namely, home; and it will generally be found that as between several municipal divisions, a person who is sui juris has his municipal domicil in that place in which he has his home in fact.

§ 184. Id. Animus non Revertendi. But how far must a person intend to abandon his former place of abode, as a place of abode, in order to effect a change of municipal domicil? This is a difficult question to answer, and the cases are apparently in considerable conflict with regard to it. We have seen that with respect to national and quasi-national domicil this abandonment must be final and complete. But the same cannot be affirmed with respect to municipal domicil. We shall see, further along, that a person may have two residences in different places, as, for example, at different seasons of the year, and may shift his municipal domicil from one to the other without abandoning the former as a place of abode. This occurs not unfrequently, but the usual mode of changing municipal domicil is by the substitution of one place of abode for another; and in order to do this, the former place of abode must be abandoned as a place of abode. Hence, generally speaking, no change of municipal domicil can occur where there is an animus revertendi after the accomplishment of a particular purpose.2 A mere contingent intention, a vague and uncertain intention, or, in the language of Story,5 a "floating intention" to return, however, will not prevent a change.

§ 185. Id. Animus Manendi. It is equally clear that mere presence in a place for a temporary purpose is not sufficient. to fix municipal domicil there. There must also be intention to remain. And this is so, whether the former place of abode has or has not been abandoned. But to what extent must a person intend to remain in a place in order to acquire a municipal domicil there?

It is clear that for this purpose the intended residence need not be of the same permanent character as is demanded, as 5 Confl. of L. § 46. See supra, § 154

1 Infra, § 421.

2 See cases cited, § 182, note 2.

8 Barton v. Irasburgh, 33 Vt. 159. 4 Id. and Hartford v. Hartland, 19 Vt. 392.

et seq.

1 See supra, § 182, note 3.

we have seen in the last chapter, for a change of national or quasi-national domicil. Certainly Vattel's 2 definition of domicil — namely, "the habitation fixed in any place with an intention of always staying there" is not applicable to municipal domicil. At least it is not suited to the circumstances of this country, the habits of whose people are migratory, and of very many of whom it cannot be affirmed that they fix their municipal abodes with any positive intention of always continuing there.3

In many cases of municipal domicil the requisite animus manendi is described as intention to remain for "an indefinite time."4 That this is not a satisfactory test of national or quasi-national domicil, has already been pointed out.5 When applied to municipal domicil it is probably less objectionable, although even here it is capable of misinterpretation and of being carried to an undue length. Such was the case in Jamaica v. Townshend, where a person who resided in J. purchased a tract of land in the same town and set about building a house upon it. In the mean time he removed to the town of L., intending to remain there only during the building of his house and then to return to J. and occupy said house. Under these circumstances it was held that he had changed his domicil, although the building of the house occupied only twentynine days.

The distinction between national and municipal domicil with respect to the animus manendi was thus referred to by Foster, J., in Wilbraham v. Ludlow: "Our own adjudged cases sufficiently establish the rule that one who is residing in a place with the purpose of remaining there for an indefi

2 Bk. 1, ch. 19, § 218.

3 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488. 4 Greene v. Windham, 13 Me. 225; Wilton v. Falmouth, 15 id. 479; Stocton v. Staples, 66 id. 197; Moore v. Wilkins, 10 N. H. 452; Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. 362; Whitney v. Sherborn, 12 Allen, 111; Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587; Landis v. Walker, 15 La. An. 213. Most of these cases, however, demand clear proof of animus non revertendi in order to make intention to remain for an

nite period of time, and without retaining and keeping up any animus revertendi, or intention to return to the former home which he has abandoned, will have his domicil in the place of his actual residence. Where the question is one of national domicil, this statement may not be correct; for such a condition of facts might not manifest an intention of expatriation. But it is accurate enough for cases like the present, which relate to a change of domicil from one place to another within the same Commonwealth."

It is probable that to municipal domicil rather than to national or quasi-national domicil should be applied the oftquoted language of Story:8 "If a person has actually removed to another place with an intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and as a place of fixed present domicil, it is to be deemed his place of domicil, notwithstanding he may entertain a floating intention to return at some future period."

§ 186. Id. The Negative View of Animus Manendi. Το municipal domicil also properly belongs the definition by Parker, J., in Putnam v. Johnson, namely: "The habitation fixed in any place without any present intention of removing therefrom is the domicil." This language was used in a case of municipal domicil, and the remarks of the learned judge throughout show that he had particularly in mind that species of domicil. It must be remembered, however, that mere presence in a place without any special views as to future residence either there or elsewhere will not establish domicil there. In such case the former domicil would be presumed to continue. The phrase "habitation fixed" is probably to be construed as including animus manendi of some description; so that the definition above given seems to resolve itself substantially into that given by President Rush, in Guier v. O'Daniel,2 namely, "residence in a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of continuing it an unlimited time."

8 Confl. of L. § 46.

1 10 Mass. 488, 501. This view of the necessary animus manendi is also taken in the following cases of municipal domicil: Turner v. Buckfield, 3 Greenl.

229; Whitney v. Sherborn, 12 Allen, 111; Parker City v. Du Bois (Pa.), 8 Cent. R. 207; Stratton v. Brigham, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 420.

2 1 Binney, 349, note.

§ 187. Id. Intention to make the new Place of Abode Home." - In many of the cases the requisite intention for a change of municipal domicil is said to be intention to make the new place of abode the "home" of the person,' meaning thereby, of course, not "home" in the loose and general sense in which any place of abode, whether of a temporary or permanent character, is sometimes spoken of as "home," but "home" in its more restricted sense, in which, as we have already seen, the idea of permanency is, at least to some extent, included.

§ 188. Id. Contingent Animus Manendi. How far a merely contingent animus manendi will suffice for a change of municipal domicil is not at all clear. In Putnam v. Johnson,1 Parker, J., said: "In this new and enterprising country it is doubtful whether one half of the young men, at the time of their emancipation, fix themselves in any town with an intention of always staying there. They settle in a place by way of experiment, to see whether it will suit their views of business and advancement in life; and with an intention of removing to some more advantageous position, if they should be disappointed. Nevertheless, they have their home in their chosen abode while they remain." But it certainly is not every contingent residence in a place which will establish a domicil there.2 Much, doubtless, will depend upon the nearness or remoteness of the contingency, and upon the extent to which the former place of abode has been abandoned. If the latter clearly appear to have been finally abandoned, the courts are disposed to require animus manendi of much slighter character than if it remain in doubt or be mainly inferrible from the nature of the animus manendi.

§ 189. Double Residence. In cases of double residence, when a change of domicil is alleged from one place of residence to that of the other, it is difficult, if not impossible, to

1 Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt. 350; Wilson v. Terry, 11 Allen, 206; Bangs v. Brewster, 111 Mass. 382; Parker City v. Du Bois, supra; State v. Dodge, 56 Wis. 79.

1 10 Mass. 488, 501.

2 E.

g., Williams v. Henderson, 18

La. R. 557, where the defendant resided in New Orleans for the purpose of trying the commission business. The case, however, turned much upon the retention of the former place of abode and the continuance of defendant's family there.

lay down any general rule. It is clear that a total abandonment of the former is not required, and the problem in such cases usually is to determine to which of the two residences belong more of the characteristics of "home." This subject will be further considered hereafter.1

1 See infra, § 421.

263