opportunity to read it. We have had it a sufficient length of time. I have read the statement in its entirety and reread a great part of it a second time yesterday. So far as I am concerned I think it would be wise to put it into the record. And the Secretary will, of course, refer to [1067] it, and perhaps read portions of it in answer to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I concur in the views expressed by Senator George and the request made by counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I concur in the statement made by the able Senator from Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I Concur in Senator George's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I have had the statement and I have read it. I have been deeply impressed. I feet that in deference to the Secretary, Mr. Hull, this carefully considered statement of his, which, as I understand, has been prepared under his direction and represents a very careful and well considered presentation of the events leading up to this affair, certainly it deserves the consideration which it would receive by being read.

It is quite true that the members of the committee have had the statement. I have read it two or three times. I am perfectly ready to go ahead, but I think the committee as well as everybody else can profit by having it read.

While perhaps it may seem that this is an extra judicial observation, and we are not primarily concerned with the audience [1068] immediately gathered here, we are speaking to an audience of 120 million Americans that are concerned, and I think we realize very well, under modern conditions, that if we proceed immediately with whatever examination is to follow, that that will immediately preempt the statement, to the exclusion of Mr. Hull's statement, and I therefore believe that Mr. Hull's statement, which I assume would take the better part of the morning to read, should be read here at this time.

It is so important that it certainly deserves that amount of consideration by this committee. We could permit Mr. Hull to return at 2 o'clock and then take up whatever questions may be directed to him. And perhaps have it read by Mr. Gesell, who is very competent, certainly, in this field.

I feel quite strongly that the public interest would be served by having it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have given a great deal of time and consideration to this statement. As far as I am concerned I am prepared to proceed without having it read. I concur in the statement of the gentleman from Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, while I have spent a considerable time upon the statement I was compelled to do so at intervals and not to read it all at one time. I think that [1069] it would be well for the committee to hear the entire statement, as a whole, read before the committee, but I have no desire whatever that the Secretary remain here during that reading. I feel that he should not unless he so desires.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I would not insist upon the Secretary himself reading the document, but, as it appears to me, Secretary Hull was one of the great actors in one of the greatest periods of our American history, and to take his carefully prepared statement and merely insert it in the record doesn't strike me as giving proper consideration to the statement of one who played so important a part in the development of the world situation."

I think it ought to be read in order that those of us who have already read his statement may have the essential points properly emphasized in our memory in this important day's proceeding. I would like to

have it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I agree with my colleague Mr. Gearhart.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair has not expressed his view but in order that there be no partisan division in the committee the Chair will vote with the minority that the document be read at this time, and if agreeable, Mr. Gesell, who is competent in such matters, will proceed to read it.

[1070]

Mr. Secretary, if you do not wish to remain here while the document is being read you may retire and come back at 2 o'clock; just as you wish.

Mr. HULL. Well, I would be disposed to retire unless my absence should be construed as a lack of interest by any of my friends who want it read.

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will assure the Secretary that, in view of his health, that his retirement while this document is being read, and about which no questions would be asked of the Secretary if he were sitting here while it was being read, his retirement at this time will not be interpreted as any lack of interest in the document on which he has spent, no doubt, weeks in preparation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman

Mr. HULL. Then I will be expected to be here at 2 o'clock?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think if it would simply appear that the Secretary has incorporated in the record that this is his considered statement, very carefully prepared, of the background of all these events, that it does represent his considered conclusions and contribution, so that we will not understand that it is an incidental or minor document, [1071] it would be well.

Mr. HULL. I think everyone understands that we took the unusual step immediately or soon after Pearl Harbor to publish, first in one volume and then in two, containing some 1,800 to 2,000 pages, virtually every conversation and its record that took place between the Japanese and myself and the President. When this hearing was projected I undertook to prepare a statement, with the cooperation of the experts who understood the nature and location of all relevant documents, undertook to prepare a statement, which is now before you.

So far as I have observed, I consider it accurate and I would not under any circumstances want anyone to have any doubt about my standing for that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is sufficient to identify it as a statement which you would yourself present in person except for the condition of your health.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask the unanimous consent then that Mr. Hull have the permission and consent of the committee to retire during the reading of the statement and to return for an appearance before the committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that consent is given by the committee.

Secretary Hull, you may sit here as long as you wish and
retire when you wish. We will expect you back at 2 o'clock.
Mr. HULL. I may return shortly or I may not.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Gesell.

[1072]

Mr. GESELL. I will commence the reading of this statement and if I find that my voice gets tired I would appreciate permission of the committee to ask one or two of the men from the State Department here to spell me a bit on the reading.

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable. The Chair will help you out if necessary.

Those who desire to retire will do so as rapidly and in as good order as possible.

The committee will come to order. You may proceed.

Mr. GESELL. I will not commence reading with the table of contents but start at page 2.

(The table of contents referred to follows:)

C. Divergence Between Japanese and American Policies_--
D. Situation in Europe--.

1084

1093

E. Situation in the United States--.

1095

F. Decision to Enter into Conversations with the Japanese_

1100

1103

1109

1116

1127

1136

II. Conversations and Developments Prior to July 1941__
III. Japan's Warlords Disclose Their Intention of Further Aggression.
IV. Japanese Proposal for Roosevelt-Konoe Meeting_-.
V. Tojo Cabinet and Continuations of Conversations___
VI. Japanese Ultimatum of November 20 and Our Reply.
VII. The Last Phase_.

1153

[1074] Annex A Record of the Secretary of State's Conference, Consultatons and Telephone Conversations (as entered in engagement books) with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941

Annex B Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Department with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, October, 1940December 7, 1941

Annex C Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941

Mr. GESELL. (reading):

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was preceded by months of conversations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan. The initiative in this matter came from Japan which, by the beginning of 1941, after nearly a decade of relentless pursuit of a policy of aggression and conquest, had apparently reached a stage in the development of that policy at which she felt the need for a showdown with the United States.

A comprehensive documentary history of these conversations, as well as of the whole course of our relations with Japan during the fateful decade from 1931 to 1941, which began and ended with acts of aggression committed by Japan, was prepared and published by the Department of State shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

It comprises well over 2,000 pages and is contained in the volume entitled Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, and much more fully in the two volumes entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941. It is, I believe, the most complete account of a diplomatic record every published so soon after the events to which it relates.

I commend these volumes to the attention of the committee. In the present statement I shall attempt to supplement this documentary history with such additional [1076] material as might be of interest to the committee and with a personal analysis and interpretation of the events which led up to the treacherous attack launched by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. While the story I am about to tell relates primarily to the year 1941, it is necessary also to deal, to some extent, with the developments of the preceding decades in order to lay bare the roots of the events which immediately anteceded the Pearl Harbor attack.

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. JAPAN'S RECORD OF AGGRESSION

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern [1077] state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandizement. For the most part, expect during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation. In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and main

tain for her

[1078] self an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo." By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. [1079] On April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion of China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937 Italy adhered. While the fact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations-the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis."

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread [1080] fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "The New Order in Greater East Asia" and "The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.