[29] Mr. MITCHELL. There is another order, of November 7, 1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk freely with the committee and volunteer information. (The memorandum of November 7, 1945, follows:)

[30]

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, November 7, 1945. Memorandum for the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows: "SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs."

In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, you are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the committee's investigation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or

[31] not they

are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or not they are called to testify before the joint committee.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[32] Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is a memorandum by the President under date of November 9, 1945, enlarging on the last-mentioned memorandum.

(The memorandum of November 9, 1945, follows:)

[33] Memorandum for the chief executives of all executive departments, agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With further reference to my letter of November 7, 1945, addressed to the above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed to the committee.

This does not include any files or written material.

[34] Mr. MITCHELL. Those formal documents I hand to the reporter to open the record in that way.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper and helpful if the record of the original presentation of the resolution by the chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that timenot subsequent at that time, be inserted in the record so that there may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings. The CHAIRMAN. There being no objection in connection with the introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author of the resolution, and the discussion that took place at that time, will be inserted in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full discussion that took place at that time be inserted in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what I intended.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understood the Senator from Maine requested.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

I would like also to have the request of the committee to the President, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be inserted in connection with these papers.1

[34a] (Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including the discussion and adoption of S. Con. Res. 27, ordered to be printed at this point, follow :)

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, inasmuch as I shall be compelled to leave the Chamber shortly on an important matter and may not be present during the entire call of the morning hour's business, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted at this time to make a brief statement and, following that, to introduce a concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Kentucky may proceed.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941.

On December 18, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive order a board or commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

This commission was composed of Justice Owen J. Roberts, as chairman, Admiral William H. Standley, Admiral J. M. Reeves, Gen. Frank H. McCoy, and Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.

The commisison made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and this report 'was immediately made public.

In June 1944, by joint resolution approved June 13, Congress in effect directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate appropriate boards or courts of inquiry "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper." The board appointed on behalf of the War Department was composed of Lt. Gen. George Grunert, as president, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank.

This board made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1944, and the report was released to the public on Wednesday, August 29, 1945. The report consists of more than 300 pages of typewritten matter detailing the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, indulges in criticisms of certain military and other officials, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of War. The board appointed on behalf of the Navy consisted of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, as president, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews.

This board finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

The report of the Navy board went into some detail concerning the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, and recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

This report was also made public by the President on August 29, 1945.

Since these reports were made public, I have spent a large portion of my time studying them, and also, in connection with them, I have reread the report of the Roberts commission.

The official report of the board appointed by the Secretary of War I have here, and, as I have said, it consists of 304 pages of typewritten matter on what we call legal size paper, not letter size. The report of the board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy contains various divisions, all of which add up to something like 100 pages of typewritten matter.

Reading these reports and studying them, insofar as I could in the limited time at my disposal, required my attention not only during the daytime since the

1 See the suggested memorandum approved by the President in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5510.

reports were made public on last Wednesday, but required practically all of two nights, in order that I might read not only the reports, but the statement or summary made by the Secretary of War based upon the report of the Army board and the statement made by the Secretary of the Navy based upon the report of the naval board of inquiry, as well as other documents pertaining thereto. I have not been away from the city of Washington during the entire adjournment since the 1st day of August, when the Senate adjourned.

Mr. President, I shall not at this time attempt to discuss these various reports in detail, but after studying them to the extent possible in the time at my disposal, I am convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States.

In forming this opinion, Mr. President, I cast no reflections upon the ability, the patriotism, the good faith, or the sincerity of the boards which have thus far investigated and reported upon the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor on any member of these various boards. They are all outstanding American citizens and officials, who have rendered signal service to their country over a long period of time in various capacities. That includes the members of the Roberts commission, the War Department board, and the Navy Department board, as well as all those officials who have commented upon these reports or are in any way involved in them.

But these reports, Mr. President, are confusing and conflicting when compared with one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves.

Under these circumstances it is not strange that widespread confusion and suspicion prevail among the American people and among the Members of Congress.

In these several reports men in the armed services and in civilian positions of executive responsibility and authority are subjected to criticism, and the defenses are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. It would be easy now, if time allowed and if it were necessary, to point out these inconsistencies between the report made by the naval board and the report made by the Army board, and both of them as compared to the Roberts report. I do not deem it necessary to go into that at this time.

It is my belief, therefore, Mr. President, arrived at immediately upon the conclusion of my study of these reports, that under all the circumstances Congress itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack.

This inquiry, Mr. President, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to convince the Congress and the country and the world that no effort has been made to shield any person who may have been directly or indirectly responsible for this disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in authority, military, naval, or civilian, at the time or prior thereto.

Ever since the day of Pearl Harbor there have been discussions of courts martial in the Army and in the Navy. We have here extended from time to time the statute of limitations pertaining to courts martial. The report of neither the naval nor the military board of inquiry recommends any further proceedings in these matters. It is my understanding that the law is that in the Army no man has a legal right to demand that he be court-martialed. Charges must be filed against an Army officer or an enlisted man setting out the offense which he is alleged to have committed. He has no right, as I understand the law, to go into the War Department and demand that he be court-martialed upon any accusation or any charge of misconduct on his part.

