Great Britain. The tax is, by the State statute, imposed upon the proceeds of the mine worked by the corporation, and is resisted on the ground that the title to the land from which the mineral is taken, is in the United States, and is not for that reason liable to State taxation. The case is prepared and submitted to us on printed arguments in the very last days of the term, and we are urged to decide it on the ground that it involves a question of vast interest to all the mining operations in the Pacific States, and is of vital importance to the State of Nevada, as it affects her largest source of revenue. In view of its importance, we should postpone the decision until next term, if the questions presented were either doubtful or difficult of solution. We think a very few words-all we can give to the subject at this late day-will show that it is. neither. It is very true that Congress has, by statute, and by tacit consent, permitted individuals and corporations to dig out and convert to their own use the ores containing the precious metals which are found in the lands belonging to the government, without exacting or receiving any compensation for these ores, and without requiring the miner to buy or pay for the land. Congress has recognized possessory rights. It has gone further, and recognized the possessory rights of these miners, as ascertained among themselves by the rules which have become the laws of the mining districts as regards mining claims. (See Revised Statutes, title XXXII, chap. 6, secs. 2318-2352.) But in doing this it has not parted with the title to the land, except in cases where the land has been sold in accordance with the provisions of the law on that subject. Tax levied on property right of the United States, void. If the tax of the State of Nevada is, in point of fact, levied on this property right of the United States, we are bound by our previous decisions and by sound principle, to hold that it is void. If on the property of the miner, otherwise. If, on the other hand, it is levied on property of the miner, and may be collected without affecting or embarrassing the title of the United States to property which belongs to that government, then there is no ground for interference with the processes of the State in its collection. A few extracts from the statute of Nevada, showing the nature and character of the property on which the contested tax is imposed, and the manner of its enforcement and collection, will enable us to decide whether it belongs to the one or the other of these classes. We copy here the important sections of the act of February 28, 1871, imposing this tax: "SECTION 1. All ores, tailings, and mineral-bearing material of whatever character, shall be assessed for purposes of taxation for State and county, in the following manner: From the gross yield, return, or value of all ores, tailings, or mineral-bearing material of whatever character, there shall be deducted the actual cost of extracting said ores as mineral from the mine, the actual cost of saving said tailings, the actual cost of transportation of said ores, mineral-bearing material, or tailings to the place of reduction or sale, and the actual cost of such reduction or sale, and the remainder shall be deemed the net proceeds, and shall be assessed and taxed as provided for in this act; Provided, that in no case whatsoever shall the whole amount of deductions allowed to be made in this section from the gross yield, return, or value of said ore, mineralbearing material, or tailings, exceed the percentage of gross yield, value, or return of such ore, mineral, or tailings, as hereinafter specified; on all ores, tailings, or mineral-bearing material the gross yield or value of which is $12 per ton or less, the whole amount of deduction shall not exceed ninety per cent. of such gross yield, return, or value; on all ores, tailings, or mineral-bearing material, the gross yield, value, or returns of which is over $12, and |