Admiral RICHARDSON. Because at the end of a fleet exercise [788] all of the senior officers are assembled.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give us the date of that order?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Which order?

Senator FERGUSON. The one you just read. I haven't seen it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. May 4.

Senator FERGUSON. The 4th of May?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of the memo that you were to

release a press release?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received that on May 7.

Senator FERGUSON. The 7th of May?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever discussed that with Admiral Stark or anyone here in Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Before the event?

Senator FERGUSON. No, after the event. After you had that paper asking you to make a press release, did you ever discuss that with Admiral Stark or anyone else?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, sir. No, I never discussed it with any

one.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever discussed your testimony here with anyone other than the counsel? You have never written [789] any books about it, or magazine articles, or anything of that kind, have you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I have never talked to anybody about it. Senator FERGUSON. Now when did you first receive definite information that the fleet would be kept at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. We never received any definite information as to the duration of our stay in Hawaii. We just gradually drifted into staying.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time were you receiving any diplomatic information between our country and Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, while you were commander in chief, receive any diplomatic information?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you came here to Washington to receive your instructions as far as any diplomatic relations were concerned.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I came here to find out the background of our stay, the purposes back of it, and, if possible, how long we would stay.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get the background from the State Department or anyone?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I acquired the information that [790] we would stay there as long as it was considered essential for us to support diplomatic representations by being there.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you told what the diplomatic representations were that you were supporting? Were you taken in on those?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, but I can read it in the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you state what your opinion was as to what were the diplomatic relations that were going on at that time?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the United States has always believed in a strong China, a China that could stand alone, and we were doing all that we could, without going to war, to induce Japan to cease what we considered was aggressive action in China. We also were opposed to the extension of Japanese activities and Japanese influences further south in Asia.

[791] Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with anyone the question of a patrol line from Hawaii to the Asiatic coast? Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us whom you discussed such a matter with?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, may I read a memorandum on that subject which I prepared several weeks ago, thinking that I might be asked that question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The committee will be very glad to have it, Admiral.

May the Chair ask what sort of a line that was you were inquired about?

Admiral RICHARDSON. A patrol line.

In presenting this, I would like to state that my war plans officer accompanied me to Washington, and I discussed with him most of the things that were talked about. He was a man whose judgment I held in very high esteem, and when I prepared this he went over it so that I discussed with him what I might present here as part of my testimony, and I did it in the interest of accuracy.

On October 10, the day that I had reservations to return to the west coast by plane

The CHAIRMAN. That is 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940; October 10, 1940.

[792] About 5 p. m. Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, sent for me and Admiral Stark to come to his office. I was accompanied by Commander Vincent R. Murphy. Admiral Stark was accompanied by Admiral Ingersoll, and Capt. C. M. Cook, who is now, I think, perhaps a vice admiral.

The Secretary stated that he had important information bearing on the employment of the fleet. He stated that he had just talked to the President, and that the President was concerned as to the Japanese reaction to the British on the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled for October 17. In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the President, was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philippines, and from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies.

The question was raised-I do not recall by whom-as to whether this included stopping Japanese ships as well as others, and the view was expressed that this would be an act of war, and I asked whether the President was considering a declaration of war.

The Secretary stated that the President hadn't said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.

I was amazed at the proposal and stated that the fleet [793] was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action, and that we would certainly lose many of the ships.

Parenthetically, I had seen that thing tried in the war plans, and it didn't work.

There was some further discussion that a line of light ships as proposed would entail such dispersal as to expose the ships to destruction in detail, and that the best way to accomplish the President's purpose was to control the source of the trade by patrol of the relatively few ports involved.

The Secretary appeared displeased at the general reaction and mine in particular, and said:

I am not a strategist; if you don't like the President's plan, draw up one of your own to accomplish the purpose.

The conference closed with the understanding that Stark and I, with our war plans officers, would draw up a statement of assumptions, proposed decisions, and tentative plan of operation in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.

An outline plan was drawn up. It envisaged the transfer to the Pacific of additional patrol planes, an aircraft carrier, some destroyers, and possibly a cruiser or two.

Admiral Stark was not prepared to approve these transfers, [794] and stated that he would talk the matter over with the President and let me know later what decisions were arrived at.

When the plan was completed, the Secretary and the President were away from Washington, and I returned to the west coast on the 11th. Senator FERGUSON. Are you through, Admiral, with that answer? Admiral RICHARDSON. I am ready for another question, sir. [795] Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any more about the plan after you left Washington? You say that the Secretary and President-you mean the Secretary of the Navy and the Presidentwere not in Washington when the plans were completed, and you left Washington.

