Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that it was being sent out to Hawaii in May of 1940 as an arm of the diplomatic negotiations? Mr. WELLES. I could not possibly say "Yes" to that question. I think the action taken, as I

Senator FERGUSON. It went out, I think, in March. It went out in March on maneuvers, but then there was a telegram sent that there was to be a release from Hawaii that it was going to be detained there for some time.

Mr. WELLES. May I finish my earlier answer, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I want you to finish it.

Mr. WELLES. My judgment was that it was done only as an integral part of over-all policy.

In answer to a question of Senator Brewster yesterday, I said that I thought that under conditions such as those which existed in the prewar years you could not divorce what was done in the military field from what was done in the diplomatic field, or vice versa-that it was a part of the whole policy. In other words, that the military was not being made subservient to the diplomatic nor the diplomatic subservient to the military; that the policy was being worked out along parallel roads.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

[1335] Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then do I understand that as part of the diplomatic negotiations and in cooperation with them it was decided by someone that the fleet would be transferred from the west coast to Hawaii?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that it was felt that in view of the situation which was existing the continued refusal on the part of the United States to take measures which it regarded as necessary for the protection of its legitimate interests would be regarded as a sign of weakness and of acquiescence by the Japanese military leaders in their policies.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was the opinion of someone in our own Department, in our State Department, someone in our Government, that we would strengthen our position in the diplomatic field if we had the fleet stationed at Hawaii rather than on the west coast?

Mr. WELLES. Those decisions with regard to the over-all policy covering both the diplomatic and the military and naval field were made, of course, by the President himself after consulting with the Secretary of State and his other advisers who were dealing with that question.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be the decision of the President of the United States?

[1336]

Mr. WELLES. It would have to be so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you understand, when you were talking about the fleet back in those days, that the fleet was to protect and defend Pearl Harbor, the Islands? Was that your understanding? Mr. WELLES. That the fleet was to defend Pearl Harbor? Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. My understanding was that it was part of a general strategy which was looked upon by the Navy Department for the protection of our interests throughout the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why the Army had its installations at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. In the same sense, as a means of protection of our-
Senator FERGUSON. Was it to protect the fleet?

Mr. WELLES. As a means of protection of our interests throughout the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12 having arrived, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1337]

AFTERNOON SESSION-2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Welles, you may resume the witness chair.
Senator Ferguson, you were inquiring.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Secretary, were you able to find any of the messages I spoke to you about this morning?

Mr. WELLES. I think, Senator Ferguson, I have the information which you requested.

Senator FERGUON. Will you read it, please?

Mr. WELLES. May I give you the information in full in my own way? Senator FERGUON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. You will remember that there has already been read the memorandum of my conversation of December 2 with the Japanese Ambassador and with Mr. Kurusu in which I communicated to them a message from the President. That is a part of the record, as I understand it.

I found in my personal file, after the conclusion of the hearing this morning, a copy of a letter which I sent on the same date to the British Ambassador. I sent it by messenger. May I read the text of that? Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

[1338] Mr. WELLES. December 2d.

Personal and strictly confidential.
My dear Ambassador-

Senator FERGUSON. It is 1941?

Mr. WELLES. December 2, 1941.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: In accordance with our telephone conversation I am enclosing herewith for your personal and confidential information copies of the two documents handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador November 26th last.

Mr. Hull asks that I request you to see that every possible precaution is taken to prevent any publicity.

I am likewise enclosing a copy of the document which I handed the Japanese Ambassador this morning and which, as you will recall, is a copy of a memorandum sent to me by the President.

Believe me, yours very sincerely.

My understanding is that the message from the President which I communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy to the British Ambassador on December 2 is the message referred to in the telegram which was read this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Are those messages in the white papers [1539] or in the Foreign Relations papers?

Mr. WELLES. The message from the President which I communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy on December 2 to Lord Halifax is published, as Document No. 262 in "Peace and War."

Senator FERGUSON. That is commonly known as the white papers? Mr. WELLES. I imagine so.

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Mr. WELLES. Page 262, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GESELL. I might say the letters appear in volume II which many of the committee members have been using, the Foreign Relations of the United States, at page 778.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the reasons I have asked you quite a number of questions, Mr. Welles, is that you had written a book, "The Time for Decision," and I noticed on the cover it had "Only a handful of men in the world have had access to the information on which this is based." Naturally I assumed that I had one of the men on the witness stand, or before me today, from whom I might get this information.

