Senator FERGUSON. About when did you get them? Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the exact hour? Senator FERGUSON. When? There are two sets of them and I would just like to know when counsel got them. Mr. MITCHELL. My assistants says these documents reached me ap. proximately 2 p. m. yesterday afternoon. Senator FERGUSON. Two p. m. yesterday afternoon. Has counsel had time to examine each one of them? Mr. MITCHELL. We went over them in a rough way. I have not spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we thought we would get back to the original source here. Senator FERGUSON. Did they give you translations? Mr. MITCHELL. They are in the papers here. Senator FERGHSON. They are among the papers? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator? Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I do not know. Mr. MITCHELL. I want you to know. What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Japanese language? Will you state generally what that is? Admiral INGLIS. There are photostat copies of two docu- [422] ments in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2. Mr. MITCHELL. That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order? Admiral INGLIS. It is a plan and an order, in effect. Mr. MITCHELL. Will you look over these other documents and just generally describe what they are. Admiral INGLIS. This first one I have is a translation of a captured document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii." Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire from counsel when counsel requested these documents from the Navy? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I think these particular documents I asked him to bring in here sometime yesterday, because I understood the committee wanted all the original material on which any testimony was based. Senator FERGUSON. I understand it has not been requested by counsel prior to yesterday. Mr. MITCHELL. We had the operational order in English, the translation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think. Senator LUCAS. You should have translated them right, Mr. Mitchell. [423] Mr. MITCHELL. I could not swear to that. Senator LUCAS. I know there are going to be a lot of questions about that. Mr. MITCHELL. I do not suppose anybody can settle that question. Admiral INGLIS. Are you ready, sir? Mr. MITCHELL. All right. Go head. Admiral INGLIS. The next document is entitled "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is February 25, 1944. Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on that is January 12, 1941. The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The subject is Kuboaki, Takeo. That is obviously the name of a Japanese. "Superior class engineer petty officer, interrogation of." That is the subject. [424] The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." This is an evaluation prepared by intelligence officers. Mr. KEEFE. Jap intelligence officers? Admiral INGLIS. United States intelligence officers. The next document is entitled "Intelligence Report." The subject is "Japan Navy submarines." The date on this is April 22. The year is not given. It might be deduced, however, that the year is 1944. The next document is 16 August 1943. It is marked "Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the family name and S the initial of the given name. The next document is entitled "United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944." The next document is dated 30 June 1943. The subject is "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii. "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai." "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands." The next document is dated 25 July 1945, Translation [425] No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki”, Kuramoti being the family name and Iki the given name. The next document is a translation of combined fleet top secret operation order No. 1. Mr. MITCHELL. Is that a translation of the Jap script we have here, or is supposed to be? I Admiral INGLIS. This is a translation of the Japanese script. am informed by my translators that there are a few corrections which they feel should be made in this document here, and those corrections will be produced at the proper time. We haven't got the photostatic copies now. The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Subcarried Planes." There is no date on this. Its precise source is not indicated. The next document is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the fifth Marine Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Prewar Espionage in the Hawaiian Island," and it pertains to an interview with Yoshio Shiga, lieutenant commander, Imperial Japanese Navy. In this case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family name. That memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, special agent of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, attached to the Four Hundred Ninetysixth CIC Detachment of the Fifth Marine Division, and contains several endorsements through official channels, showing its [426] receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, November 16. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from headquarters at Tokyo. Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. At this point I will read into the record a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur, as follows: The War Department has been requested to provide the joint congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack with information concerning the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by attack force before and after attack, and Japanese knowledge of damage inflicted. Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air mail pertinent documents. Now in response to that message the War Department has produced three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur, [427] dated the 14th of October-this is a preliminary report-and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945. Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last night, that was a Navy report, is that right? Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines through Navy channels. Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had this report from General MacArthur's headquarters in this message before you? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. And examined that? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. Now the War Department handed me last night, or early this morning, another message from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you examined that? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, we have also examined that. Mr. MITCHELL. How would you classify this material, as to the type of material it is? First there is an operational order and other captured documents from the Japs, is that it? Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. Then you have also a number of documents recording interviews of captured Japanese prisoners? Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. [428] Mr. MITCHELL. Then you have the report from General MacArthur? Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, and those are interviews of Japanese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war. Mr. MITCHELL. Is there anything else in that file that is classified in a different way, that you can think of? Admiral INGLIS. The only remaining item is the report which originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieutenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy. Mr. MITCHELL. Is not he a prisoner of war? Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; he is in more or less the same category as the others, an officer who was interviewed after VJ-day. Mr. MITCHELL. That is the document that came in last night, isn't it? Admiral INGLIS. That is the document that came in last night. Mr. MITCHELL. Now previous to the receipt of that document, and the one of November 8 from General MacArthur, have you prepared a summary digest of these documents? Admiral INGLIS. I had, sir. I would like to add to my [429] answer to your former question that this last document which has just been presented, the one that was received last night Mr. MITCHELL. By the Navy? Admiral INGLIS. Through Navy sources, through Navy channelsalso contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorsement from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort to corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant Commander Shiga. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, since the receipt of these last two documents that came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last few hours, have you gone through them to see whether your digest requires any additions? Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir; and it does require some substantial changes and additions. Mr. MITCHELL. Have you made those? Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. You had to do that last night and this morning, is that correct? Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. And you have already put in motion mimeographic machines so that copies of them may be supplied? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. Mr. MITCHELL. Now I would like to ask the Admiral if [430] you will please give your digest of these original documents that you have there. Admiral INGLIS. I would like to say, first of all, that throughout this presentation which is to follow, the dates will be expressed in Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as December 8, which is Japanese time, rather than December 7, which is Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will specifically so state, as I proceed. With respect to that difference, we should add 191⁄2 hours to Honolulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 51⁄2 hours to Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should add 14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time. I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where the Japanese are directly quoted. The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack Mr. MITCHELL (interposing). When you say "it is reported" you mean it is disclosed in these documents? Is that what you mean? [431] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. That expression "it is reported" is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been confirmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All we have is the report. Mr. MITCHELL. You are not guaranteeing the Japs? Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. [432] It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief combined fleet, who, at that time, ordered Rear Adm. Takijiro Onishi, then chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part of August 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all fleet commanders and other key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to a final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to September 13. On September 13 an outline containing essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders on November 5, 1941. Therefore, this date, November 5, 1941, is to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed. Operation order No. 1 under heading of "Preparations for the Out. break of War" states that— When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be [433] issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War." That completes that quotation. The operation order continues to say that The time for the Outbreak of War (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters Order. The details of the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth in operation order No. 1, were worked out by members of the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff and first air fleet operations staff. III. Determination of December 8 as day of attack; under date of November 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2 saying "First preparations for war. Y-day will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y-day as given in operation order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial naval order issued from the Imperial general headquarters under date of December 2, 1941 states: The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December. This order is in effect the announcement of X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack [434] selected on November 7 and defined as Y-day is reaffirmed on December 2 as X-day. In other words, the original tentative date-Y-day-and the final precise date-X-day-are in fact the same date. Mr. MITCHELL. That is December 7, our time? |