"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman."

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, in view of the Chair's ruling that the concurrent resolution may now be considered by unanimous consent, without reference to a committee, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution and for its immediate adoption,

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. White, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Lucas addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Maine. I have promised to yield to the Senator from Michigan, and later I shall yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, in all ordinary circumstances I should be moved to object to such a request as has been made, for I think that by and large we progress most wisely if we observe the rules of the Senate as to procedure in this body. But I believe there is so nearly unanimous sentiment of approval in this Chamber in respect to a resolution similar, if not identical, to that offered by the Senator from Kentucky that I have no purpose to object.

I do wish to say, Mr. President, that I know of at least one resolution of similar purport prepared by a Senator upon this side of the aisle whose purpose it was to introduce it at some proper time, but I take it that the two resolutions are not dissimilar in their object. Their purpose is the same; and so far as I am concerned, I am not going to object to the request made by the Senator from Kentucky. I think the Senate overwhelmingly approves the purpose of his resolution and of his request.

Mr. BARKLEY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield now to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I had prepared to offer a concurrent resolution nearly identical in terms to the concurrent resolution which is now before the Senate. I merely had in mind that probably seven Members from each House would be better because of the question of attendance, but I should like in the time of the Senator from Kentucky to say a few things now in relation to why I believe a resolution such as the one which has just been read should [34d] immediately be adopted.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to do so, I should like to make a remark in regard to his attitude and situation. I appreciate his attitude and his cooperation. I did not know that he contemplated the introduction of a resolution until I saw mention of it in the newspapers last night. But in the meantime I had already prepared mine and, as I have said, I had conferred with the President and with others about it. So it was not prepared and offered in any way for the purpose of interfering with the introduction of any other resolution. But I felt probably it should be offered and considered and, if possible, adopted immediately. So that the country will understand that the Senate, and, I am sure, the House of Representatives, feel that they owe a public duty to go into this whole matter; and I wish the Senator from Michigan and all other Senators to know that I deeply appreciate the cooperation which seems evident in regard to the matter.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I appreciate and I understand the situation. It is not a question as to who introduces or offers the resolution, but it is a matter of having the job done. I should like to make a few remarks at this time regarding why I believe such a resolution should be adopted.

At the very outset I want to make clear precisely what I think should be investigated. The question is why our Army and Navy were not able either to avoid or to cope with the initial attack launched by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Everybody-those who opposed the war and those who favored it -was shocked at the swift liquidation of our Pacific naval strength; I am

sure that everybody, men of every point of view-will agree that we ought to have the whole truth about this unfortunate event. The only question is as to how this inquiry should be made.

I am sure that no one will question that some inquiry is necessary. The President of the United States dispatched Secretary Knox to Hawaii immediately after the battle to investigate, because he felt the people ought to know the truth. In 5 days the Secretary of the Navy was back with his report. He said:

"The United States services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formal investigation which will be initiated immediately by the President. Further action is, of course, dependent on the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board. We are all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of judgment which contributed to the surprise, (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the attack."

Only a few days later, the President named a commission of five, headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts, to go to Hawaii and make a fuller investigation. However, the Executive order for the Roberts inquiry read as follows:

"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the part of the United States Army or Navy personnel"

We in the Senate must note that it referred just to Army or Navy personnel— "contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."

That meant that the commission could go only into the question of dereliction of duty or error of judgment of the Army and Navy personnel.

The report of that commission became a subject of endless discussion and questioning.

The last report of the War Department said that their Board had made a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts commission. It further said that the Board had been materially helped and enlightened by the report and record of the Roberts commission, and that "we append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts commission; or at least were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents, or report of the Roberts commission."

In June 1944 Congress by resolution directed the Army and Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe of December 7, 1941. Under that authority the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry filed their reports in October 1944. That was 9 months ago. But the nature of their findings was not made known until last week. This delay in turn created the impression in many minds that something was being suppressed. I do not wish to make any criticism of this myself. It can be argued that it would have been unwise to publish these findings while we were still engaged in active warfare and when unity of purpose and spirit against the enemy was essential. Some persons even claimed military security was involved. Nevertheless, men-being what they are-had their curiosity and their suspicions whetted about the contents of these reports by the very act of withholding them.

I am sure the officers charged with the investigations have performed their duties with a full sense of their responsibilities. Now that they have made known their conclusions the whole situation remains more clouded than ever. Returning to the Army report, it says further:

"We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured."

