Chief of Naval Operations. There was a commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, who commanded all the combatant ships in commission in the Atlantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations. The CHAIRMAN. When did you become commander in chief of the United States Fleet? Admiral RICHARDSON. On January 6, 1940. The CHAIRMAN. So that you were in command of the fleet approxi mately 13 months? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the fleet under your command in the Pacific? Admiral RICHARDSON. He was. He was in the fleet under the command of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark before I became commander in chief and before Admiral Stark [737] became Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved Admiral Stark as commander of the cruisers and from that position he relieved me. The CHAIRMAN. What relationship did he occupy in authority with respect to you as commander in chief of the fleet? Was he senior officer under you or how far down the line did he go? Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel ? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he was very far down. He was a rear admiral and under me came first the commander of the battle force, who was an admiral. Then commander of the scouting force and commander of battleships, who were both vice admirals. Then Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruisers and as such he was on the same level as the commander of the battleships, the commander of the destroyers and the commander of the aircraft. The CHAIRMAN. And he was commander of all the cruisers then in the force? Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, what we call a type commander. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, in this correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, you continuously emphasized your belief that the fleet should be based on the Pacific coast rather than in the Hawaiian Islands or Oahu? [738] Admiral RICHARDSON. I did that. The CHAIRMAN. And there were, as I gather from the correspondence, many reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their homes? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral RICHARDSON. I presented solely the naval point of view. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral RICHARDSON. There are other considerations that at times determined the disposition of the fleet or the units thereof. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washington and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there was probably a diplomatic or other, maybe psychological, reason for keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the part of Japan? Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely. [739] The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you were in Washington you emphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was beign vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships were being built? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. That you needed more men? Admiral RICHARDSON. I did it in and out of port, everywhere. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Then you referred to 5,000 men that were allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on a carrier, did you say? Admiral RICHARDSON. Those that I was unable to accommodate in the ships that came with me to the west coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor in a carrier. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Following your detachment from the fleet you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in Washington? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Senator George? Senator GEORGE. I don't care to ask any questions at the present time. The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper? [740] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't think I have any questions now, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas? Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the admiral two or three questions. In your memorandum of September 12, 1940, to the Secretary of the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points to be considered, among which were the operations of the fleet and in that part of the memorandum you discussed the problems involved if the fleet was to be retained in Hawaiian waters. As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you stressed in that memorandum were purely problems from a naval standpoint and nothing else? Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, absolutely. Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, you set forth seven points, seven disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area. Those points have been gone over by counsel and yourself and I was anxious to determine from you as to whether or not at that time you considered the question of the possibility of a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation, in connection with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters? Admiral RICHARDSON. I had not considered that it was likely that the fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid and I so stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the fleet. [741] The CHAIRMAN. Will the admiral desist for a moment? The Chair announced at the beginning of these hearings that the photographers would not be permitted in this areaway. It interferes with the wit 79716-46-pt. 1-21 nesses, with the counsel, and with the committee, and I hope that my friend will observe that rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator. Senator LUCAS. This memorandum was in June 1940, and if I understand you correctly, Admiral, the possibility of a hostile air attack on the fleet was not considered in making up the recommendations which the authorities here in Washington should study? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct. Senator LUCAS. And the question of a submarine attack was not considered either in connection with those plans? Admiral RICHARDSON. I have difficulty in hearing the Senator. Senator LUCAS. I say the question of a submarine attack by a hostile force was not considered in 1940 either? Admiral RICHARDSON. No. I think my view is clearly presented in a document before the committee which says: The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assump- [742] tions: (A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt; (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor, (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pear Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel, (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. So that, actually, before I left the fleet we were sweeping the channel against magnetic mines. Senator LUCAS. How long was it after you gave your seven points of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed? Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Andrews' order did not start a patrol. Senator LUCAS. What was that order? Admiral RICHARDSON. It modified the patrol that I had in existence. Senator LUCAS. I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into existence that you had, Admiral? [743] Admiral RICHARDSON. It started the day that the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April. Senator LUCAS. 1940? Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940, purely as a part of the fleet exercise for training purposes. Senator LUCAS. For training purposes only? Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. Senator LUCAS. And how long did that continue? Admiral RICHARDSON. It continued until, I think, the 30th of December 1940. Senator LUCAS. Well, how did the admiral's order augment that? I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago. Admiral RICHARDSON. Initially the long-range patrol, so-called, but it was not a long-range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that220 to 335 to 180 miles. Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance to 300 miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north. Later on I modified that patrol. Senator LUCAS. Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long did that continue? Admiral RICHARDSON. The patrol established by Admiral Andrews? [744] Senator LUCAS. That is right. Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not certain, but I think it continued as long as the Army maintained their alert which was, as I remember, almost a month. Senator LUCAS. Now, how many planes were being used on that patrol? Admiral RICHARDSON. I haven't the faintest idea. Senator LUCAS. Did the Navy use any planes? Senator LUCAS. But you don't know how many planes the Navy used on that patrol? Admiral RICHARDSON. No. Senator LUCAS. Well, who would know that? Admiral RICHARDSON. I doubt if anybody would know Senator LUCAS. Well, weren't you Admiral RICHARDSON-Because you cannot remember, at least, the commander in chief cannot remember, details of activities after 5 years. Senator LUCAS. Well, did you make any record of the daily patrols that were made by these planes from the ships? Admiral RICHARDSON. No. You established it in an order and forgot it, assuming that it would be carried out. [745] Senator LUCAS. You do not recall? You wouldn't want to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol to cover this arc that was established by the admiral? Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I would not hazard. a guess and the only possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files of the commander in chief and the files Senator LUCAS. Of the Fourteenth Naval District? Admiral RICHARDSON (continuing). Become very voluminous and are normally retained active only about 2 or 3 years. Senator LUCAS. Do I understand that at that particular time the planes that were on the sea on the Enterprise, that were making daily flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes that went out and when they came back? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of everything that it does. Senator LUCAS. Well, that is what I thought. Admiral RICHARDSON. And in the patrol squadrons there would undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when they returned. Senator LUCAS. Now, who would have the record of the patrol, of the men who were making the determination of the number of planes that were going out on this patrol in line [746] with the order that was augmented by Admiral Andrews? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the officer in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many planes to use, when to start out, how far they would go, when they would return. Senator LUCAS. Well, was that Admiral Andrews' responsibility then? Admiral RICHARDSON. What? Senator LUCAS. Would that be Admiral Andrews' responsibility for issuing the order and for the keeping of the record of the planes? Admiral RICHARDSON. No; he would not keep a record. In consultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I think was Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general terms. The commander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it and record his compliance. Senator LUCAS. All right. Later on, Admiral, you modified this order? Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. Senator LUCAS. Just how did you do it, now? Admiral RICHARDSON. Because of the number of planes that were available and because of the need for training men, I modified the patrol to cover periodically an arc between 170°, which is 10° to the east of south and [747] 350°, and I covered daily an arc, a sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I rotated that sector. Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, one further question and then I will be through. With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any information at that time from anyone in Washington, D. C., about that? Admiral RICHARDSON. Not at that time. Senator LUCAS. You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark about the type of alert that was on and that you had never received any answer from him. Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, I telegraphed him, I mean I sent him a radio and asked him what it was all about. Senator LUCAS. And you never received any reply to that? Senator LUCAS. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as [748] Senator LUCAS. What did Admiral Stark say as to the reason he did not reply after this type of alert went out to the islands? Admiral RICHARDSON. He said it was an exercise, an Army exercise. Senator LUCAS. That is what Admiral Stark said? Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. Senator LUCAS. And he did not think it was sufficiently important, even though he had received a message from you, he did not think it was important enough to make reply to you? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he knew that I had enough confidence in him to know that if it were the real thing he would have told me. Senator LUCAS. But you did send him a wire? |