So I was trying to get as near the source as I could. I realize that it would be a great task for Mr. Hull to ask him the questions. So if you will just bear with me a little while I ask you questions[1340] Mr. WELLES. I am entirely at the disposal of the committee and yourself, Senator Ferguson.

If you will permit me to make an observation with regard to my own feeling of modesty, an author is not always responsible for the blurbs on the covers of his publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though he may benefit from that.

I notice that on page 288 of your book you say:

The wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its results. Any impartial estimate of our policy during these crucial years from 1936 to 1941 must, therefore, be appraised in that light. Our objectives, essentially, were those laid down for the Government by its chief military and naval advisers and in my own judgment our policy did delay the Japanese attack for at least a brief period.

Now, were you familiar with the note-call it a note-it is a memorandum-of November 5, of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, in relation to "no ultimatum." That was used in that note, as I remember it. I just use that to refresh your memory.

Mr. WELLES. I have not got the text of that before me, but I do recollect it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you show Mr. Welles that, Counsel ?

Mr. GESELL. Here is the memorandum on the top and the [1341] related documents. [Handing.]

Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed, Mr. Welles.

Mr. WELLES. I remember having seen this document, Senator. I couldn't at this moment say the precise date, however, upon which I first saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. We might assume that you saw it near its delivery?

Mr. WELLES. Approximately that time.

Senator FERGUSON. And that indicates it was delivered on November 5?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was another document delivered on the 27th, that either the Army or the Navy board refers to, one or the other?

Will you show him the one of the 27th?

Mr. GESSELL. This is Exhibit 17 in this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 17.

Do you know how it happens that that was delivered following the day of the note by Mr. Hull on the 26th, why it was not obtained before? Mr. WELLES. I could not answer that question. I am afraid that is a question that only Mr. Hull could answer.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any knowledge on that?

[1342] Mr. WELLES. I have no knowledge on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. I think I asked you this morning whether or not it wasn't true, to your knowledge, that we carried on the negotiations subsequent to the Atlantic Conference, the Atlantic Charter meeting, that we carried it on?

Mr. WELLES. That we

Senator FERGUSON. The United States Government.

Mr. WELLES. The United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. The United States Government rather than the other governments.

Mr. WELLES. Yes. That, of course, Senator, was a resumption of the negotiations which had been commenced in the preceding month of March by Mr. Hull. In other words, there is nothing new about it. It is the result of negotiations which had been interrupted.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see the instruments in exhibit 18, please. Mr. GESELL. I think you have that.

Senator FERGUSON. I may have it.

I have; if you will show Mr. Welles, the memorandum of November 24, 1941, I have a copy now. It is "Proposed Modus Vivendi for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."

Participants: Secretary of State Hull; the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax; the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih; the Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey; and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon.

If you will turn to page 3, I read:

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than in this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

[1344]

Are you familiar with that?

Mr. WELLES. I am familiar with the memorandum; yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. That is initialed by Mr. Hull.

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with that fact at that time? Mr. WELLES. I was not present at this conference, if that is what you have in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. No. How soon after this conference was had, did you become familiar with this memorandum or the information in the memorandum?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that Mr. Hull spoke with me after the conference which he had had, and that he also saw the copy of this memorandum shortly after it had been dictated.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall reading that?

Mr. WELLES. I recall reading it but my mind was more concentrated, perhaps, on the general conversation I had with him than on the precise phraseology of this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what was meant by:

I remarked that each of their governments were more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country and at the same time they expected this country

I assume he means the other governments

[1345]

in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

What is meant by that?

Mr. WELLES. I think it would be perhaps more desirable, Senator, for you to get Mr. Hull to explain the language which he himself dictated, because this represents his own thinking at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your understanding as to his meaning?

Mr. WELLES. My understanding is that what he had said here arose from the warning given to the Japanese Government by the President on August 17. If the Japanese Government undertook to continue its policy of conquest and expansion, the United States would be obliged, in its defense and safety, to take such steps as it considered necessary, and, obviously, those steps envisaged the possibility of military action. [1346] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, did you understand that the note of the parallel note that I referred to this morning of August 17 committed us to the action that he is now mentioning in this note and at the same time they expected this country in case of a Japanese outbreak to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area?

Mr. WELLES. What I interpreted that note as meaning was that it envisaged the possibility that if Japan continued a policy of conquest and expansion in conflict with the legitimate interests of the United States the steps that this Government would then have to take to preserve its own security might lead to some form of conflict with Japan. Senator FERGUSON. Now, so that there won't remain any misunderstanding about this in the record I will read the rest of the instrument. [Reading:]

And yet I said their governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his [1347] government and that it would support the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.