Now, did you hear anything further about the plan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received, after my return to the New Mexico at Long Beach, a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing me to send to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet a copy of the assumptions and the tentative United States Fleet disposition, and operations to meet the situation, which I did in a letter dated 16 October 1940, and my recollection is that I sent this to Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Asiatic?

Commander RICHARDSON. Asiatic Fleet. By the commanding officer of the Houston, which was bound out from Long Beach.

I sent this letter out by Captain Jesse B. Olindorf, now either a rear admiral or vice admiral, and this [indicating] is the paper. Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, do you know what paper the admiral is referring to? Have we a copy of it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. What?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked counsel if we had a copy, if [796] they knew what memorandum you were referring to, and if we had a copy of it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The date is 16 October, 1940, and the subject is "International Situation Re Enforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.” You had this duplicated.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me see it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The light paper doesn't belong with it. I would like to have that.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, sir. I will tear the light paper off. (A document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. MITCHELL. The admiral is right. We do have a copy of it. This is it, isn't it, Admiral? [Indicating.]

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we ready to proceed?

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't had time to read this, but I will come back later to it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. If I may add, this plan was never carried out. Senator FERGUSON. Can you give a reason why it was not carried out?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it served as a base, I mean

[797] it influenced in some way the development of succeeding plans, but I never heard any more about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at that time we did not have an embargo on, did we, in October of 1940? That did not come until July 25, was it not, in 1941?

I notice the "B" item here is :

Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.

C. Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and America.

At that time we did not have an embargo on, did we?
Admiral RICHARDSON. As far as I know, we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any embargo prior to sometime in July of 1941?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do not remember when the embargoes, any embargoes were placed, but there was either a limitation on the shipment of aviation gasoline under consideration or in effect before I relinquished command of the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand you to say that you said something to the Secretary of the Navy about-that this would mean war or would not mean war, if you put this into effect that he had suggested?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I thought it would mean war, and I so stated to the Secretary.

[798] Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us his reply to that? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he said that he didn't know whether the President meant war or not. And I further stated that the fleet was not ready for any such plan-was not ready for war.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you told the Secretary of the Navy that you were not in position to put this plan that he was putting up to you into effect?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I never stated that I couldn't put it into effect. I could have tried it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the substance of what you said to him? Admiral RICHARDSON. That in my opinion it would mean war; in my opinion we would lose the ships; and in my opinion we couldn't stop trade between South America and Japan without being in trouble with both of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything else you can add to what you have said that took place at that time in relation to this embargo or patrol of the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; except as I stated before that the Secretary stated, if you are unwilling, deem it inadvisable, highly inadvis

able to establish this line of ships to shut off trade between Japan and America, draw up a plan by which you would shut off such trade, if ordered to do so.

[799] Senator FERGUSON. That is the plan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is the plan.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read this over and come back to it.

Will you refer to your long-hand letter of January 26, 1940, please? It is the part where you are talking of Admiral Leahy as "Bill Leahy." Do you have your letter, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where you say:

I use to say to Bill Leahy "be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they cannot leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

Now, do you remember that part? Whom were you talking about— "the boss"?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The President of the United States, who is also known as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy by the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is a paragraph in that same letter, on the first page:

When this understanding was reached it had some value, [800] but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about two and one-half continents.

What were you talking about there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well that might be some slight exaggeration. Senator FERGUSON. What were you exaggerating about?

Admiral RICHARDSON. About the 211⁄2 continents. But my recollection of that is this, that Rear Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll-I think that is his initial-Royal Ingersoll anyway, then a rear admiral, had made a trip to London to have some exploratory conferences with the British Admiralty, because if there appears a possibility of nations being associated, it is always customary, in my opinion for the miltary or the naval staffs to discuss with each other what might happen if such association becomes a reality, so they would not be taken by surprise.

So I was expressing my understanding of the meaning of exploratory discussions betwen the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, as what might be considered by them as reasonable steps to be taken if the United States and Great Britain should become associated in an effort.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time Admiral Ingersoll held what position in the United States Navy?

[801] Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not certain, but I believe at least there is a possibility, that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time? It was Admiral Stark, was it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Stark; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you had been saying to Bill Leahy, as you describe hime-Admiral Leahy-what position did he hold in the Navy when you were telling him to "impress the boss"?