tainty of purpose, and to that extent aid in defeating the proof otherwise tending to show a change of domicil. Thus, in Whicker v. Hume, the fact that the testator, a domiciled Englishman, upon going to Paris, took a lease of a house there for three, six, or nine years, with the option of quitting it at any time upon six months' notice, was relied upon to some extent in the House of Lords as indicating temporary animus manendi. On the other hand, taking a lease for a long term, building a large and expensive house and residing in it with wife and family, were relied upon in Platt v. Attorney-General as strong evidence of permanent residence. In De Bonneval v. De Bonneval,5 Sir Herbert Jenner considered the leasing of a dwelling-house in England for eight years strong evidence of animus manendi if followed up by continued residence, but held it to be overbalanced in that case by other circumstances.

1

§ 417. Ownership of Dwelling-house or other Real Estate. — Papinian says: "Sola domus possessio, quæ in aliena civitate comparatur, domicilium non facit." The mere fact of ownership of a house or other real estate at a particular place is of little importance; but the manner of, and circumstances attending, the acquiring or disposing of it, the treatment of it, and in some cases the failure to get rid of it, serve to some extent to let us into the mind of the owner. When the question is as to the abandonment of the domicil of origin, the ownership and retention of real estate there-particularly a dwelling-house, however acquired is of some value,2

8 Supra. Similar was Moorhouse v. Lord, where a lease was taken for three years, determinable at three months' notice.

+ L. R. 3 App. Cas. 336.

31 Curteis, 856. So also Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch. 129; AttorneyGeneral v. Pottinger, 6 Hurl. & Nor. 733; and Stevenson v. Masson, L. R. 17 Eq. Cas. 78. In Drevon v. Drevon, Kindersley, V. C., says respecting the fact of taking a long lease for business purposes: "That is a circumstance certainly not necessarily importing that he ceased to be a Frenchman and became

an Englishman, but at the same time it is a circumstance to be taken into consideration."

1 Dig. 50, t. 1, l. 17, § 13.

2 Munro v. Munro, 7 Cl. & Fin. 842; Moorhouse v. Lord, 10 H. L. Cas. 272; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. Jr. 750; Curling v. Thornton, 2 Add. 6; Forbes v. Forbes, Kay, 341; Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. Ct. 499; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Barton v. Irasburgh, 33 Vt. 159; Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673. In Butler v. Hopper, Washington, J., said: "But will it be contended that if a man removes from one

inasmuch as it adds another tie by which the person is bound to the home of his youth, and to that extent strengthens the presumption of non-abandonment. And the value of such evidence is increased when the person whose domicil is in question improves such property, or renders it more fit for occupancy, or adds to it by the purchase of neighboring real estate. The same rule applies to a certain extent also to acquired domicil. Thus, in Maxwell v. McClure, the retention of a dwelling-house at the place of acquired domicil was considered a strong circumstance against reverter. The importance of ownership of real estate as evidence of animus revertendi is, however, affected so much by special circumstances, often slight, that it is impossible to draw any lines or lay down any definite rule with regard to it. It has been frequently held to be destroyed by proof of purchase of real estate, accompanied by residence, elsewhere.5

§ 418. Sale of Dwelling-house or other Real Estate. The sale of real estate, particularly a dwelling-house, at the place of domicil, whether acquired or of origin, accompanied by removal elsewhere, is some evidence of animus non revertendi, but is not conclusive.2

§ 419. Purchase of Dwelling-house or other Real Estate. The purchase of real estate at a new place, accompanied by

State to another, with an intention of making the latter his permanent abode, he is not domiciliated there, because he has left behind him an estate which he cultivates, sometimes visits (no matter how often, or how long in each year), and whilst there, keeps house, and is even elected into the Legislature of the State he has left? These circumstances are of prodigious weight, I admit, to repel the idea of a change of domicil; but strong as they are, evidence might have been given to the jury, sufficient to warrant them in the conclusion they have drawn"

3 Munro v. Munro, supra; Somerville v. Somerville, supra; Moorhouse v. Lord, supra; Forbes v. Forbes, supra. 46 Jur. (N. s.) 407. See also Isham v. Gibbons, 1 Bradf. 69.

5 Anderson v. Laneuville, 9 Moore P. C. C. 325, s. c. 2 Spinks, 41; Platt v. Attorney-General, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 336; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704; Succession of Franklin, 7 La. An. 395; New Orleans v. Shepherd, 10 id. 268. See also Weston v. Weston, 14 Johns. 428, where the retention of the ownership of real estate and the continuance of the wife at the place of former domicil were held to be overborne by other evidence. Similar cases are

numerous.

