Mr. MURPHY. It is the one distributed yesterday.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches." It has just been introduced as exhibit 37.

Senator FERGUSON. The exhibit number is what?

Mr. GESELL. Thirty-seven.

The CHAIRMAN. The dispatch which you just read is on page 40. Mr. GESELL. Page 40.

The CHAIRMAN. And it goes over?

[2219]

Mr. GESELL. No.. There is another message on page 41 which I now wish to read, of the same date, December 3, to Admiral Kimmel and others:

Circular twenty-four forty-four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine, Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo, December 2 Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, British Admiralty London today re ports Embassy London has complied.

[2220] Mr. GESELL. There are other messages here concerning codes which I will not read at this time except for this message of December 6 to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that?

Mr. GESELL. On page 46, to Admiral Stark, from "COM Fourteen" in Hawaii, stating:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with that?

General MILES. I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. GESELL. Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General MILES. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General MILES. No, sir.

[2221] Mr. GESELL. What is the explanation of that?

General MILES. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. GESELL. It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes, as we have seen, was it not?

1

General MILES. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir. Mr. GESELL. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Any instruction to the Navy?

[2222]

Mr. GESELL. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them? General MILES. No, sir; that was not considered necessary.

Mr. GESELL. May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japs were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General MILES. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly through what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. GESELL. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not? General MILES. It was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You stated, I believe, a moment ago that the information concerning code burning was known in Hawaii. Was your reference to these messages that I have just read?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you have any information as to whether [2223] or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages?

General MILES. I had every reason at the time to expect that they would be transmitted to General Short or his staff.

Mr. GESELL. But do you have any specific information? ·

General MILES. But I have no specific information on that point. Obviously, if the Navy in Hawaii on the sixth knew that the Japanese consul there was burning his code, the Army must also have known it. Mr. GESELL. Now, I wish to introduce at this time a message that we present in view of Senator Ferguson's questions the other day,1 a message signed "Miles" to the Military Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941. This is to be designated Exhibit 38. The CHAIRMAN. It may be so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 38.") Mr. GESELL. The message reads as follows:

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD [2224] used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

Do you recall sending that message?

General MILES. I do, sir.

(Signed) MILES.

Mr. GESELL. Just as a matter of information, General Miles, was it a practice for the Military Attachés to use the same or different codes than the Ambassador and the diplomatic staff?

1 P. 775, supra.

General MILES. It was, sir. We had our own Army codes.

Mr. GESELL. So this related to the Army code system of communication between you and the Military Attaché at Tokyo?

General MILES. It did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that offered in evidence as an exhibit now?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. It is Exhibit 38, and has been so received, I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. And made a part of the transcript.
Mr. GESELL. Now, there is just one further question.
In exhibit 33, General Miles, there are two items-items

[2225]

29 and 30, being two memoranda sent by you under date of December 6 to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, in which you set forth estimates of Japanese air and ground forces and strength in Indochina.

Could you state to the committee, please, what were the circumstances which led to the preparation of these memoranda, if you recall it?

General MILES. I do not recall specifically what those circumstances were. I do recall that in general in connection with what was commonly felt would be the main line or certainly the first line of Japanese advance to the south, that the strength of the Japanese in Indochina was a particular factor of interest. There were also, of course, as we know now, telegrams from the Chinese Generalissimo with regard to the possibility of cutting the Burma Road. That occurred sometime previous to those estimates of December 6.

Mr. GESELL. Just one final question, General Miles.

Did you know in the period from November 26 on that the Navy had lost track of the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

General MILES. I knew it about that time, sir; it was brought out by your question this morning that a part of the Japanese Fleet was not identified as to location by Navy.

Mr. GESELL. Specifically, did you know that that part included a substantial portion of the Japanese carriers!

[2226]

General MILES. I do not believe that I did know exactly what that force was.

Mr. GESELL. I have no further questions, if the committee please. I simply would like to again point out that we have not included in General Miles' examination anything concerning the "wind" code messages or the events of the 6th and 7th as they relate to the fourteenth part and 1 o'clock messages, for the reason that those subjects are to be covered later on, and General Miles will return to the stand for that purpose, in accordance with the procedure we have outlined. The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the cross-examination of this witness begins?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Does counsel have here the testimony of General Miles on all previous occasions? Is it available for examination? He said he testtified five other times.

