Senator BREWSTER. I understand, Admiral, that the translations which you presented on Saturday covered all of the Japanese documents which you turned over?

[495] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, in what examination I was able to make over the week end there was some 300 pages of Japanese material that was not translated. Can you explain that discrepancy?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the translation is complete. Senator BREWSTER. Well, have you the exhibits there?

[Pause.]

Admiral INGLIS. Senator Brewster, I am informed by the translator who is sitting at my elbow that this material was received by microfilm and that at the end of the microfilm there was some additional Japanese documents which had nothing to do with the Pear Harbor case but in the mechanical process of turning it out that is included with the material which has to do with Pear Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. That would mean there were approximately 118 pages of material bearing on this and 300 pages bearing on other matters.

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that is correct, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that would explain the discrepancy.
That other material, what did it have to do with?

Admiral INGLIS. Those were combined fleet orders which were issued subsequent to the attacks and had nothing to do with [496] the attack itself; concerning Japanese operations after Pearl Harbor. Senator BREWSTER. Now, you, in the summary which you gave, cited the Japanese estimate of damage as 450 planes. From what examination I was able to make there appeared to be an estimate of 250 planes that were damaged, plus 10; another estimate of 157. They apparently were different estimates. Estimates of different pilots. I didn't find the figure of 450. Was that a cumulation, or what was the basis of it?

Admiral INGLIS. The source of that figure of 450 is a combination of sources A, B, and C. There was one statement that 250 planes were known to have been destroyed plus an indeterminate number of others presumably in the hangars, and therefore not subject to photographic reconnaissance and observation.

Senator BREWSTER. Two hundred and fifty plus ten.

Admiral INGLIS. Some of the other sources increased the figure and said specifically that their estimate was 450.

Senator BREWSTER. That specific figure appeared somewhere didn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. That figure is in the diary of a Japanese ensign captured at Tarawa. The committee has that exhibit.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I have that. What is the citation on that? [497] Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry, that we haven't got. Senator BREWSTER. What I have is page 15, showing this estimate

of 157.

Admiral INGLIS. The only copy of any of those documents in existence are in the hands of the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the record may we have what the Senator is reading from, page 15 of what?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator state what that was that he was reading from?

Senator BREWSTER. It was the document the witness now has. Admiral INGLIS. I have before me a document entitled "Translation of Captured Document, Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy, Captured Tarawa, 24 November, 1943."

Senator BREWSTER. Is that the diary to which you are referring? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that shows, on the page I pointed out, the figure of 157?

Admiral INGLIS. On page 4 of that document, at the top of the page, fifth line, is the figure "shot down, 450 planes".

Senator BREWSTER. That is right. What was the later record, how did he distinguish between these two? What is the crepancy between them?

[498] dis

Admiral INGLIS. The official figure which the Japanese announced shortly after the attack was 450 planes. I am informed that later on, in a more detailed analysis of the evidence which, apparently, was available to the Japanese, that they became more conservative and cut this down to 157, but that was never incorporated into a subsequent official announcement. As far as the public knew they stood by their original announcement of 450.

Senator BREWSTER. What does that purport to be, on page 115, where the figure of 157 was used?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that this purports to be just the ensign's recollection, apparently, of an order from the Navy Ministry, but the text is so obscure that I wouldn't like to state just what the significance of that is.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, about the records of the Hawaii broadcasting stations to check up on the report as to espionage, are those station records available for that period?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that the Army will have those, if any, and I would like to inform the Senator that I only had about 5 minutes to look at this last document which came in, and I am not too familiar with the substance contained in that document; and, of course, with respect to any intelligence or counter-intelligence material that the Senator may be interested [499] in, I would like to refer him to the then district intelligence officer out in the Fourteenth District, naval district, Admiral Mayfield, who is listed as a witness, and also Admiral Wilkinson, who was then the Director of Intelligence, and who is also listed as a witness.

I am not prepared to answer questions on that.

[500] Senator BREWSTER. Well, as I understand, this possible tip as to the broadcasting from Hawaii to inform the Japanese fleet came on October 13, that they made this extension "Tokyo” at the suggestion of the authorities here and that an immediate check was made then to find out whether transcripts of those Hawaiian broadcasts during the period just preceding Pearl Harbor, December 7, were available.

That, I assume, came under your office.

Admiral INGLIS. From a very hasty look at that document I would have that same impression.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; and that it then appeared that those records were missing. Is that also your impression?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my impression.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; so that the records for that period apparently disappeared. The suggestions were made that some of them

think that might possibly have been turned over to the Army or the FBI.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that is what the paper says, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, can the Army find out? Colonel, have you any information about this?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. Senator BREWSTER. Well, the matter will be followed up.

[501] Under which jurisdiction would that matter come? Admiral INGLIS. Well, I would suggest that the Senator address a question of that nature to Admiral Mayfield and Admiral Wilkinson. Senator BREWSTER. Well, no, I am speaking to the Director of Naval Intelligence now, as this is apparently a current matter. It apparently is obvious that there are no past records about this and the question is to determine what did become of those records and not under whose authority they were destroyed.

