Massachusetts in Briggs v. Rochester to ignore this generally received construction; but that case was subsequently overruled by the same court in Borland v. Boston, where an elaborate opinion was rendered, in which the subject was reviewed at great length, and the result reached that beyond doubt "the word inhabitant' as used in [the Massachusetts] statutes, when referring to liability to taxation, by an overwhelming preponderance of authority means 'one domiciled.""

This branch of the law has furnished a large number of cases in which the subject of domicil has been discussed and applied.

§ 52. Liability to other Public Burdens. Domicil has been used in this country as the test of liability to other public burdens, among which two may be mentioned; namely, (1) liability to militia service,1 and (2) liability to jury service.2 The latter has, however, been usually discussed from the opposite standpoint, namely, that of eligibility.

§ 53. Right to Vote. In this country the qualifications for the exercise of the electoral franchise are fixed by the constitutions and laws of the several States. These qualifications vary somewhat in different States, although they are in most respects substantially the same everywhere.

In most of the States citizenship of the United States is required, although in a number it is deemed sufficient if the person whose right is in question, being a foreigner by birth, has declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States. But the laws of all the States unite in requiring residence for a fixed period (which varies in different States), both in the State and in the particular election district; and "residence," as so used, has, wherever the question has

616 Gray, 337.

7 132 Mass. 89.

1 Hill v. Fuller, 14 Me. 121; Shattuck v. Maynard, 3 N. H. 123; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 id. 235; Commonwealth v. Walker, 4 Mass. 556. Domicil was used as the test of military service in the armies of the late Confederate States. In re Fight, 39 Ala.

452; In re Toner, id. 454; Ex parte Blumer, 27 Tex. 735; Ex parte Luscher, cited id. 746.

2 United States v. Thorp, 2 Bond, 340; State v. Groome, 10 Iowa, 308; Graham v. Trimmer, 6 Kans. 230; Beason v. State, 34 Miss. 602; People v. Peralta, 4 Cal. 175; Clarke v. The Territory, 1 Wash. Ter. 82.

arisen, been uniformly construed to mean "legal residence," or domicil.1

§ 54. Eligibility to Office. - Domicil is also frequently used in this country for the determination of other public rights of the citizen, one of which may be particularly mentioned; namely, eligibility to office, where such eligibility depends upon "residence." 1

§ 55. Settlement under the Poor-Laws. Settlement or right to support under the poor-laws depends, in England and in the various States of this country, upon various statutory provisions, the principal grounds (which are recognized in most of the poor-law systems) of the right to such support in or by a particular poor-district being, ownership of real estate, payment of taxes, and residence for a fixed period in such district. In England residence under the poor-laws has never been considered as in any way connected with the subject of domicil. This is no doubt due to the fact that the principles of pauper settlements were substantially fixed before the introduction into English jurisprudence of either the term "domicil" or the definite notion signified by that term. In this country various statutory words, such as "dwelling-place," "home," "inhabitancy," and "residence," have been used to fix the place of settlement; and these words in different States have been differently construed. In some States they have been held to mean, or treated as meaning, domicil; while in others a contrary view has prevailed. It is not proposed here to examine the decisions in the various States upon this subject; it is sufficient to notice only those of Maine and Massachusetts as representing the opposite tendencies. In the earlier cases 1 1 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; 1 Commonwealth v. Kelleher, 115 Blanchard v. Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Mass. 103; Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Opinion of the Judges, id. 587; Holmes Pa. St. 365; State v. Grizzard, 89 v. Greene, 7 Gray, 299; Crawford v. N. C. 115; Yonkey v. State, 27 Ind. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Fry's Election 236. Case, 71 Pa. St. 302; McDaniel's Case, 3 Pa. L. J. 310; State v. Frest, 4 Harr. (Del.) 558; Roberts v. Cannon, 4 Dev. & B. 256; State v. Hallett, 8 Ala. 159; State v. Judge, 13 id. 805; Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 160; Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246; Cooley, Const. Lim. P. 600.

1 Parsonfield v. Perkins, 2 Greenl. 411; Boothbay v. Wiscassett, 3 id. 354; Parsonfield v. Kennebunkport, 4 id. 47; Hallowell v. Saco, 5 id. 143; Richmond v. Vassalborough, id. 396; Waterborough v. Newfield, 8 id. 203; Greene v. Windham, 13 Me. 225, and others.

decided by the Supreme Court of the former State, settlement was apparently put squarely upon the basis of domicil; but these cases have long since been overruled, and the position established by numerous decisions that "residence," "dwelling-place," and "home," as used in the pauper laws of that State, are not equivalent to, but mean something less than "domicil," the principal difference noted, however, being that while a person cannot be without a domicil somewhere he can be absolutely without a residence, dwelling-place, or home. On the other hand, the Massachusetts courts have with great consistency construed "inhabitancy," "residence," etc., in the statutes relating to pauper settlements in the same sense as that in which they have construed the same and similar words in statutes relating to other subjects, and have with great uniformity held them to mean "domicil" in its technical sense.3

No apparent difficulty has arisen from the application of the Massachusetts doctrine, and it has the merit of furnishing a more certain and more generally understood standard of decision than any which can result from its rejection. In the present state of the decisions, however, it is unsafe to rely too far upon settlement cases as decisive of principles relating to even municipal domicil without at least inquiring into the general tenor of the decisions upon this branch of the law in the particular State in which they have been decided. But even when settlement cases cannot be relied upon strictly as authorities, they often furnish illustrations of principles which are equally applicable to domicil, and particularly to municipal domicil. For this purpose they will mainly be used in this treatise.

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§ 56. Homestead and other Exemptions. One other use of domicil may be mentioned; namely, for the determination of the right of persons to homestead and other exemptions, out of their own property or that of deceased persons. All the

2 Exeter v. Brighton, 15 Me. 58; Jefferson v. Washington, 19 id. 293; Warren v. Thomaston, 43 id. 406; Littlefield v. Brooks, 50 id. 475, and others.

8 Although not the earliest, the leading case is Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170. See remarks of Shaw, C. J., infra, § 75, note 2.

States of the Union have passed laws allowing such exemptions, usually to their own citizens only; and in determining who are entitled to the statutory exemptions the principle of domicil has been extensively applied.1

1 Wharton, Confl. of L. § 189; Lindsay. Murphy, 76 Va. 428; Harkins v. Arnold, 46 Ga. 656; Talmadge's Adm'r v. Talmadge, 66 Ala. 199; Kelley's Ex'r v. Garrett's Ex'rs, 67 id. 304; Johnson v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280; 92

Republic v. Young, Dallam, 464; Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673 ; Russell v. Randolph, 11 id. 460; Shepherd v. Cassiday, 20 id. 24; Gouhenant v. Cockerell, id. 96; Cross v. Everts, 28 id. 523; Lacey v. Clements, 36 id. 661.

CHAPTER III.

DEFINITIONS.

§ 57. Difficulty of Defining Domicil. The difficulty, if not impossibility, of arriving at an entirely satisfactory definition of domicil has been frequently commented upon.1 Lord Al