We note that they do not say that all have been secured, but that "practically" all have been secured, "although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we have found these documents elsewhere, or we were able to prove them through copies in other hands." This quite clearly shows that the Army board felt the investigation was not complete. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War was

satisfied with the report from the respective boards. When the Navy report was delivered to him last October, Secretary Forrestal said:

"The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted." [34e] Last October, when the Army report was delivered to him, the Secre

tary of War said:

"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material fact can be obtained, and I have given the necessary direction to accomplish this result.

Thereafter the Army detailed Lieutenant Colonel Clausen of the United States Army to continue an ex parte investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and the Navy Department detailed Vice Adm. Henry K. Hewitt to continue the Navy Department investigation as an ex parte investigation into the catastrophe.

While Admiral Kimmel was entitled to counsel and to take part in the proceedings before the Navy Board of Inquiry, General Short was entitled to counsel but had no right to take part in any of the proceedings. These continued investigations made by the Secretaries of War and Navy have not been given to the public. There is no evidence that the continued investigations dispose of the conflict between the two reports and fix the responsibility on the basis of persuasive evidence. That being true, Congress must try to find out the facts for the public and for itself. The two boards are quite far from being in agreement, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have each issued critical opinions of the findings of their own boards.

The last published findings have added to the list of the accused names which are still more eminent than those of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. As matters now stand Admiral Stark, who was Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and General Marshall, who led our armies through the great struggle just crowned with victory, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, have been held to share in the guilt of the defeat. The President of the United States has agreed with some of the findings and has disagreed with others.

Certainly no responsible statesman will quarrel with the curiosity of the people about this now badly confused episode. The curiosity of the people about their public affairs is the sole bulwark of a republican government. There are too few nations left in which there is a public opinion. This court of public opinion is a valuable institution in the United States, and must be able to function.

It is a citizen's duty to be curious. But it is also his right to have the whole truth about even small matters, and, of course, for a greater reason to have the whole truth about a subject which has cost so much in the blood of our sons, and the treasure of our people.

But there is still another force to be recognized here. I refer to the American's sense of fair play. It is a powerful feature of our national character. First, we had two distinguished officers who were accused of neglect of duty, and removed from their commands. Everyone expected they would be tried. But they have never been tried. And because they are officers of the armed services they are not at liberty to talk up with the same freedom possessed by an accused private citizen. They have not had a trial and they have not even had the opportunity of defending their honor in the public press. I do not want to enter into a discussion of the conditions which may have made this possible.

The only point I want to make is that our Government cannot behave in this way without creating in the minds of the masses of our people a feeling of sympathy for these men. Our Government cannot afford to do this sort of thing. To do so violates a fundamental principle of conduct which our boys and girls learn in the very first years of their schooling, namely, the great principle of American fair play. It violates the fundamental principle of the right of the accused to a fair trial with the opportunity of presenting his side in public.

Every consideration-the demands of public policy, the obligation of justice to the men who fell in the battle, the duty of fair play to those who have been

accused cries out for some form of inquiry which will bring to light the whole truth.

Here we have Cordell Hull, a distinguished former Member of this body, publicly and officially charged with a dereliction of duty, partly responsible for the loss of thousands of lives. We cannot subject him to a court martial, but we must not permit that stain to remain on his name without invoking all the powers of the Government to uncover all the facts. He is entitled to have those facts produced. He is entitled to more than mere conclusions based on part of the facts. All the facts cannot be produced by an Army court martial of General Short, or a naval court martial of Admiral Kimmel. The Pearl Harbor tragedy was a single great episode in which many services, such as the Army, the Navy, and the State Department participated. The controversy relating to the subject cannot be settled by a group of trials and inquiries in which each service will be the judge of its own actions. There is in the Government no agency capable of examining the whole chapter and compelling the production of all the facts, except the Congress of the United States.

What is true of Mr. Hull is true of General Marshall. He has presided over our military forces in the greatest war of our history, and has, in the public mind, managed that great task with courage and ability, and certainly with success. On the very day of final victory he is confronted with the judgment of an Army board that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, which began the war, was due in part to his failure to perform his duty. We cannot leave that slur upon the name of General Marshall without giving him the full benefit of a complete and unprejudiced publication of every fact. Here again we cannot do it in a court martial. General Marshall ought not to have to submit to a court martial, For if he escapes the judgment of any Army court martial he may run into a verdict of guilty against him in the eyes of the public by a Navy court martial of Admiral Kimmel, where he would have no right to defend himself.

All these men, Secretary Hull, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, and General Short, have an inescapable claim upon the conscience of the American people for a full and honest inquiry into the whole incident, and that such inquiry be conducted by a Congress which will proceed in the open. with full opportunity for every side to participate in the proceedings.

