memory on some orders that were issued at that time. It is the second paragraph of the story. [Reading:]

It was not that we pilots did not sense the tenthe Pacific. You could feel it everywhere all the time. we were returning—

I will interpolate, on December 7

[272] sion that lit up The mission from which

had the flavor of impeding action. We had been delivering a batch of 12 Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 21 to Wake Island where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28 under absolute war orders. Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky and pound anything we saw in the sea. In that way there could be no leak to the Japanese.

And I might point out to you that at the time that was written Clarence E. Dickinson was a lieutenant and that the last time I recall he had been promoted twice and is now a commander, so evidently there wasn't any objection in the Navy Department to that which he said.

Now, do you anything about that of which Lieutenant and now Commander Dickinson wrote?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. We did not attempt to read magazine articles and things of that character in making up this presentation. Mr. GEARHART. Will you get me, Mr. Counsel, [273] the orders under which Lieutenant Dickinson flew on that trip and if those orders were in part verbal will you please ascertain for me what the verbal part of the orders were ?1

Senator LUCAS. I would suggest you get the witness also, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. GESELL. The witness is on our list. Admiral Halsey is on the list to testify. He was in command of those flyers. He seemed to us to be the logical person to give the facts that the Congressman is interested in.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. I merely advert to this because of all of this being a surprise. Why should anybody be surprised when we are making war orders?

The CHAIRMAN. Does any member of the committee think that this is argumentative matter that should appeal to the committee and not to the witness?

Mr. GEARHART. That is to the entire country, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have no doubt of that.

Mr. GEARHART. And that will, accordingly, include our distinguished Chairman as well.

The CHAIRMAN. No doubt and I accept my part of the responsibility.

Mr. GEARHART. It is a very heavy burden for you to bear, I admit

that.

[274] Now, Admiral Inglis, do you know where the United States cruiser Boise was about that week of December 1 to December 78

Admiral INGLIS. I understand the Boise was in the Philippines.
Mr. GEARHART. In the Philippines?

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476 for a letter from the Navy Department.

Admiral INGLIS. She was attached to the Pacific Fleet, but actually present in the Philippines if my information is correct. I just obtained this information just this moment.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was commander of that ship?

Admiral INGLIS. What is that?

Mr. GEARHART. Who was commander of that ship at that time? Admiral INGLIS. Captain Robinson. I am not sure of his initials. Mr. GEARHART. Do you know who is commander at the present time? Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know a Commander or Captain Moran? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Mike Moran?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He at one time was in command [275] of that ship and at one time preceding that was executive officer of that ship; is that not correct?

Admiral INGLIS That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you tell me whether or not the Japanese fleet, the attacking force that was proceeding to rendezvous 200 miles north of Oahu-if that ship did not sight the Japanese fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. I know of no sighting of the Japanese fleet at all. My information is that the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was not sighted.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you make an investigation and determine whether or not there is a report on file indicating that the officers and crew, somebody in an official position on the cruiser Boise, sighted the Japanese attacking fleet during the first week of December?

Admiral INGLIS. If there is any evidence, either written or from witnesses, I am authorized to state that the Navy Department will make that available to you and the committee, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It will not be forgotten now that I have raised the question, I trust.

Admiral INGLIS. It will not be forgetten.1

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there is another thing that I would like to ask you about.

[276] Were any orders issued from Hawaii or from Washington or from any other place placing restrictions upon the use of ship radios, radios of the type, for instance, on the cruiser Boise? I am now referring to the fatal week in December.

Admiral INGLIS. I am answering that question now from my own personal memory, Mr. Gearhart, and I have a recollection that I am not too sure of, because this was nearly 5 years ago, that there was a general order in effect about that time which applied to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, instructing them to maintain radio silence. I cannot be positive that that applied to the Pacific Fleet, but my recollection is that it applied to the Atlantic Fleet and in all probability it applied also to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. When was that order enjoining silence upon ships at sea made?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got that information available. The Navy will try to get it for you, sir.2

1 The log of U. S. S. Boise was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 68." 2 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, it was made just shortly before, around the latter part of November or the early part of December, 1941, wasn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. It is my recollection that the order was issued long before that, sir, but my recollection may be faulty. Mr. GEARHART. By the way, was that phrase,

force" used in 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe it was, sir.

[277]

"task

Mr. GEARHART. I was told that it came into use and was borrowed from the Japanese nomenclature on or well along in 1942. Admiral INGLIS. That is not my understanding.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it is strangely significant that there should be an order directing all of our ships to sail south of Hawaii, that there should be a radio beam directed to be held on all night for the benefit of B-17's which the Japanese availed themselves of? Don't you think it is rather significant that there were naval orders enjoining silence upon all of our ships at sea, which would forbid them from reporting anything that they might obtain by way of information on the high seas? Don't you think it is strangely significant that the radar should be turned off the air during the danger hours of the day?

