with the intention of renouncing and abandoning the Portuguese domicil which his origin had conferred upon him? I was much struck with the argument that such a resolve ought to be indicated by some acts or words of a marked character, from which definite intentions of a permanent nature might be safely collected. But while admitting this as a general proposition, it is, I think, sufficiently obvious that the mode in which a man may be expected to evidence his intentions on such a subject must vary indefinitely with the age, character, circumstances, and general conduct of the individual. In canvassing the words and actions of a youth just emerging from minority, and still wholly dependent on his father, one would not expect the intention, if it existed, of making England his home to be evidenced by such acts as would be likely to attend the resolve of a matured man of business. Nor would it be reasonable to look for conduct such as might be evinced by a healthy, energetic youth, in the full use of his faculties, in one who was neither healthy nor energetic, and whose mental faculties were weak, if not yet unsound. I am far from saying that this last condition dispenses with, the proof of the intention in question, or that the existence of the intention, in all its fulness and completeness, must not be arrived at by the court before a change of domicil can be declared. But I am speaking of the media of proof, and I hold it to be unreasonable to require any further proof to this end, than the individual, such as he really was, might fairly be expected to have furnished in the circumstances in which he was placed, if he had, in fact, really and truly entertained the intention of which we are in quest."

§ 368. Id. To the same effect was the language of Dr. Lushington, speaking for the Privy Council in Hodgson v. De Beauchesne: "With respect to the evidence necessary to establish the intention, it is impossible to lay down any positive rule. Courts of justice must necessarily draw their conclusions from all the circumstances of each case; and each case must vary in its circumstances; and, moreover, in one a fact may be of the greatest importance, but in another the same fact may be so qualified as to be of little weight."

1 12 Moore P. C. C. 285, 330.

§ 369. All the Facts of a Man's Life Evidence of his Domicil. -It frequently happens that there appear a few simple and decisive facts which relieve a case of any difficulty; but, on the other hand, it also frequently happens that the prominent facts in a man's life are so nearly in equilibrio that resort must be had to the closest scrutiny of his whole life and conduct before any definite result can be reached. There is, therefore, no fact which is of itself conclusive evidence of intention; and, on the other hand, there is scarcely any fact too trivial to be of service on occasion. "We must look to all the facts down to the last moment of his life.” 1 "Acts and declarations," 2 "conduct," 3" mode of life," 4 "habits,"5 "disposition," "character," 7" age," 8" circumstances,' "pursuits," 10" domestic relations," "family, fortune, and health;" 12 and, in short, "the whole history of the man from his youth up," 13 furnish the criteria by which intention is to be determined, and the determination is to be from the preponderance of evidence.1

14

§ 370. Ia.-Kindersley, V. C., who has considered this subject in a number of cases, says with great force, in Drevon v. Drevon: "But, whatever is the definition, if you could

1 Bramwell, B., in Attorney-General v. Pottinger, 6 Hurl. & Nor. 733.

2 Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch. 129; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; Burnham v. Rangely, 1 Wood. & M. 7; Read v. Bertrand, 4 Wash. C. Ct. 514; Prentiss v. Barton, 1 Brock. 389; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Hegeman v. Fox, 31 Barb. 475; Dupuy v. Sey. mour, 64 id. 156; State v. Frest, 4 Harr. (Del.) 558; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704; Verret v. Bonvillain, 33 La. An. 1304.

8 Ommanney v. Bingham, Rob. Pers. Suc. 468; Lord v. Colvin, 4 Drew. 366; Cockrell v. Cockrell, 2 Jur. (N. s.) 727; Sharpe v. Crispin, L. R. 1 P. & D. 611; Richmond v. Vassalborough, 5 Greenl. 396; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349, note.

4 Wayne v. Greene, 21 Me. 357.
5 Ommanney v. Bingham, supra ;

Wayne v. Greene, supra; Hallet v.
Bassett, 100 Mass. 167.

6 Wayne v. Greene, supra.

7 Sharpe v. Crispin, supra; Hallet v. Bassett, supra.

8 Sharpe v. Crispin, supra.

9 Id.; Wayne v. Greene, supra. 10 Hallet v. Bassett, supra; and see Ommanney v. Bingham, supra.

11 Hallet v. Bassett, supra, Wayne v. Greene, supra. Whether married or single. Barton v. Irasburgh, 3 Vt. 159.

12 Hoskins v. Mathews, 8 De G. M. & G. 13.

13 Hallet v. Bassett, supra.

14 Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170; Blanchard v. Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Hallet v. Bassett, supra; Dauphin Co. v. Banks, 1 Pears. 40; Sanderson v. Ralston, 20 La. An. 312.