I do not see how Congress can ignore the things that are being said throughout the country about all this subject. Newspapers and magazines have offered their versions of this distressful event, and millions of people have read the accounts. Whether they are true or false is not the question here. Some of them are certainly not true, because the numerous versions themselves contradict each other quite as freely as do the official versions. But this subject is one which must be set straight, and I can think of no way to do so except by a congressional investigation, and because it is so important, nothing less than a committee which represents both Houses of Congress should make the inquiry.

The reason why this inquiry is needed is as I have pointed out. The Roberts inquiry was limited by the Executive order. The Army report covers 304 pages. but when we reach page 241 it jumps suddenly to page 294. A whole chapter of 52 pages of the Army board's findings has been omitted by order of Secretary Stimson. The Navy report contains a clause which indicates that the Navy board of inquiry was directed to leave out certain testimony. In fact, the Navy board said:

[346] "The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war."

This tells us plainly that the Army board of review and Navy court of inquiry left these details out not on their own motion but under orders from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Let us concede that there may have been a reason for omitting this testimony during the war; there is certainly no reason for hiding it now. It is unthinkable that the Congress and the public shall not have access to this testimony in order to appraise justly the correctness of the findings of the Army board and Navy court of inquiry.

There are points of serious difference between the Army and Navy board reports. For example, one of them fixes the date when General Marshall and Admiral Stark petitioned the President that no ultimatum be issued to Japan as of November 5, the other as of November 27-a very vital difference.

A congressional investigation is the only means of producing all the facts. All we have now are the conclusions of the Roberts commission and the conclu

sions of the Army and Navy commissions, but the public has been denied all the facts and testimony on which these are based.

There is a feature of these reports which is certain to impair public confidence in them regardless of their internal soundness. In this whole episode not only the conduct of the leading commanders but of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State is involved. The press has already caught the significance of who was responsible for appointing the Army board and the Navy court of inquiry. It has been noted that neither report makes any criticism of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, but that the Army report goes out of its way to castigate the Secretary of State, who had no hand in appointing his judges. These are reasons why neither the Army, the Navy, nor the State Department, or any tribunals within them, should make the final investigations. It is also a reason why courts martial cannot properly determine all the facts of this case. Actually this is no longer a case where Kimmel and Short, Marshall and Stark, Stimson and Knox and Hull, along with various subordinate commanders of both services, are on trial. Stated more correctly, the case brings in the responsibilities of so many that what we have on trial is the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, and only Congress has the authority to find all the facts.

The Army report puts blame on General Marshall and Secretary Hull. The Secretary of War criticizes the findings of his own board and disagrees with the verdict against General Marshall. The President of the United States approved the verdict in part and criticized it in part. He dissented from the criticism of Secretary Hull and General Marshall. As disclosed by the Army report, Mr. Stimson furnished most of the testimony against Secretary Hull. Secretary Stimson declares that Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum on November 26, while Secretary Hull stoutly denies this.

Whatever point there may be in these differences, which are merely samples which come to mind, the fact remains that a great deal of information which has been withheld because the war was raging at top height 9 months ago must now be made public.

If we, the Congress, do not do this, history will do it, and will also appraise our neglect.

Mr. Lucas and Mr. White addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry with respect to the concurrent resolution. In section 2 I find the following:

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941."

I should like to ask the able majority leader whether or not he considers that under this resolution the committee would have the power to investigate, let us say, what took place at Wake Island on the morning of the 7th of December 1941, or what took place in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, or the following day. In other words, are we going into the investigation of what transpired in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, or does the concurrent resolution confine the investigation solely to what happened at Pearl Harbor? Would the committee be able to make further investigation as to what happened in the Pacific at that time?

Mr. BARKLEY. In answer to the question propounded by the Senator, in my opinion the language of the concurrent resolution is broad enough to permit the committee to investigate anything which happened prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, or led up to it, the circumstances which produced it, as well as the consequences of the attack. I realize that it would be impossible to include in a single resolution reference to all the islands in the Pacific which were attacked either concurrently with the attack on Pearl Harbor or shortly thereafter. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the attack which precipitated the war, which brought us into the war, and all the controversy has revolved around the attack on Pearl Harbor. But I use the language "relating to the attack" so as to make it possible for the committee to investigate anything which took place prior to it, or any of the consequences which may have flowed from the attack. The Philippine attack, the Guam attack, and the Wake Island attack were all within a radius of a few hours, and they were related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So I think the language is sufficiently broad to cover those attacks.

Mr. WHITE. What the Senator from Kentucky has just said about the language "relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor" in