What effort has been made by the Intelligence Service to break down and ascertain how all these strangely significant things could occur, all of which, every one of them, operating to the benefit of our enemy and to the vulnerability of our own crews and ships?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I object to that on the ground that the witness has been asked five different

[278]

questions and

I think they should be propounded one at a time.
The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer all the five.
Mr. GEARHART. I think the five together is what makes it signifi-

cant.

The CHAIRMAN. The question of significance will not be gone into at the moment, but answer, if you can, Admiral, all five together or ad seriatim.

Admiral INGLIS. Congressman Gearhart, that covers a lot of territory. Two of these questions, if I recall them, refer to Army matters, the B-17's and the radar going off the air at 7 o'clock.

Now, you ask me my opinion of the significance of those five things? I am not sure that I understand what the point is that you are making, but I will do the best I can to give you my opinion of the significance. Mr. GEARHART. Well, you say you don't understand why I have raised this question, or what I mean by it?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't understand what

Mr. GEARHART. I understand that the Intelligence Service is an agency of the Army and an agency of the Navy, created for the purpose of taking these strange circumstances and finding out what they mean. Therefore I asked you have you made any investigation to determine why this long list of events, all of which tied the hands of America and [279] all of which benefited the Japanese, why they should all occur at one time, in one picture? Has that been a study of the Intelligence Bureau of which you are a part?

Admiral INGLIS. I would like to leave out, if I may, from the record any discussion of the functions or success of the Intelligence Service

at present. Insofar as it affected Pearl Harbor I think I can answer the gentleman's question.

My opinion is that the significance of those three things is accounted for by the tense relationship which existed in world politics at that time and it was only natural, for instance, that under the circumstances information concerning the movements of our fleet should be denied to any country with which our relations were strained. That is the only significance that I can read into the five items that the gentleman has just given me.

Mr. GEARHART. In your testimony yesterday you said that there was a condition existing on the battleship California which prevented it from performing its best service under the crisis. You said you had a report from the Chief of Naval Yards and Docks.

Admiral INGLIS. The report came from some officers in the Bureau of Ships who had made a study of that and the gist of the report that I gave yesterday was that the California was the only ship where any openings or lack of closures, let [280] us say, of watertight doors and hatches contributed in any way to the damage which resulted.

Mr. GEARHART. The words which caught my attention was that— in any way contributed to the inability of that ship to fight.

Now, were there other ships that had their doors opened, other ships that had themselves in such a condition that they could not fight in the most efficient manner?

Admiral INGLIS. The openings, of course, would not stop the ship from fighting but might possibly lessen the ability of the ship to stay afloat.

Now, as I said earlier this morning, we are getting that material together for you in response to that question and the Navy Department will make available to you and to the committee everything that they have on the subject.

Mr. GEARHART. Very well, but why put it off when you have right in your hands a report from which you can give us that.

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got it right in my hands.

[281]

ject,

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you read this report of the Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Ships or Yards and Docks, whichever it was? Admiral INGLIS. I read no report. This is the Bureau of Ships, Mr. Congressman, that is responsible for that subnot the Bureau of Yards and Docks; the Bureau of Ships. Mr. GEARHART. The Bureau of Ships? Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got a report, in response to your question. I was told by my staff that they have received verbally this information that I have given you about the California being the only ship where the openings contributed in any way to the damage which was suffered by any of the ships there.

Mr. GEARHART. Did your staff tell you what the conditions were on the California?

Admiral INGLIS. Not in detail, no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Generally what did they tell you?

Admiral INGLIS. They told me that because of some difficulty in closing the watertight doors and hatches after general quarters were sounded, which changes the conditions of readiness from three to one, because of that difficulty that the flooding and perhaps resulting fire spread more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case.

Mr. GEARHART. Why were the doors and hatches of the California opened on that day?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question at present, but we will get that information.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, this is one of these [282] things we are going into and it has got to the point where we feel we have to call witnesses who were actually on those ships to be sure to know what the conditions were and we are going to do so and I hope we will get it all here.

Mr. GEARHART. Counsel will recall that I have asked for all written orders which might have produced that condition or a similar condition on our ships, verbal orders, ship orders or district orders or commander in chief orders or Washington orders.

Mr. MITCHELL. My impression is that things of that kind are individual ship matters. As the matter stands we may have to call officers or men who were on the vessels themselves, but we are going ahead to try to get the facts.

Mr. GEARHART. It is now past 12, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. No. I say it is now past 12. We have reached our adjournment hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[283]

AFTERNOON SESSION- -2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion that took place this morning among members of the committee, the Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the general counsel, which is described as a "Tentative order of proof." Then a

Preliminary statement, covering committee procedure, relations with agencies concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged with Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directiveswhich was done previously, when we started.

Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated [reading]:

The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the [283a] public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

And following that there is subdivision "A," under the heading of "The Attack," and under that subdivision "A" there are 17 points, outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memorandum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of the committee on the 1st of November.