Admiral INGLIS. According to our records, those documents were turned over to a Major Putnam, an Army major, who was on duty in Hawaii at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I know you don't want to do an injustice to the Army, but I think there is great doubt on that score. I think Major Putnam expressed some doubt as to whether he got them. In any event, the station claims it did not turn over any but limited ones, which may or may not have had any relation to this particular episode, but would it come within your purview now as Director of Naval Intelligence to pursue that matter and to find out as fully as possible whether or not there may have been any relation?

Admiral INGLIS. The Office of Naval Intelligence has already inquired into that matter and the best information [502] that we have is that these documents were turned over to Major Putnam of the Army.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with the message of or the battle orders of November 25 and December 2 as appear in your evidence on page 437 in our text, it may not be particularly material, although it has sufficient significance so that I am sure you would want the record correct.

According to the exhibits which we examined, the battle order which you cited on November 25 was actually the one of December 2. The phraseology was somewhat different in those two orders.

Have you those there? That is subhead B on page 437, at the bottom of the page. You will find that under the transcript that you presented to all the members of the committee from General MacArthur's headquarters on complying with your orders of October 26th. Admiral INGLIS. Is the Senator referring to the quotation:

"Japan now understands her self-preservation and self-defense has reached"— "Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America"?

Senator BREWSTER. No; have you the transcript of the evidence? Well, yes, it is after that order, but it is 4-A, [503] and in your testimony there cited as "B" at the bottom of page 437. Admiral INGLIS. I have that, sir. Your question is, what is the source of that?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, yes.

Admiral INGLIS. The source of that is the material from headquarters in Tokyo.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, my point was that the language which you used-I think you have transposed them between the 25th of November and December 2.

Admiral INGLIS. If the Senator will refer to the so-called MacArthur paper on

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. Sir?

Senator BREWSTER. I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, subparagraph 4-A.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Admiral INGLIS. Issued in December.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is there a copy of that to be made available to all the other members of the committee? Senator BREWSTER. Yes, you have that.

Mr. MURPHY. You are reading from the copy?

[504] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Then the

Senator BREWSTER. I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That was issued on December 2, is that right? Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, you show that in your testimony on page 437 as issued on the 22d of November.

Admiral INGLIS. Now, if the Senator will bear with me and refer to page 8 of that same document, down near the bottom of the page, there is a shorter version of that same paragraph.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Admiral INGLIS. Now, that version on page 8 was issued on the 22d of November.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right, and that is the one which should appear at the bottom of page 437 as the 22d of November order, is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. To be chronologically correct, I believe that is the case, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't know that there will ever be any material distinction between them but I think it would be well if you would see that the record is corrected so that [505] whatever variation there is in language between the order of the 22d of Novemberon the 25th of November, that is the date, the 25th of November and the December 2 order is clarified in the record in whatever way you find most practicable.

Admiral INGLIS. May I ask the reporter now to make this correction on the record? At the bottom of page 437, lines 21 to 25, inclusive, substitute the following:

(b) Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.1

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the other is on page 464, which is the order of well, that refers again to the erroneous order. You subsequently put in the message of December 2. It seemed to me it might have some importance that on December 2 they did issue the order which you have erroneously quoted. Perhaps you can put it in at

'P. 180, supra.

79716-46-pt. 1- -16

that same point, at page 437, if you wish to, and substitute for that on December 2 that further language was used in the battle order.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes; will the reporter please add to that previous quotation that on the 2d of December the longer version, as shown in the original transcript, volume 3, was issued as an Imperial naval order.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't know what the significance is. [506] They call it a Naval General Staff instruction. Does that have any significance in your documents.

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the Japanese procedure in a case of that nature is for the Imperial General Headquarters to issue instructions to the Navy section. The Navy section then converts those instructions into an order.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, will you properly complete the text as shown in the MacArthur report of that December 2 Navy General Staff instruction?

Admiral INGLIS. The version as contained in the so-called MacArthur paper is:

Naval General Staff instruction (issued 2 December) Bear in mind that should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and to return to their bases.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the only other comment I have, Admiral, and I don't want to seem too meticulous, but it did seem, at least, we are dealing in connection with the question of visual hand signals.

You remember that was a matter of discussion, as to whether or not that ever occurred and you reported from the Japanese manuscripts reports that the Japanese pilots stated [507] that no visual signals were received.

I noted in the report of it that he added-it may or may not be significant the words "to his knowledge," and it seemed to me it might be illuminating as indicating that he did not presume to say as to whether anybody else might have received them but as far as he knew none were received. I am sure that was simply

Admiral INGLIS. I agree with the Senator and think that the same reservation should be applied to nearly all of the verbal testimony given by these prisoners of war.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Inglis, as I understand it in the printed testimony at page 422 you outlined in the record the sources of material upon which you based the summary which you gave to the committee, is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I also understand it, the committee were furnished with a group of papers, the first one dated November 8. 1945, and headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers", continuing down to a paper which appears to be a questionnaire, all of these papers [508] apparently having been forwarded to us from the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.