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ing of mining claims, and clearly sets forth the manner of proceeding to obtain government title.

One of the conditions precedent to obtaining patent for a mining claim is, that "the register of the land office * * * shall publish a notice that such application has been made for the period of sixty days in a newspaper, to be by him designated as published nearest to said claim."

In the case under consideration it appears by the sworn statement of S. P. Lathrop, who was register of the Central City land office at the date of the filing of said application, "that on the second day of March, 1873, during his absence from said office, John B. Lewis filed in said office an application for patent for the Cascade lode, situated in Cascade mining district, Clear Creek county, Colorado Territory; that, without the knowledge and authority of affiant, the receiver of said land office caused a notice of said application to be published in the Colorado Herald instead of the Georgetown Miner, in which, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it should have been published."

By the affidavit of Francis F. Bruné, deputy mineral surveyor for said district, it appears that the premises described in the application for patent are about four miles from Georgetown, and about twelve miles from Central City.

Publication of notice.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the notice was not published in accordance with the law, having been published without the knowledge of the register, and not in a paper published nearest the claim.

The register has been accustomed to publish the notices of applications for patents for mining claims situate in Cascade district, Clear Creek county, in the Colorado Miner, which is published near to said district and within the county, and parties owning claims in that district had a right to expect that notices of intentions to apply for patents for mines in said district would be published in the Colorado Miner, and not in a paper published in another county and at a much greater distance. Very respectfully,

* * *

*

W. W. CURTIS, Acting Commissioner.

No. 6. Not restricted to one mining claim.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 21, 1872.

JOHN G. IRWIN, Esq., Weaverville, Trinity County, California. SIR: In response to your inquiry of the sixth instant, I have to state that the mining statute does not restrict a party to one patent, but gives the right to proceed to procure government title to as many valid mining claims as he may have the possessory right to under local laws, and upon which the necessary amount has been expended in labor or improvements. Very respectfully, etc.,

WILLIS DRUMMOND, Commissioner.

No. 7. 1. Acts of co-owner and attorney.

2. Effect of abandonment of surface conflict upon adverse claim. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, January 3, 1877. SIR: I have considered the appeal of George R. Ayers and Isaac S. Waterman, claimants of Sacramento Lode, from your decision of June 17, 1876, allowing a patent to issue for the Last Chance No. 2 Mine, Marcus Daly and John Cassin applicants, situated in Ophir Mining District, Utah Territory.

Daly and Cassin applied for a patent March 6, 1875, and during publication of notice, viz., on the fifth of May, 1875, Ayers and Waterman filed an adverse claim, and on the twenty-ninth of the same month commenced suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Utah.

The first and second objections raised by the adverse claimants in their appeal, viz., that the application for a patent, signed by Daly only, for himself and Cassin, the joint owner, was not a legal application, no authority to sign for Cassin being shown, and, secondly, that the abandonment of the surface ground in dispute, filed by Shellabarger and Wilson, attorneys for the applicants, can not be treated as an abandonment by the applicants, as no authority from them to so act is shown by the attorneys, raise points involving questions of office practice, and are not vital in the consideration of the case.

Application by one joint owner recognized.

The practice of your office has been to recognize an application for a patent signed by one joint owner, in behalf of himself and the remaining joint owners, in the absence of alleged or apparent fraud. The practice is one of great convenience to the applicants, and is based upon law and

reason..

Acts of attorney in legitimate prosecution of case recognized.

The practice of the department has also been uniform in regarding the acts of recognized attorneys, performed in the legitimate prosecution and adjudication of cases, as the acts of the claimants themselves. This practice is based upon custom and principle, and I see no reason to change. or modify the same in the absence of either alleged or apparent fraud. In my opinion, no substantial reasons are assigned why the rules so long and uniformly practiced in your office should be changed, and the application declared illegal, and the abandonment a nullity.

An abandonment of surface conflict does not relieve the necessity of a stay of proceedings in the Land Department.