Mr. GESELL. I notice you said five, General Miles.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to see all five of them.

Mr. GESELL. I think on five occasions. Will you tell us what those five occasions were, General Miles, so that I can answer Congressman Murphy's question?

[2227] The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said this was the fifth. General MILES. I appeared before the Roberts Board; I appeared before the Grunert Board, the Army Pearl Harbor Board; I appeared and gave testimony before Brigadier General Clark, G-2, the month after my appearance before the Grunert Board; and I was again under oath as shown by my affidavit to Lieutenant Colonel Clausen.

Mr. GESELL. All of that material has been available to us.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. And it will be available during the course of this examination?

Mr. GESELL. Well, we have in some instances only one copy. In some instances we have seen the material.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make this request owing to the statement just made, that when counsel gets material that is available to the committee, if not for a member of the committee asking for it, that the committee members be individually advised as to the receipt of that material or of their having it so that we might inquire about it.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I am sorry. We will try to do that. I thought the committee understood that we had received all of the reports and transcripts of testimony of all of the various inquiries conducted by both the Army and the Navy, as [2228] well as the Roberts material.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you understand that the committee knew that Colonel Clark, or General Clark, had made an investigation?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I thought so.

Mr. KEEFE. I never heard of that one. It is news to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to make this observation: In many instances in which documents or testimony has been made available, or in some instances at least, it has not been available in sufficient copies to permit each member to have a separate copy of his own. In other cases it has been. And in cases where there is only one copy of available testimony it is more or less difficult for all members to examine it simultaneously and in instances of that sort those who get it first ought to seek to accommodate themselves to the desires of other members so that sooner or later all of them can see it. I do not know how many have seen this.

Mr. GESELL. Well, would this be helpful to the members of the committee: If, prior to the appearance of each witness, we handed to each member of the committee the record references in these various reports and documents where that particular witness has appeared on prior occasions? We will do that if the committee wishes it. The CHAIRMAN. It would help. The Chair might suggest [2229] that it obviously is impossible, as the Chair understands it, for each member of the committee to have simultaneously the complete record of the testimony given by all the witnesses in all the previous investigations that have been held. Is the Chair correct in that?

Mr. GESELL. We have only one copy of quite a bit of that material. The CHAIRMAN. And to make additional copies sufficient for all members would be quite a task and quite an expense, but if any member gets possession of one of these copies first, the Chair would suggest that as soon as possible that he make it available to other members in turn.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make.
Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, you may go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we get this material that we at least have it 48 hours beforehand or 24 hours, so that we may review it, rather than receive it at the time that a witness is on the stand or coming on. It is very difficult to prepare and we will cut down the period of time that it takes to question a witness if we have it sufficiently in advance.

Mr. GESELL. The Senator is quite right on that and we will try to make up a list for the members of the committee [2230] showing where each person testified and have it available as much ahead of time as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is obvious that in cases where only one copy is available that, naturally, counsel who under our arrangement have the first examination of a witness, would like to feel that they should have the right to examine it first in order to become familiar with it, but as soon as possible in such cases after they do so that it be passed around as rapidly as possible to the various members of the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have one request.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. It seems to me in view of the nature of the testimony we have received from General Miles that each member of the committee ought to be furnished before Monday morning or before Sunday if possible with a photostatic copy of all of his previous testimony. I think it is extremely important and I would like to go into it pretty thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is unable to say whether that is physically possible but every effort will be made to do that.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought that I was more or less familiar [2231] with all of the so-called Pearl Harbor investigations but reference has now been made to a General Clark investigation, which is entirely new to me. I never heard of it until General Miles mentioned it and I would like at this time to make some inquiry as to the nature and scope and character of that investigation. When was it held and under whose direction and for what purpose and where are the records, if available?

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Keefe, I think I can explain in this fashion. That was a technical investigation into a very detailed aspect of this situation and I have just explained

Mr. KEEFE. You mean with respect to the codes?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that sort of thing?

Mr. GESELL. And I have just explained the situation to the Senator from Michigan. I will be very glad to discuss it with you, Congress man Keefe, after we adjourn. That has been available to the staff and to the committee from the outset of the inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it has never received any particular notice so far as the committee is concerned, I think; at least I have never heard of it before. Is it because of the fact that it does contain restricted material relating to [2232] codes and code breaking and that

sort of thing?