Mr. GESELL. I believe that must be the reason, Congressman Keefe, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say he has heard in a general way of a report made by General Clark, who is a member of the General Staff, as he understands, but the Chairman of the committee has not seen the result or the testimony which General Clark took on the code situation, with which the Chairman understands he dealt exclusively. Mr. KEEFE. Well, I presume that will be made available to the

committee at a certain time.

Mr. GESELL. Oh, yes; Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I am sure this is not in the spirit of "I told you so," but I raised this question at the very first meeting of the committee in executive session.

It now appears that there have been eight exhaustive investigations, eight reports written and testimony given in support of those reports. I knew that, with the exception of the Clark investigation, when we had our first meeting and I made the request that the testimony be digested so that we [2233] would have it in such form that we could compare the testimony of witnesses given at different times and I was given the impression as a result of that first meeting that that was being done.

Then at the last meeting of this committee in executive session I learned to my astonishment that nothing had been done along that line. I then asked, after having gone out of my way to call one of the great law book publishing companies to see if they could furnish us an editorial staff, I made the suggestion that even at that late hour that we employ people to compare that testimony for us, classify it as to subject so we could compare the testimony given by individual witnesses at different times to the same points and at that time the committee referred it to a sub-committee.

So today we are now confronted with the situation where we have a tremendous mass of testimony, probably thousands upon thousands of pages, probably eighty or ninety or a hundred volumes according to figures that have been given to me offhand and now we are talking about bringing that testimony in and dropping it on the desks of the different members of this committee expecting us to analyze that testimony on the spot, testimony given by the same witness at different times and then intelligently cross-examine a witness sitting on the stand here in respect respect of what he may have said at ferent times.

dif

[2234]

If anyone has ever been vindicated in offering something which should have been acted upon in the first place, which has not been acted on at all, I certainly am in reviewing the situation which confronts the committee at this particular time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair simply wishes to observe that Congressman Gearhart did at one of our executive meetings suggest that the staff of the West Publishing Co. of Minneapolis, Minn., be brought down here to digest the previous testimony. The matter was discussed. No action was taken upon it. Whether wisely or unwisely may be a matter of opinion. It was not done. The Congressman did suggest that that be done.

Now, counsel, are you through with your main examination?
Mr. GESELL. Yes; Mr. Chairman.

General MILES. Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing that I am afraid I did not make myself wholly clear on?

The counsel asked me several questions in regard to the messages of November 3, I believe, or December 3, sent by Navy regarding the Japanese and the burning of their codes and pointed out also to me that on some other occasions the War Department had specifically asked that the Navy messages be transmitted to Army.

[2235] I think it only fair to state, therefore, why I believed and why I think everyone in my department believed that Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice versa.

I come down to three principal reasons. One is my intimate knowledge of the basis and policies governing the plans for the defense of Hawaii, in which it was always emphasized, so far as I can remember, the great importance of close liaison between Army and Navy. It was a tight little fortress which demanded primarily the close cooperation of the two services.

Second, my knowledge that General Marshall as Chief of Staff always emphasized the necessity of close cooperation and liaison with the Navy here in Washington and, I felt sure, to his senior officers in command of the major units of the Army that had any connection with Navy, as was particularly the case in Hawaii.

And, third, I received an official letter on the 17th of September, dated the 6th of September, from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, Colonel Fielder, stating, inter alia:

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete.

[2236] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the whole letter should go in. We should not have only the inter alia. General MILES. I will read the entire letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the whole letter or message go into the transcript at this point.

General MILES. This refers to summaries of intelligence which we were sending them.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

General MILES. The date? I will read the whole message. [Reading:]

Subject: Summaries of Information

6 SEPTEMBER 1941.

To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

[2237] 3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,

Lieut. Colonel Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

General MILES. That is the complete letter, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I would like to clear up some of the terminology used by the War Department with respect to matters about which you testified.

You have down there, I believe, "G" by itself and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 and maybe some other G's, but what is "G" by itself?

General MILES. "G" was an abbreviation that we adopted in the first World War from the French. To us it meant the General Staff Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the Chief of Staff? Would that also indicate the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. It was used both to describe an office or a department of the General Staff and loosely applied to the individual heading that department. There were five divisions of the General Staff, four G's and the War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. So that standing by itself "G" either means the General Staff or the Chief of Staff?

[2238]

General MILES. A General Staff division or the Chief of Staff, de

pending upon context.

The CHAIRMAN. What is G-1?
General MILES. Personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. And G-2?

General MILES. Intelligence.
The CHAIRMAN. Intelligence.

General MILES. G-3 was Operations and Training; G-4 Supply and War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And you designate that by the initials "W. P. D."? General MILES. "W. P. D."; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did the Chief of the Division of Intelligence, in Military Intelligence under the symbol G-2, have charge of all military intelligence in the War Department?

General MILES. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff. He was the man in charge of military intelligence of the General Staff.

I had better read it directly from the Army regulations. The Army regulations current at that time, No. 10-15, state in paragraph 9 [reading]:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GENERAL DUTIES

[2239] a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.

b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning

(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction

and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).

(2) The custody of the General Staff map and photograph collection.

(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.

(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.

(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.

(6) Codes and ciphers.

(7) Translations.

(8) Public relations, to include all forms of publicity.

(9) Censorship in time of war.

And added to it the acquisition of military topographical [2240] maps, as well as their reproduction and distribution, and the custody of the War Department map collection.

The CHAIRMAN. Did each of these divisions, G-1 and G-2, 3, and 4 and also the War Planning Division have at the top an officer who was a member of the General Staff and designated as Assistant Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir; or Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Acting Assistant.

Now, yesterday I think you testified that you had no control or supervision or what you call SIS, which I understood was Signal Intelligence Service?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it happen that there would be any lack of supervision by the member of the General Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of any particular phase of military intelligence such as SIS, Signal Intelligence Service, which is under the Signal Corps? Why would there be that hiatus between the control or supervision of the Chief of Military Intelligence of that branch, of that essential branch of military intelligence that came under the Signal Corps, which was very active and no doubt expected to be active in the obtaining of information?

[2241] General MILES. Senator, the theory on which the General Staff was established was that the divisions of the General Staff were not operating agencies. They were divisions of a staff serving the Chief of Staff whose principal duty was as military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States.

Now, the SIS was a technical branch which served Military Intelligence just as the Quartermaster Corps was a technical branch which served the Supply Division of the General Staff, if I may use that analogy.

Does that answer your question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in a way, but I would like to know to whom SIS was responsible and to whom it was expected under the regulations to make its reports?

General MILES. Directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. The CHAIRMAN. And they were under no obligation then to report to you as head of the Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. They formed no part of the Military Intelligence Division. They were part of a technical service, the Signal Corps of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. But that technical service was charged with the responsibility of obtaining information, was it not?

General MILES. No, sir, of transmitting. It was a communications service.

[2242]

The CHAIRMAN. So that it reported under that arrangement directly to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. No, sir; it reported directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom did he report?

General MILES. All heads of the different branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff. Those branches of the Army were divided in General Staff Divisions and the technical or service staff if you like to call them that.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no obligatory connection between the Military Intelligence of which you were the head and the Signal Service Corps except such as might be informal or voluntary?

General MILES. That is true, sir. I had no right or authority whatever to give any orders to the SIS or any other part of the Signal Corps or any other part of any other technical branch of the Army. It was, of course, expected that great cooperation would exist and if I want to General Maughborne, Chief Signal Officer, and said that I wanted something very badly he would and did get it for me if he possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there or not have been an advantage [2243] in a crisis such as that which we are discussing, an imminent conflict, if there had been a more direct connection between the Signal Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service of which you were the head?

General MILES. Well, Senator, that goes pretty deeply into the theory of the organization of the General Staff and the organization of the War Department which I do not feel competent to go into at this time. I can only say that it was set up that way with the approval of the Congress of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. In exhibit No. 2 entitled, "Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, etc.," which covers Hawaii and the Panama Canal, the Philippines, southern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, the west coast and then miscellaneous and under the respective headings of which we find many intercepted messages with respect to the movement of ships through the Panama Canal and also the movement of ships in Hawaii and in the Philippines and in the Southeast Atlantic, southeastern Asia, and the Netherlands, which is the Southeast Pacific region or Southwest Pacificwhich was it geographically, Southwest Pacific. It was southeast Asia, but it was geographically where?

General MILES. Southwest Pacific, yes, sir.

[2244] The CHAIRMAN. The Southwest Pacific? General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, southeast Asia, or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General MILES. If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were getting information from their representatives either in Panama, for instance, or through some South American country with respect to all movements of not only warships but commercial ships through the Panama Canal in both directions?

General MILES. I did not get the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I say they were receiving information as to the movement of ships, both naval and commercial, through the Panama

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