(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface. (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing. (6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale. (7) In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting in confusion and a net loss of time. Shall I continue? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, I think those are pertinent. Admiral RICHARDSON (reading): If the disposition of the fleet were determined solely by naval considerations the major portion of the fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war. If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the fleet. In other words, is it more important [679] to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases? In case our relations with another Pacific nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2,000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases? Mr. MITCHELL. Shortly after that you made a visit to Washington, did you not, Admiral?. Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember when you reached here and when you left, approximately? You were here on October 8, were you not? Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. At 07:07, on October 7. I talked with Stark, Nimitz, Knox. That was my second visit to Washington. I came at that time because the Secretary said he wanted to talk to me. I arrived. I found that they were considering increasing the strength of the Asiatic Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Hart. And while here I lunched with the President. Had a long talk with him. I saw Dr. Stanley [680] Hornbeck of the Department of State, who was at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, the advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs. Mr. MITCHELL. In your interviews with the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark, did you take up this question with them of your objections, the objections that you just stated, as to the basing of the fleet in the Hawaiian area? Admiral RICHARDSON. I think not, because I had given a memorandum to the Secretary and fully stated my views to him. I had sent a copy of it to Admiral Stark, who was thoroughly familiar with my views. And I had sent a copy of part of it to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department who knew what I thought. So, if I remember correctly, I did not talk about that with Admiral Stark. I talked primarily about detaching ships from the main fleet to strengthen the Asiatic Fleet. And the first day I arrived I was suddenly confronted with the fact that 5,000 sailors had landed on the west coast to be turned over to me and I had to find some means of getting them out to Hawaii. So I had to take a carrier-I think it was the Saratoga-and use her to transport the men that I was unable to accommodate in ships that had come to the coast with me. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the White House records show that on October 8, 1940, you had lunch with the President and with Governor Leahy at 1 p. m. Do you remember that? [681] Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct. Mr. MITCHELL. Governor Leahy or Admiral Leahy? Mr. MITCHELL. He was then Governor of Puerto Rico. Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. We did not go to the White House office in company. I was invited by the President through the Chief of Naval Operations to lunch at 1 o'clock. When I arrived there I found Admiral Leahy there. Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state in your own way, Admiral, just what occurred at that meeting and what was said about any of these matters we have been referring to? Admiral RICHARDSON. The President talked to Admiral Leahy about Puerto Rican affairs, and as I was not interested, I remember little of what was said; but I have a vague recollection that one subject under discussion was the question of housing. The President asked Admiral Leahy his opinion about strengthening the Asiatic Fleet and my recollection is that Admiral Leahy said that whatever you sent out will be lost, therefore I would send the least valuable combatant ships we have, the 7,500 ton cruisers, but I recommended, I personally recommended that none be sent. A decision to send none was reached. Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations previously? [682] Admiral RICHARDSON. He had been Chief of Naval Operations. He was Chief of Naval Operations when I was the assistant. Mr. MITCHELL. Then proceed, Admiral, with your statement of what occurred there. Admiral RICHARDSON. The following statement, because of its importance, I have written out. I wrote it out several weeks ago when it appeared certain, in my mind, that I would, unfortunately, be called before this committee. And with the permission of the Chairman I would like to read this statement The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral RICHARDSON. Which I prepared in the quiet of my home, where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent possible. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral, to do that. Admiral RICHARDSON. I took up the question of returning to the Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment. The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train of [683] auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action. I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations. The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.". I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war operations." The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward." This is embarrassing. Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not [684] enter the war, that if they even attacked the Fhilippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. Mr. MITCHELL. Does that complete your statement of the conversation? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is about all of it. Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to adjourn? The CHAIRMAN. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945.) [685] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1945 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee. [686] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned. You may proceed. Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell-this is not necessarily on the record. (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. MITCHELL. Very well. TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON (Resumed) Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day following this visit with the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. It was. Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me to interpose. Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like to have that at this moment, if I could. Mr. MITCHELL. I am informed that they have been working [687] on it; they ought to have it any time; they haven't sent it yet. Mr. GEARHART. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will appreciate it very, very much. The CHAIRMAN. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as soon as it is available it will be presented here.1 1 Exhibit No. 86. Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. MITCHELL. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940, following your visit the day before with the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and as to his views as expressed to me. Mr. MITCHELL. The first item on that memorandum is: "Go ahead with assembly of train." What does that mean? Admiral RICHARDSON. There had been some discussion as to assembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be prepared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead with the assembly of a train. Mr. MITCHELL. Item 2 is: "Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four old light cruisers?" Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know about? Admiral RICHARDSON. The Fresident asked me. I knew we did not have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in Samoa. Mr. MITCHELL. Item 3: Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the international date line. Was that another request from the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. No. That was a request by me, as I remember it. Mr. MITCHELL. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated: The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley That is Admiral Ghormley, is it? Admiral RICHARDSON. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley.. Mr. MITCHELL (reading): -was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the [698] British Admirality felt that they should have offices prepared for staff conferences. Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you? Admiral RICHARDSON. I was. Mr. MITCHELL. No. 5: The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain overland through Africa. Under that, in brackets, "F. D. R." What does that mean? Admiral RICHARDSON. "F. D. R." belongs to the next paragraph. The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is intended to read: I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability, because that is what the President stated to me. I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo |