in the American municipal domicil, and a few other cases, being expressed by Lord Wensleydale in Aikman v. Aikman,2 as "residence for a definite time, though of uncertain duration." "And this," he adds, "would not, I conceive, confer a domicil." § 169. Id. id. Intention to remain during the Life of Another. Whether intention to remain during the life of another person is a sufficient animus manendi for the constitution of a domicil of choice, is not settled. In Anderson v. Laneuville,1 decided by the Privy Council, the affirmative was held under the following circumstances: A., whose domicil of origin was Irish, at the age of nineteen, being in France for his education, formed an attachment for L., who saved his life during the French Revolution and procured his escape to England. Forty years afterwards, having in the mean time acquired an English domicil, he ascertained the whereabouts of L., and joined her in France and lived there with her for thirteen years, until his death, in a house which he bought jointly with her. There was evidence that he had repeatedly declared his intention of returning to England in case L. predeceased him, and on the other hand his intention of remaining in France as long as she lived was clear. Dr. Lushington, speaking for the Privy Council, said: "It was contended that the testator only intended to remain during Madame Laneuville's lifetime. Assuming that to be the fact, assuming that he intended to quit when Madame Laneuville died, it does not at all follow that that will establish the conclusion that he had not acquired a domicil in France; because what is it that takes off the acquisition of a domicil by long residence in a country? tinue there for an unlimited time.' If that means an endless time, it is scarcely an accurate expression; if it means a residence without any actual time assigned to it, it is probably more accurate. Another expression relied on is an indefinite intention of remaining; the next is a permanent settlement for an indefinite time,' or probably it might be more correct to say, an indefinite permanency.' With these is coupled the expression: 'If a person has a vague and floating intention of re turning, that will not prevent his acquiring a domicil.' Such definitions seem to me to arise from a vague notion of the term 'domicil."" See the language of Brett, L. J., in Doucet v. Geoghegan, supra, § 155, note 8. See also the latter part of Lord Westbury's "description of the circumstances which constitute a domicil of choice," supra. 23 Macq. H. L. Cas. 854. 19 Moore P. C. C. 325; s. c. 2 Spinks, 41. It is being there for a temporary purpose. It never can be said that residing in a country till the death of a party was a temporary purpose." In Attorney-General v. Countess De Wahlstatt, the Court of Exchequer took the opposite view. The testatrix, an unmarried woman, whose domicil of origin was English, had for fourteen years resided with her sister, who was married and domiciled at Baden-Baden, in Germany, and the evidence was uncontradicted that it was her intention to remain with her sister as long as the latter lived. In the view which the court took of the facts, the intention of the testatrix beyond the life of her sister was not clearly shown, if indeed any had been definitely formed. Upon these facts the domicil of origin of the testatrix was held to continue. It must be remarked, however, that this was one of "the intermediate cases between Moorhouse v. Lord and Udny v. Udny, whose authority has been considerably shaken by the latter case and its sequents. If a But whether Anderson v. Laneuville or Attorney-General v. Countess De Wahlstatt express the better doctrine, or whether they may be reconciled, it is clearly impossible to lay down a strict rule that intention to remain for the life of another is or is not a sufficient animus manendi. In each of the cases referred to, the person whose domicil was in question, and the cestui que vie were of about the same age. Suppose, however, that the expectation of life of the former had been greatly in excess of that of the latter, or the reverse. young and vigorous person go to reside with one who is old and feeble, intending to remain during the lifetime of the latter, and to return upon his death, would a change of domicil be held? Or take the converse, and suppose that an aged and infirm parent should follow a young and vigorous child to a new country, intending to end his days with him if possible, but without any intention of remaining in case his child should die first; would not, in such a case, a residence sufficiently permanent to constitute domicil be contemplated? § 170. Id. American Authorities. In America there has been considerable conflict of opinion, and certainly much 2 3 Hurl. & Colt. 374. looseness of expression, with respect to the requisite animus manendi. This has been due to several causes, the principal of which have been: (1) the application of the doctrine of domicil to a large variety of frequently very diverse subjects; (2) the legislative habit of using such words as "residence," "inhabitancy," and the like as approximate terms to describe connection between person and place, leaving to the courts the duty of determining their true meaning in accordance with the general tenor, object, and scope of the particular legislation in which they are used; and (3) the too frequent practice of relying upon cases of municipal domicil as authorities in cases of national and quasi-national domicil. In most of the cases, however, in which the subject is at all considered, intention to remain permanently is either laid down or assumed as the necessary animus manendi. In many it is strongly insisted upon, some cases even going to the extent of adopting Vattel's definition either in terms or in substance. President Rush, in the leading case of Guier v. O'Daniel,2 defines domicil to be "residence at a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of continuing it an unlimited time;" and through the influence of this definition, particularly in its modified form as given by Phillimore, intention to remain " for an unlimited time" has been adopted in a number of the American cases.3 1 The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; The Ann Green, 1 Gall. 274; Catlin v. Gladding, 4 Mason, 308; Burnham v. Rangeley, 1 Woodb. & M. 7; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. Ct. 101; Castor v. Mitchell, id. 191; Butler v. Hopper, 1 id. 499; Read v. Bertrand, 4 id. 514; Prentiss v. Barton, 1 Brock. 389; Kemna v. Brockhaus, 10 Biss. 128; Johnson v. Twentyone Bales, 2 Paine, 601; s. c. Van Ness, 5; United States v. Penelope, 2 Pet. Ad. 438; Sears v. Boston, 1 Met. 250; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Re Catharine Roberts' Will, 8 Paige Ch. 519; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Vischer v. Vischer, 12 id. 640; State v. Ross, 3 Zab. 517; Clark & Mitchener v. Likens, 2 Dutch. 207; Taylor v. Reading, 4 Brewst. 