1 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sch. App. 441; Stevenson v. Masson, L. R. 17 Eq. Cas. 78; Hamilton v. Dallas, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 257; King v. Foxwell, 3 id. 518; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 466.

2 Chaine v. Wilson, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 673; White v. White, 3 Head, 404.

residence there, has been accepted in many cases as evidence of animus manendi,1 particularly where the person whose domicil is in question has expended a considerable sum of money in improving such estate and in fitting it up in a manner suitable for the permanent residence of himself and family.2 But such evidence is not decisive, if from the other facts in the case animus revertendi appears.3 Thus, for instance, in Gillis v. Gillis, a person was held to have retained his Irish domicil of origin notwithstanding that he had resided in France for nineteen years, during the last twelve of which he had lived in a house purchased by him there; it sufficiently ap‐ pearing to the court that his residence in France was for the benefit of his health, for the improvement of which, to the extent of permitting him to return to and remain in his native country, he had constantly hoped. The same may be said in case the purchase is for the purpose of future and not present residence, or for a mere investment and not for a home. The purchase of real estate at the place of domicil of origin will naturally strengthen the presumption of animus revertendi, but will not necessarily render it conclusive.7

§ 420. Location of Personal Property. The location of one's personal property is a circumstance to which in modern. law usually little weight is attached in determining his domicil. In the Roman Law probably it was different; the location of the "fortunarum summa" being one of the chief tests of domicil laid down in the definition contained in the Code;

1 Anderson v. Laneuville, 9 Moore P. C. C. 325, s. c. 2 Spinks, 41; Platt v. Attorney-General, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 336; Attorney-General v. Pottinger, 6 Hurl. & Nor. 733; Hoskins v. Matthews, 8 De G. M. & G. 13; Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch. 129; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389; Hegeman v. Fox, 31 Barb. 475; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106; New Orleans v. Shepherd, 10 La. An. 268. Some of the English cases above are cases of long leases, but of course the efficacy of such evidence cannot depend upon whether the interest in lands is freehold or less than freehold.

2 See generally the cases cited in the last note, but particularly Platt v. Attorney-General.

3 Gillis v. Gillis, Ir. R. 8 Eq. 597; and see Crookenden v. Fuller, 1 Swab. & Tr. 441.

4 Attorney-General v. Dunn, 6 Mees. & W. 511; State v. Hallett, 8 Ala. 159; and see supra, § 177.

5 Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312.

6 Moorhouse v. Lord, 10 H. L. Cas. 272; Succession of Franklin, 7 La. An. 395.

7 Drevon v. Drevon, supra.

and doubtless the phrase was largely applicable to movable possessions. The conditions of life were then very different, and the means of personal locomotion and of transferring personal property from place to place and from country to country are now so much improved as to render the same principle no longer applicable. Still, like other circumstances in the life of a man, the collection of his personal property at a particular point may give some indication of his intention with respect to his residence there.

517

CHAPTER XXIV.

CRITERIA OF DOMICIL (continued), —DOUBLE RESIDENCE.

sides in different Places.

§ 421. Difficult to determine the Domicil of a Person who reIt is sometimes very difficult to locate the domicil of a person who has domestic establishments in different places, or who resides in different places at different seasons of the year. We have seen that among the Roman jurists there was a difference of opinion concerning the case of one who appeared to be equally established in several places; some holding that he had several domicils, while Labeo held that he had none, and Celsus that the location of his domicil depended upon his choice and intention.1 The remarkable case of two contemporary residences put by Lord Alvanley at the conclusion of his judgment in Somerville v. Somerville2 has already been referred to and discussed. In the same case he lays it down that "a merchant whose business lies in the metropolis shall be considered as having his domicil there, and not at his country residence;" while "a nobleman or gentleman having a mansion-house, his residence in the country, and resorting to the metropolis for any particular purpose, or for the general purpose of residing in the metropolis, shall be considered domiciled in the country." But this distinction, which was doubtless founded upon the usual habits and customs of persons belonging to the two classes mentioned, is far from being applicable to all cases. And, indeed, no definite rule upon the subject has been or perhaps can be laid down.

§ 422. National Domicil. Where the question is one of national domicil no doubt the principle that the former place of abode must be completely abandoned as a place of abode before a new domicil can be acquired,1 should be applied with great strictness; and hence, where a person has domestic 1 Supra, 151 et seq.

1 Supra, § 88.

25 Ves. Jr. 750.