1 34 L. J. Ch. 129.

give one, of domicil, what are the acts which are sufficient to constitute a change of domicil? It leaves you much in the same difficulty even as you are in as to its definition. I think the court has been under the necessity of doing this in all cases, taking all the acts of every kind, more or less important, throughout the man's life, upon which you can have evidence; taking not only his acts, but his declarations valeant quantum, and then judging whether the testator did or did not mean to give up his domicil of origin and adopt a new one. I may say with regard to the evidence of acts, there is no one circumstance that has ever been brought to the attention of the court in any of the cases, as to which I think it may not be truly said that in some of the cases that occur, that act or that circumstance which has been treated as of great importance, in other cases that same act or circumstance has been treated as of very little importance. For example, the first fact generally brought forward, and, of course, which is brought forward and relied upon in this case, is length of residence. Length of residence has in many cases, both by English and foreign jurists, been considered a very important ingredient in the question; and in other cases it has been considered of as little importance, that is, as compared with and brought into connection and contact with other circumstances of which evidence is given in the case. I think with regard to that point, the true conclusion is this: not that any one act or any one circumstance is necessarily per se of vast importance and other circumstances of little importance, but it is a question what is the relative importance of the different acts; whether some acts tending one way are of greater weight than those tending the other as to the animus manendi, or the animus revertendi, or the animus, as to changing domicil. I think this also may be said: there is no act, no circumstance in a man's life, however trivial it may be in itself, which ought to be left out of consideration in trying the question whether there was an intention to change the domicil. A trivial act might possibly be of more weight with regard to determining this question, than an act which was of more importance to a man in his lifetime."

§ 371. Probabiles Conjecturæ. -John Voet1 remarks, with reference to the determination of domicil: "Quoties autem non certo constat, ubi quis domicilium constitutum habeat, et an animus sit inde non discedendi, ad conjecturas probabiles recurrendum, ex variis circumstantiis petitas, etsi non omnes æque firmæ, aut singulæ solæ consideratæ non æque urgentes sint, sed multum in iis valeat judicis prudentis et circumspecti arbitrium."

In this connection Kindersley, V. C.,2 may again be quoted: "There must be the act, and there must be the intention; and in order to decide the question of intention there are undoubtedly a number of circumstances which are considered by the law of this country, and probably by the law of almost all other countries, as affording certain indicia or criteria, from which you may infer the intention one way or the other. But it is obvious that some of the circumstances may have a tendency one way and some the other way; and very often it is extremely difficult to come to a determination among the conflicting tendencies of the different circumstances on the different indicia of intention. . . . In all questions of this sort you are obliged to resort to what are called by some of the jurists probabiles conjecturæ (probable conjectures) as to

(De Jure Civili, 1. 17, c. 12, p. 978, no. 60): "Quod si dubitabitur, quis sit animus in ea re cujusque, de eo duabus his ex rebus æstimandum est; ex muniis vitæ quotidianæ, quæ quis alicubi obeat; tum ex ordine et conditione personæ. Ex muniis vitæ ; si quis aliquo in loco ea faciat, quem facere ejus loci cives et incolæ solent: puta, si in eo loco semper agat; in illo emat, vendat, contrahat; in eo foro, balneis, et aliis locis communibus utatur; ibi festos dies celebret; omnibus denique commodis loci fruatur, ut Ulpiani descriptio est in leg. ejus 27 § 1 D. ad municip. Ex conditione personæ; si cujus ea conditio sit, propter quam eum in aliquo loco semper consistere necesse sit. Cui rei exemplo sunt tres; senator, miles, relegatus."

Zangerus says that in the absence of express declarations made before the cause of action has arisen, the animus is to be ascertained "ex conjecturis et presumptionibus" (De Except. pt. 2, c. 1, no. 14 et seq.); and among most conspicuous grounds of conjecture he instances seven; viz., (1) the location of the “lares" of the Romans, or the "fire and light" of the Germans; (2) the possession of the major part of one's property in any place; (3) the sale of one's property in the place of former domicil and emigration with one's family to another city or country; (4) constant residence in a place; (5) obtaining eiti. zenship; (6) in the case of a secular priest, obtaining a benefice which requires residence; and (7) in the case of a woman, marriage.

727.

2 In Cockrell v. Cockrell, 2 Jur. (N.S.)

what his intention was, to be inferred from circumstances. Perhaps the more correct expression would be 'probable prescriptions,' rather than 'probable conjectures,' though those prescriptions are in great degree founded upon conjectural reasoning upon the circumstances."

“

§ 372. Facts to be construed untechnically and according to their Natural Import.- Lord Cranworth, speaking on this subject, in Maxwell v. McClure, said the question of domicil turns entirely upon the facts of the case, and upon the construction which, as men of the world, we should put upon the acts of parties as disclosed in the evidence." 1 Demolombe,2 after pointing out a few of the usual indicia of domicil, concludes: "It belongs, then, to the magistrate to appreciate the importance, the priority, the isolation or the concourse, and the force, more or less probative, of all these elements constitutive of the domicil of each one, regard being had to his particular position and personal habits."

§ 373. Certain Facts usually entitled to more Weight than others. But whatever difficulty there may be in laying down any positive rule which will fit all cases, or which will give to certain facts, under all circumstances, greater probative force than to others, courts and jurists have laid stress on certain facts, either when standing by themselves or when corroborated by, or opposed to, certain other facts, leaving their force to be strengthened, diminished, or entirely destroyed in other cases by the appearance of new circumstances. Indeed, the great bulk of what has been said in the decided cases has been by way of appreciation of given facts as determinative of intention; and while they are to be used with caution and tested thoroughly by the circumstances of each particular case, certain approximate values have been set upon certain things as indicia of intention, or, as they are sometimes called, criteria of domicil.

§ 374. The Definitions of Domicil in the Roman Law mainly Formulæ of Evidence. -The so-called definitions of domicil which are to be found in the Roman law are for the most part formula for the ascertainment of the necessary element of in345. See also Pothier, Intr. aux Cout.

16 Jur. (N. s.) 407.

2 Cours de Code Napoléon, t. 1, no. d'Orléans, no. 15.