[346] I understand that in the Navy any officer or man who is charged with an offense that would constitute a violation of the Articles of War or Navy Regulations has the right to demand or request-I am not certain that he has the right to demand, but has the right to request, and it may be to demand-that he be given a court martial.

So that as it applies to any Army officer who may have been responsible prior to or at the time of this attack, as I understand, he has no right to demand that he be given a trial in order that he may be vindicated or that the facts may be brought out. Whether in the Navy formal request has been made by any naval officer for a court martial I am not in position to say, though the newspapers have carried stories that such a request has been made.

But if it were possible or appropriate, Mr. President, to subject high-ranking military or naval officers to courts martial, the trials might be conducted in

secret, and would relate themselves principally, if not entirely, to the guilt or innocence of the person against whom the specific charges were leveled. I do not here feel called upon or competent to determine whether court martial should be inaugurated in any case involving any officer of the Army or Navy or any person in the armed forces.

But I am convinced that the Congress and the country desire an open, public investigation which will produce the facts, and all the facts, so far as it is humanly possible to produce them.

Such an investigation should be conducted as a public duty and a public service.

It should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead.

It should be conducted in an atmosphere of judicial responsibility, and it ought to be so complete and so fair that no person could doubt the good faith of the report and the findings made in it, or those who make it.

It ought not to be conducted or undertaken for the purpose or with the sole view of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who has been in office during the period involved.

It ought not to be undertaken or conducted for the purpose of enhancing or retarding the welfare of any political party, or any person now in office, or any person who desires or aspires to hold public office.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of attempting to bedaub the escutcheon of any innocent man, high or low, living or dead, with the infamy of imputed wrong.

It should not be conducted with the purpose of gratifying the misanthropic hatreds of any person toward any present or past public servant, high or low, living or dead.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of casting aspersions upon the names and records of men who have rendered outstanding service to their country and to the world; nor should it be conducted for the purpose of whitewashing any person who may have been guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the whole affair.

Such an investigation should look solely to the ascertainment of the cold, unvarnished, indisputable facts so far as they are obtainable, not only for the purpose of fixing responsibility, whether that responsibility be upon an individual or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or cooperated, or failed to do either. It should be conducted with a view of ascertaining whether, in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor and prior thereto, or even subsequent thereto, it might be useful to us in legislating in regard to the operations of our military and naval forces and the executive departments having control of them, or which are supposed to work with them.

In my opinion this investigation should be a joint effort of the two Houses of Congress. If the two Houses should undertake separately to investigate, going their separate ways, the result might be divergent reports made by the two Houses, which would contribute to further confusion in the minds of the public, as well as in the minds of Members of Congress. Whatever the findings may be, they will carry more weight and bear greater authority if both Houses of Congress jointly and concurrently conduct the investigation.

For these reasons, Mr. President, acting in my capacity as a Member of the Senate and in my capacity as majority leader of this body, I am submitting a concurrent resolution directing such an investigation by a joint committee of the two Houses, consisting of five Members from each House, no more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the respective Presiding Officers of the two Houses, with all the authority they will need; and, in order that there may be no unnecessary delay in making the investigation and the report to Congress, directing that such report be made not later than January 3, 1946.

It is now nearly 4 years since disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor. During the war, for certain military reasons, it was deemed inexpedient to do what I am now proposing. I believe that that decision on the part of the Congress and the Government as a whole was a wise decision. But the war is now over, and there is no military reason of which I am cognizant which would make it advisable any longer to delay a complete revelation of all the facts and circumstances leading up to this disaster, and the events which occurred while it was in progress. Mr. President, I am submitting this resolution with the full knowledge and approval of the President of United States. After I had studied the reports and made up my own mind as to what my duty was, I called upon the President

and discussed the matter with him, because obviously I would not want to take such a step without discussing it with him or at least letting him know what I had in mind and what I thought about it. He not only approved but urged that I be not dissuaded for any reason from my purpose to submit the resolution calling for this investigation.

Also, since the preparation of the resolution, I have discussed the matter with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and I have his assurance that if and when the Senate acts upon the concurrent resolution, it will receive prompt consideration by the House.

Mr. President, I express the earnest hope, which the President shares, that the two Houses may promptly agree to the resolution; that the investigation may proceed forthwith, without further delay; and that the Congress and the country may expect a full and impartial report, without regard to the consequences, within the time limit designated in the resolution. I send the resolution to the desk and ask that it be read and appropriately referred. [346] Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I think it would be appropriate to ask that the concurrent reso lution be immediately considered and agreed to.

Mr. BARKLEY. That is what I had in mind. I should like to ask that that be done. Under the rule, a resolution providing for an investigation and calling for the expenditure of funds is supposed to be referred to a standing committee, reported back, and then referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate. Personally I should like to obviate those necessities, and I suppose it could be done by unanimous consent. I make the parliamentary inquiry now as to whether, notwithstanding the rule, the Senate could, by unanimous consent, proceed to consider and agree to the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It will be done by unanimous consent.
Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. BARKLEY. I think it would be appropriate to read the resolution first, for the information of the Senate. If I could obtain unanimous consent for its present consideration, I should be extremely happy.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be read for the information of the Senate.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27) was read as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than_three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. "SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

"SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

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