You hold that, by reason of the abandonment, "no necessity exists for a further suspension of proceedings upon said application for patent." In view of the provisions of section seven of the act approved May 10, 1872, I think this conclusion was erroneous. In accordance with the provisions of that section, Ayers and Waterman filed an adverse claim upon oath, showing the nature, boundaries, and extent of said claim, and commenced suit. The possession of the surface ground in dispute may be of the least importance-a mere incident. Other and far more important questions may be involved-the location of the lode, for example; and to allow the defendants to obtain the advantage to be derived from the possession of a patent from the Government, simply by filing in your office an abandonment of said surface ground, would, in my opinion, be an evasion of both the intent and letter of the law.

The terms of the act are explicit: All proceedings, except the publication of notice and making and filing of the affidavits thereof, shall be stayed until the final adjudica

tion of the case by the authorized tribunal, or a waiver of the adverse claim.

The provision of the law, that in case two lodes intersect, the prior location shall be entitled to the ore or mineral contained within the space of intersection, does not, in my opinion, release the Department from the duty of abstaining from all further proceedings in the case, or justify the issuing of a patent embracing the premises in controversy, with the exception of the immaterial portion abandoned by the applicants, viz., the surface ground. I think it is clear that it was the intention of Congress to refer all questions arising from a conflict of claims, when a suit is duly commenced, to a court of competent jurisdiction, in the possession of the power necessary to ascertain the truth and facts relating to the same, a power not possessed by this department; and, if so, it is the duty of your office to refrain from any act that would in any manner interfere with the adjudication of such controversy.

Non-concurrence in decision of predecessor in the "Antelope Lode" case.

Reference has been made by the attorneys for the applicants to the decision of my predecessor dated April 1, 1875, in the matter of the application for a patent for the "Antelope Lode." After a careful consideration of the case now before me, I am unable to concur in the views expressed in that decision, or to arrive at a conclusion other than that requiring a suspension of all proceedings before this Department during the pendency of the suit.

This decision is in accordance with the views expressed by me on the twenty-sixth ultimo, in the matter of an application for a patent for the "King of the West" mine.

It follows that your decision must be reversed, and all proceedings in the case suspended until the final determination of the same by the court, or a waiver of the adverse claim in due form, or by a failure to prosecute the suit with reasonable diligence. The papers transmitted with your letter of September 5, 1876, are herewith returned. Very respectfully,

Z. CHANDLER, Secretary. The Commissioner of the General Land Office.

No. 8. 1. An application for patent can not proceed until all persons claiming a right are in a condition, as to citizenship, to receive title.

2. Effect of naturalization.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 18, 1876.

Register and Receiver, Carson City, Nevada.

GENTLEMEN: On the twenty-seventh of May, 1875, an application for patent for four hundred linear feet of the Lady Allen vein or lode was filed in your office.

This application was sworn to before the register on the twenty-seventh of May, 1875, by William S. Wood, one of the applicants for patent, the others being G. W. Deys, J. P. Sweet, Jacob Smith, Levi Chapman, and Jno. B. Gallagher. It appears from a certified copy of the location notice that W. W. Elliot and one other located four hundred feet of the Lady Allen lode-Mary Ann Co.-on the eleventh of July, 1863, and made record of such location.

The abstract of title is incomplete. In the sworn statement of W. S. Wood, he refers to certain deeds made previous to the year 1870, which, "although properly executed and delivered, were not recorded, and were, as deponent is informed and believes, destroyed by fire in the town of Silver City, Lyon county, in the year 1870,” and alleges that said applicants "have become the owners of, and are in the actual, quiet, and undisturbed possession of," said premises. It is shown, however, by the abstract of title from the office of the recorder of Lyon county, Nevada, that J. P. Sweet, one of the applicants, conveyed by quitclaim deed, dated May 19, 1875, fifty feet in said. claim to John Henry, and that this deed was recorded May 26, 1875, in the recorder's office.

In an affidavit on file with the case sworn to by W. S. Wood, on the first of March, 1876, before the register, Mr. Wood alleges that "he is informed by said John Henry, and the deponent verily believes that said John Henry is an alien, and a subject of Great Britain; that deponent has frequently requested said Henry to make declarations of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in order that said application for patent might proceed; but the said Henry has constantly, and does now positively,

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