439; Lindsay v. Murphy, 76 Va. 428; Horne v. Horne, 9 Ired. 99; Plummer v. Brandon, 5 Ired. Eq. 190; Rue High, Appellant, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 515; Campbell v. White, 22 Mich. 178; Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312; Dale v. Irwin, 78 id. 160; Johnson v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280; Gravillon v. Richards Ex'r, 13 La. An. 293; Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673; and see infra, § 173, note 4. See also remarks of Butler, P.J., in Re Lower Oxford Election, 11 Phila. 641. 2 1 Binney, 349, note. 3 Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350; White v. Brown, 1 Wall. Jr. C. Ct. 217; Littlefield v. Brooks, 50 Me. 475; Stockton v. Staples, 66 id. 197; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Hege § 171. Id. id. Intention to remain for an Indefinite Time. In many of the cases intention to remain "for an indefinite time" has been considered as sufficient. This phrase was originally used doubtless as synonymous with "unlimited time," 2 but through the influence of the cases of municipal man v. Fox, 31 id. 475; Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 718; Dow v. Gould, 31 Cal. 629; and see Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle, 312 (a case of reverter). 1 The Venus, supra, per Washington, J.; Ennis v. Smith, supra; White v. Brown, supra; Harris v. Firth, 4 Cranch C. Ct. 710; Jennison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. 77; Sleeper v. Paige, 15 Gray, 349; McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372; Hegeman v. Fox, supra; Venable v. Paulding, 19 Minn. 488; Johnson v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280; and see § 159, note 2, supra, and the remaining notes to this section. 2 The Venus, supra; Ennis v. Smith, supra; White v. Brown, supra; McConnell v. Kelley, supra; Hegeman v. Fox, supra. In The Venus, Washington, J., says: "The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose, and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel, 'domicil,' which he defines to be, a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.' Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens; but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicil, he continues, is not estab. lished unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. Vatt. pp. 92, 93. tius nowhere uses the word 'domicil,' but he also distinguishes between those who stay in a foreign country by the necessity of their affairs, or from any other temporary cause, and those who Gro reside there from a permanent cause. The former he denominates 'strangers' and the latter 'subjects;' and it will presently be seen, by a reference to the same author, what different consequences these two characters draw after them. . . . In deciding whether a person has obtained the right of an acquired domicil, it is not to be expected that much, if any, assistance should be derived from mere elementary writers on the law of nations. They can only lay down the general principles of law; and it becomes the duty of courts to establish rules for the proper application of those principles. The question whether the person to be affected by the right of domicil had sufficiently made known his intention of fixing himself permanently in the foreign country, must depend upon all the circumstances of the case. If he had made no express declaration on the subject, and his secret intention is to be discovered, his acts must be attended to, as affording the most satisfactory evidence of his intention. On this ground it is that the courts of England have decided, that a person who removes to a foreign country, settles himself there, and engages in the trade of the country, furnishes, by these acts, such evidence of an intention permanently to reside there, as to stamp him with the national character of the State where he resides. In questions on this subject, the chief point to be considered is the animus manendi; and courts are to devise such reasonable rules of evidence as may establish the fact of intention. If it sufficiently appear that the intention of removing was to make a permanent settlement, or for an indefinite time, the right of domicil is acquired by a resi dence of a few days. This is one of the rules of the British courts, and it 3 domicil has sometimes received a much different construction. It is unfortunate that the word "indefinite " has been used at all in this connection, as it is at best a vague term, and may mean much or little, as happens. For in a certain sense intention to remain for life is but intention to remain for an indefinite time, while in another sense residence for the merest temporary purpose may be residence for an indefinite time. Thus intention to remain during the building of a house, though it took but twenty-nine days, or from spring to the fall or winter of the same year, until M. (a tinpedler) could no longer travel on wheels,5 has been held to fall within the meaning of the phrase, and to work a change of municipal domicil. From such cases this doctrine has crept into cases of quasi-national domicil. Thus, in Sleeper v. Paige,6 appears to be perfectly reasonable." In the same case, Marshall, C. J., in a dissenting opinion, remarks: "A domicil, then, in the sense in which this term is used by Vattel, requires not only actual residence in a foreign country, but an intention of always staying there.' Actual residence, without this intention, amounts to no more than 'simple habitation.' Although this intention may be implied without being expressed, it ought not, I think, to be implied, to the injury of the individual, from acts entirely equivocal. If the stranger has not the power of making his residence perpetual; if circumstances, after his arrival in a country, so change as to make his continuance there disadvantageous to himself, and his power to continue doubtful, - 'an intention always to stay there' ought not, I think, to be fixed upon him, in consequence of an unexplained residence previous to that change of circumstances. Mere residence, under particular circumstances, would seem to me, at most, to prove only an intention to remain so long as those circumstances continue the same, or equally advantageous. This does not give a domicil. The intention which gives a domicil is an unconditional intention 'to stay always.'. . . Let it be remem bered that, according to the law of na- 3 Possibly a distinction may be taken between "intention to remain for an indefinite time" and "intention to remain indefinitely." In Concord v. Rumney, 45 N. H. 423, Bell, C. J., defines the latter phrase as a general intention to remain with no definite purpose to remove elsewhere." 66 4 Jamaica v. Townshend, 19 Vt. 267. 5 Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. 362. 615 Gray, 349. The facts of this case are not fully reported, but it appears that the defendant had left Massachusetts, taking with him his family, |